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General Information

Established in 1967 “to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects,” the World War Two Studies Association, whose original name was the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican.

The Newsletter

The WWTSA issues a semiannual newsletter, which is assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the Library of Congress. Back issues of the Newsletter are available from Kansas State University Institute for Military History and 20th Century Studies, 221 Eisenhower Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-1002.

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Annual Membership Dues

Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the WWTSA (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars. The Newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.
Annual Business Meeting Report

The annual business meeting of the World War Two Studies Association was called to order by Chairman Donald S. Detwiler at 11:50 a.m. on Saturday, April 6, 2002 in the Gallery Room of the Best Western Inn on the Park in Madison, Wisconsin.

The first order of business was the treasurer’s report from Mark Parillo, who reported that the dues payments continue to balance expenditures for newsletter printing and mailing and that the association thus remains solvent. Accordingly, it has not been necessary to draw upon the much appreciated donations to the association’s dedicated account presently located with the Kansas State University Foundation.

Then speaking as association secretary, Parillo announced that Robin Higham, now professor emeritus at Kansas State University, is retiring as association archivist. The archives, consisting primarily of back issues of the newsletter, have been moved to the newly established Institute for Military History and Twentieth Century Studies at Kansas State University, with the understanding of Institute Founding Director and KSU History Department chair Professor Jack Holl.

Detwiler moved that the association vote its acknowledgment and deep appreciation of Professor Robin Higham’s years of service as archivist. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

Parillo next reported on the KSU Institute for Military History and Twentieth Century Studies. The Institute was officially founded in October 2001 and involves cooperative programs with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, such as the KSU-CSC cooperative Ph.D. program, symposia, and a library consortium. The Institute is prepared to offer some support to the World War Two Studies Association, including the assumption of the support previously provided by the Department of History at KSU. Such support includes continuation of the “Friends of the World War Two Studies Association” account at the KSU Foundation, limited clerical assistance and operating overhead, travel funds to attend the WWTSA annual meeting for Institute faculty members serving as association officers, a Web site domain home, newsletter archives storage and management, and some dedicated time of the Institute’s technical graduate assistant for purposes of Web site construction and maintenance as well as other WWTSA tasks.

Next Detwiler reported on recent developments with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War. At its quinquennial meeting, together with the International Congress of Historical Sciences, in Oslo in August 2000, a new president and a new secretary general were elected, and it was agreed that proposals for revision of the ICHSWW’s statutes would be drawn up and circulated to the national affiliates so that they could be considered prior to the next plenary meeting, in 2005 in Sydney, Australia. Meanwhile, plans and programs of the ICHSWW were to continue to be coordinated, as in the past, through the standing Executive Committee, which includes, in addition to the president, secretary-general, and treasurer, the
American and Russian vice presidents (Detwiler and his Russian counterpart, Prof. Oleg A. Rzheshevsky), and a few others (e.g., representatives of the British and the Canadian committees). Unfortunately, Detwiler reported, since Oslo the three principal officers of the ICHSWW have failed to coordinate with the full Executive Committee the program for an ICHSWW conference in Hamburg on “The Home-Coming of Prisoners of War after 1945: Ideology, Family, Narrative,” in summer 2002, and the proposal for a round-table by the ICHSWW on “Norms of Legitimate Warfare in History” to be held in Sydney, Australia, in conjunction with the International Congress in 2005. Detwiler said that he and Prof. Rzheshevsky have both formally protested their exclusion from responsible participation, as members of the Executive Committee, in the planning of ICHSWW activities, but that their protests have been brushed aside. As things now stand, annual dues for membership in the ICHSWW are being withheld. However, Detwiler hopes that it may be possible to restore the collegial collaboration that was cultivated under the leadership of the founding chairman of the ICHSWW, Henri Michel, and reactivated during the chairmanship of David Dilks in the 1990s.


There was a call for suggested presentations for the 2004 AHA annual conference, to be held on 8-11 January 2004 at the Marriott Wardman Park and Omni Shoreham in Washington, D.C. During a brief discussion of possible sessions that ensued, Professor Mark Stoler pointed out that the AHA’s recently renewed interest in cultivating greater participation by military historians presents much more promising opportunities for getting WWTSA-sponsored sessions approved by the AHA program committee than has been the case for several years.

The association secretary concluded the new business with the announcement that the WWTSA Web site is being rehabilitated and moved to a new location. Changes will include the assembly of searchable cumulative bibliographic listings (both for books and journal articles) from the newsletter and construction of a “virtual archives” of the newsletter. The bibliographic project will be completed by 1 May 2002, and the “virtual archives” will be assembled back through the 1996 issues of the newsletter by 1 September 2002, with earlier numbers to be added later. The URL of the new Web site is:

WWTSA Web Site Update

The association secretary concluded the new business with the announcement that the WWTSA Web site is being rehabilitated and moved to a new location. Changes will include the assembly of searchable cumulative bibliographic listings (both for books and journal articles) from the newsletter and construction of a “virtual archives” of the newsletter. The bibliographic project will be completed by 1 May 2002, and the “virtual archives” will be assembled back through the 1996 issues of the newsletter by 1 September 2002, with earlier numbers to be added later. The URL of the new Web site is:

<http://www.ksu.edu/history/institute/wwtsa/>.

With no new business from the floor, the meeting adjourned at 12:40 p.m.
searchable cumulative bibliographic listings for books and journal articles from earlier newsletters and the construction of a "virtual archives" for the newsletter. The new site will be operational on 1 May 2002.
The German History of World War II (Volume VI)

A Review Essay

by

Donald S. Detwiler


With this volume, Oxford University Press has reached the midpoint in publication of the English translation of the projected ten-volume history of Germany and World War II from the German Defense Ministry's Research Institute for Military History. The first three volumes, reviewed in the fall 1996 issue of this newsletter, dealt with the background of the conflict and with its course through 1941, except for the campaign against the Soviet Union, which was covered up to the winter of 1941-42 by the fourth volume, reviewed in the fall 1999 issue. Those four volumes, carrying the account of the war to the time of the entry of the United States into the conflict, were followed by Volume V, Part 1, a structural study, in historical context, of the organization and mobilization of the German war economy through the winter of 1941-42. That volume was reviewed in the spring 2001 issue of this newsletter.2 Volume VI, reviewed here, resumes the narrative approach in the first four volumes, with consideration of one theater of war after another in its treatment of the war as a global conflict from December 1941 to the winter of 1942-43, the period during which the initiative passed from Germany and its Axis allies to the United Nations.3

In his *Introduction* (pp. 1-8), Wilhelm Deist, Historian-in-charge of the Research Institute for Military History (1988-1993), writes that "within the framework of the series as a whole the present volume acquires a special position mainly through the fact that the criteria of strategic assessment were fundamentally transformed by the development of the European war into a world war. This strategic perspective thus provides the bracket between the separate parts of the present volume; it is, moreover, needed as an introduction into the many-sided range of issues and as a link between the different areas of warfare."4

Part I: Policy and Strategy 1941-1943: From Continental-Atlantic to Global War (pp. 9-189) opens with an eighty-nine-page section on "The Anti-Hitler Coalition" by Horst Boog. In the first of its two chapters, "Developments up to the Entry into the War by the United States of America," Boog concisely reviews U.S. foreign policy before World War II, explaining Roosevelt's increasing concern about the threat to peace posed by "aggressor states, in particular Japan, Germany, and Italy, which in his eyes had violated international peace (in China and Ethiopia, and in the Spanish Civil War)."5 He recounts the steadily increasing U.S. support for
Britain following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the beginning of Anglo-American support for the Soviet Union after the German invasion of Russia, and the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition following the Japanese attacks and the German and Italian declarations of war on America in December 1941. The second chapter, "1942 and the Casablanca Conference" (pp. 61-109), deals with Anglo-American strategic planning that led to the landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) in November followed, in January 1943, by the Casablanca Conference, with Anglo-Soviet relations that led to the British-Soviet Agreement of 26 May 1942 and to Churchill's visit (with Averell Harriman) to Stalin in August 1942, to alleviate Soviet mistrust of Britain and America. However, "Stalin had the impression that the western powers were sparing the employment of their troops at the expense of the Soviet Union. . . . Suspecting peace feelers between the Germans and the Allies . . ., he tried to reach a secret agreement with Hitler in order to restore the pattern of power that had existed from 1939 to 1941. For him this would have been much more favourable, because the western Allies would then have had to bear the burden of the war on their own. From December 1942 he repeatedly extended peace feelers to Hitler on those lines, while, as Soviet successes grew at the front, the frontiers proposed were progressively moved to the west. The German eastern army, which, apart from individual and often heavy defeats, was still undefeated as a whole, was to withdraw from the Soviet Union and turn west against the British and Americans. Berlin did not react to these Soviet moves, while the western Allies, unacquainted with Hitler's stubborn refusal to entertain Stalin's proposals, actually feared a German-Russian separate peace."

The second section of Part I, "The Coalition of the Tripartite Pact States," begins with a chapter on "Hitler's Grand Strategy between Pearl Harbor and Stalingrad" (pp. 112-144) by Bernd Wegner that concisely draws on findings, insights, and conclusions developed in detail in the rest of the book, but particularly his 375-page monograph that concludes the volume, Part VI on the war against the Soviet Union, 1942-43 (pp. 841-1215). The following synopsis cannot do justice to Prof. Wegner's findings presented in his contribution to the opening part of the volume and underpinned by his detailed treatment in Part VI, but it may serve as an introduction to his carefully nuanced interpretation of Hitler's strategy, policy, and leadership style from December 1941 through March 1943. He begins with a consideration of Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, which he finds to have been "the first fateful example of a trend characterized by the diminution of political and strategic options. If we examine the genesis of this decision, taken by Hitler in person and without consulting his military advisors, it emerges unmistakably as an attempt to escape, by means of a flight forward, from a situation recognized as hopeless." His reaction to the U.S. occupation of Iceland in July 1941 and to Roosevelt's "shoot-on-sight" order of 11 September 1941 "clearly suggests," according to Wegner, "that he was anxious to keep the United States out of the war at least until the conclusion of Operation Barbarossa [against the Soviet Union], with its extreme strain on all German forces." However, "tensions between the United States and Germany had, as a result of open American support for the British and Russian war effort, an increasing number of clashes between American ships and German U-boats in the Atlantic, and Washington's spectacular revision of its Neutrality Act on 13 November 1941, reached such proportions that, from the German point of view, the step towards an official state of war seemed insignificant." This consideration, together with "the failure of the expected 'blitz' victory over the Soviet Union," led Hitler to the realization that a war on several fronts might no longer be avoidable, according to Wegner, who then poses the question...
whether, from Hitler's point of view, it "would . . . not be advisable to conduct it jointly with Japan, in order to draw at least some of the Anglo-American war potential away from the Euro-Atlantic theatre." Under the circumstances, Wegner continues, "it was entirely logical . . . that Tokyo's enquiries, cautious at first but increasingly urgent after 18 November, concerning Germany's attitude in the event of the outbreak of war between Japan and America met with a fundamentally positive response in Berlin." Consequently, on 11 December, four days after the Japanese attacks on U.S. and British holdings in Asia and the Pacific and Japan's declaration of war against the United Kingdom and the United States, Germany and Italy declared war on America as well and concluded "the hastily prepared so-called 'No-separate-peace agreement'" with Japan. "Hitler and Ribbentrop . . . could now feel secure in the knowledge that while it had not been possible to prevent America's intervention in the war--too soon for Germany's liking but scarcely avoidable in the circumstances--its effect had at least been blunted." A memorandum of 14 December 1941 on the significance of the entry into the war of the United States and Japan prepared by the Operations Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Wehrmachtführungsstab [OKW/WFSt]) "saw reason for optimism," Wegner writes, "predominantly based on four assumptions, none of which turned out to be correct a year later": first, that before America could fully mobilize, "Germany would reach its military objectives in the east, in the Mediterranean, and in the Atlantic"; second, "Germany would succeed . . . in securing the periphery by bringing . . . Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive . . . would . . . tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable time"; and fourth, "the United States would not be able to conduct an offensive two-ocean war in the foreseeable future." Meanwhile, the command crisis triggered by the Soviet counter-offensive on the Moscow front early in December 1941 had culminated in Hitler's personal assumption of command of the army on 19 December and to "structural changes in the top echelons [that] had broken up the unity of the Army High Command, deprived the Army General Staff of many of its functions, and narrowed down its authority to the operational direction of the war in the east (except for Finland). As a result, [General Franz] Halder, as chief of the Army General Staff, irrespective of his new immediate proximity to Hitler as commander-in-chief of the army, had largely lost his right (which he held under service regulations) of advising the Führer on all matters concerning the conduct of the war; these functions were now mainly performed by the Chiefs of the Wehrmacht High Command [Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel] and of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff [General Alfred Jodl]." The Naval War Staff welcomed the Japanese entry into the war and, "proceeding from the optimistic assumption of an imminent Japanese move into the Indian Ocean as far as Madagascar, . . . proposed the swiftest possible German-Italian thrust towards Suez--an objective for the sake of which all other operational objectives in the east, 'except for the Caucasus operation and the seizure of Murmansk,' should be set aside." Hitler did not explicitly reject these recommendations, but he did not implement them, for he "still believed in military victory [over the Soviet Union], while with Britain he hoped to conclude a political arrangement."
On the key issue of Hitler's military leadership, writes Wegner, "Hitler's perception of the overall war situation in the first half of 1942 revealed his typical combination of strategic instinct, surpassing that of many of his military advisers, and compulsive ideological wishful thinking. Its dogmas apparently provided him with a kind of filter for the flood of individual decision-relevant items of information, a flood no longer manageable by a single individual. Most of these pieces of information penetrated into his consciousness only if they conformed to his 'categorical imperative' of the essentially winnable nature of the war. Contrary information and experience only rarely had a lasting effect on Hitler's political and strategic picture of the situation; as a rule they were quickly reinterpreted into ideologically conforming arguments. . . ."17

Under these circumstances, Wegner continues, "the gulf between the reality of the war and its perception by the Führer was bound to widen to the extent that the war situation developed contrary to Hitler's hopes. From the second half of 1942 onwards this process of blindness to facts acquired a dimension which, more and more often, deprived any rational strategic (and operational) calculations of their basis. The consequence was an increasing number of objectively mistaken operational decisions, which, however, did not impair Hitler's monopoly on decision-making. If anything, the contrary was true. After the leadership crisis in September [1942, when Halder was replaced by General Kurt Zeitzler as Army Chief of Staff] Jodl lost his position as Hitler's first operational adviser for the overall conduct of the war. The Wehrmacht Operations Staff was squeezed out by Zeitzler . . . from its shared responsibility for the Russian theatre of war, with the result that, while operational responsibility for the individual frontal sectors may have become more clearly assigned, any unified overall planning of the war had become totally impossible. The prospects of an effective corrective to Hitler's strategic inspirations were thus slighter than ever."18

The consolidation of the eastern front in January, following the crisis triggered by Soviet counterattacks in December 1941, the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February, and Rommel's seizure of Tobruk in June, reinforced Hitler's conviction that the war could be won, and he attributed "the relative ease of the German advance" in the summer offensive on the southeastern front launched late in June 1942 to the exhaustion of the Red Army rather than evasive maneuvers to harbor its strength (in contrast to its tactics a year earlier, when large formations attempting to stand their ground were destroyed or taken prisoner). Grossly underestimating his adversary, Hitler "decided in the third week of July to split his offensive into two synchronous but geographically divided partial offensives, one towards the Volga [and Stalingrad] and the other toward the Caucasus [for its desperately needed oil]."19 The impending consequences of this "operationally wrong decision" led to "the most serious leadership crisis of the war until then, culminating in Halder's dismissal. Not only had the offensives at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus got bogged down, but the few oilfields then captured had been so thoroughly destroyed as to remain unproductive for a long time to come."20

Meanwhile, Rommel's decisive defeat at El Alamein and the successful Anglo-American landings in French Northwest Africa had transformed the situation in the Mediterranean theater, as reflected in a somber "internal assessment by the [German] navy at the beginning of 1943 [that] suggested that 'it should today be assumed that securing of the continental maritime fronts and continuation of the U-boat offensive are the prerequisites of a conclusion of the eastern
campaign, the objective of which should be limited to the seizure of the regions necessary to us and the establishment of a secure frontier. Now that the war has been started in Russia, and now that it has been shown that Russia cannot be defeated for the moment with the military forces available to us, but must gradually be forced to bleed itself white and to yield, there is a danger that, if we continue to concentrate all our offensive strength in the east without achieving our present final strategic objective, we shall weaken ourselves to such a degree that we are no longer able to repulse the offensive thrusts to be expected in the north, the west, and the south of the Continent." This assessment reflected the views and perspective of the head of the German Navy, Admiral Raeder, who was deeply concerned about "the strategic situation on the southern flank of the German sphere of power," but not the views of Hitler, who replaced him with Admiral Karl Dönitz, the head of the submarine forces, at the end of January 1943. 22

Wegner's consideration of Hitler's grand strategy in the section on "The Coalition of the Tripartite Pact States" is followed by Reinhard Stumpf's chapter entitled "From the Berlin-Rome Axis to the Military Agreement of the Tripartite Pact: The Sequence of Treaties from 1936 to 1942" (pp. 144-161) and by Werner Rahn's on "Japan and the War in Europe" (pp. 161-189), both of which underline how tenuous the ties were between the Axis powers and how limited their cooperation was. This was illustrated in spring 1942. "The German Naval War Staff ... as recently as 27 March [1942] ... had expressed to the Japanese navy representative in Berlin, Vice-Admiral Nomura [Noakuni], the 'lively hope' that the Japanese navy would start operations against Allied sea communications in the northern Indian Ocean as soon as possible and notify its intentions for the purpose of mutual harmonization of operational plans." As a matter of fact, the Japanese First Carrier Fleet under Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chuichi had already set out on 26 March from Staring Bay in the South Celebes for a two-week incursion into the Indian Ocean, in the course of which it bombed harbor installations at Colombo and Trincomalee, Ceylon, sank more than a score of merchant ships, and, in a series of engagements with elements of the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet under Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville, sank a British aircraft carrier, three cruisers, two destroyers, a corvette, and two tankers, but the Germans learned of this operation "only when the first reports came in of Japanese successes." 23

Part II: The War in the Pacific (pp. 191-298), by Werner Rahn, is a monograph to which the author's contribution on "Japan and the War in Europe," with which Part I concludes, may be read as a kind of preface. In his opening chapter, "Potential Sources of Conflict," Rahn briefly reviews "the factors and basic preconditions that ... influenced Japanese policy since the First World War." 24 His second chapter, "Japan's Road to War"--a concise overview of the first half (1937-1941) of the eight-year-long Second Sino-Japanese War that draws on the important study of Japan's German policy from the mid-1930s to the opening of the Pacific War by Gerhard Krebs, the coauthor, with Horst Boog and Detlef Vogel, of the recently published seventh volume in the Research Institute for Military History series on Germany in the Second World War 25--concludes:

"During the nineteenth century Japan had not only opened her doors to world trade in response to American pressure but, where her political, economic, and military development was concerned, had proved an assiduous 'pupil' of the western powers. The pupil was now threatening to cut loose and become a regional master and teacher disruptive and/or destructive of edifices founded
on traditional models. [General] Ishiwara Kanji foresaw this confrontation with the West and endeavoured to prepare his country accordingly, but he failed. In 1947, when testifying before representatives of the International Military Tribunal as a witness for the defence after Japan's defeat, he employed the master-pupil metaphor to teach the United States a lesson, as he saw it, in Japanese history and historical responsibility:

"Haven't you ever heard of Perry? Don't you know anything about your country's history? . . . Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation; it didn't want to have anything to do with other countries, and had its doors locked tightly. Then alone came Perry from your country in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned that "If you don't deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too." And when Japan did open its doors and tried dealing with other countries, it learned that all those countries were a fearfully aggressive lot. And so for its own defence it took your own country as a teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might say we became your disciples. Why don't you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal?" where he "expressly warned against a military solution of the Chinese problem, arguing that a policy of military pressure would inevitably lead to another war whose outcome and prospects of success were uncertain" (p. 211).

In his third chapter, "Pearl Harbor and the Expansion of the Japanese Sphere of Control," Rahn writes that "the armed forces and strategies of Japan's partners in the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy, played no part in her operational planning. Never apprised of the objectives, timetable, or forces involved, they were dependent on conjecture. Tokyo had absolutely no thought of exploiting the advantages of co-ordinated, coalition warfare. Its own strategic objectives were deliberately confined to China and South-East Asia, and it regarded the war in Europe merely as a welcome commitment laid upon the western powers."

The Japanese followed up their surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong and their landings in Malaya with the conquest of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. It took them, Rahn writes, "only ninety days to conquer all the territories they needed to keep them supplied with the raw materials essential to their war effort. . . . It soon became apparent that the enemy powers were unwilling to seek a quick peace settlement. . . . The Japanese navy chiefs advocated that the strategic initiative be retained by launching offensive thrusts that would deprive the Allies of any opportunity to counter-attack. The army, on the other hand, wanted to go on the defensive on the grounds that its strongest forces were tied down in China and Manchuria, and that sheer lack of manpower would render any further offensive difficult to mount. The two services could not agree on a joint strategy because the army declined to release the forces required for the navy's proposed offensives. The army gained acceptance for its guidelines relating to the future conduct of the war at a liaison conference on 13 March 1942. Although everything possible was to be done to keep the United States and Britain on the defensive, the focal points of the relevant offensive measures were left undefined. Prime consideration was given to the development and consolidation of existing conquests so as to enable Japan to withstand a lengthy war. Any extension of hostilities by invading India and Australia was deferred and made dependent on the future development of the military situation,
on political factors such as Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and China, and on the German-Soviet War.”

**Part III: The War at Sea in the Atlantic and in the Arctic Ocean**, pp. 299-466, also by Werner Rahn, opens with consideration of “The Atlantic in German and Allied Strategy,” in which he writes that at the outset of the war, “Hitler and the naval command were operating on different planes of strategic thinking. Hitler reckoned on a short war within Europe and did not wish to jeopardize a hoped-for rapprochement with Britain by waging radical economic warfare at sea; by contrast, the navy assumed at a very early stage that Germany was facing a long struggle against the British, which would be waged and must be won predominantly at sea even if the United States would thereby be drawn ‘with certainty’ into the war. In the following years, in his conferences at Führer headquarters and in his detailed memoranda and situation reports, Raeder repeatedly attempted ‘to convince Hitler of the Atlantic character of this war,’ and thus to influence overall German strategy.”

In his treatment of Allied strategy, Rahn carefully recounts the gradual escalation of American support for Britain before the formal entry of the United States into the war. Regarding the stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland in July 1941, he writes that "the occupation of Iceland must . . . be seen in the context of the German attack on the Soviet Union. In Washington it was generally assumed that the Red Army would collapse within two or three months and that this would be followed by a switch of the focus of the German war effort back to the west. The position of Britain would then be under extreme threat. In this situation the American leadership considered it essential to seize the unique opportunity offered by the engagement of German military potential in the east in order to extend their support for the British war effort.”

Meanwhile, in the face of the crises facing the German leadership on the Russian front and in the Mediterranean at the end of 1941, "only six U-boats were made available for an immediate offensive on the American coast" after Germany declared war on the United States. Altogether, as of 1 January 1942 the German navy had 249 U-boats in service, but "only 91 were actually in direct front-line operations, while the rest were either still in training or were getting their last refit in the dockyards. Of the front-line boats, . . . no fewer than 26 were in the Mediterranean, 6 off Gibraltar, and 4 in the Norwegian sector. Only 55 boats, in consequence, were available for the vital tonnage war in the Atlantic, and 33 of these were in their bases for essential maintenance. However, owing to the acute shortage of dockyard workers, this work was not being completed quickly . . . There were therefore only 22 boats at sea in the North Atlantic, approximately half in the actual area of operations and half on the transit to and from it.” On 11 January 1942 the first five large U-boats reached the east coast of America and sank fifteen ships with 97,242 GRT within two weeks; and in February a second group of five larger U-boats extended operations as far as the Caribbean and by 18 March sank 23 ships with 62,492 GRT, thereby increasing the successes of the Axis U-boats in the Atlantic alone from 295,776 GRT in January to 500,788 GRT in March 1942. By May 1942, U-boat operations off the North American east coast between Newfoundland and Florida were being conducted by no fewer than 18 boats, several of which were enabled substantially to extend their operations by weeks after having been refueled by submarine tankers. material readiness for action of the U-boat crews they served.
The medical care provided by the U-tankers was undoubtedly of great psychological significance for the U-boat crews. On 23 April the first tanker, \textit{U-459}, reached its area of operations some 500 nautical miles north-east of Bermuda; by 5 May it had supplied no fewer than 15 U-boats. From the middle of June 1942 there were always two or three tankers in remoter areas of the Mid-Atlantic, outside the range of Allied air cover." During the seven months from January through July 1942 "Axis submarines sank 757 merchant ships and auxiliary warships...--a total of 3,773,469 GRT. In so doing they lost 52 submarines, giving a ratio of losses to sinking of one boat per 72,567 GRT. High losses of tankers in particular (122 were sunk and another 39 damaged between January and May) led to supply problems in industry and even to petrol rationing in the east of the United States. Furthermore the shortage of tankers had also had an effect on the naval war in the Atlantic. Not least owing to the need to save fuel, the convoys had begun to travel on the shortest routes and were therefore easier for the U-boats to locate." These catastrophic losses led to the belated introduction of the convoy system not just on transatlantic sea lanes, but also for coastal traffic along the Atlantic seaboard.

Much of the Germans' success in the U-boat war in 1942 was due to their naval radio intelligence specialists' ability from February through mid-December of that year to read up to 80 percent of the "Naval Cypher No. 3" used not only by the British and Canadian navies, but also by the U.S. Navy for joint Atlantic operations.\footnote{Mittelstand} 

In late summer 1942, in view of "prospects of success for German operations in the Middle East and... German-Japanese co-operation..." four long-range submarines and a submarine tanker were dispatched to the South Atlantic to attack Allied shipping in South African waters bound for Egypt and India via the Cape of Good Hope. "Their operations," writes Rahn, "led to an incident which, more than most, illustrates the ambivalent dimensions and reality of war. In the evening of 12 September, some 250 nautical miles northeast of Ascension Island...[the German submarine] \textit{U-156}... sank the British troopship \textit{Laconia}... In addition to its crew, this vessel was carrying passengers, guards, and approximately 1,800 Italian prisoners of war-some 2,800 people in all. \textit{U-156} immediately began to take rescue action, radioed its position in clear with a request for support, and suggested to the Commander of U-boats [Admiral Karl Dönitz] that the area of the sinking should be declared a neutral zone. Dönitz was in a dilemma: from the military point of view it was necessary that the South African operation should proceed without interruption; from the humanitarian standpoint and in terms of Axis politics (the large number of Italians among the shipwrecked men), the rescue action ought to be supported. After consultation with the Naval War Staff, which immediately informed Hitler of the incident, a compromise was reached: Dönitz sent a further three boats (including one Italian), which were not earmarked for South Africa, to the position of \textit{U-156}. The Naval War Staff also asked the French naval command in Vichy to support the rescue action from West Africa. Hitler revealed his utter contempt for human life with the cynical comment that '\textit{U-156} should have dived'; he issued a strict order that no neutralization of the area should be agreed with the enemy, and that the chief concern must be the continuation of the operation.

"On 16 September \textit{U-156}--with four lifeboats in tow and 115 survivors on board--was attacked several times by an American B-24 bomber ('Liberator'), despite the fact that the U-boat was showing a clearly recognizable Red Cross flag and had attempted to make contact with the
bomber. The attack claimed the lives of many of the survivors. Dönitz ordered the damaged boat to break off the rescue operation immediately, but left the other three boats with the survivors as the arrival of French vessels was imminent. . . . After taking on supplies from the U-tanker between 22 and 26 September 600 nautical miles south of St. Helena, the boats reached the area of Cape Town at the beginning of October. ... Meanwhile, "though the British Admiralty had now become aware of the southward movement of the boats and had taken a number of defensive measures, such as rerouting, the boats were still able to sink 15 ships . . . within five days of starting their attacks," and a group of three particularly long-range U-boats advanced into the Indian Ocean along the African coast and, by the middle of December 1942, had sunk 25 ships, leading the Allies to switch to the convoy system, reducing the rate of sinkings accordingly.

Shortly after the Laconia incident, Dönitz ordered all U-boat commanders "to forgo any attempt to rescue the crews of ships they had sunk on the grounds that rescue contracited 'the elementary necessity of war for the destruction of enemy ships and their crews'. . . . Until the summer of 1942 the U-boats attempted on many occasions to assist the crews of the . . . ships they had sunk (giving provisions, course directions for lifeboats, etc.) so long as the tactical situation allowed. . . However, their conduct changed from October 1942. . . . The 'Laconia order' was having its effect. When U-177 sank the troopship Nova Scotia off South Africa on 28 November [1942] and discovered that it had over 1,000 people on board, including 765 Italian civilian prisoners, the boat took only 2 survivors on board and withdrew on the order of the Commander of U-boats ('Waging war has priority. No rescue attempts').

Improvements in the technology and operational effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine operations during the second half of 1942 led to a rise in German U-boat losses from a monthly average of three to four U-boats during the first half of the year to an average of eleven during the second half, but the Admiralty's attempts to evade submarines was severely hampered by the German U-boat command's change in the radio code machine at the beginning of February 1942. This deprived the Allies of the vital source of information (code-named Ultra) on German submarine operations that they had been able to exploit for much of the previous year, thanks to the codebreakers' having been able to decode the operational radio traffic between U-boat command and the German submarines at sea. But on 13 December 1942 the British succeeded in breaking the "Triton" cipher. "Thereafter, the entire radio traffic of the German U-boat command for Atlantic operations was once again read with only brief delay and used to re-route convoys."
had "an extensive and detailed investigation" conducted by the Chief of the Navy Intelligence Service, Vice Admiral Erhard Maertens, who on 10 February reported that "of some 180 situation reports, only 10 had been 'disquieting because they accorded with the actual situation' [and that] further investigation of these uncertain cases had shown that 'any suggestion of the reading or decrypting by the enemy was scarcely justifiable.'" Maertens concluded that "on the basis of German levels of knowledge of the techniques of decrypting alone, there was 'fundamental evidence . . . that the enemy is not reading, is not decrypting, is not even partially decrypting.'" Considering that Maertens took the position that "anything we Germans are unable to do, the enemy cannot do either," Rahn comments that "it was no surprise that the report confirmed the 'wartime dependability' of the cipher system."  

The convoy battles of late winter and spring 1943 culminated in the attack on convoy ONS 5 from 4 to 6 May 1943. The westbound convoy, originally with 42 ships and seven escort vessels, had been delayed due to a prolonged stormy period and some of the ships had been widely scattered, when it was confronted by a "U-boat concentration of 41 boats in an exceptionally favourable starting position for co-ordinated night attacks." In two days eleven ships were sunk, and, by the afternoon of 5 May, "it seemed likely that the convoy would be completely destroyed in a matter of hours," but heavy fog suddenly descended and "the situation changed dramatically in favour of the escort vessels, which generally knew from their radar the exact positions of the U-boats around the convoy. Within a few hours there were bitter duels between U-boats and escorts, in which 5 boats were sunk and another 17 more or less severely damaged; 4 boats were forced to break off the engagement. The convoy escort sustained no losses." Twelve ships in the convoy had been sunk, but the cost, in terms of submarines sunk and damaged, represented "a degree of attrition not acceptable for much longer." Altogether, in May 1943, "41 boats were lost . . ., 29 of them in the North Atlantic and 6 in the Bay of Biscay. On 24 May Dönitz had no choice but to call a halt to attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic, to abandon this area, and withdraw to the south to other areas of operations with less enemy air cover." In concluding his account of the U-boat war, Rahn writes that "there was no single decisive cause for the failure of the German U-boats in the spring of 1943, but rather a variety of interlocking factors and reasons which supplemented and reinforced each other. . . . Not until 1943 was U-boat construction accorded very high priority in armament production . . . In the decisive phases of the struggle in the North Atlantic between the spring of 1942 and April 1943, there were usually too few boats available. Furthermore, air support was inadequate and often completely lacking. This ensured that reconnaissance, which was essential for an attack on the convoys, had to be undertaken by the boats themselves, a task for which they were thoroughly ill-suited . . . ." While earlier postwar assessments of Allied countermeasures against German submarines "concentrated on the exploitation of radar and intensive air surveillance as . . . decisive . . ., subsequent research [after the revelation of Ultra in 1974] has shown that the decrypting of U-boat . . . signals was at least as significant. . . . This vital development--not considered by researchers until 1974--was not of itself decisive for the defeat of the German U-boats, but it was surely a major factor: the Ultra information not only made the U-boats themselves vulnerable to surprise attacks, but also had a major effect on entire convoy operations by ensuring that numerous convoys were rerouted and thereby avoided being located and attacked by U-boats."
Turning from submarine to surface forces, Rahn recounts the German naval operations early in 1941 against British shipping by the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper* and the two battle cruisers *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* in the North and Mid-Atlantic, by the heavy cruiser *Admiral Scheer* in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and by six auxiliary cruisers in the South Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, forcing the British Admiralty to concentrate its forces and escort each convoy with at least one capital ship to protect it against the dangerous German surface vessels.  

Rahn provides a detailed account of Operation *Rheinübung* ("Rhine Exercise"), the deployment of a naval battle group commanded by Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens with the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* and the powerful new battleship *Bismarck* that debarked from Gotenhafen (as the Polish port of Gdynia near Danzig had been renamed) on 18 May. Observed by British air reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast, the German battle group was pursued by elements of the Royal Navy's Home Fleet and on 24 May intercepted southeast of Iceland by the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the heavy cruiser *Hood*. In a brief engagement, the Germans scored hits on both. The *Prince of Wales* was damaged and forced to break away. The *Hood* went down in a magazine explosion survived by only three members of its crew of over 1400. But the *Bismarck* also sustained serious hits that reduced its speed as it made for the (German-controlled) dockyards at St. Nazaire on the French Atlantic coast for necessary repairs. The crippled German battleship temporarily eluded its pursuers from the north, but on the afternoon of 26 May was attacked by torpedo planes from the British aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, deployed as part of the Royal Navy's Force H based at Gibraltar, and suffered a torpedo hit to its rudder that rendered it unmaneuverable. "As a result, some 400 nautical miles west of Brest, it was delivered into the hands of its pursuers. The *Bismarck* sank on the morning of 27 May after a heavy artillery engagement with the battleships *King George V*... and *Rodney*... , and torpedo hits from the heavy cruiser *Dorsetshire.*"  

A few weeks after sinking the *Bismarck*, the British were able, using Ultra, to capture or destroy "a whole series of supply tankers, scout ships, and weather observation ships," as well as to locate and torpedo and seriously damage the heavy cruiser *Lützow* as she was preparing to break out into the Atlantic. "Further setbacks [to German naval operations] occurred because effective defence against British air raids could not be provided for the bases on the French Biscay coast, even though these offered a favourable starting-point for future operations in the Atlantic," notes Rahn, citing the heavy damage to the battle cruiser *Gneisenau* shortly after it sailed into Brest in April and to the *Scharnhorst*, when withdrawn further south to La Pallice in July. Meanwhile, in the latter half of 1941 the fuel shortage had emerged as so serious a constraint that Admiral Dönitz, Commander of U-boats, "made a suggestion which, though radical, was," Rahn writes, "appropriate in the circumstances—that the heavy [surface] units should no longer be included in plans for the war in the Atlantic. Though the Navy War Staff was not prepared to accept Dönitz's argument, it was forced to bow to the realities imposed by the catastrophic shortage of fuel oil. It was not only the demands of the army which were eating up the reserves; in addition, the appalling position of Italy required measures of support in order to prevent the Italian war effort in the Mediterranean from collapsing altogether. At the end of October 1941 the navy's supplies of fuel oil were only 380,000 tonnes, distributed across 62 bases. With imports from Romania for the next months failing to arrive, the navy was able to rely only on 50,000 tonnes per month from domestic production. Monthly consumption, on the other hand, was 90,000 tonnes. A single operation by surface vessels was estimated at 72,000 tonnes. In view of these bottlenecks and
foreseeable shortfalls, the Quartermaster's Department of the Naval War Staff considered that the planned Atlantic operation of surface units was no longer justified. Instead, measures should be taken which permit a reduced, but in the long-term secure, supply of the naval forces on a limited scale, in order to avoid being forced to accept a total paralysis of the war at sea with regard to surface forces as a result of a further decline in stocks. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that when, at the end of 1941, Admiral Raeder and his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Kurt Fricke, attempted to convince Hitler that the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and the battle cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst should be deployed for another operation in the Atlantic, he ordered instead that they "should immediately be stationed in Norway," insisting, moreover, that "the transfer should take place by means of a surprise move through the English Channel and without prior training of the kind demanded by the Naval War Staff in order to make the ships fully combat-ready... In his view the only chance to give the ships any useful operational opportunities in future lay in achieving a successful Channel breakthrough. If that proved impossible, the ships should be taken out of service and disarmed."

The preparations for the Channel breakthrough involved extensive minesweeping operations, assembling numerous escort vessels, and thorough air cover. British intelligence did not fail to record enough information about the German operation to anticipate a sailing through the Channel, but they "expected the German formation to pass the narrowest point between Dover and Calais by night," whereas the difficulties of navigation led the Germans to make the passage by daylight. On the evening of 11 February the formation, under Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax, left Brest and passed the narrows between Dover and Calais before the British initiated their planned countermeasures. Attacks by British ships and planes were fought off. The only significant damage suffered by the German heavy ships was from mines hit by the two battle cruisers; the Gneisenau hit two and the Scharnhorst one, necessitating subsequent repairs. Two weeks later, however, the Gneisenau was so severely damaged by an air raid in Kiel that it had to be towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia) for protracted repairs that were discontinued in 1943. The battle cruiser never returned to service.

After a concise overview of "The Trade War with Auxiliary Cruisers" (pp. 425-431) and a subchapter on "Mine Warfare and Coastal Operations" (pp. 431-441), Rahn concludes his monographic study on the war at sea with a chapter on "Operations on the Northern Flank of Europe" (pp. 442-466), where he recounts the circumstances leading to the destruction of Convoy PQ 17 in the summer of 1942. Three of its ships were sunk by the Luftwaffe on 4 July and another 21 ships were lost to air and U-boat attacks between 5 and 10 July. "Only 11 ships reached Archangel, and more than 65 per cent of the cargo was lost... 3,350 out of 4,246 vehicles, 430 out of 594 tanks, 210 out of 297 aircraft. The Germans sent into action a total of 202 Luftwaffe planes (Ju 88, He 111, He 115) as bombers or torpedo aircraft, and 11 U-boats... [and lost] 5 fighters and 2 reconnaissance aircraft..." Rahn also provides a detailed account of Operation Rainbow on 30-31 December 1942, in which the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Lützow and six destroyers unsuccessfully attacked an Allied convoy off the North Cape of Norway; the convoy escort lost one destroyer and one minesweeper and suffered damage to a second destroyer, but the freighters they were escorting reached their destination without any losses, and the Germans lost a destroyer and the Admiral Hipper was damaged. For Hitler, as Rahn explains it, that was the last straw; he had long had misgivings about the value and
effectiveness of the surface fleet. In the aftermath of this operation, which he regarded as a fiasco, he sent Raeder into retirement, promoted Dönitz, Commander of U-boats, to Grand Admiral, and made him commander-in-chief of the German Navy. "By choosing Dönitz," Rahn concludes, "Hitler decided for the 'other navy' which still promised to bring him vital success."56

Part IV: The Anglo-American Strategic Air War over Europe and German Air Defence, pp. 467-628, by Horst Boog, begins with a well-informed introductory account of "Doctrine and Preparation of the Strategic Bombing War in Great Britain and the United States of America up to the Beginning of the War,"57 followed by a somewhat more detailed review of "Air Defence in the German Air War Doctrine and the Build-up of German Air Defences in Peacetime," dealing with the background and build-up of German military aviation during the interwar period.58 Contrasting the development of air power in Britain and in Germany, Boog writes that "the German sense of superiority, which went hand in hand with offensive thinking, a deceptive consciousness of security, and ideological bias, was reflected in the assessment of the potential enemy in the air. Even in 1938 ... [the Germans] believed that the Luftwaffe was at that time superior to any other European air force. The British and the French acted 'democratically,' which was evidently regarded as a feeble way to behave. The British were said to avoid logical thinking, their organization at the top was 'almost impossible.' In fact," Boog stresses, "it was far better adapted to the needs of modern, high-tech air warfare: it included permanent civilian and military advisory and decision-making levels (committees) with the necessary constant flow of information from all relevant areas, permanent planning sections set apart from the daily operational routines, and operations research sections to calculate the economic viability of the conduct of the war. All these were lacking in the German high commands and senior staffs, where those with the relevant knowledge were kept apart, as encouraged by Hitler's basic Order No. 1 of 11 January 1940. The gulf between civilian and military in the militarized German society had also severely hindered such co-operation between the two."59

Regarding the beginnings of strategic bombing in World War II, Boog points out that until December 1939 the British Air Staff and Bomber Command leaders had assumed "that bombers flying in close formation could defend themselves with their concentrated armament and thus fulfil their missions ... [and that] a fighter escort was not needed ...," but that this "belief in the penetrative power of bomber formations by day was ... shattered by the heavy losses in the operations of Wellington bombers against shipping in the North Sea on 4 and 12 December 1939, and in particular on 18 December in the so-called air battle over the North Sea, where more than half the bombers were lost."60 According to Boog, "the three air battles of December 1939 over the North Sea are really among the most important actions of the entire war as regards bombing strategy, because they gave a completely new aspect to the war in the air. In the years that followed it was conducted primarily at night ..."61

In fall 1940, once the threat of a German invasion of Britain subsided, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command began preparations for the strategic bombing of Germany. "On 21 October 1941 Churchill ordered the establishment of training schools for the bombing of Germany 'under conditions in which admittedly no special accuracy would be obtained'," and a directive of 30 October 1940 from the Air Staff to Bomber Command defined as a chief goal of the strategic air offensive "the battle against the German will to resist." This was to take the form of attacks on
German towns that would begin with fire-raising operations, using as many incendiaries as possible, followed by waves of bombers using the fires as targets for their high-explosive bombs that would hinder fire-fighting efforts and spread the fires. "Although reference was still made to militarily relevant targets in the towns, these were practically speaking only the peg on which to hang what was later known as area bombing." An August 1941 appraisal of bombing operations against Germany during the foregoing two months "established by aerial photographs that of all the bomber crews who believed they had hit the required target, only an average of one-third had penetrated the five-mile zone surrounding it. In the French ports the figure was actually two-thirds, but in the Ruhr only one-tenth. . . . With a full moon two-fifths of the bombers reached the five-mile zone, on a dark night only one-fifteenth. . . . Most of the bombers had dropped their bomb loads in open country. . . ." These findings "hastened a development which had already begun and marked the final switch from the so-called precision attacks on selected targets to area bombing, or an indiscriminate air war. In view of the proven inaccuracy of target-finding, area bombardment seemed to be the one practical possibility for the effective use of bombers at night." Churchill had no illusions about winning the war by bombing alone, but he supported it as "the one instrument with which Hitler could be directly attacked. . . ."

The American approach to strategic bombing differed from the British. "To the Americans," Boog writes, "accurate bombing and operational economy were vital to strategic bombing. The philosophy of precision was rooted in the ideal of 'marksmanship' from the Wild West and in the morally motivated, publicly maintained revulsion at the killing of defenceless civilians . . . . The fact that the American bomber arm had originally been created for the defence of their own country against enemy shipping, which could be hit only by precision bombing (Mitchell) also played a role--an idea embodied in the dive-bombers of the American Naval Air Forces. The Americans were also encouraged by the development of the Norden bombsights to undertake precision bombing by day. The generally good visibility in the continental climate of the United States contributed to this." Boog concludes a detailed overview of U.S. preparation for the air war by observing that American "long-term planning . . . was more continuous and fundamental than in the Luftwaffe, whose General Staff did not even possess a special planning department."

Direct American participation in the bombing of Germany began only gradually in the course of 1942, in part because of the delay in the build-up of the Eighth Air Force in Britain caused by the diversion of resources to support the landings in North Africa. In late 1942 many missions were aborted due to mechanical defects and weather conditions; "from 21 October 1942 to January 1943, of a total of 1,053 bombers that had taken off, only 632 attacked." Boog's detailed treatment of German air defense (which was an organic part of the Luftwaffe, not the German Army) makes it clear that whatever deficiencies the Allied strategic bombing campaign may have had in terms of precision bombing of high-priority targets or the effectiveness of area bombing, the bombing offensive had a major impact on the course of the war simply by virtue of its diversion of resources from the fighting fronts. "Increasingly, the German air defence tied up fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and searchlights as well as the personnel concerned, and took up more and more industrial capacity, e.g. for the production of radar apparatus. All this was withdrawn from the other fronts and the labour force potential, and
to that extent provided indirect assistance to the Soviet Union as well. The anti-aircraft personnel in the Reich air defences rose, for instance, from 255,200 in 1940 to 344,400 in 1941 and 439,500 in 1942. By the end of 1942, "the Luftwaffe . . . by perceptibly stripping the eastern front, had concentrated nearly 70 per cent of its flying forces in the Mediterranean, the west, and the air defense of the Reich, whereas in June some 54 per cent of them had still been deployed in the east."70

Part V: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942-1943: Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean, by Reinhard Stumpf, is a sequel to Part V, "The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa," by Bernd Stegemann, in The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941, Vol. III of Germany and the Second World War, published by Oxford University Press in 1995 and reviewed in the Fall 1996 issue of this newsletter. Stumpf begins his first chapter, "The Opening of the Second German-Italian offensive in North Africa and the Battle of Malta," with an overview of the North African theater and the complex Axis command structure, noting that Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German Commander-in-Chief South, "was not Rommel's superior, and each man was dependent on the other's cooperation,"71 and then gives a concise account of Rommel's reconquest in January and early February 1942 of Cyrenaica (northeastern Libya), from which he had been forced to withdraw by a British offensive late in 1941. Stumpf concludes his first chapter with an account of "The Battle of Malta (December 1941 - 21 May 1942)," in which he explains the importance of the island fortress situated some sixty miles south of Sicily, describes the intense air offensive against the island in the first half of 1942, Allied efforts to resupply it (including sorties into the Mediterranean in April and again in May by the U.S. aircraft carrier Wasp to ferry a total of over 100 Spitfires within range of the island), and Axis plans to take the island. At a meeting with Mussolini at Klessheim near Salzburg on 30 April 1942, "Hitler promised 'generous German participation' in the [planned] Malta operation," but when General Kurt Student, who was to have commanded German forces that were to have participated in the attack on Malta informed him three weeks later "that 'utter confusion' reigned in respect of tactical concepts [of the Italians] and that 'in all, three to four plans' were under discussion," Hitler, in disgust, wrote off the operation and ordered Student not to return to Rome to continue planning and arrangements.72

The next three chapters in Part V treat Rommel's North African campaign through his victory at Tobruk followed by his defeat at El Alamein, the Allied landings in French Northwest Africa, and the German-Italian Armored Army's retreat from western Egypt to the Tunisian border, with extensive documentation as well as explanatory commentary in copious annotations.73 The brief fifth chapter is an account of the German occupation of the previously unoccupied two-fifths of France administered by the Vichy government and the scuttling of the French warships at the port of Toulon.74 The concluding chapter of Part V, "The War at Sea and the Supply Situation 1942-1943," deals with naval warfare in the Mediterranean, with particular consideration of British strategy and tactics, the significance of Gibraltar and Malta and the forces based at those key bastions, and the logistical problems faced by Rommel in his North African campaign.75 A "fundamental problem" that was never resolved, writes Stumpf, was that "because of insufficient cargo space and the Italian escort vessels' shortage of fuel, which even German deliveries failed to relieve, vast quantities of supplies destined for the [Italo-German] Panzerarmee [in Africa]
piled up in Italian ports and were never ferried across. It never proved possible in 1942 to effect a thoroughgoing increase in supplies and reinforce the Panzerarmee as Rommel had so often requested. The . . . Axis partners had drained their resources by 1942 . . . Prompted by political considerations, Hitler had always acknowledged the Italian claim to 'mare nostro' to be the bedrock of Mussolini's regime. The Mediterranean and its peripheral territories he regarded as Italian areas of expansion and theatres of war and it was only with reluctance that he intervened there—in the Balkans and North Africa—as a means of securing his southern flank and retaining the allegiance of his principal European ally. Hitler's own objectives lay in the east, but his Russian blitzkrieg had been transformed into a war of attrition by the onset of winter in 1941. By 1942, therefore, he was bereft of choice where the disposition of his military resources was concerned: they were all being consumed by the war in the east. 76

Part VI: The War against the Soviet Union, 1942-1943, by Bernd Wegner, the longest part of the volume, is, in effect, a continuation of the fourth volume of the Research Institute for Military History series on Germany and the Second World War, which was reviewed in the fall 1999 issue of this newsletter. 77 Prof. Wegner begins his magisterial, book-length account of the war on the eastern front from spring 1942 to the late winter battles early in 1943 with an assessment of the German eastern army's situation when Hitler issued War Directive 41 of 5 April 1942, providing for a major thrust in the southern sector of the eastern front with objectives of 'elimination of the Soviet armament centres and traffic junctions in the Stalingrad area, and, in particular, the seizure of the huge oilfields of Maykop, Groznyy, and Baku on the northern slope of the Caucasus.' 78 Less than twenty-five years earlier the invaluable resources of this region had led the German Supreme Army Command to dispatch some 19,000 men to Tbilisi (Tiflis) in 1918 "in order to safeguard . . . [them] against the threat of . . . British capture," and, Wegner adds, Ludendorff's assessment of Caucasian oil as militarily decisive "was certainly shared by Hitler in equal, and possibly even in greater, measure." 79

"After the war," Wegner writes, "the impression was created by Halder and persons close to him, and indeed by numerous historians under his influence, that Hitler's ideas, because of the disproportion between objective and forces available, had encountered resolute opposition from the Army General Staff, and even that the General Staff had developed an alternative concept in the form of a 'provisional strategic defensive'; however, there is nothing in the records to support that view. On the contrary: in spite of misgivings which he undoubtedly had, Halder demonstratively backed the Caucasus operation. To Captain Konrad Weygold, the navy's liaison officer at the Army High Command, he described it as 'an inescapable necessity', as that region had for the Reich 'about the same importance as the Province of Silesia has for Prussia'. 'Only through possession of that territory will the German war empire be viable in the long term.' 80

The condition of the German army, as preparations were made for the 1942 offensive, reflected the enormous losses that it had suffered since the invasion of Russia the previous summer. "The eastern army's overall losses of killed, wounded, and missing from the start of the operation to the end of March 1942 totalled more than 1.1 million men, or some 35 per cent of its average overall strength. Adding cases of sickness, of particular importance during the winter months, manpower losses since the beginning of November totalled 900,000--only partially offset by an intake of approximately 450,000 men, representing the 'virtually complete employment of the
Halder, in full agreement with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, estimated the diminution of infantry combat efficiency, due to the scale of losses . . . , at 50 percent of initial strength for Army Group South and at no less than 65 percent for the other two army groups. In terms of equipment, the situation was no better than in terms of personnel. The eastern army's mobility had been severely reduced by a serious shortage of vehicles. "Of over 74,000 command cars and trucks, motorcycles, and artillery tractors lost since the beginning of October [1941], only about a tenth had been replaced by the middle of March [1942]. . . . There was also a very severe fuel shortage, and "the consequences which [this] . . . and the loss of motor vehicles had on the mobility of the formations in the east were magnified by their loss of horses: of the approximately 180,000 animals lost over the winter months through enemy action, fodder shortage, cold, and poor accommodation, only 20,000, hardly more than a tenth, had been replaced by mid-March, in spite of the rapidly increasing need as units were being demotorized."

In short, the Germans' logistical situation on the eastern front in spring 1942 was grim. However, having ordered everything done that could be done to ameliorate it, Hitler saw no choice but to forge ahead, making the best of it. "Having . . . restricted the summer offensive to just one of three front sectors and conceded its phasing into partial operations, he believed that he had thereby made the utmost possible allowance for the eastern army's loss of strength . . . . Any further scaling down of the current year's objectives in the Volga and Caucasus region might have increased the chances of success of individual lesser operations, but would have deprived Germany of the strategic advantage of secure raw materials for a long time ahead--an advantage regarded as indispensable in view of the expected full-scale offensive of the western Allies. In other words, there were, from Hitler's viewpoint, certain objectives which simply had to be achieved at any cost in 1942, regardless of ratios of strength, unless the Reich wished to forfeit its capacity to survive the war in the long term."

The summer offensive, Operation Blue, launched on 28 June, soon made significant advances. Unlike the previous summer, however, when German advances often involved the encirclement (followed by subsequent destruction or capture) of Soviet forces, many of the advances in summer 1942 were the consequence of "the continuing large-scale withdrawal of the Soviet adversary; this lured the German side not only into a treacherous optimism but also into an equally large-scale pursuit." Initially Hitler's optimistic view that the Red Army was "on the point of collapse" was "officially shared by Wehrmacht and Army High Command circles," as Wegner phrases it, "but whereas a markedly more cautious assessment had been gaining ground in the Army General Staff since the German recapture of the initiative in May-June, Hitler's optimism had taken on a life of its own. While Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost [the Foreign Armies East Department of the Army's Intelligence Staff] . . . warned that, in contrast to 1941, the enemy might succeed in evading annihilation with a substantial portion of his forces,' Hitler . . . felt reassured in his impression 'that, compared to the previous year, Russian resistance has become much weaker.' Euphoric about victories at Kharkov in the Ukraine and in the Crimea, Hitler, in a new war directive (No. 45 of 23 July 1942), revised his initial order for Operation Blue and split Army Group South into two parts, ordering the one (Army Group A) to advance southward into the Caucasus and the other (Army Group B) to advance southeastward across the Don to the Volga and Stalingrad. What this amounted to, writes Wegner, was nothing less than the
synchronization . . . of what had originally been planned as . . . consecutive . . . phases of the summer campaign . . . ." Halder was deeply concerned that splitting Army Group South in this manner in order to pursue two goals simultaneously would lead to catastrophe. They would simply be too weak to accomplish separately missions that they would have a reasonable chance to achieve together, taking them on one after another, with undivided resources. The Army Chief of Staff therefore "earnestly, though unsuccessfully, pleaded that the offensive be initially concentrated on the general area of Stalingrad and that the advance to the Caucasus be postponed until it could be executed with a free rear and a secure flank. The funnel-shaped widening of the front towards the east was bound . . . to result in an overextension of the front lines and excessive demands on the armies of Germany's allies, which were now engaged in covering the Don position; such demands might be justifiable if the enemy did not attack. But this [he regarded as] . . . an unfounded hope in view of already perceptible Soviet troop concentrations both in the wider area of Stalingrad and in the southern Caucasus. With no support from Keitel and, at best, timid support from Jodl, Halder's dissenting ideas had no other effect than to renew, at the Führer's new Headquarters [at Vinnitsa in the Ukraine, to which it had been moved from Rastenburg in East Prussia on 16 July 1942], those wearying arguments which had been poisoning the atmosphere during the previous winter. Just as then, Hitler's raving fits, accompanied by 'the gravest reproaches against the General Staff'--now repeatedly recorded by Halder--signalled the beginning of a 'crisis among the generals', this time extending over months, and only settled by the elimination of some of the most notable representatives of the traditional military elite." Wegner cites Halder's diary entry on 23 July 1942, the date of Hitler's War Directive No. 45: "The chronic tendency to underrate the enemy capabilities . . . is gradually assuming grotesque proportions and develops into a positive danger. The situation is getting more and more intolerable. There is no room for any serious work. This 'leadership', so-called, is characterized by pathological reacting to the impressions of the moment and a total lack of understanding of the command machinery and its possibilities."89

As Army Group A under Field Marshal Wilhelm List advanced southward (raising the German flag on the peak of Mt. Elbrus, the highest mountain in the Caucasus, on 21 August 1942), air force and motorized infantry formations were withdrawn from it "to cover the yawning gap" between Army Groups A and B. Meanwhile, its advance was slowed by a serious shortage of fuel, and enemy resistance so markedly stiffened that List reported the critical need for reinforcements. The chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, General Alfred Jodl, flew to List's headquarters on 7 September to look at the situation and, on his return, gave a report to which Hitler reacted 'with an indescribable outburst of fury,' caused apparently not only by Jodl's rather sombre report, but also by his belief that the present crisis of the Caucasus offensive was by no means--as Hitler asserted--the result of persistent insubordination by the army group and its commander. By insisting that List had strictly followed the directives given to him, Jodl was implicitly criticizing Hitler's own conduct of operations. While such readiness on Jodl's part to contradict the Führer was in itself unusual (it was never in fact to be repeated in that form), Hitler's further reaction was even more so. After past outbursts of temper he would normally try to gloss over the effect of irritation by small conciliatory gestures. Now he was doing the opposite. He reduced contacts with his closest entourage to the absolute minimum necessary. The generals were henceforward denied the daily handshake and Hitler, for the time being, no longer joined his entourage at the luncheon and dinner table. Instead he withdrew to his windowless hut,
which he would now leave only after dusk. The two scheduled daily situation conferences (midday and evening) were now held there 'in an icy atmosphere'—instead of, as before, in the building of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. But that was not all. Hitler demanded to see all orders given to Army Group A since its crossing of the Don and later ordered a 'shorthand service', whose verbatim record of all situation conferences was to eliminate all future misunderstandings and malicious distortions. Meanwhile, on 9 September List was relieved as commander of Army Group A and on 24 September 1942 General Halder was replaced as Army Chief of Staff by General Kurt Zeitzler.

By that time, Army Group B's Sixth Army under General Friedrich Paulus, having reached the Volga, was fighting its way into Stalingrad, a major industrial city, rail terminal, and river port. Extending some thirty miles along the western bank of the Volga and fortified by four defensive belts with pillboxes and firing pits, the city was tenaciously defended. Because of the decision to take Stalingrad and thereby gain control of the Volga with weakened forces, the long flanks of the spearhead were only thinly covered by elements of two Romanian armies. On 19 November, when the Germans had succeeded in taking all but a tenth of the embattled city, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a crushing attack that quickly broke through the northern flank of the spearhead, followed on 20 November by an attack that broke through the southern flank, routing the hopelessly outnumbered Romanians. By 23 November the Soviet spearheads met and completed the encirclement. Paulus promptly requested "freedom of action," i.e., authorization to break out, "as otherwise the army would be 'heading for annihilation in a very short time'," but on 24 November was answered by "a 'Führer's decision'" ordering him to hold the existing Volga front "at all costs" and informing him that supply from the air was "being started up" and "a relief force in the strength of two armoured divisions was being built up."

On 20 November, Hitler appointed Field Marshal Erich von Manstein commander of a new "Army Group Don," comprised of the Fourth Armored Army under General Hermann Hoth, the Sixth Army under Paulus, and surviving elements of the Third and Fourth Romanian armies, with orders "to bring the enemy attacks to a standstill and recapture the positions previously occupied by us." Assessing Manstein's role in the Stalingrad crisis, Wegner writes, "No doubt the new commander of Army Group Don must have realized upon arrival in the southern sector that, given Hitler's recent order, any further insistence on a breakout would be pointless and would merely exacerbat[e] the conflict. If the option of a breakout (covered by valid orders) was to be saved at all, it may have seemed more sensible to dismiss it initially and to endorse Hitler's proposed solution [to hold on, with resupply by air, until a relief column could break through]. To the extent that this would later prove to be impracticable, the chances would then improve of obtaining Hitler's consent to a breakout as a 'last resort.'" However, Wegner continues, whatever Manstein may have had in mind with "his assessment of the situation, its psychological effect was devastating. Not only did it mean the collapse of what a day earlier was still a united front of the generals against Hitler, but it endowed his operational stubbornness with an appearance of professional soundness. Small wonder, therefore, that, supported in his plans by the most respected operational authority of the day, Hitler again displayed signs of confidence and became even more intolerant of dissenting opinions than before. This was experienced by Richthofen when he tried to change Hitler's mind, just as it was by Zeitzler when, at the evening situation conference of 24 November, he again broached the question of a breakout."
Turning to Manstein's relationship to Hitler and the broader question of his acquiescence in the dictator's authority, Wegner writes that "the perhaps unavoidable consequence of Hitler's decision-making monopoly was the diminution of a sense of responsibility among the military professionals. Ten years after the Nazi 'seizure of power' Hitler--this was again demonstrated after the events of 19 November--had become for many officers (and not only Nazi sympathizers) in high and top-level posts the ultimate law, not only hierarchically but also morally. The most striking example of this was provided by Field Marshal von Manstein (anything but a 'believer in the Führer') when, in reply to Paulus's letter of 26 November, he urged him with these words to hold out in the pocket in accordance with the Führer Order of 24 November: The Führer's order relieves you of all responsibility other than the most appropriate and resolute execution of the Führer's order. What happens when, in execution of the Führer's order, the army has fired off its last bullet--for that you are not responsible!"

By that time, in late November, the situation of Sixth Army was desperate. Even prior to the Soviet counterattack, it "...had virtually lived hand to mouth, and... a large part of its food stores was lost during encirclement... Rations were cut... on 26 November; no more than 350 grammes (from 1 December 300 grammes) of bread, 120 grammes of meat... and 30 grammes of fat were henceforward to be issued per man per day... Over four days, between 18 and 22 December, no less than 450 tonnes of foodstuffs were flown into the pocket. If this could have been maintained, it would have roughly met the amount needed to preserve the army's strength. However, this was just a flash in the pan achieved at the price of greatly reduced supplies of ammunition and fuel." Meanwhile, "the spearheads of LVII Armoured Corps became bogged down some 50 kilometres short of their objective, i.e. outside Sixth Army's potential radius of mobility," and "on 21 December... Sixth Army reported its first deaths from starvation."

Just over a month later, on 22 January 1943, Soviet infantry broke through Sixth Army's southwestern front. Paulus radioed to Army High Command: "Russians advancing eastwards on 6-km. front to both sides of Voronopovo, some with flying colours. No possibility left of sealing the gap... Food supplies finished. Over 12,000 uncared-for wounded in the pocket. What order shall I give to the troops which have no ammunition left and continue to be attacked by strong artillery, armour, and massed infantry? Soonest decision necessary, as disintegration beginning at some points. Confidence in leadership still there." That same day, Manstein, "convinced that the fate of Sixth Army was sealed," as Wegner puts it, in a telephone call to Hitler "proposed negotiations with the Red Army... provided it declared itself ready to observe the Geneva Convention; alternately, there could be a German proposal to undertake to feed the Sixth Army by air for a further fourteen days after its capitulation. Hitler, however, did not even enter into such arguments but brought the conversation to an end by declaring briefly and brusquely: 'A capitulation of Sixth Army is not possible, if only from the standpoint of honour, and besides the Russians do not keep to what they promise."

In the end, Paulus, promoted to field marshal on 30 January 1942, was taken prisoner by the Russians the next day, and, after holding out two days longer, the remainder of the German forces in a separate pocket gave up on 2 February.

Among Hitler's "mistakes and omissions" that contributed to the German defeat on the Volga, Wegner considers three to have been particularly important: "First, his insistence on the capture
of the city of Stalingrad—unnecessary from the operational viewpoint—even though it was clear that this would tie down the bulk of the battle-weary German formations of Army Group B, while the flanks of the Sixth Army were covered only by weak forces, chiefly those of Germany's allies. Second, the helpless manner in which he reacted to the Soviet counter-offensive of 19-20 November had grave consequences. Realizing the bankruptcy of his strategy for 1942, he escaped into a 'hold-on' mentality. Instead of immediately detaching Sixth Army from Stalingrad and gaining freedom of movement by attacking one of the two enemy prongs, Hitler, evidently overtaxed in his operational ability, displayed a remarkable passivity and uncertainty in his decision-making. This did not change even after the encirclement of the German-Romanian formations at Stalingrad was complete, and thus led to a third fundamental mistake—his veto on a breakout by Sixth Army, accompanied by half-hearted relief preparations. . . .

Wegner concludes his study of this turning point in the war by observing that "even if, as Zeitzler assumed after the war, 'history [had] already passed its crushing judgement' on Hitler as a military leader, the historian interesting in exploring causes and examining scopes for action will have to draw attention to a number of factors hitherto largely neglected in the available literature on Stalingrad:

"1. The roots of the Stalingrad catastrophe go back a long way, to the planning phase of Operation Blue. That the Red Army would do its utmost to oppose a closure of the Volga and a seizure of the oilfields by seeking a decisive battle was surely one of the basic assumptions of the summer offensive of 1942. Yet despite some doubts in the Army High Command, and partly even in the Wehrmacht High Command, no one had seriously considered that the Red Army might actually win such a battle. . . .

"2. Even before the beginning of the Soviet Uranus operation on 19-20 November, the German position on the Volga had become untenable largely for logistical reasons. The food, ammunition, and fuel situation of Sixth Army, in particular its totally inadequate winter stocks, would have made it impossible for the troops to survive the winter in their exposed position. . . .

"3. There probably never was a prospect of permanently restoring the status quo ante once the two Romanian armies had been routed and the Sixth Army encircled. Even so, a breakout by the army in the first days after the closing of the ring might have been a realistic option, albeit a dangerous one in view of the weakness of the fronts of the pocket. That it was not taken was primarily an omission on Hitler's part, even though his refusal received significant support from Manstein's situation report on 24 November. . . .

"4. As for Manstein's (and Zeitzler's) wrangling for Hitler's authorization of a breakthrough operation to be initiated by Sixth Army itself (this continued from the end of November until shortly before Christmas), Hitler's stubbornness should not blind one to the fact that the army's operational and logistical situation in fact no longer permitted such an operation. . . .

"5. It is often argued that the sacrifice of Sixth Army had by no means been futile, but that it had averted the encirclement of Army Groups Don and A and hence helped to avoid an even greater disaster. In principle, this argument is correct . . ., though it looks at only one side of the coin. Its
reverse ... is that Hitler's order for the withdrawal of Army Group A from the Caucasus (on 28 December 1942) actually came too late. Had it been issued a month earlier, the sufferings of Sixth Army might have been substantially shortened, and realistic conditions might possibly have been created for the rescue of the army itself."  

Wegner completes his operational history of the German-Soviet war from the spring of 1942 to late winter 1943 with a concise overview of developments of the central and northern sectors of the eastern front during the period under consideration and with a more detailed account of Manstein's skillful withdrawal of German forces from the Caucasus (where they might well have been cut off, precipitating another catastrophe comparable to Stalingrad), followed by a German counter-offensive in March 1943, in which he succeeded in retaking Kharkov in the Ukraine and more or less restoring the front line in the southern sector of the eastern front to the shape it had before the beginning of the battles the previous summer. Although the front line resembled that of a year earlier, Wegner points out, "the situation, by comparison with the end of the previous winter, had changed dramatically, indeed to the point of hopelessness. Hitler and the military leaders of Germany were facing the wreck of their strategic and operational concept drawn up exactly a year previously: five of their armies were routed, and not one of their operational or strategic objectives had been accomplished. The seizure of the Caucasian oil--in the German view of decisive importance for the outcome of the war--had misfired; important regions of the Donets basin, as well as the Volga as a central transport artery, were again, or still, in Soviet hands. At the same time, German warfare had clearly arrived at the end of that time-slot within which there would have been a prospect of bringing the war for hegemony in Europe to a victorious conclusion by concentrating upon a single land front."  

In "The Historical Topos of the Second Campaign against the Soviet Union," the concluding chapter of Wegner's monographic study, he stresses how different Operation Blue was from Operation Barbarossa a year earlier. The earlier campaign had been been conceived as a Blitzkrieg, intended to destroy the Soviet Union in an operation expected to take a few months. After its failure at the gates of Moscow, Hitler launched his second Russian campaign, Operation Blue, the following summer not in the hope of a swift victory, but in an effort to secure the indispensable oil resources of the Caucasus region, without which Germany would be gravely handicapped in a contest that had become global in scope and indeterminate in length, due to the full engagement of the United States as an adversary and as a supplier of military aid to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain. With Germany's crushing defeat at Stalingrad and retreat from the Caucasus, there was no longer any prospect of acquiring in the east the raw-material resources necessary to supply the Wehrmacht and to enable the Greater German Reich to hold its own against its adversaries. "After Stalingrad," Wegner concludes, "there was no realistic hope left of a victory in the east. Realization of this fact might have occasioned a turn in German war policy too. That it failed to do so, and instead became the starting-point for a further radicalization of the German war effort, was perhaps the most remarkable result of the battle on the Volga."  

The Conclusion (pp. 1217-1230) to the volume as a whole reviews, from early 1942 through late winter 1943, the interrelationships and consequences of the eastern campaign, the war in the Mediterranean theater, the war at sea, and the air war over Europe, as well as the global
dimensions of the war in Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific, together with the global strategy and diplomacy of the Axis powers and of the United Nations. The four authors of the volume, who jointly signed the well-crafted, illuminating essay concluding their very successful collaborative work, write that "while the western powers had, from the outset, been anxious to coordinate the utilization of their potentials for a combined war plan on the basis of a frank exchange of information, the Axis powers were far from achieving a similar trusting co-operation at top level." Among the Axis powers no such collaboration was developed.

"In Germany," the authors continue, "the supreme leadership was increasingly moving in a fantasy world, in which any reference to the actual situation was perceived as a depressing and disturbing factor, as it revealed the hopelessness of the war. To have yielded to strategic wishful thinking despite the shattering lessons of the war, and, in contrast to 1918, not infrequently against their own better knowledge, represents perhaps the most serious failure, during those critical months, on the part of the top military leadership...

"That failure," they conclude, "was certainly not the accidental result of specific structural aspects of the 'Führer state'. Hitler's progressive military 'seizure of power' and the resulting dismantling of the Reich's top military authorities with the accompanying gradual incapacitation of their leading representatives resulted in a considerable fragmentation and departmentalization of areas of competence, which in turn increasingly channelled overall strategic responsibility towards the person of the Führer. Regardless of the measure of his personal competence, whose patent shortcomings naturally emerged with particular effect in just these circumstances, such a system of command, one-sidedly tailored to a single individual, was totally inappropriate to the complexity of the war, which had vastly increased since 1939. Moreover, corrupted by numerous earlier successes, it showed little capacity for learning. In contrast to Stalin's structurally comparable regime, that of National Socialism did not react to the major reverses of 1941 and 1942-43 by delegating command functions, thereby relieving its decision-making top, but on the contrary by concentrating further command functions on Hitler's person. The resulting permanent overtaxing of the dictator, as the crises of 1942 revealed, thus frequently paralysed the regime's decision-making centre at the crucial moment. Along with ideological megalomania, lack of potential and resources, overextended front lines, and the weaknesses of the system of alliances, it was ultimately this evidently irremediable functional handicap which robbed the German leadership of any chance of seeing the war through to a victorious end or at least concluding a political compromise."

The Bibliography, pp. 1231-1291, lists unpublished archival sources, indicating their location in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (pp. 1231-1243), service publications and regulations (1243-44), and printed sources (pp. 1244-1291).

The Index of Persons, pp. 1293-1301, does not list Hitler.

The front matter includes:

List of Illustrations, pp. xvii-xxii, including 23 diagrams, 34 tables, and 75 black-and-white maps (including the maps on the front and back endpapers).
Notes on the Authors, pp. xxiii-xxiv, listing their publications.

Note on the Translation, p. xxv, stating that, whenever possible, English translations of German and other foreign-language works have been used for quotations occurring in the text.

Abbreviations (including acronyms), pp. xxvi-xlv, with German terms written out, followed by English translations.

Glossary of Foreign Terms, p. xlvi.

Notwithstanding a price that reflects the costs of translation and production without the kind of subvention that has facilitated dissemination of the relatively affordable German edition, Oxford University Press is to be congratulated on having produced this invaluable volume, which, like the earlier instalments in this distinguished series, will be indispensable to scholars, students, and general readers alike. It belongs in academic and public libraries serving readers to whom the original edition is not accessible.

Notes

1. The original German edition was published as Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 6, Der globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiativen 1941-1943, by Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, and Bernd Wegner (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), xix & 1184 pp., with a list price of €49.80 (equivalent to $43.35 on 4 March 2002).

2. The original edition of the fifth volume was published in two tomes totaling 2175 pages. The first part, published in German in 1988, appeared in English translation in 2001 and, as noted above, was reviewed in this newsletter the same year. No publication date has been announced for the English translation of the second part of the volume, which appeared in German in 1999 as Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5, Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs, Zweiter Halbband, Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1942-1944/45 ["The German Reich and the Second World War," vol. 5, "Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power," part 2, "Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1942-1944/45"] by Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hans Umbreit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999).

3. In his preface to vol. 6, the Director of the Research Institute for Military History writes that vols. 7 and 8 will present military operations to the beginning of 1945; vol. 9 will deal with developments in state and society, administration and Wehrmacht, and that vol. 10 "will present a chronological and systematic account of the agony and collapse of the German Reich, draw a balance sheet of the Second World War, and reveal perspectives pointing beyond the end of hostilities" (p. vi).
Meanwhile, the seventh volume has been published as *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, Band 7, *Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive--Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943-1944/45* ["The German Reich and the Second World War," vol. 7, "The German Reich on the Defensive--Strategic Air War in Europe, War in the West and in East Asia 1943-1944/45"] by Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001 [xv & 831 pp., €49.80, ISBN 3-421-05507-6]).


7. Ibid., p. 113. In footnote 9 on this page, Wegner refers his readers to "different approaches" by several others, including Gordon A. Craig, "Roosevelt and Hitler: The Problem of Perception," in *Deutsche Frage und europäisches Gleichgewicht: Festschrift für Andreas Hillgruber zum 60. Geburtstag* ["German Question and European Balance of Power: Festschrift for Andreas Hillgruber on His 60th Birthday"], ed. by Klaus Hildebrand and Reiner Pommerin (Cologne and Vienna, 1985, pp. 169-194) and Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Germany's Declaration of War on the United States: A New Look," in *Germany and America: Essays on Problems of International Relations and Immigration*, ed. by Hans L. Trefoisse (New York, 1980), pp. 54-70. Readers should bear in mind that here, as elsewhere in this heavily annotated volume printed in 2001, the scholarship of the past dozen years is not taken in account, insofar as the original German edition went into production at least a year before its publication in 1990.

8. Ibid., p. 114.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 115.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., pp. 115-16.

13. Ibid., pp. 120-21.

15. Ibid., p. 124.

16. Ibid., p. 127.

17. Ibid., p. 131.

18. Ibid. As noted below, the leadership crisis in September 1942 (in connection with the German offensive that led to Stalingrad and into the Caucasus region) is dealt with in considerable detail (also by Bernd Wegner) in Part VI (pp. 841-1215) of the volume under consideration.

19. Ibid., p. 133.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 139, citing a Naval War Staff estimate of the overall strategic situation on 12 Jan. 1943.

22. Wegner deals with the conflict between Raeder as champion of surface vessels and Dönitz as protagonist of submarine warfare in conjunction with his consideration of Hitler's strategy on pp. 139-142. The circumstances of Raeder's resignation (and retirement from active duty) in the aftermath of Operation Rainbow, an unsuccessful attack at the end of December on a British convoy off the North Cape of Norway by German surface vessels (in which a destroyer was lost and the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper* was damaged), are spelled out in detail by Werner Rahn on pp. 458-466 of Part III of the volume under consideration, which amounts to a self-contained monograph on *The War at Sea in the Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean* (pp. 299-466). See also the detailed account in Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, *Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945: The Naval History of World War Two*, 2nd ed. [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992], p. 184.

23. Ibid., pp. 180-81 and 268; see also Rohwer and Hümmelchen, op. cit., pp. 131-32.


26. Loc. cit., pp. 241-42. Ishiwara had studied in Germany, 1923-25, lectured on military history at the Japanese War Academy from 1925 until transferred to the Kwantung Army in 1928 (p. 201), and in 1935 taken over the operations section of the General Staff of the Japanese Army (p. 207),

27. Ibid., p. 257.
28. Ibid., p. 267.
29. Ibid., pp. 301-302.
30. Ibid., p. 312.
31. Ibid., p. 324.
32. The severe manpower shortage that Germany suffered by 1941 is dealt with extensively in the first part of volume 5 of the Research Institute for Military History series on Germany in World War II, reviewed in the spring 2001 issue of this newsletter.
34. Ibid., pp. 371-72.
35. Ibid., p. 373. "The U-tankers . . . had, besides their normal load of 203 tonnes, an additional capacity of 439 tonnes of diesel fuel and about 50 tonnes of other supplies. Furthermore, the tankers had small reserves of manpower as well as limited repair facilities, thus helping to extend the
36. Ibid., p. 378.
37. Ibid., pp. 383-84, where Rahn notes that the U.S. Navy for its own operations employed "a much more secure machine cipher system."
38. Ibid., pp. 386-87, including footnote 134 on p. 387, where Rahn states that "a total of 1,120 people were saved, including around 400 Italians" and refers readers, for "background to the bombing raid of 16 Sept. 1942, which was undertaken on specific orders," to Maurer and Paszek, "Die U.S. Army Air Force und der 'Laconia-Fall'," *Marine-Rundschau* 61 (1964), pp. 185-200.
40. Ibid., pp. 388-89. At the postwar International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Dönitz was charged with "breaches of the international law of submarine warfare," but not found guilty, in the words of the judgment, "in view of all the facts proved, and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answer to interrogations by Admiral Nimitz that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried out in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that nation entered the war" (cited in *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir* [New York: Knopf, 1992; repr., Boston: Little Brown, 1993], pp. 592-93, by Telford Taylor, who, as a participant in the proceedings, considered the charges against Dönitz flimsy and noted that his ten-year sentence was the shortest of those received by defendants who were convicted [ibid., p. 599; see also pp. 566-68]).
41. Loc. cit., p. 391. The cipher was solved using code-books retrieved from *U-559* when it was depth-charged and forced to the surface in the eastern Mediterranean, as related in detail, in
42. Loc. cit., p. 392. The British were extremely careful, in operational radio traffic with convoys, to avoid any reference whatsoever to intercepted and deciphered German messages, in order not to reveal that the code had been broken.

43. Ibid., pp. 392-93.

44. Ibid., pp. 400-401.

45. Ibid., p. 402.

46. Ibid., pp. 404-405. For reconnaissance, some very large Japanese long-range submarines were equipped with catapults to launch and equipment to retrieve and store one or even two seaplanes (P. E. Schramm et al., *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges* ["History of the Second World War"], 2. Teil [Part 2], *Die Kriegsmittel* ["War Materiel"], 2nd ed. (Würzburg: A. G. Ploetz, 1960), pp. 305-308.

47. Loc. cit., p. 405.

48. Ibid., p. 407. For the fate of an unescorted convoy see Rohwer and Hümmelchen, *Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945*, who write that "during the night 11-12 Feb [1941] Admiral Hipper makes contact with the convoy SLS.64, consisting of 19 ships and still unescorted; in the morning of 12 Feb she sinks seven ships of 32806 tons and severely damages two more" (p. 50).

49. Loc. cit., pp. 417-418. Rahn adds that the commander of the Royal Navy combat group pursuing the *Bismarck*, Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, "who had taken part in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 as commander of a destroyer, was deeply impressed by the last battle of the *Bismarck* and its crew. He made this clear to the Admiralty at midday on 27 May: 'I should like to pay the highest tribute for the most gallant fight put up against impossible odds.' London, however, took a different perspective, as the rapid reply made clear: 'For political reasons it is essential that nothing of the nature of the sentiments expressed by you should be given publicity, however much we admire a gallant fight'" (p. 419). See also the account in Rohwer and Hümmelchen, *Chronology*, pp. 63-64.


51. Ibid., pp. 421-22.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 424. Some 250 Luftwaffe fighters covering the German naval units "with the assistance of the ships' anti-aircraft artillery shot down 49 Allied aircraft with German losses of 17" (ibid., p. 604, in the fourth chapter of Part IV, on the air war).

54. Ibid., pp. 423-25.

55. Ibid., pp. 453-455.

56. Ibid., pp. 458-466.
57. Ibid., pp. 469-477, with citation and consideration of the standard American and British literature as well as relevant German studies in fifty footnotes.

58. Ibid., p. 480, where he notes the value of the experience gained during the Spanish Civil War, including its demonstration of "the overwhelming effectiveness of heavy anti-aircraft guns against tanks and pillboxes in ground fighting."


61. Ibid., p. 494

62. Ibid., pp. 505-507.

63. Ibid., p. 515. The report by Mr. D. M. B. Butt, a member of the War Cabinet staff, had been prompted by Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific advisor, and its findings, according to Boog, "roughly coincided with the detailed lists in the situation reports of Luftwaffe Operations Staff Ic" (p. 515, footnote 123).

64. Ibid., p. 516.

65. Ibid., p. 518.

66. Ibid., p. 557.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., pp. 593-95.

69. Ibid., p. 580.

70. Ibid., p. 627.

71. Ibid., p. 635.

72. Ibid., pp. 654-660, where Stumpf writes (on p. 660) that "on 21 July [1942] the German Naval War Staff issued the following directive: 'Operation Hercules to remain in abeyance until the termination of Theseus,'" and explains in footnote 109 that "Herkules' was the code-name for the invasion of Malta, 'Theseus' for the 'push to Suez'."

Africa and the German-Italian Panzerarmee's Retreat to Tunisia," pp. 791-821, has 118, many of which relate to the importance of signals intelligence, e.g., note 115 on p. 821: "Ultra expressed Rommel's intentions to the All-Highest [Hitler]--we were sometimes hindered by Ultra, because Rommel was too good a soldier to carry the intentions out'; Brig. Williams, GSO 2, Intelligence, Eighth Army . . ., quoted in [Nigel] Hamilton, Monty, [vol.] ii, [London, 1988], [pp.] 92, 93."

74. Over half the French navy was based at Toulon; "the 77 vessels that sank on that momentous day in the history of the French navy [27 November 1942] included 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 32 destroyers, and 16 submarines" (ibid., p. 827).

75. "The War at Sea and the Supply Situation 1942-1943," ibid., pp. 828-840, where Stumpf writes that "it has been interesting to speculate, ever since the disclosure of the Ultra secret, how far British radio intelligence was responsible for the Royal Navy's successful attacks on Axis shipping. Alberto Santoni has shown that, although its share in them was very considerable, Ultra was not a 'miracle weapon' that might have enabled the sinkings to be, as it were, bureaucratically planned. The system had many defects, and evaluation presented problems throughout the relevant period. Of the ships lost on the Libya and Tunis routes (discounting losses attributable to mines), those sunk as a result of Ultra tip-offs amounted to only 39.8 per cent, or 42.1 per cent of the tonnage destroyed. A breakdown of the two routes reveals that Ultra was responsible for 35.3 per cent of the transports sunk on the Libya route and 50.8 per cent on the Tunis route, where traffic increased later on" (p. 837, citing Alberto Santoni, Ultra siegt im Mittelmeer ["Ultra Wins in the Mediterranean"], Koblenz, 1985, pp. 252 ff.).

76. Ibid., p. 839.

77. As mentioned in a note to that review essay, an updated edition of the German volume on the attack on the Soviet Union was issued in 1991 as a reasonably affordable, well-produced 1376-page paperback, with a number of new annotations (not incorporated into the English translation) and with a chronology (on pp. 1364-69) not included in the original German edition published in 1983 or in the English translation. That paperback edition is listed, at the time of this writing (in March 2002) by the German branch of Amazon.com (at http://www.amazon.de) as Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991[ISBN 3-596-11008-4]) at a price of €14.95.


79. Ibid., p. 851. (To interject a contemporary reference, it is not unlikely that today, sixty years after the German offensive of 1942 into the Caucasus, the deployment of U.S. forces in that region may reflect not only determination to track down fugitive terrorists, but, at least in some measure, a long-term concern about access to valuable oil reserves.)

80. Ibid., p. 860, citing in footnote 56 a report of the naval liaison officer to the Army High


82. Ibid., p. 871.

83. Ibid., p. 873.

84. Ibid., pp. 868-69.

85. Ibid., p. 974.

86. Ibid., p. 987.


89. Ibid., pp. 985-87.

90. Ibid., pp. 1046-1049. The transcripts of the situation conferences were burned at the end of the war, but some 1500 pages, many with gaps, were salvaged and the surviving text was published as Hitler's Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 ["Hitler's Situation Conferences: The Fragments of the Protocols of His Military Conferences, 1942-1945"], edited by Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962).

91. Ibid., pp. 1049-1059, where Wegner analyses the leadership crisis in September, Halder's role and the implications of his dismissal, and the relationship between the Army High Command and the Wehrmacht High Command.

92. Ibid., pp.1078-1081.
93. Ibid., p. 1072-73.


95. Ibid., p. 1126, where Wegner notes that Paulus' report of 22 November 1942 at 19.00 hours, "Army encircled," may have been premature, but that the 45th Armoured Brigade of the Soviet IV Armoured Corps making contact with the spearhead of the IV Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front in the early afternoon of 23 November clearly closed the ring. (In the text on p. 1126, Paulus' report of encirclement is misdated 12 Nov., but footnote 245 citing the record of the signal gives the correct date of 22 November.)

96. Ibid., pp. 1130-31.

97. Ibid., p. 1134.

98. Ibid., p. 1137. Manstein had commanded German forces in the Crimea, where, on capturing Sevastopol on 1 July 1942, he had been promoted to field marshal (nine days after Rommel's promotion to field marshal when he captured Tobruk). In the index of the volume under review, "Manstein" is followed by a cross-reference to "von Lewinski gen. von Manstein," whereby "gen." is an abbreviation of "genannt [named]". Born in 1887, Fritz-Erich von Lewinski, the son of a general, had been adopted in 1900 by Field Marshal Georg von Manstein, the husband of his aunt, and thereafter went by the name Erich von Manstein (Gerhard Taddey, ed., Lexikon der Deutschen Geschichte [Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1977], p. 770, and footnote 2, p. 57, of Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 1942-1945, cited above in note 90, a 971-page volume that includes among its extensive annotations concise biographical summaries of senior officers mentioned in the text).

99. Ibid., p. 1139.

100. Ibid., pp. 1152-53.

101. Ibid., pp. 1162-63.

102. Ibid., pp. 1165-69, where Wegner points out that the commander of the 71st Infantry Division, General Fritz Roske, at whose command post Paulus and the remnants of his staff had found asylum, made contact with the Soviet side, that "after brief negotiations, without any written agreement, all fighting was stopped on the following day," that "Paulus himself had no share in these conversations," and that "to the very end the army commander and his chief of staff tried to avoid any formal act of surrender."

103. Ibid., pp. 1169-70.

104. Ibid., pp. 1170-72

105. Ibid., pp. 1191-93.

106. Ibid., p. 1215.
107. Ibid., p. 1219.

108. There was one special case in which an unusual level of German-Japanese rapport was established. As Carl Boyd explains and documents in detail in *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Ōshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), Hitler came to respect and trust the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Ōshima, so much that he made a point of explaining German operations and plans, as well as his own concerns and intentions, in great detail. This enabled the general to keep his countrymen far better informed about what was going on in Europe than the Germans were about developments in East Asia and the Pacific. However, because Ōshima's radiograms to Japan were intercepted and decoded by American cryptographers, Hitler's unguarded candor resulted in General Marshall and President Roosevelt often being better informed about what the German warlord had in mind than many members of his own staff.

109. Ibid., pp. 1229-1230.
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James Ehrman


Ludlum, Stuart D. They Turned the War Around at Coral Sea and Midway: Going to War with Yorktown’s Air Group Five. Bennington, VT: Merriam, 2002.


Saunders, Tim. *Gold Beach: Jig Sector and West.* Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002.


