ECON 945 - ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY II
Fall 1999
Professor: Yang-Ming Chang
Office & Phone: 319 Waters Hall, ph. 532-4573
E-mail:
ymchang@ksu.edu
Class Hours: 2:30
- 3:45 p.m., Monday and Wednesday
Office Hours: 1:30 - 2:30
p.m., Tuesday and Thursday, or by appointment
Objective:
This is the second
course in a two semester sequence in graduate microeconomic theory.
This course is intended to focus on advanced topics in microeconomic
theory in the light of
contemporary thought. Attention will be given to general equilibrium
theory and applications,
welfare economics, and the economics of choice under uncertainty.
Prerequisites:
A working knowledge of graduate
microeconomic theory I (ECON 940) is required.
Abilities to use the techniques of mathematical optimization and the
method of comparative statics
are necessary.
Grading:
You are required to solve
a number of homework assignments which will count for 20%
of your course grade. All assignments are due at the beginning
of class on the due date. There
will be two exams: one midterm (40%) and one final (40%).
There will be no extra credit work available. Grading will be based on a curve.
Required Textbooks:
Varian, H. R., Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd Edition, W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.
Silberberg, E., The Structure
of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis, 2nd Edition,
McGrow-Hill, 1990.
(Third edition will be available in July 2000.)
Topics and Associated Readings: (Tentative)
Students are expected to
do the assigned readings in Varian and Silberberg. Some
supplemental papers are provided for each topic. Additional references
can be found in Varian
and Silberberg. Some papers that will be used for discussion
will be assigned in class. Students
may read unassigned papers at their discretion.
(1) General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics
Key Topics (1.1)
General Equilibrium Methodology
Linear and Non-linear Models
Fixed-Coefficient Technology
The Linear Activity-Analysis
Model
Duality Analysis in General
Equilibrium
The Edgeworth-Bowley Box
Diagram
Contract Curve and Production
Possibilities Frontier
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorems
The Rybczynski Theorem
Pure Exchange Model of General
Equilibrium
The Core of an Exchange
Economy
Walrasian Competitive Adjustment
Mechanism
Existence and Stability
of Walrasian Equilibria
Key Topics (1.2)
Pareto Optimality in Production
Pareto Optimality in Consumption
Overall Pareto Optimality
The Efficiency of Perfect
Competition
The Efficiency of Imperfect
Competition
External Economies and Diseconomies
in Production and Consumption
Taxes and Subsidies - Solutions
to Pareto Suboptimality
Optimal Pricing (or Taxation)
to Maximize Social Welfare
Public Goods
*Silberberg, "General Equilibrium I: Linear Models," Chapter 15.
*Silberberg, "General Equilibrium II: Non-Linear Models," Chapter 16.
*Varian, "Production," Chapter 18.
*Varian, "Exchange," Chapter
17.
*Silberberg, "Welfare Economics,"
Chapter 17.
*Varian, "Welfare," Chapter 22.
Stolper, W. R., and P. A.
Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages," Review of Economic
Studies, 9
(1941): 58-73.
Jones, R. W., "The Structure
of Simple General Equilibrium Models," Journal of Political
Economy, 73
(1965): 557-572.
Mayer, W., "Short-Run and
Long-Run Equilibrium for a Small Open Economy," Journal of
Political Economy,
82 (1974): 955-967.
Johnson, H. G. and P. M.
Mieszkowski, "The Effect of Unionization on the Distribution
of Income: A General Equilibrium
Approach," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84
(November 1970): 539-561.
Jones, R. W., "Distortions
in Factor Markets and the General Equilibrium Model of
Production," Journal
of Political Economy, 79 (1971): 437-459.
Baumol W. and Bradford, D.,
"Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing,"
American Economic Review,
69 (1970): 256-283.
*Varian, "Public Goods," Chapter 23.
*Varian, "Externalities," Chapter 24.
Varian, H.R., ��A Solution
to the Problem of Externalities When Agents are Well-
Informed,�� American
Economic Review, 84(December 1994):1278-1293.
(2) Economics of Choice under Uncertainty
(2.1) Key Topics
The Expected-Utility Hypothesis
The Expected-Utility Theorems
Attitudes Toward Risk: Risk
Aversion, Risk Neutrality, and Risk Preference
The Measurement of Risk
Aversion
*Silberberg, "Behavior under Uncertainty," Chapter 13.
*Varian, "Uncertainty," Chapter
11.
Pratt, J. W., "Risk
Aversion in the Small and Large," Econometrica, 32 (January-April
1964): 122-136.
Friedman, M. and L.
Savage, "The utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of
Political Economy,
56 (1948): 279-304.
Brunk, G. G., "A Test
of the Friedman-Savage Gambling Model," Quarterly Journal of
Economics,
(May 1981): 341-348.
(2.2) Special Topics
I
Risk Shedding and
Risk Pooling
Risk-Bearing, Demand
for Protection and Insurance
Insurance and Moral
Hazard
Ehrlich, I. and G.
S. Becker,"Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection,"
Journal of Political
Economy, 82 (1972): 623-648.
Chang, Y. M. and I.
Ehrlich, "Insurance, Protection from Risk, and Risk-Bearing,"
Canadian Journal
of Economics (August 1985): 574-586.
Pauly, M. V., "Overinsurance
and the Public Provision of Insurance: The Role of Moral
Hazard and Adverse
Selection," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88 (1974): 44-54.
Routhchild, M. and
J. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay
on the Economics of
Imperfect Competition," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November
1976): 629-649.
Wu C. and P. F. Colwell,
"Moral Hazard and Moral Imperative," Journal of Risk and
Insurance,
(March 1988): 101-107.
Briys, E. and H. Schlesinger,
"Risk Aversion and the Propensities for Self-Protection and
Self-Insurance," Southern
Economic Journal, (1985):458-467.
Cleeton, D. L. and
B.B. Zellner, "Income, Risk Aversion, and The Demand for Insurance,"
Southern Economic
Journal, 60 (July 1993): 146-156.
(2.3) Special Topics
II:
Comparative Statics
of the Risk-Bearing Optimum
Theory of Firm under
Uncertainty
Production Uncertainty
Price and Cost Uncertainty
Consumption and Saving
Decisions under Uncertainty (If time permitting)
Sandmo, A.,"On the
Theory of The Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American
Economic Review,
(March 1971): 65-71.
Batra, R. and A.Ullah,"Competitive
Firm and the Theory of Input Demand under
Uncertainty," Journal
of Political Economy, (June 1974): 537-548.
Ishii, Y., "On the
Theory of The Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty: Note,"
American Economic Review,
(September 1977): 768-769.
Flacco and D. M. Larson,
"Nonparametric Measures of Scale and Technical Change for
Competitive Firms under
Uncertainty," American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
February 1992, 173-176.
Schmitz, A., H. Shalit and
S. J. Turnovsky, "Producer Welfare and the Preference for Price
Stability," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (1981): 158-160.
Coyle, B. T. ��Risk Aversion
and Price Risk in Duality Models of Production: A Linear Mean-
Variance Approach,�� American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (November 1992):
173-176.
Saha, A. ��Risk Preference
Estimation in the Nonlinear Mean Standard Deviation Approach,��
Economic Inquiry
25 (October 1997):770-782.
Leland, H. E., "Saving
and Uncertainty: The Precautionary Demand for Saving," Quarterly
Journal of Economics,
82 (1968): 465-473.
Dreze, J. H., "Consumption
Decisions under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, 5
(1972): 308-335.
Sandmo, A., "The Effect
of Uncertainty on Saving Decisions," Review of Economic
Studies, 37
(1970): 353-360.
Kimball, M., "Precautionary
Savings in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica,
(January 1990): 53-74.
Chang, Y. M. and I.
Ehrlich, "On the Economics of Compliance with the Minimum Wage
Law," Journal of
Political Economy, 93 (January 1985): 84-91.
Chang, Y. M., "Noncompliance
Behavior of Risk-Averse Firms under the Minimum Wage
Law," Public Finance
Quarterly, 20 (July 1992): 390-401.
Academic Accommodations for Disable Students
If you have any condition,
such as a physical or learning disability, which will make it
difficult for you to carry out the work as I have outlined it or which
will require academic
accommodations, please notify me in the first two weeks of the course.
Plagiarism and Cheating
The administration
requires that each syllabus include the following statement regarding
KSU's policy on plagiarism and cheating:
"Plagiarism and cheating are serious offenses and may be punished by
failure on the exam, paper
or project; failure in the course; and/or expulsion from the university.
For more information refer
to the 'Academic Dishonesty' policy in Inside KSU or Appendix
F in the Faculty Handbook."
Updated: 9/12/23