- Current news
- NBAF
- Media Guide
- News archives
- K-State News Insider Blog
- Filming/photography on campus
- Perspectives Webzine
- K-Statement
- Achievements
- Nuclear engineering
- Audio reports
- Podcasts
- Forms
Media Relations
Kansas State University
9 Anderson Hall
Manhattan, KS 66506
785-532-6415
media@k-state.edu Information provided by K-State Media Relations, K-State's news service, may be reproduced without permission. The marks and names of Kansas State University are protected trademarks and may not be used in any commercial or private endeavor without the approval of the university.
Want more information about the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility? K-State has a speakers' bureau available for presentations on what the NBAF is, what it would mean to K-State, and to answer any of the community's questions on the topic. To schedule a presentation, call 785-532-6415, or e-mail media@k-state.edu. |
Critical questions about the
National Bio and Agro-defense Facility
1. Will the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility, or NBAF, be a dangerous bioweapons lab?
No. The United States is a signatory to the international treaty prohibiting the development and use of biological weapons. Consequently, there are no bioweapons labs in the U.S. NBAF's charge is to develop solutions to high-consequence foreign animal diseases, including those that can spread from animals to people. The facility will allow for basic infectious disease research, as well as the development of diagnostic tests and validation of treatment methods and vaccines. The facility, which will replace the aging Plum Island Animal Disease Center off the coast of New York, will integrate animal health research with public health research relative to national security. Ways to prevent and treat serious diseases threatening the nation's food and health will be developed at NBAF, not biological weapons.
2. Will bringing NBAF to Manhattan make the community a terrorist target?
No. NBAF would be a highly improbable target. Attacking the NBAF facility to obtain or release disease-causing agents would make little sense, because the microorganisms to be worked on there exist naturally in other parts of the world. It would be easier to obtain such microorganisms outside of the U.S. Moreover, only small research quantities of these agents are worked on in such facilities.
Facilities like NBAF are designed to be very secure. Research materials are heavily protected. Terrorists are much more likely to attack "soft" targets with little or no formal security. That's why the government's list of potential terrorist targets includes highways, stadiums, shopping malls, power plants, municipal water supplies, dams, ports and trains.
Bottom line: If terrorists wanted to obtain infectious agents or cause a release into the community, they would have better luck elsewhere. Manhattan will not be more of a terrorist target with NBAF.
3. Do biocontainment labs pose a risk to the public? There have been news reports detailing more than 100 worker exposures in high-level research labs since 2003.
The exposures that made the news circuit in October of 2007 are important to note. However, given the number of labs studying and developing treatments for infectious diseases it's clear that worker exposure is not a common occurrence. Importantly, many of those incidents did not result in serious illness and there were no known transmissions of disease to the community.
Many jobs carry some degree of occupational risk. Lab workers understand, and therefore accept, the occupational risk of working with infectious microorganisms. That danger is precisely why extensive protocols are developed and lab workers are actively trained to follow them. Rarely, but occasionally, workers fail to follow safety protocols or lab accidents occur. However, there is a critical difference between occupational risk and community risk.
4. What are the chances that a disease will be released into the community?
The chance that a microorganism being studied at NBAF will be released into the community is close to zero. Research with infectious microorganisms has been going on for more than 50 years with an excellent safety record. Researchers who work at the lab will have expertise handling and researching high-consequence microorganisms. That expertise includes knowledge of proper protective gear, which safety protocols apply, and experience in handling such organisms.
5. In case of an accident, is there an evacuation plan for the Meadowlark Hills Retirement Community and the low-income housing area just a few miles from the proposed site?
Laboratory facilities like NBAF pose negligible risk to the community at large. There is no plausible scenario with the NBAF where evacuation of adjacent communities would be necessary. However, a response plan will be developed in conjunction with community members, elected officials, health experts and emergency responders. It will provide a plan for evacuation in the highly unlikely case that there is a disease threat. Factors such as the ability of specific populations to evacuate will be carefully considered in the development of that plan.
6. Does putting a facility like NBAF in the middle of the city pose a higher risk to the public than if the lab were located on an island?
No. Nearly 60 years ago, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center was built on a small island off the coast of New York. The thinking at that time was that the geographical distance would act as a safety barrier in case an organism somehow came to be outside the center's walls. Today, that security concept is outdated and technology has advanced far enough to make studying such diseases on the mainland very safe. Also of note, deer currently swim to Plum Island and birds nest on the island and fly to the mainland daily. This is remarkable only because these animals are susceptible to some of the diseases being studied within the Plum Island Animal Disease Center's walls. Any physical barrier the island location once created is all but imaginary today. Thanks to technology, high-level biocontainment facilities have been placed successfully in communities without posing additional risk to residents. There are hundreds of biocontainment facilities and laboratories across the country operating safely every day.
7. Does NBAF's proximity to the livestock trade mean they'll be exposed to dangerous animal diseases like foot and mouth?
No. State-of-the-art containment facilities are designed to be very safe. There are multiple, redundant safety systems and procedures to prevent and mitigate any possible incidents. The benefits of the NBAF to the state and our national agricultural infrastructure far outweigh any theoretical risk. Without the work scheduled for NBAF, the U.S. will fail to be prepared to deal with diseases that are a very real threat to public health and our nation's economy.
8. Isn't there a greater chance of the community being exposed to pathogens while samples are on the way to NBAF? How exactly will specimens or animals be transported to and from the NBAF?
The regulations governing how specimens are transported to biocontainment labs are detailed and pathogen-specific. Certain containers must be used for certain specimens. Redundant layers of protective packaging are used with the intent of preventing breakage and leakage, and only packaging meeting the specifications of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods is used. This packaging undergoes rigorous testing to verify its strength.
Also, agents being transported are tracked and any required permits or registration must be obtained before the sample is sent. The paperwork tracks the shipment from its origin to its final destination. Whether a permit or registration is granted depends on details like the agent's intended use and who will be handling it. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are the primary agencies that govern the permitting and registration processes.
In addition, potentially hazardous agents may only be transported by a carrier whose employees have undergone extensive background checks and who have completed training on handling hazardous materials. Sick animals will not be taken to NBAF.
Overall, it is highly unlikely that a specimen in transit would cause a community-wide outbreak. The quantities being transported are usually very small. The U.S. Department of Transportation tracks accidents involving the transport of hazardous materials. Over the last decade, there have been an average of 250 accidents a year involving infectious materials and including medical waste. No one has been hospitalized as a result of those accidents. This is out of an estimated 80,000 shipments daily.
9. Will NBAF only provide jobs for scientists from out of town?
No. Two of the most important criteria that the Department of Homeland Security is using to site NBAF are whether the proposed location already has an available workforce and a solid research foundation. That's an area where Manhattan has an advantage. K-State's long-standing education and research base in the food safety, animal health and infectious disease arenas is notable, to say the least. Graduates of K-State in those fields will undoubtedly be qualified for jobs at NBAF. The lab is estimated to provide 350 new jobs, from non-technical personnel on up to senior-level scientists. About 1,000 construction jobs will also be created while NBAF is being built. Scientists who currently live in other parts of the country will be attracted to NBAF, wherever it locates. However, there will be significant opportunities for Manhattan's non-scientists and scientists alike.
10. How will K-State students and faculty benefit from such a facility on campus?
Though K-State already has decades of expertise in food safety, agriculture and animal health, the proximity of NBAF will provide unique opportunities for K-State faculty and students. NBAF will greatly increase the opportunities for research collaboration. NBAF scientists are likely to be become adjunct faculty at the university, further augmenting the outstanding teaching team at K-State. NBAF scientists' participation in graduate research will expand the depth of expertise that our PhD-level students will be able to call upon.
11. How will having a high-security (armed guards, high fences, etc.) facility like NBAF change the friendly atmosphere at K-State?
Though NBAF will be built on land currently owned by K-State, the lab will be owned and operated by the federal government. Faculty and student researchers will have the chance to collaborate, however the facility will be relatively isolated and security concerns will not disrupt everyday campus life. Federal-level labs have successfully integrated into other university communities. A prime example can be found in the collaboration between graduate-level researchers at Iowa State University and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Animal Disease Center.
To suggest additional questions, or for more information, contact media@k-state.edu.