Abstract
Brase &
Barbey (in press, Nova publishers book chapter)
This
chapter reviews ongoing research on human statistical reasoning, looking at the
relationships between how information is presented, how numerical information
is subsequently represented in the mind, and how the resulting judgments are
made. At each of these stages
there are both emerging conclusions and ongoing debates. Information presented in the form of
frequencies appears to be more easily accepted into the cognitive judgment
mechanisms, as is information presented in clearly organized relationships.
Clarifications are necessary, however, regarding what constitute frequency
presentations and the isomorphism of organizational relationships that have
been proposed to be facilitatory.
The actual reasoning processes are constrained (or enabled, as it were)
by the nature of these mental representations. Finally, the benchmarks by which human judgments are evaluated
– the markers for claiming that humans are “good” or “poor” at statistical
reasoning – are assessed.