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(formerly American Committee on the History of the Second World War)

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General Information

Established in 1967 “to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects,” the World War Two Studies Association, whose original name was the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican.

The Newsletter

The WWTSA issues a semiannual newsletter, which is assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the Library of Congress. Back issues of the Newsletter are available from the Institute for Military History and 20th Century Studies, 221 Eisenhower Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-1002.

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Annual Membership Dues

Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the WWTSA (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars. The Newsletter, which is mailed in bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.
The German History of World War II (Volume VII)
A Review Article by Donald S. Detwiler

Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5, translated by Derry Cook-Radmore, Francisca Garvie, Ewald Osers, Barry Smerin, and Barbara Wilson, translation editor, Derry Cook-Radmore. Volume VII of Germany and the Second World War, edited by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History), Potsdam, Germany. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. xxvi & 892 pp., with 16 diagrams, 56 maps (including front and back endpapers), 26 tables, notes on the authors and on the translation, a list of abbreviations, a glossary of foreign terms, a bibliography, and an index of persons (ISBN 0-19-822889-9, $250.00).1

The seventh volume of the Oxford University Press translation of the projected ten-volume history of Germany and World War II from the German Defense Ministry’s Research Institute for Military History has three segments: an extensive account of the air war in Europe in 1943 and 1944; a shorter study of the war in the West during the same period, focusing on the Allied invasion of Europe and the ensuing campaign through the Battle of the Bulge; and a concise monograph on the war in the Pacific from 1943 through its conclusion and aftermath.2

Part I, “The Strategic Air War in Europe and Air Defence of the Reich, 1943-1944” (pp. 7-458, with 488 footnotes), by Horst Boog, is the sequel to Part IV of the sixth volume of Germany and the Second World War, Boog’s 160-page monograph on “The Anglo-American Strategic Air War over Europe and German Air Defence,” covering prewar preparations and the course of the air war over Europe to the end of 1942.3 In his study that comprises over half the seventh volume in the series, Boog provides a meticulous, thoroughly documented account of the Allied bombing offensive against Germany from early 1943 to mid-1944, a detailed account of German air defense during the same period, and a somewhat shorter but no less thorough account of the German attempts to retaliate in 1944 by the resumption of bombing and the use of the V-1 cruise missile and the V-2 ballistic rocket.

Boog begins his narrative with the agreement reached at the Anglo-American summit conference in Casablanca in January 1943 regarding a combined strategic bombing offensive against Germany. “The main bombing targets were, depending on ‘meteorological and tactical feasibility,’ to be -- in the following order -- the German U-boat yards, the aircraft industry, the transport system, the fuel-producing installations, and other targets in the war industry.” But there was also concurrence on “the importance of daylight attacks wherever possible against targets unsuited to night raids, to continuous pressure on the morale of the civilian population, and to the need to inflict heavy losses on the German fighter defences and thus draw fighter resources away from Russia and the Mediterranean.” The agreement represented a fundamental commitment to the common effort, but a very loosely defined one. Because of differences between the two sides, “divergent views were accommodated within the general concept, and a great many questions were deliberately left unanswered.”4
In the sixth volume, Boog recounted the emergence during 1942 of the fundamental difference between the American commitment to precision bombing of strategic targets by daylight and the British practice of massive area bombing at night. This difference was reflected in the POINTBLANK Directive of 10 June 1943, the formal order to the US 8th Air Force (based in Britain) and the RAF Bomber Command. This directive, Boog writes, “was an invitation to the Americans to give proof of the effectiveness of their ‘daylight precision raids’ (which were in practice the area bombing of selected industrial targets and their immediate surroundings), and a license to [Bomber Command’s Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur] Harris to carry on with the indiscriminate area bombing of German industrial cities by night. The British did not go along with [US Army Air Forces commander] Gen. [Henry H.] Arnold’s attempts to give bomber operations a tight and unified overall command; they were afraid that with the growing material superiority of the Americans they would lose their independence in the air war. Though the thus loosely controlled bombing war was meant to be only the necessary preliminary stage leading up to an invasion, both [US 8th Air Force commander] Gen. Carl A. Spaatz and Harris were secretly quite sure in their own minds that before then they could, each in their own way, bring about the fall of Germany by bombing and without a land offensive; one reason for the latter’s belief was the widespread aversion in Britain to a repeat of the bloody trench warfare of the First World War, together with memories of the defeat in France in 1940.”

During the early months of 1943, the US 8th Air Force was not yet in a position to launch major attacks against Germany. The build-up of its heavy bomber force of B-17 Flying Fortresses in England was delayed in part by “having to send a great many new aircraft and trained aircrew to the Mediterranean front, as the battles in North Africa were taking longer than originally expected. The average daily operational strength of the 8th Air Force in February was thus only 74 aircraft.” But the RAF Bomber Command, by the beginning of 1943, had been strengthened in terms of the quantity as well as the quality of its aircraft, including the four-engine Avro Lancaster heavy bomber and the very fast twin-engine de Havilland Mosquito. Moreover, Bomber Command’s effectiveness in conducting night raids had been substantially enhanced by the application of steadily refined air-navigation systems, such as OBOE, the ground-mapping radar system known as H2S, and bomb-targeting techniques, using sophisticated flares.

The Casablanca agreement having assigned the German U-boat yards in the Bay of Biscay the highest priority for the combined strategic air offensive, RAF Bomber Command launched a series of thirteen attacks between mid-January and the beginning of April 1943 on the submarine bases at Lorient and St.-Nazaire, in which an average of over 200 bombers per raid dropped a total of over 7,000 tons of bombs on the massive, hardened submarine pens without inflicting serious damage. Admiral Karl Dönitz was reported to have observed that “all that happened was that surrounding towns were destroyed.” So far as Air Chief Marshal Harris was concerned, Boog writes, it was “a ‘hopeless misuse of airpower’ and a distraction from the main target of Germany, where he now had the technical means of waging a successful bombing war.”

As the first phase of that war, Harris conducted a series of raids from March through July 1943 on the Rhineland and Ruhr regions of western Germany, beginning with a major attack, on Friday night, 5 March 1943, on Essen, the home of the Krupp armaments works. The raid, Boog writes, “was extremely successful: The first OBOE-equipped Mosquito reached Essen at 2058h, two minutes early, and released its marker flares blind. It was followed at intervals of a few minutes, until shortly after 2130h, by other OBOE Mosquitos of 8 (Pathfinder) Group, who did the
same. These blind markers were backed up by 21 heavy bombers who more or less simultaneously dropped green flares inside the target area already marked out in red. Then came, partly overlapping, three waves of mainly heavy bombers which dropped a total of 1,014.8 t of bombs, over half of them (524.4 t) incendiaries, which [the RAF Chief of Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles] Portal termed ‘the main weapon for lasting destruction’. A third of the HE [high-explosive] bombs were fitted with delayed-action fuses, so as to hinder the work of the firefighting services. Out of 442 aircraft, 367 arrived over the target; 61, including three OBOE Mosquitos, had to abort; 14 bombers (a relatively small total) were lost, while 38 more were damaged. Only 153 bombers managed to place their bomb-load within a 3-mile (c. 5 km) radius of their aiming-point. By 2140h the raid was over. The Krupp works and city suffered severe devastation, with about 0.6 sq. km of the built-up area totally destroyed; in about a further 1.8 sq. km the bombs damaged or destroyed three-quarters of the buildings. This was the first major success against a previously hard-to-hit target.”

Essen was hit even harder the following week, but three nights later, an attack on Nuremberg, beyond the range of the OBOE navigational system, was unsuccessful: “The bombs fell widely scattered, and only by chance fell on some of the suburbs and factories.” The most frequently attacked city by the RAF during spring 1943, Duisburg, at the confluence of the Ruhr with the Rhine, “withstood four raids [during March and April] relatively well, but then suffered much destruction during the fifth and final one on 12/13 May. The OBOE marking was extremely precise, so that around 85 per cent of all bombs fell within 3 miles of the aiming-point.”

When he concluded his campaign of over forty raids against Aachen, Bochum, Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Frankfurt, Oberhausen, Wuppertal, and other cities in the Rhineland and Ruhr area in July 1943, “Harris believed,” Boog writes, that “he had reduced the region to chaos, reduced German arms production to a considerable degree, and shattered the morale of the population; and indeed a far greater effect had been obtained against Essen with only 5.6 per cent of his forces (3,261 aircraft) with 138 losses than had been achieved in 1942 with 10 per cent (or 3,724 bombers) and 201 losses. But this effect -- while it was indeed felt in, say, the aero-engine crankshaft sector -- was much less than Bomber Command assumed. Only four to six weeks of industrial output were lost, as the dispersal of industrial concern such as Rheinmetall-Borsig of Düsseldorf had already begun. The cost to Bomber Command of 43 major raids was, however, considerable: about 18,500 bomber sorties were made, with a total loss of 872 (4.7 per cent) of the aircraft, with their crew-members numbering some 6,000, and a further 2,126 aircraft sustained sometimes irreparable damage. . . . The main weapon of this bomber offensive, OBOE, had however proved its worth, and despite the high losses the total fleet of bombers was actually increased, from 663 in March 1943 to 776 in July.” Moreover, by July 1943, Bomber Command was receiving a thousand fresh aircrew members weekly, over a third of the pilots coming from Commonwealth countries.18

When the bombing campaign led to concern in Britain and serious questions in Parliament about the impact on the civilian population and the destruction of cultural treasures, Deputy Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee stated in the House of Commons on 28 May 1943, Boog writes, “that no ‘indiscriminate bombing’ was taking place. Only militarily relevant targets were being attacked -- a statement that was greeted with applause”; and half a year later, “the air minister, Lord Archibald Sinclair, told members who had voiced their doubts about the British bombing war . . . that the government’s policy on this had not altered.” But periodically the issue was brought up again, and when it was, “. . . Sinclair or government spokesmen in the House trod
very carefully in answering the question of exactly what was being targeted; often only half the truth or an outright lie was told when refuge could not be sought in equivocation and ambiguity.\textsuperscript{19} The head of Bomber Command, who “believed in victory won by air power alone,”\textsuperscript{20} did not approve of this semi-apologetic stance. “Whatever else he may be accused of,” writes Boog, “Harris was more honest. In order to avoid his crews getting the feeling they were having to do something of which the Air Ministry was ashamed, he called on the ministry in October 1943 to say unambiguously that ‘the aim of the bombing offensive was to destroy German cities, kill German workers, and make civilized life in Germany impossible.’ Harris refused to take the hypocritical attitude of claiming that the bombing of cities was not necessarily a direct attack on civilians.”\textsuperscript{21}

Bomber Command’s next major bombing offensive, following the campaign against cities in western Germany in spring 1943, was Operation GOMORRAH, a devastating series of attacks on Hamburg in late July and early August 1943. Shortly before the beginning of the operation, Prof. Henry Tizard, scientific advisor to RAF Chief of Staff Portal and Prime Minister Churchill, expressed his misgivings about the planned attack on Hamburg, writing, according to Boog, that “its harbour could be useful to Britain after the war. It would be better, he said, not to destroy Hamburg, because occupied Germany could be administered better from there than from Berlin . . . .” Responding on Churchill’s behalf, Portal stressed the importance of Hamburg as an industrial center and added that “the control of Germany after the war would anyway be ensured only by weak though mobile land forces but primarily by air power; and for that there was no need of big cities.”\textsuperscript{22}

Operation GOMORRAH began on Saturday evening, 24 July 1943, as a 75-mile-long stream of 791 bombers took off from 42 airfields in England with 14,451 tons of high-explosive bombs and 1,020 tons of incendiaries. The target was the center of the city. 10,289 civilians were killed. For the first time in the war, the British dropped WINDOW, many thousands of strips of metal foil that produced a cloudy image on radar screens, severely handicapping radar-equipped German night fighters as well as the targeting mechanisms of the heavy anti-aircraft guns defending the city. The German flak batteries could do nothing but put up a random barrage, firing more than 50,000 shells that brought down only three bombers. More were shot down by German night fighters, but the total losses during the raid amounted to only 1.5 per cent, the smallest proportion suffered in a major raid up to that time.\textsuperscript{23}

The smoke was so thick over Hamburg that the American raid scheduled for the next day was postponed several hours and the RAF raid planned for that night was diverted to Essen. On the afternoon of Sunday, 25 June, 100 heavy bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force set out to attack the Blohm und Voß U-boat yard and the Klöckner aero-engine works in Hamburg, but flak and smoke clouds prevented accurate bombing, so that damage was limited to the harbor and other industrial quarters. 15 B-17 Flying Fortresses were shot down, mostly by German fighters. The next day, Monday the 26th, 54 B-17s hit the Howaldt shipyard and a large Hamburg power station, killing 156 civilians and losing two aircraft. Meanwhile, the RAF, which had kept Hamburg on alert through nuisance raids by Mosquitos on Sunday and Monday nights, the 25th and 26th, returned in force on Tuesday night, the 27th, to deliver one of the most devastating blows of the war. 729 heavy bombers dropped 2,326 tons of bombs, over half of them incendiaries. “After barely half-an-hour,” writes Boog, “a fire storm of hurricane force, of a kind never before seen in air warfare, was raging through the closely packed and densely populated
residential areas. It covered an area of some 12 square kilometers. The fires combined with the unusually high atmospheric pressure to create an ‘air chimney’ that caused a powerful up-current over Hamburg. People burned to death in the hurricane of heat, or were suffocated in their air-raid shelters. That one night claimed more than 18,000 lives.24

After waiting for the smoke over Hamburg to dissipate, Harris sent Bomber Command back for a third major strike on Thursday night, the 29th, in which 699 bombers dropped over 2,300 tons of bombs, more than half incendiaries, killing almost 10,000 more people. The final large-scale attack of the operation was on Tuesday night, 3 August, “but this time heavy thunderstorms broke up the attack, with the result that only 51 of the 740 bombers that took off were able to drop their bomb-loads within the 3-mile zone round the aiming-point.”25 In the four major raids of Operation GOMORRAH, during which 8,344 tons of bombs, half of them incendiaries, had been dropped on Hamburg, Bomber Command lost 97 bombers and 552 aircrew. The impact on Hamburg was enormous. Boog writes that “a total of 242,202, or 43.8 per cent, of all dwellings were destroyed or made uninhabitable; there were 900,000 homeless. To this day the number of dead is still uncertain, and varies with different authors between 30,000 and 50,000. According to the figures in the Reich statistics office on 9 March 1945 there were 41,450 killed between 24 July and 3 August 1943. Subsequently a figure of 42,600 was taken as a basis. In all, the casualties in Hamburg over this period were equivalent to around 80 per cent of the number of British civilians killed by the German air offensive in England from August 1940 to May 1941. The British authorities, who otherwise tended rather to exaggeration, underestimated the total deaths to a remarkable degree; they put them at between 12,000 to 15,000, and protested at allegedly exaggerated figures in the Swiss and Swedish press.”26

On Tuesday night, August 17th, two weeks after the conclusion of the devastating series of attacks on Hamburg, Bomber Command attacked Peenemünde on the Baltic Island of Usedom near the mouths of the Peene and Oder rivers, where German V-weapons were being developed and produced. Because of the importance of the target, the raid was carried out on a moonlit night, providing visibility that contributed to the accuracy of the bombing, but also to the loss of 40 aircraft, 6.7% of the attacking force of 596. Less than a week later, on Monday night, August 23rd, Bomber Command launched an attack with 727 aircraft on Berlin, but because the Pathfinders were unable to identify the center of the city with their H2S radar, they mistakenly marked an area in the southern outskirts of the city, with the consequence that many of the bombs fell in open country. The German air defenses were quite effective; Bomber Command suffered its heaviest loss in one night so far in the war, with 56 aircraft, almost 8 per cent of the attacking force, having been brought down by German flak and night fighters. Targeting with H2S radar was more successful in the raid on Sunday night, September 5th, on Mannheim-Ludwigshafen. On Monday night, October 4th, Frankfurt am Main suffered its first heavy raid of the war. And on Friday night, October 8th, the center of Hannover was devastated, while some 1,200 were killed and well over 3,000 injured.27 On the night of Friday, October 22nd, 444 RAF bombers attacked Kassel. Most bomb loads were dropped within 800 meters of the aiming point, the city center. “The result,” Boog writes, “was the worst disaster for any German city since Hamburg and until almost the end of the war. Almost 6,000 people were killed -- 2.65 per cent of the 226,000 inhabitants, proportionally 0.2 per cent more than in the four raids on Hamburg. About 3,600 were injured, and more than 8,000 suffered damage to their eyes from the smoke and heat. Around 62 per cent of the population -- 123,800 persons -- were made homeless. The historic town centre was wiped out. . . . With a ‘social index’ (reflecting the degree of
destruction) of 164.1, Kassel was far ahead of Hamburg with 'only' 115.4; Bomber Command could cross it off its list of targets.\textsuperscript{28} One reason for the high death toll, according to Boog, was that "the German ARP [air-raid protection] authorities made a fatal mistake: they did not realize that the delayed-action bombs exploding here and there had nothing directly to do with the air raid itself, and were meant only to interfere with the fire-fighting later on. So the all-clear was not sounded until the bomber stream was already a couple of hundred miles away, by which time the fires started in the historic old town by the numerous incendiaries had taken a firm hold and developed into a Hamburg-style fire storm. The inhabitants, still sitting in their cellars, were trapped . . . and died amid the smoke and flames. Had the all-clear been given promptly, they would have been able to leave their shelters in time."\textsuperscript{29}

During the first half of 1943, while Bomber Command was conducting its campaign of area bombing of German cities at night, American daytime precision-bombing operations were directed primarily against German submarines and their bases; however, from 17 January through 22 June 1943, the 8th Air Force did conduct eighteen daylight raids over Germany, dispatching between 63 and 235 aircraft, dropping a total of some 3,700 tons of bombs, and losing 117 heavy bombers (6 per cent) and over 1,100 aircrew. These losses were deemed acceptable, in part because of "an almost tenfold overestimate of German fighter losses" and a tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of the bombing raids themselves; in the case of an attack on 18 March 1943 on the German U-boat yard at Vegesack, for example, "the yard was not in fact put out of action for a year, nor were seven U-boats destroyed or damaged -- the commissioning of just one U-boat was merely delayed by 14 weeks." And on 17 April, when 97 8th Air Force bombers, flying for the first time over Germany in the "combat box" formation, attacked the Focke-Wulf aircraft works in Bremen, 52 German fighters were estimated to have been shot down, rather than the correct figure of five.\textsuperscript{30}

In the summer of 1943 the rate of losses suffered by the 8th Air Force sharply increased, once it began conducting unescorted daylight attacks deeper in Germany than it had flown during the first half of the year. Ten "blitz week" raids in late July cost 105 B-17 Flying Fortresses; particularly heavy losses were sustained during the attack on an aircraft plant at Oschersleben southwest of Magdeburg on Wednesday, July 28\textsuperscript{th}, during which 40 per cent of the attacking bombers were brought down. "For the first time," writes Boog, "the German fighters fired 21-cm air-to-air rockets from beyond the range of the bombers' guns . . . ." The toll would almost certainly been higher still had the Germans fighters pursuing the returning bombers not been confronted, near the Dutch border, by American P-47 Thunderbolt fighters fitted with drop-tanks that had extended their range sufficiently to enable them to escort the bombers on the last segment of their return flight.\textsuperscript{31}

After the Allies captured air bases in North Africa in 1943, a second front was opened in the air war against the Third Reich. At the beginning of August, bombers from the U.S. 9th Air Force, then based in the Mediterranean, were dispatched to attack the Romanian oil refineries at Ploiești. However, as Boog writes, "the German radio monitoring service had been listening to the practising near Benghazi [in Libya] from the outset, and knew the date and route of the attack in plenty of time so that defensive measures, including smokescreens, could be prepared. Of the 177 bombers that took off on 1 August 1943, 154 reached the target area; but because of the unexpectedly heavy flak, the camouflaging, and navigational and other tactical errors they were not always able to destroy their intended targets. . . . The bombing brought a halt to around 42
per cent of Ploiești refinery production for four to six weeks; the actual consequences were not, however, all that great, since all the plants were networked and in any case an equivalent spare capacity was still lying unused . . . On their flight back to base the bombers were again mauled by German and Bulgarian fighters; a total of 54 B-24s were lost, with 532 aircrew. Only 92 aircraft reached Benghazi, 19 landed at Allied airfields in the eastern Mediterranean or on Malta, seven crashed in Turkey, and three ditched in the Mediterranean, thus putting even the losses of the 8th Air Force in the shade.\textsuperscript{32}

Little over two weeks later, the 8th Air Force suffered even more severe losses in a two-pronged attack on Tuesday, August 17th, on German fighter-production facilities at Regensburg and on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt. The targets were severely damaged, but at the cost of 60 of over 300 bombers that took part in the mission, while 175 were damaged, eleven so badly that they were scrapped. The Americans estimated that they had shot down 288 German fighters, but the actual figure was 27. Moreover, the impact of this Schweinfurt raid on the German arms industry turned out to be relatively minor because, Boog writes, “substitute supplies began to be ordered from Sweden and Switzerland, temporary bottlenecks were overcome by the ball-bearings being carried from production to assembly in rucksacks, there was a changeover to making simpler bearings, and it was soon discovered that the firms still had enough ball-bearings of each type stockpiled.”\textsuperscript{33} Two months later, on Thursday, October 14th, in view of repair work observed at Schweinfurt, 8th Air Force launched a major follow-up raid by 320 bombers that proved even more costly than the August raid. Once the P-47 escorts turned back near Aachen, the bombers were attacked in what, according to Boog, was “the biggest air battle over Europe so far.” Only 288 bombers reached Schweinfurt, and there were further losses on the return flight. Sixty bombers were lost during the mission, five more crash-landed in England, and twelve were damaged beyond repair. As for the industrial impact of the raid, the German manufacturers were once more able, as after the August attack, to draw on their six- to twelve-month stockpiles of ball-bearings. By fall 1943, moreover, German aircraft production was being switched from bombers to fighters, which needed far fewer ball bearings. In conclusion, Boog observes, “the German ball-bearing industry could . . . not be brought low by air raids, if only because of the speedy countermeasures that thwarted the Allies’ plans to strike a fatal blow at German armaments. At the end of the war there were more ball-bearings than ever before.”\textsuperscript{34}

Following the costly October raid on Schweinfurt, the 8th Air Force suspended operations that involved sending its bombers beyond the limited range of the fighter escorts, deferring deeper-penetration attacks until the delivery of sufficient long-range fighters (especially P-51 Mustangs) to escort the bombers to the heart of Germany and back. This meant, Boog writes, that “only RAF Bomber Command was capable, under cover of darkness, of attacking the fighter-manufacturing plants in central and eastern Germany . . .”\textsuperscript{35} But Harris was “so certain . . . in his belief that the war could be won by strategic area bombing alone” that he was unequivocally opposed to any diversion from what he saw as Bomber Command’s primary mission, the destruction of German cities by carpet bombing.\textsuperscript{36} In late fall 1943, Allied intelligence estimated that as of 1 May 1944, the planned date of the invasion of Normandy, the likely strength of the German fighter force would be 2,850 planes, rather than the 650 previously reckoned on. Therefore the RAF’s Deputy Chief of Air Staff Norman Bottomley wrote to Harris on December 17th, expressing the hope,” as recounted by Boog, “that he would soon give orders for a raid on Schweinfurt. Harris refused this three days later, in strongly emotional terms . . . . An operation like this made no sense, the target was too hard to find, the town was so strongly
defended that six or seven raids would be needed, and success would be doubtful. If the target was really so important, then the Americans should attack it again. What was more, the Germans would in any case by then have foiled such attacks by relocating their industrial plant. He went on to list other bomber operations that at the time had been seen as decisive, such as the attacks on the railways, the Möhne dam, the molybdenum mine at Knaben in Norway and synthetic fuel works in western Germany, the marshalling yards at Modena in Italy, and the Ploiești oil refineries. None of these had hindered the Germans from launching further major offensives in the east. It had all been in vain. He scoffed at ‘panacea targets’ like these, and even if they were acting in good faith had no time for the ‘panacea-mongers’ who he felt saw themselves as infallible.”

In November 1943 Harris launched what he called the “Battle of Berlin,” a series of large-scale raids on the German capital, which was not only the seat of government, but also a very important industrial center. Harris told Churchill, Boog writes, that “once these [raids] were over Berlin would, . . . if the Americans came in on it, ‘be wrecked from end to end’, setting the seal on Germany’s downfall. It would mean losing 400-500 bombers, but Germany would lose the war.” The series of 16 raids from 18 November 1943 to 24 March 1944, during which some 30,000 tons of bombs (about half of them incendiaries) were dropped, involved 9,105 bomber sorties; 493 bombers were shot down, 849 damaged, and 2,983 aircrew killed. “These figures were more or less what Harris had calculated,” Boog writes, “but the hopes that had been coupled with them had not been met.”

Moreover, in British society, Bomber Command’s attacks on Berlin “again raised the question of the legality and inhumanity of such operations. While the government succeeded in preventing as far as possible any public statements, or indeed protests, on the subject, it could still be spoken about in parliament,” Boog concludes his report on the debate that took place in Westminster with an account of the role of an Anglican prelate in the House of Lords: “The most notice was aroused by the way George Bell, the bishop of Chichester, urged that even in a war one could not forget the suffering of one’s fellow human-beings on the other side. During a trip to Sweden he had been told by two German pastors and members of the resistance to Hitler of the appalling effects the bombing of German cities was having on the civilian population, and learned from other eyewitnesses of the horrors of the air war in Lübeck, Rostock, Cologne, and Hamburg. He was angered by the public statements of Churchill and his government that always spoke only of military and economic targets. He wrote letters to the government, and planned protest demonstrations. With the wartime emergency regulations in force these could be banned, and his letters to the press censored. Only in the Upper House, of which he was a member, could he speak freely, and on 9 February 1944 he demanded from the Churchill government a public response to his complaint about the indiscriminate bombing by the RAF. Everyone must by now be aware, he said, of how far the destruction of European culture had already gone. Did one want to destroy the rest? Those in charge must surely know that the factories were in general built outside the German city centres with their historic monuments. Hitler was a barbarian: but this did not mean one must take his barbaric deeds as a model. After Bell had described the extent of the destruction and suffering in Hamburg, he quoted from the Swedish Svenska Dagbladet newspaper how the British with their massive bombing raids on Berlin had achieved what Hitler had still failed to do with his decrees and regulations: they had aroused the fury of the majority of the German people. . . . Bell’s closing words were that the Allies were fighting, as the liberators of Europe, for something that was greater than might -- for justice; and this had to be
more important than force. . . . Bell’s attack had no immediate effect, any more than did a protest in the journal *News Review* on 23 March 1944 by 26 leading personalities -- including Benjamin Britten -- against the ‘Attack on Humanity’.”40

One week later, on Thursday night, March 30th, as a kind of postlude to the Battle of Berlin, Harris launched a major raid on Nuremberg, as the home of the National Socialist Party Congresses an important political center. It turned out to be a total failure; wind and cloud conditions caused the target marking to go awry, so that the overwhelming majority of the bombs fell in open country. But the cost of delivering them was greater than on any of the recent raids on Berlin. The German night fighters used new radar interception equipment that the British could not block, and “German bombers dropped flares along the bomber stream’s path, to be seen by all the night fighters. Out of 795 RAF bombers,” Boog writes, “95 were destroyed immediately, and a further 12 damaged to the point of write-off. This put the loss rate at 11.8 per cent, and on top of this around 70 aircraft were damaged. It was the heaviest blow Bomber Command had ever suffered. It was ‘more than a setback -- it was a defeat’.”41

Meanwhile, in February 1944, the U.S. 8th Air Force, based in Britain and augmented by a strong force of long-range fighter escorts, and the 15th Air Force, based in Southern Italy, launched a series of attacks on the German Air Force and aircraft industry, targeting production facilities in Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Stuttgart, and Leipzig. In the course of the “Big Week,” as this offensive came to be known, the Americans flew more than 3,800 heavy bomber sorties (dropping over 13,000 tons of bombs) and 3,673 escorting fighter sorties. Losses amounted to 266 bombers (ca. 6 percent) and 28 fighters (0.8 percent) together with 2,600 aircrew. As for German losses, Boog writes, “in February 1944 the Luftwaffe lost around 510 fighters in the air and 1,000 on the ground, as well as 366 pilots killed, wounded, or missing; these were increasingly hard to replace, whereas the Americans had no shortage of fighter pilots.”42 German aircraft production dropped in February 1944 compared to January, but in March it substantially increased, and “by July even reached 4,219, the highest monthly output figure of the whole war.”43 But the planes were useless without fuel and pilots, and “the bombing of the synthetic fuel plants producing the bulk of aviation spirit supplies that began on 12 May quickly led to a serious curtailment of pilot training . . . In July a great many new fighters had to stay on the ground for lack of fuel.”44

A significant change in American tactics in the winter of 1943-44, Boog observes, was that “so-called precision bombing gave way to saturation, area, or carpet bombing whenever there was no view of the ground. ‘Precision’ bombing was already very inaccurate, since the formations dropped their bombs on a visual signal from the leading aircraft; the aiming-point was, however, always a factory or militarily relevant installation, and in this the Americans prided themselves on differing from the British with their area bombing of cities. Yet in fact theirs was, even with a clear view, nothing other than a limited carpeting process, with only a third of individual bomb-loads finding the target . . . Gen. Arnold, always concerned for the good name of his air force, especially with his own government and home population, told Gen. Spaatz to avoid using the term ‘blind bombing’ . . . , so that no false impressions would be created among the public. Spaatz therefore employed instead more technical- and less ambiguous-sounding turns of phrase such as ‘overcast bombing technique’ or ‘bombing with navigational devices over clouds up to 20,000 feet’.”45
Beginning in January 1944, writes Boog, “the growing number of heavy bombers and escort fighters . . . available, together with . . . new radar aids, led . . . to a fundamental change in American attack tactics. It was now no longer necessary for self-defence purposes for the bombers to fly in tightly grouped and stacked formations of 54 bombers in a box measuring around 3,800 x 870 x 810 metres; and with more aircraft being lost to flak this had in any case become too dangerous. The fighters no longer needed, against their nature and their higher speed, to stick close to the bombers they were protecting; guarding these no longer took priority over shooting down enemy fighters.”46 In a raid on 8 March 1944 on Erkner, the site of important ball-bearing factories southeast of Berlin, for example, 37 of 623 bombers were lost, but only 18 of 861 of the escorting fighters, while the Germans lost 87 fighters.47 But the cost of the heavily escorted daylight bombing campaign over Germany during the first six months of 1944 was very high: 2,942 bombers and 3,025 fighters were lost during that half year.48

On 14 April 1944, in view of the impending invasion, Harris’ Bomber Command and Spaatz strategic bombing forces were placed under the “direction” (not “command”) of the Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and they increasingly were used in missions directly supporting the invasion. But “Eisenhower was aware,” writes Boog, “of the continuing value of the strategic bombing missions -- the 8th Air Force, for instance, was in its operations over Germany destroying hundreds of German fighters a month in the air and on the ground, so that sorties by the tactical bombers against airfields in France met with hardly any fighter opposition. On 17 April Eisenhower’s directive on support by the strategic air units to the preparations for the landing went out to Spaatz and Harris. The top objective remained . . . the continuing destruction and paralysing of the German military and economic and industrial system, together now with the destruction of the major transport arteries. Linked directly with this was the breaking of the Germans’ power to resist in the air, through a successful pursuing of the combined bomber offensive. Spaatz’s forces were to wear down the Luftwaffe, especially its fighter arm, and destroy the installations that supported it, and to sever the German railway links, in particular those to the intended beachhead. Beyond this, Spaatz was given free rein to attack important military and political targets in south-eastern Europe. Harris was, because of the lack of accuracy of night-time bombing, told to carry on with the destruction of German ‘industry’; his operations were, however, to be arranged so as to supplement those of the American strategic bombers in that they as far as possible also struck at the Luftwaffe and the rail network . . . Tactical bombers [under British Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander (under Eisenhower) of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces] had the task of knocking out the V-weapon sites in northern France, if necessary calling on the strategic bombers to help in this.”49 In the course of “the nine weeks up to D-Day, British and American aircraft dropped, about half each, a total of 195,000 t of bombs, losing 1,953 aircraft (1,251 of them American) and more than 12,000 aircrew in the process.”50

Immediately after D-Day, on 8 June, “Spaatz gave orders that for both his strategic air fleets [the 8th Air Force based in England and the 15th in Italy] the interdiction of fuel supplies to the Wehrmacht was from now on to be their foremost task, an instruction that remained in force until the end of the war . . . Since April 1944 the 15th Air Force had, with a loss of 350 aircraft, dropped a total of 13,469 t of bombs on oil targets around . . . [Ploieşti]. In August oil output dropped to 10 per cent.”51
Boog concludes his treatment of the Allied bombing offensive against Germany with a brief excursus on the Soviet strategic bombing war against Germany. Soviet bombers were primarily employed in connection with land operations, but “in response to a German air raid on Moscow on the night of 21/2 July 1941, Soviet naval bombers over the period 7/8 August to 3/4 September flew a total of seven night raids . . . mainly against Berlin; they dropped more than 30 t of bombs there and on towns in north-east Germany, as well as . . . leaflets with Stalin’s speech of 3 July 1941.” In 1941 altogether 549 aircraft were used against targets in Germany; in 1942, there were Soviet raids against Berlin on the nights of 26 and 28 August and 9 September, with a total of 212 aircraft; and in April 1943 there were raids on targets in East Prussia, “with 920 aircraft dropping 700 t of bombs, including one 11,000-pounder -- the heaviest Russian bomb of the war -- on Königsberg (Kaliningrad).” In February 1944 the Soviet long-range bomber force flew three night raids on Helsinki, in which 1,980 aircraft bombed the city, to put pressure on the Finns to sue for peace, and in September of that year the Hungarian capital, Budapest, was subjected, with the same objective, to four nights of raids by over a thousand bombers. In March and April 1945 Soviet bombers flew “raids against Königsberg, Breslau, Danzig, and finally Berlin. Taken all together, the bombing raids inside Germany carried out during the war, involving 7,158 bombers and 6,700 t of bombs, were relatively insignificant at only 3.1 per cent of all the bomber sorties made by the Soviet forces, and amounted to only around 0.5 per cent of the Anglo-American strategic sorties against German-occupied Europe and 0.21 per cent of the bombs they delivered. The use of Soviet long-range bombers against Reich territory had no effect worthy of note on the course of the war.”

The second part of Boog’s monograph, “DEFEENDING GERMAN SKIES, PART OF THE OVERALL AIR-WAR PROBLEM: FROM EARLY 1943 TO THE INVASION IN 1944,” makes it clear that in terms of the allocation of war matériel and personnel resources, the air defense of Germany was a major theater of war. “In 1943,” writes Boog, “the Allies’ strategic bomber fleets dropped 346,166 t of bombs on German-occupied territory -- 450 per cent more than they had in the year before. Of these, 177,263 t fell on Germany alone, compared to 45,000 t in 1942 . . . The number of those killed in air raids rose from about 6,800 in 1942 to around 100,000 in 1943, and that of civilians wounded from something over 24,000 to around 200,000. In Germany in 1943 approximately 173,000 buildings were destroyed, and 212,000 damaged.”

The escalation of the air war over Germany was largely due to the rapid growth in 1943 of the numbers of American aircraft, especially during the second half of the year, “from 1,671 in June to 4,242 in December, coupled with an average attack strength of 183 bombers in August and 506 in December.” To counter this growing challenge, the German Air Force had available, in spring 1943, “only 40 per cent of the amount of fuel needed for training fighter pilots . . . In fact, in March 1943 the night-fighter force was 51 short of the number of fully operational crews experienced in blind flying needed to fly the 360 serviceable aircraft . . . With the single-engined fighters there were only 1,187 fully operational pilots for an actual strength of 1,535 machines -- meaning that some 350 fighters had to be flown by pilots with only limited operational training (assuming they all had even that).”

To many in the German population, it seemed as though the German interceptors appeared, if at all, only after a raid was over. “The American bombers were, it seemed, flying in peacetime display formation (a misinterpretation of the combat boxes and combat wings used as a self-defence tactic) unhindered across the skies of Germany. This was what Hitler said to Göring,
when, as ‘spokesman for the German people’, he summoned him on 5 October [1943] to receive a two-hour-long lecture on ‘the importance of defending his people’, and demanded that he, ‘whatever the cost, stop the massive attacks by day’. As Boog recounts in detail, Göring held a series of three commanders’ conferences within a week, passing on Hitler’s pressure to his chief subordinates, and then comments that “the minutes of the Reich marshal’s conferences show very little sign of the systematic approach to the various problems that is so evident in records of meetings of senior commanders in the British and American air forces. Instead we find a great many ad hoc decisions being taken, and matters of opinion on even the tiniest detail being discussed when they should have been dealt with in subordinate bodies and certainly not by the commander-in-chief of one of the armed services. Göring waffled his way through the meetings, with constant appeals to National Socialist beliefs and exhortations for fighting spirit, and with the muddled language he used betraying his poor grasp of tactical and technical matters and the extent to which he was trapped within his outdated experience of fighting in the First World War.”

The corollary of Göring’s appeals for fanatical attacks on the enemy was that his pilots were not fighting as they should. “The accumulation of...[his] insulting allegations against...[them] led to a confrontation with the general of the fighter arm. When, during one conference, the Reich marshal called them ‘pampered’ and unworthy of their high decorations — they had been failures as early as the Battle of Britain, where many of their commanders had ‘faked their reports’ to get their Knight’s Crosses — [the head of the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces, General Adolf] Galland ripped his own Cross from his collar and slammed it down on the table in front of a speechless Göring; he did not wear his war decorations again for the following six months, and other officers followed suit.”

With the heavy losses of German fighters, the defense against the Allied bombing campaign fell increasingly to the anti-aircraft artillery, which in the Third Reich was part of the Air Force rather than the Army. In the course of the year following the beginning of American daylight bombing operations against Germany in January 1943, the number of heavy flak batteries, firing 88-, 105-, and 128-mm shells, doubled. “In November 1943,” Boog writes, “the Luftwaffe personnel numbered around 3 million, of which some 2.1 m. were troops, with 900,000 civilians and auxiliaries. The flak artillery, always the arm of the Luftwaffe with the greater number of personnel, numbered at this time more than 1 million troops together with auxiliary staff, in a ratio of 2:1... These [auxiliaries] included male and female ‘flak helpers’, men from the Reich Labour Service (RAD), and Russian prisoners of war... together with Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians; Göring remarked that his flak batteries were like a meeting of the League of Nations.”

“The material demands of the flak artillery,” Boog continues, “may be gauged from, inter alia, the fact that in the final year of the war around 800,000 men were employed in producing flak armaments, and one-third of the barrels produced in 1944 were for AA guns.” The output of flak munitions rose from 74,711,000 rounds of all calibres in 1941 to 190,099,000 in 1944. In terms of the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery as opposed to fighters, “in the battle against the U.S. 8th Air Force the flak shot down only 239 aircraft between August 1942 and the end of 1943, whereas fighters accounted for 702.” Despite this disparity the flak arm of the Luftwaffe continued to enjoy high priority in the allocation of resources, on Hitler’s direct orders, thanks to what his Luftwaffe adjutant, Nicolaus von Below, called his ‘flak-centred thinking.”
Air defense against the impending invasion in the west was the responsibility of Air Fleet 3 under Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle. According to advance planning, he was to “use his fighters to achieve air superiority in the army’s area of operation -- that is, above the invasion zone; his fighters and fighter-bombers were to attack enemy ships and troops on the beaches during daylight hours, and his bombers by night.” But to carry out these missions, Air Fleet 3 had on D-Day “only 319 serviceable aircraft, around 100 of them fighters. Facing them were around 12,800 Allied aircraft of all types, of which 6,000-7,000 were fully serviceable; they were thus outnumbered 20 to 1. Reinforcements were flown in from Germany, but were shot down at an average rate of over three dozen daily; by 2 July the total lost was 1,040. Then, “in July,” writes Boog, “Hitler inflicted a fresh haemorrhage on the fighter force by ordering the dispatch to the west of a further 800 aircraft from the home defence’s reserve . . . . The fighters moved forward straight into a German retreat; for the 25 of the enemy’s aircraft they managed to shoot down, more than 400 of them crashed on landing, blew up, or fell to the enemy -- a fiasco all over again.”

Under the subtitle “THE LUFTWAFFE AND AIR DEFENCE IN MID-1944: THE ME 262 ‘SHEET ANCHOR’,” Boog recounts the development of the German jet fighter and its modification so that it could also be deployed as a bomber. Galland, after his first flight with the Messerschmitt powered by twin turbojets on 22 May 1943, wrote that “flying it was ‘as if an angel were pushing’.” At a demonstration of the Me 262 on 26 November 1943, when Hitler said that he wanted the new jet as a high-speed bomber, he was “assured, without contradiction from the Luftwaffe top brass present, that the machine could carry bombs, even though no start at all had been made on the technical modifications needed for this.” Nor had they been made by the following spring, when Hitler asked Göring’s deputy, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, “how many bombs the Me 262 could carry, and the latter replied, ‘None, mein Führer, the Me 262 . . . is being built exclusively as a fighter.’” Hitler flew into a rage, furious that his order of six months before for a Blitzbomber had been ignored. During the heated exchange, Milch answered with ‘Mein Führer, the smallest infant can see that this is a fighter, not a bomber aircraft!’ The conversion of the jet fighter into a fighter-bomber, which involved strengthening the aircraft’s undercarriage, was promptly undertaken, and “on 17 June 1944, on Hitler’s orders, the evocative name Sturm Vogel (Storm-bird) hitherto planned for the Me 262 was changed to Blitzbomber.”

“Yet in June 1944,” Boog writes, “development of the Me 262 was still not far enough advanced for it to be described as ready to go into service. The turbine rotors, with their guide vanes made from a brittle Tinidur alloy, were still not right. Blade fractures were common. During casting, up to 90 per cent of the blades produced were at first rejects. No more than 25-30 hours of working life could be guaranteed for the rotors. New hollow blades . . . could not be expected before the autumn of 1944.”

Production of the Me 262 slowly began in May 1944 with eight aircraft, rising to 124 in December, though, due to various defects, only 75 per cent of the 564 produced in 1944 passed the quartermaster-general’s acceptance inspection. Considering the problems with the development and production of the Me 262, Boog finds it “surprising that the myth is still widespread -- though not among professional historians -- that the Me 262 could have been introduced earlier in huge numbers if Hitler had not wanted to have it built as a high-speed bomber. From the production-engineering viewpoint this order could at that time have played no part at all, since the main problem was still with the turbines . . . . Hitler gets the blame for the Me 262 ‘coming too late’, when it could have altered history in the skies over Germany. But . . . the
The third part of Boog’s monograph, entitled “ATTACK THE BEST FORM OF DEFENCE? GERMANY REACTS IN KIND TO THE ALLIED BOMBER OFFENSIVE,” deals with the attempt by the Luftwaffe to resume strategic bombing of Britain in 1944 and with the V-Weapon offensive. When the British began their heavy bombing of Hamburg in summer 1943, Hitler ordered reprisal raids on English cities. Boog quotes him as saying that “the decisive thing is this: the British will stop only if their cities are destroyed, nothing else ... I can win the war only if I destroy more on the enemy’s side than the enemy destroys on ours -- only if I myself make him feel the horrors of war. This has always been so, and it is the same in the air. ‘Terror is broken by terror,’ he repeated several times at the midday situation conference on 25 July 1943. ‘We must go over to counterattacks, everything else is nonsense’.” When the chief of the naval operations staff pointed out ‘that Luftwaffe attacks on shipping and shipbuilding yards had a greater effect on the British and represented a more effective contribution to the war effort, especially the war at sea, than terror raids’, General [Hans] Jeschonnek [the chief of staff of the Luftwaffe] replied that the Luftwaffe realized this. However, he had a clear order from the Führer that a bomb had to be dropped on London every single night, if at all possible, and that the terror raids must not stop, because the Führer wanted to remind the British again and again that they were suffering from the air war, while people in the United States continued to live undisturbed. It was therefore a political decision.”

Heavily engaged on the Russian front and in the Mediterranean, the German Air Force in 1943 “was for the time being in no position to resume a strategic bomber offensive [against England] worthy of the name. It had no four-engined bombers like the British Lancaster or the American B-17, no light high-altitude bombers like the Mosquito, and no specialized night bombers.” With few exceptions, the raids on Britain in 1943 “were no more than pinpricks ... Altogether only 2,298 t of bombs were dropped on England during the whole of 1943 -- as much as a German town experienced on a single day, or one-hundredth of the bombs dropped that year by the British, or one-hundred-and-fiftieth of the bombs dropped by the Allies jointly on Germany and German-occupied Europe.” By 20 January 1944, 524 bombers and fighter-bombers, 462 of them operational, were assembled for Operation STEINBOCK (Ibex), the retaliation offensive against England. Most of the planes were older models, but the force did include 46 new Heinkel (He 177) heavy bombers. The “Baby Blitz,” as the British called the new offensive, began on the night of 21 January 1944 with a large-scale attack on London, in which some 220 bombers in each of two waves “were to drop a total of about 475 t of bombs (just under 60 per cent of them incendiaries) ... The result for the Luftwaffe was shattering: only about half the bombs hit the British mainland and only just over 30 t fell on the British capital. The bombing raid carried out on London a week later, again in bad weather, was every bit as much of a failure. In the two nights 57 aircraft or nearly 8 per cent of the employed strength were lost; 101 crews had aborted the attack, mostly because of technical trouble. Hitler was beside himself when he was informed of the outcome. He was particularly furious over the failure of the still not operationally reliable He 177 heavy bombers, of which 12 were destroyed during the first week of the air offensive alone, with another four being lost through fire in their power units. ... He was even more enraged by the British report that only some 30 bombers had penetrated as far as the London
urban area. Once more the bulk of the formations had failed to find the gigantic city of London.\textsuperscript{79}

There were seven further bombings of London in February employing between 160 and 240 aircraft, and even though they had fewer losses and were somewhat more successful in hitting their targets than those in January, they clearly were having no impact, Boog writes, “apart perhaps from making the population nervous. . . . In March German losses increased, while results declined with a smaller number of aircraft employed. For the Londoners the ‘Baby Blitz’ ended on 18 April with a raid by 125 bombers. Only a little over 50 t of bombs fell on Greater London. From then on the Luftwaffe confined itself to more accessible ports, but the trend towards heavier losses and smaller attacking forces continued until the offensive was halted altogether on 29 May. . . . At the end of the offensive the entire force was down to 107 bombers and fighter-bombers. . . . Without impairing Allied preparations for the invasion in the least, they had in the end worn themselves out to such an extent that, when the invasion came, they were no longer capable of any significant counter-blows. But this did not yet signal the end of the Luftwaffe’s offensive orientation. The bombers, no longer operational, were now replaced by unmanned jet-propelled bombs (V-I), supplemented by the V-2 rockets developed by the army.\textsuperscript{80}

In his account of the origins and development of the V-1 and V-2 weapons, Boog writes that Hitler “evidently . . . totally misunderstood the need for continuity of research and development of such complicated and novel devices . . . . As late as 5 May 1942 he observed that the Peenemünde people should stop inventing all kinds of things and instead concentrate on building rocket weapons. In spite of the first successful flight of . . . [the Army’s] A-4 rocket [later referred to as the V-2] on 3 October 1942, it took some urging by armaments minister Speer for Hitler . . . to sign the order for its serial production, on 22 December 1942.”\textsuperscript{81} Meanwhile the Luftwaffe was forging ahead with the development of its jet-propelled flying bomb (later called the V-1). “On 26 May 1943,” Boog continues, “a comparative test firing -- instigated by Milch in the hope of promoting the development of the flying bomb at the expense of the rockets -- took place at Peenemünde. While both flying-bomb launches failed, one of two rocket launches was successful. The outcome was that both projects were to be further pursued, but only the rocket was given top priority by Speer.”\textsuperscript{82} This was followed on 7 July 1943, six weeks after the test firing, by a presentation for Hitler by General Walter Dornberger, in charge of the rocket development program, together with Wernher von Braun, the technical director, that led the dictator -- “now intoxicated,” as Boog writes, “with the vision of shortly destroying London with the long-range rocket, making Britain ready to surrender, and thereby safeguarding Germany’s back for her war against the Soviet Union” -- to give “orders for ‘whatever is needed in manpower and material’ to be made available for this ‘war-deciding’ rocket project.” But delays in the production of the Army’s rockets in spring 1944 and a series of successful launches of the Air Force’s flying bomb led Hitler to give priority to the latter.\textsuperscript{83} The first salvo of 27 flying bombs was fired on the night of 15 June, by 18 June 500 V-1s had been launched, by 29 June,1000, and by 22 July, 5000.\textsuperscript{84}

When the Allied advance, following the invasion, deprived the Germans of the launching sites from which the V-1s could reach England, the flying bombs were aimed at targets in Belgium, particularly the port city of Antwerp, through which the Allies were supplied. From June 1944 to March 1945, a total of 22,384 V-1s were fired, 11,892 aimed at Belgium and 10,492 at England,.
and of the latter 3,528 struck England, 2,419 of them falling on London. "Civilian losses in Britain caused by the V-1 were 6,860 killed and 17,981 seriously wounded, as well as numerous pilots killed and several hundred aircraft lost. By August 1944 some 1,450,000 persons had left London. In Belgium there were 3,470 civilians killed, as well as 682 Allied soldiers."85

Meanwhile, the army's A-4 rocket, temporarily downgraded in favor of the Luftwaffe's flying bomb program in spring 1944, had found vigorous support in the aftermath of the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, that was followed by Heinrich Himmler's appointment not only as commander-in-chief of the training army, but also chief of army munitions. In the latter capacity, Himmler put SS-General Hans Kammler in charge of the army's rocket program, under whose aegis preparations were rushed to comply with Hitler's orders in late August to commence the rocket bombardment of London and Paris, which began in September. Early in October, Hitler ordered that London and Antwerp should be targeted. "By the end of 1944," Boog writes, "a total of 1,561 V-2s had been fired, averaging 14 a day. Of these, 447 were aimed at London and 924 at Antwerp... On 27 March the last rocket was fired against England... as well as the last one against Antwerp." Overall, of the almost 6,000 V-2s built, just over 3,170 were launched, 1,403 against England and 1,664 against Belgium. Of those aimed at England, "only 1,115 came down there, and of the 1,359 rockets aimed at London only 517 reached the capital. The rest blew up elsewhere in the countryside, and 61 fell into the sea."86

In assessing the impact on the war of the flying bomb and the rocket, Boog writes that "in military terms, using the V-weapons had as good as no effect..." but that "for the German munitions industry the V-weapons fragmented the development of resources, because the different armed services and their departments spent most of their time, insulated from one another, working on the same or similar projects, thereby diverting far too much material and specialized manpower from other programmes; the development of rocket motors alone was pursued by seven firms, that of missiles by eight. In point of fact, the A-4 [rocket program] at the beginning of 1944 tied up a workforce of some 200,000, about one-tenth of the total employed in aerial armaments, as well as 1,000 t of aluminium a month -- about 5 per cent of the monthly quota allocated to the Luftwaffe, and 10 per cent of the sheet aluminium, enough to build around 2,000 FW 190 fighters."87 Despite the investment in them, the impact of the V-weapons on England was not remotely comparable to that of the Allied bombing of Germany. "Over the first ten months or so of the V-weapons offensive some 5,900 t of high explosives fell on England, only slightly more than was dropped during a single raid on Dortmund on 12 March 1945. Over the eleven months from August 1940 to June 1941 the Luftwaffe dropped about ten times that quantity -- 53,395 t of HE and incendiary bombs -- on England, while the Allies over a similar period... [in] 1944/5 dropped 1,018,000 t on Germany.... One has to agree with [Heinz Dieter] Holsken, the historian of the V-weapons, when he says that there could be no question of a proportionate retaliation and that, in retrospect, the propagandistic abbreviation 'V', chosen to match the English 'V for Victory', might rather have stood not for Vergeltung (retaliation) but for Verzweiflung (despair)."88 Boog's uniquely authoritative and meticulously documented account of the air war in the seventh volume of Germany and the Second World War ends in summer 1944 with the invasion of Normandy. To judge by his communication on the Internet in April 2005 at <http://www.jf-archiv.de/archiv05/200518042953.htm>, his treatment of the final year of the war and his conclusions regarding the air war as a whole will be included in the tenth and final volume of the series, the German edition of which has, as of this writing (August 2007), not yet appeared. His perspective is clearly reflected, however, in a very critical review article,
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Part II, “German and Allied Conduct of the War in the West” (pp. 459-702 with 720 footnotes), by Detlev Vogel, begins with parallel chapters on the German situation in occupied western and northern Europe up to mid-1943 and on the western Allies’ war planning and build-up in England during the same period. The third and fourth chapters deal with German defense measures against an amphibious invasion and Allied preparations for it. The fifth chapter is on Operation OVERLORD, the sixth on the landing in southern France, and the seventh on the battles on the western front from September 1944 to January 1945.

After the German defeat of France and the conclusion of the armistice of 22 June 1940, the Germans occupied northern France and the Atlantic seaboard to the Spanish border, leaving the balance of the country under the Vichy régime of Marshal Henri Pétain. But when the Allies landed in North Africa on 7 and 8 November 1942, the Germans occupied the rest of France (except for a small zone in the southeast occupied by the Italians until after the fall of Mussolini). Although the Vichy government retained nominal sovereignty, the Germans steadily tightened political and military control of all of France, in order, “as Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker, state secretary at the foreign ministry, put it . . . [to] ‘squeeze the country dry’.” Exploitation had already begun after the fall of France, when “foodstuffs, raw materials, armaments, motor vehicles, money, and manpower began to be transferred to the Reich in large amounts,” but “grew dramatically . . . after the defeat at Stalingrad.”

The hardship this entailed gave impetus to the resistance movement that had begun to emerge not long after the defeat in summer 1940. “The Germans reacted relatively mildly to the first attacks -- with fines, curfews, and imprisonment -- but soon began shooting hostages. While the military commander for France, Otto von Stülpnagel, who was relieved of his duties in February 1942, would have nothing to do with such reprisals, Hitler and the OKW increasingly backed the use of violence and brutality. The task was taken over by the ‘senior SS and police leader’ for France, appointed by Heinrich Himmler in March of that year. The growing repression helped to bring about the unification of the initially disparate resistance groups in May 1943 . . . In response to the proliferation of attacks and sabotage, and the emergence of real trouble spots, the Germans took harsh measures. . . . With the cooperation of French police and militia units, thousands were arrested, abducted, and murdered . . .”

The situation in the other German-occupied countries of western and northern Europe was similar to that in France, where increasingly harsh repression “began to isolate those sections of
the population that were prepared to collaborate. Above all, . . . increasing demands for workers for the Reich led at first to criticism and soon -- especially in early 1943 -- to strikes, sabotage, and even revolt."92

Meanwhile, the prospect of an amphibious invasion in the west gave the "decisive impetus to build a 'new western wall', later known as the Atlantic Wall, . . . towards the end of 1941. With labour supplied by the Todt Organisation [that had been engaged in building the Autobahn network and fortifications on the Franco-German border], a total of 15,000 defence installations were to be built . . ., and manned by some 300,000 troops." By February 1943, only 6,000 installations had been completed, and "as late as June 1944, some 160,000 labourers, mostly French, were still working on the unfinished fortifications."93

After a thorough, copiously annotated review of the background and preparations on the part of the Allies and their German adversaries for the impending invasion, Vogel inserts an excursus on the similarities and differences in the conduct of the war by the two sides.94 He points out that whereas the Allies gave the planned operation priority, "Hitler, despite various declarations of intent, never concentrated his military resources in the west. The immense pressure of the Soviet armies prevented any significant withdrawal of German divisions from the eastern front."

Moreover, "heavy losses in the east and the consequent assignment of priority to the needs of the army soon led to a reduction in the arming of the navy and Luftwaffe. As a result, the plans and measures for defence against a landing were mainly decided by army staffs and army commanders. Since the weakness of German naval and air forces in the west meant that an Allied invasion could probably no longer be prevented, the army officers banked everything on making the Atlantic Wall into a huge defensive bulwark."95

In his excursus, Vogel also points out that there were "major differences between the Allies and the Germans in terms of military planning and organization. On the Allied side there was a body of experts (the COSSAC [Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander] staff) that had years of experience of landing operations, and a joint command authority (SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces]) that was able to take advantage of all that groundwork. There was nothing comparable on the German side. In accordance with the long-standing German tradition of multiple command structures, many people were responsible for many things, but no one person was responsible for everything."96

Despite these and other important differences that he describes, Vogel points out that "an analysis of opposing structures reveals certain similarities. Both . . . [commanding generals], Rundstedt and Eisenhower, had to contend with subordinates who, because of their military achievements, had a higher standing with their own propaganda organs -- and sometimes with those of the enemy -- than they themselves. The men in question were Rommel and Montgomery, who were also closer to their respective supreme commanders, Hitler and Churchill. This was bound to have a negative impact on relations with their immediate superiors, Rundstedt and Eisenhower, as well as on their work in the military high command. Standing, as they did, at the centre of things, it was no wonder that Montgomery and Rommel often thought they knew better than anyone else (Montgomery, in particular, made many American officers feel this, as well as his British subordinates). Both were increasingly unwilling to listen to other opinions or admit mistakes. All this boded no good for co-operation on future operations in western Europe."97
Nowhere did this apply more clearly than in the case of Operation MARKET-GARDEN in September 1944. The 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery was stalled in Belgium. To achieve a breakthrough, airborne forces (in Operation MARKET) were to seize the bridges across the three branches of the Rhine delta in the Netherlands (the Maas, the Waal, and the Lower Rhine), as well as several canals, and to hold them until they could be reinforced by strong armored units advancing along the connecting roads (Operation GARDEN). Success in this undertaking would open the way to northern Germany for the 21st Army Group. However, Vogel writes, “the operation did harbour some inherent risks. After all, Arnhem, where the British 1 Airborne Division was to land, was more than 80 km away from the . . . [British] bridgehead on the Meuse-Scheldt canal, so it would take some time for [Lt. Gen. Brian] Horrocks’s divisions to reach the town.”

“Montgomery, like the SHAEF officers,” Vogel writes, “presumably believed that the mass deployment of airborne troops so far behind the front would shock their opponent and paralyse his ability to react for a long time. They also thought the German troops in the Netherlands would not put up much serious resistance. Obviously this was still the view when SHAEF learned from ULTRA [codebreaking] on 16 September -- a day before the operation began -- that the 9th SS-Panzer Division was positioned near Arnhem and the 10th SS-Panzer Division was heading that way. Despite these reports, Montgomery stuck to his decision that the British 1st Airborne Division troops should be dropped at Arnhem.”

However, the presence of the two German armored divisions near the dropping zone was not first revealed by an electronic intelligence interception the day before the airborne assault, but considerably earlier, as reported in 1987 by the former chief intelligence officer of the British Airborne Corps, Brian Urquhart (in accounts not mentioned by Vogel). In his memoirs and in an article in The New York Review of Books, Urquhart recounts that, about a week before the scheduled operation, he learned from a 21st Army Group intelligence summary that elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were refitting in the Arnhem area. When he reported the danger that this represented to General F. A. M. Browning, the overall commander of the airborne operation, he was told that he “should not worry unduly, that the reports were probably wrong, and that in any case the German troops were refitting and not up to much fighting.” But Urquhart was deeply concerned and therefore had oblique photographs of the dropping zone taken at a low altitude “by the acknowledged experts in this art, an RAF Spitfire Squadron stationed at Benson in Oxfordshire,” and “the pictures when they arrived,” he writes, “confirmed my worst fears. There were German tanks and armored vehicles parked under the trees within easy range of the 1st Airborne Division’s main dropping zone. I rushed to General Browning with this new evidence, only to be treated once again as a nervous child suffering from a nightmare.” Later the same day, Urquhart was visited by the division’s chief doctor, who informed him that he was suffering from acute nervous strain and exhaustion and ordered him to go on sick leave. “When I asked him what would happen if I refused,” Urquhart writes, “he said, in his kindly way, that I would be arrested and court-martialed for disobeying orders.” So on 15 September, two days before Operation MARKET GARDEN, Urquhart went on sick leave. “The operation which was to end the war in Western Europe,” he wrote, turned out to be “an unmitigated disaster, almost certainly destroying all possibility of an early victory. It had . . . given the Germans a success on the eve of their total defeat, made a nightmare of the last months of war for the Dutch, and landed the British army in a riverine swamp for the winter. The casualties, both military and civilian, were appalling -- more than 17,000 Allied soldiers killed, wounded, or missing in nine days of fighting, no possible reckoning of civilian casualties, and all for nothing or worse than nothing. Much of the town of Arnhem was destroyed, and after the
battle the Germans forcibly evacuated the entire population for the remainder of the war. Small wonder that Prince Bernhard later remarked, 'My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success'.

In the summary with which Detlev Vogel concludes his study of the war in the west to January 1945, he writes that “it was a great stroke of luck for the Allies that in Eisenhower they had a supreme commander who was usually able to find a balance between the different interests of his staffs and senior officers. It was thanks to the American general’s diplomatic astuteness that he always cooperated well with the western political leaders; as a result, he commanded great respect when it came to taking military decisions. Rundstedt [the German commander in the west] and his successors, however, were constantly confronted with direct intervention by Hitler and the OKW, which reached down to the lowest military level.”

Part III, “The War in the Pacific 1943-1945” (pp. 703-840, with 537 footnotes), by Gerhard Krebs, is a sequel to Part II of the sixth volume of Germany and the Second World War, a study by Werner Rahn on the war in the Pacific to 1942. This contribution, which overlaps Rahn’s, is not a comprehensive history of the last part of the war in Asia and the Pacific, but a very well-informed account of Japanese strategy and decision-making from 1942 to the end of the war by a leading German authority on twentieth-century Japan, particularly during the era of the war in Asia and the Pacific.

“Since his appointment as commander-in-chief of the combined fleet in 1939,” Krebs writes, “Admiral [Isoroku] Yamamoto had systematically assembled an entourage of ambitious middle-ranking officers and had gradually taken over the task of operational planning from the naval general staff, though still theoretically under its orders. After the victory at Pearl Harbor he enjoyed such prestige that he was able at last to achieve his aim of becoming more or less free to do as he liked. . . . The very day after Pearl Harbor he set about making preparations for a landing operation . . . [against Hawaii].” The first step would be to take Midway, some 2,000 km north-west of Hawaii, from which land-based air strikes could be launched. However, the army and navy chiefs of staff were united in opposing any move to take Hawaii; Yamamoto had expected opposition from the army but not the navy, which insisted that “pressure on Australia . . . be kept up, and preparations made to attack Ceylon.” When Yamamoto finally presented the chief of the naval general staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, an ultimatum, threatening to resign if the Midway operation was not approved, “Nagano decided to give Yamamoto a free hand to execute his plan.” There was still opposition to it, but this was dispelled on 18 April 1942 by American air strikes on Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe by carrier-based B-25 bombers. “The physical damage was negligible, but the psychological impact was enormous. Essentially, the raids represented a defeat for the Japanese navy. It had not managed to block the enemy fleet’s advance, and it had assumed that the heavy B-25s could not take off from carriers. The operation showed how dangerous and effective Hawaii was as a base from which the US could use to deploy carrier formations wherever it chose. . . . The general staff promptly agreed to collaborate in operations against Midway and -- to protect the flank -- the Aleutian Islands, and planning started at once.” In the decisive Battle of Midway, early in June, the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers while the Americans lost one. “Meanwhile,” concludes Krebs, “the Imperial Navy had captured Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians, but that was small consolation.”
Early in August 1942, two months after the defeat of the Japanese Navy at Midway, American forces landed on Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands east of New Guinea, which the Japanese, in their advance into the South Pacific, had invaded in May. Although the Americans were initially able to land without losses, the Japanese quickly began to bring in reinforcements, supported by major naval forces, including battleships and aircraft carriers. The costly struggle that ensued lasted until the implementation of the decision of 31 December 1942, reluctantly approved by the emperor, to withdraw the last Japanese forces from the island. When the Japanese two months later set out to move reinforcements to New Guinea, consolidating their position after the defeat at Guadalcanal, their convoy was attacked by American and Australian aircraft in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, in the course of which eight troop transports were sunk, together with four escorting destroyers. “With the destruction of these reinforcements,” Krebs concludes, “the initiative in New Guinea passed definitively to the Americans.”

The fall of Saipan, from which the Japanese home islands could be reached by American bombers, was followed in mid-July 1944 by the resignation of General Hideki Tojo from the position of prime minister that he had held since October 1941. His successor, Kuniki Koiso, a retired general, established, as a replacement for the civil-military liaison conference, the supreme council for the direction of the war, a smaller body of six that included himself as prime minister, the foreign minister, the army and navy ministers, and the army and navy chiefs of staff.

Turning to Axis relations, Krebs writes that “until the autumn of 1942 the strategic plans for Japanese-German-Italian cooperation looked quite promising. The aim was to establish a link through India, Iran, and Suez. The European Axis powers were to advance through Egypt or the Caucasus, and Japan was to mount an attack from Burma or across the Indian Ocean. However, joint German-Japanese operations never got beyond the planning stage. The German defeat in Egypt, the Allied landing in North Africa, and above all the disaster at Stalingrad put an end to all such dreams. Japan too found itself on the defensive on Guadalcanal, in New Guinea, and at sea. Both partners solemnly promised to stick to the plans for a land link, but these declarations of intent merely served the patently transparent purpose of saving them from having to confess to each other how weak they both were.”

The only other way to establish a territorial link would have been through the Soviet Union. Despite their neutrality pact with the USSR, the Japanese, as the Germans urged them, might have launched an attack against the Russians, but they were so heavily committed in China and in the Pacific that they had no forces available to fight in a new theater. They therefore proposed to the Germans that they end their war against Russia. “Even before the outbreak of the Pacific war, [Foreign Minister Shigenori] Togo had advised Germany shortly after he took office in October 1941 to conclude a separate peace with the USSR [and in so doing] he was supported by the army high command and some members of the navy.” The Japanese repeatedly broached the subject of a separate peace, offering to mediate between Germany and the Soviet Union. But when the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Naotake Sato, approached Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in September 1943 about receiving a Japanese delegation, Molotov refused, saying “there was ... no question of a peace agreement”; and when at the beginning of October the Japanese ambassador to Germany, General Hiroshi Oshima, presented Japanese proposals for a separate German-Soviet peace, not only did Hitler and Ribbentrop reject them, but “Germany renewed its demand that Japan enter the war against the USSR, and even went so far as to suggest that Tokyo had given Moscow assurances that it would remain neutral. The Japanese re-
acted with fury." The fact was that the Japanese scrupulously maintained their neutrality in the German-Soviet conflict, and that the Germans, as Krebs puts it, were "annoyed that Japan did not stop, or even substantially hinder, Allied convoys carrying supplies to the USSR, as they passed through the waters off the Kurile Islands."

In opening his consideration of the deliberations of those in Japan who had misgivings about the course of the war and sought to end it, Krebs writes that "Japan’s decision to go to war in 1941 had not been unanimous, nor had it been taken lightly. On the contrary, there had been repeated calls for caution and restraint from various quarters, notably elements in the foreign ministry, in the navy, at court, and in industry. Even in the army a number of senior officers had had misgivings, and those retired from active service were even more skeptical. The people who had warned against starting the war, and had tried to the very last minute to prevent it, were concerned, once it had begun, to get a peace settlement as soon as possible instead of fighting on to the bitter end. . . . The extraordinary thing was that the opposition groups were able to keep in touch with one another quite easily, and develop their . . . plans with impunity. The dreaded secret police normally nipped any incipient resistance in the bud with the utmost ferocity, but prominent figures enjoyed a degree of immunity that would have been unthinkable in totalitarian states in Europe."

Prominent among those seeking to end the war as soon as possible were the former prime minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, and the former ambassador to London, Shigeru Yoshida. "They were prepared to end it even if Japan did not win, to avoid the risk of a revolution that they feared might sweep away the imperial system. They gradually won over the most important court functionary, the lord keeper of the privy seal, [Koichi] Kido . . . and constantly extended their influence, bringing in eminent people from various groups, including imperial princes such as Prince [Naruhiko] Higashikuni, a retired general, and Hirohito’s brother Prince Takamatsu, a serving naval officer and a member of the naval general staff. Within the government, the foreign ministers, Shigenori Togo, and later Mamoru Shigemitsu, both showed the keenest interest in ending the war." Shigemitsu, who became foreign minister in spring 1943, encouraged contact between his ministry and the general staff. In view of concern that Germany might seek a separate peace with the western powers, leaving Japan isolated, the general staff recommended a three-step program: a separate German-Soviet peace should be concluded with Japanese mediation; a separate peace should be concluded between China and Japan, following a reconciliation between the Japanese-sponsored regime in Nanking and the Chinese Nationalist regime in Chungking; and Germany, Italy, and Japan should conclude a peace agreement with the English-speaking powers. “This plan for a series of peace agreements remained in place,” according to Krebs, “with only a few amendments, for almost two years. It did not bear fruit, essentially because, at this stage in the war, it was unrealistic. Neither Berlin, nor Moscow, nor Chungking showed any interest in the Japanese proposals. No attempt was made to contact the Allies until the spring of 1945, and even within the upper echelons of the Japanese civilian authorities and military high command there were so many disputes on so many subjects that it was impossible to reach the consensus required under that particular system of government.”

When the German armed forces capitulated on 8 May 1945, “Japan issued an official declaration of its intent to continue the war regardless,” writes Krebs, and “the German ambassador was taken to task, and told that his country had broken its December 1941 agreement not to make a separate peace.”
Six weeks later, on 18 June, “the supreme council for the direction of the war decided, despite continued resistance from the army minister and both chiefs of staff, to approach the Allies through a neutral power, preferably the USSR, and make a peace offer subject to the condition that the imperial system be maintained. The plan was to sound out the Soviet Union by the beginning of July, and then take steps to end the war as quickly as possible.” When the Japanese received no response regarding their request from the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo by early July, the emperor decided to convey the request for Russian mediation by a special envoy. Prince Konoe agreed to undertake the mission, and Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow was sent a message for Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informing him that the Japanese earnestly desired to end the war and wished to send Prince Konoe to Russia as a special envoy with a personal message from the emperor himself. Sato promptly sought an appointment with Molotov to confirm the necessary arrangements, but was informed that the Soviet foreign minister was about to leave the country (for the impending Potsdam conference) and would not be able to see him until his return.

On 26 July the western Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration, calling for Japan’s unconditional surrender. Although there was no reference to the retention of the monarchy, the Japanese were offered the prospect of fair treatment, and the future government was to be established in accordance with the will of the people. When Tokyo learned of the terms of the declaration through an Allied radio broadcast, the supreme council for the direction of the war and the cabinet “agreed to await the Soviet reply to the Japanese initiative before responding. It was also decided that the government should pass over the declaration in silence, and that the press should publish excerpts but without undue emphasis or editorial comment. The foreign minister was accordingly astonished to read in the papers next morning that the cabinet had decided to show its contempt by ignoring the declaration. It emerged, on inquiry, that the military had again put pressure on the prime minister the day before, and the press had simply printed what he had said at a press conference.”

Two days later, at Potsdam, Stalin informed Truman of the recent Japanese initiatives and Soviet responses, but said that the latest Japanese proposal “essentially . . . contained nothing new, and would therefore be rejected.” Truman thanked him for the information and “told him that no official reply to the Allied ultimatum had as yet been received from Japan, but radio broadcasts just picked up from Tokyo suggested that it would be rejected out of hand.”

After Molotov returned to Moscow, Sato tried for several days to get an appointment with him. While he was waiting, on the morning of 6 August, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The next day, Sato was told that Molotov would see him on the evening of 8 August. “That evening Molotov received Ambassador Sato, as arranged, but before Sato could speak Molotov read out the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and handed him a written copy. The reasons the USSR gave for taking this step were that Japan had supported ‘Hitler’s Germany’ for many years, and above all that Japan’s request for Soviet mediation was rendered null and void by its rejection of the Potsdam declaration. Also, the Soviet Union was fulfilling its obligations to its allies, and thus helping to hasten the end of the war. The news was broadcast from Moscow a few hours later, and picked up by the Japanese foreign ministry just after midnight. [Foreign Minister Shigenori] Togo consulted his closest colleagues, and decided with their agreement to advise the emperor to accept the Potsdam declaration at once, without reservation.”
When the supreme council for the direction of the war met on the morning of 9 August, it was immediately informed that the emperor wanted a decision to surrender and learned, in the course of the meeting, that a second atomic bomb had been dropped, on Nagasaki, and that “the Red Army was encountering hardly any resistance from the Japanese in Manchuria.” The prime minister (since April 1945), Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, the navy minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, and Foreign Minister Togo were inclined to accept the Potsdam declaration, but “the chief of the army general staff, Gen. [Yosijiro] Umezu, the chief of the naval general staff, Admiral [Soemu] Toyoda, and the army minister, [General Korechika] Anami, would accept the Allied ultimatum only on four conditions: the Japanese state must be preserved in its present form; war criminals must be tried by Japan in its own courts; the armed forces must be demobilized by Japanese officers; and the number of Allied occupation troops must be subject to strict limits. The army minister, Anami, and the army chief of staff, Umezu, still preferred the idea of fighting a last decisive battle on Japanese soil after the Allies had landed, and called for the traditional spirit of Japan to be defended to the last drop of blood.” The meeting, adjourned for a cabinet meeting that afternoon, was “followed by a long series of consultations on way and means of ending the war, culminating in an imperial conference on 14 August. The battle-lines remained more or less unchanged, as the three ‘hawks’, that is, the army minister and the two chiefs of staff, blocked the decision to seek a peace settlement. To break the deadlock, Konoe and the former foreign minister, Shigemitsu, advised the emperor to issue an order stating that Japan agreed to surrender on one condition, that the kokutai [the emperor-system] remain intact. Hirohito agreed, and said he was prepared to hold an imperial conference for the purpose that very evening.” At the conference that began shortly before midnight on Saturday, 9 August, the prime minister recommended accepting the Potsdam declaration, “as it did not contain any demand for a change in the emperor’s constitutional position,” and that the other three conditions supported by the army minister and chiefs of staff be dropped. When they did not agree, Prime Minister Suzuki and the president of the privy council, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, finally asked the emperor to decide. “This was the first time in the history of Japan that the emperor had been called upon to act as arbitrator. Hirohito said he was in favour of surrender, as he could not stand by and see his innocent people suffer any longer. To continue the war would destroy Japanese civilization, and would have a detrimental effect on the rest of humanity.” The emperor’s decision was accepted by the council and endorsed by the cabinet the same night. “Shortly thereafter the foreign ministry informed the Allies, through its diplomatic representatives in Sweden and Switzerland, of Japan’s decision to accept the Potsdam declaration. It understood that the declaration contained no demands touching on his majesty’s prerogatives as sovereign ruler, but it sought clarification on this point.” In the response to the Japanese note of 10 August, the United States declared “its intention of placing the emperor and the Japanese government under the supreme commander of the Allied powers, and letting the final form of government be determined in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.”

When the foreign minister informed the emperor of the American response on 12 August, “he expressed the fear that kokutai ideologues would object to the phrase ‘freely expressed will of the people’ on the ground that it was blasphemous. His own department saw no reason to take exception to it. The emperor agreed, and said he was in favour of accepting it without reservations.” However, there was not only resistance within the supreme council for the direction of the war, but also among a group of middle-ranking army officers, including Anami’s brother-in-law, who had turned to the army minister, demanding that he prevent the surrender and telling him that if he failed he should commit ritual suicide. Early on Sunday morning the 13th, “Anami spoke to Kido, objecting to the idea of accepting the Allied terms, but the lord
keeper of the privy seal was not swayed, despite the danger of internal strife.” Later that day, the supreme council for the direction of the war met again to consider the American note, but the deadlock was not broken; the prime minister, the foreign minister and the navy minister could not persuade the army minister and the army chiefs of staff to agree to the accept the Allied terms. During a break in the meeting, however, “the emperor, who had been apprised of Anami’s approach to Kido, summoned the two chiefs of staff, Umezu and Toyoda, and warned them not to spill blood unnecessarily, and not to obstruct the peace negotiations.”

On Monday morning, August 14th, American planes dropped leaflets over Tokyo, stating that Japan had accepted the Potsdam declaration and informing the Japanese people of the American reply. “This meant,” writes Krebs, “that the government could now no longer keep it secret, but it also increased the danger of public revolt. Kido and Suzuki therefore urged the emperor to make a decision quickly, and persuaded him to convene a further imperial conference at 1030h, to be attended by the members of the supreme council for the direction of the war, their secretaries, all cabinet ministers, and the president of the privy council, Hiranuma.” At the conference in the palace bunker, “the emperor said that, despite the unremitting opposition of the three military ‘hawks’, he had decided to end the war because Japan could no longer continue the conflict. He was firmly convinced, despite the ambiguous wording of the Allied demands, that the monarchy and the kokutai would be left intact. . . . He proposed to address the nation in a radio broadcast, announcing that the Allied terms had been accepted -- a decision clearly taken on Kido’s advice. He instructed the cabinet to endorse the decision to end the war and draft an edict for him to issue.” Regarding Hirohito’s statement, Krebs concludes: “The fact that the emperor was obliged to express his will twice, once in the night of 9 to 10 August and again on the morning of 14 August, shows that the political and military leaders did not automatically owe him allegiance. However, his voice tipped the balance . . .” At 11 p.m. that evening, the foreign minister sent telegrams to his representative in Switzerland, for forwarding to America, Britain, China, and Russia, stating that Japan accepted the Potsdam declaration. The conditions on which the military had insisted were mentioned only as requests or suggestions. Meanwhile, that same night, the army officers who had demanded that Anami stop the surrender had pursued their plot. When they approached the commander of the imperial guard, General Takeshi Mori, and he refused to join them, two officers killed him. When the eastern district army stationed in the Tokyo area refused to join the mutiny, it was clear that it had failed. Two of the leaders took their own lives; the army minister, General Anami, did commit ritual suicide.

In his speech broadcast the next day, August 15th, the “monarch told his subjects that he was resolved to endure the unendurable, though he avoided using the word ‘defeat.’ The Suzuki cabinet resigned. The lord keeper of the privy seal, in a break with tradition, did not approach the former prime ministers but only consulted the president of the privy council, Baron Hiranuma, about a successor. This time they agreed that an imperial cabinet was the only appropriate answer, and they settled on Prince Higashikuni as a candidate for the post of head of government. The emperor gave his consent, and after some hesitation, the prince accepted the post. This was the first time in the history of Japan that a member of the imperial family had formed a cabinet and also, as a general, assumed temporary control of the army ministry.” On the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on Saturday, September 2nd, the act of surrender was signed on behalf of the Japanese government by Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had returned to the foreign ministry, and on behalf of the high command by the chief of the army general staff, General Umezu. “To the astonishment of the Japanese,” concludes Krebs, “the speech given on that
occasion by the commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces, MacArthur, was all about reform and reconciliation.”

In an epilogue, “LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: THE END OF THE PACIFIC WAR AND THE POST-WAR ORDER IN ASIA,” Krebs writes that “the radical changes wrought by the Second World War were even more far-reaching in Asia than in Europe. Armed conflicts continued for much longer, revolutions swept away the old order, and decolonization brought white rule to an end. Japan, defeated, had to submit to occupation by the victorious American forces, under the supreme Allied commander, General MacArthur -- with token contingents from the Commonwealth countries, Australia, New Zealand, and India -- and was obliged to accept military tribunals and undergo a process of democratization. The armed forces were constitutionally disbanded, and the country was formally required to refrain from the threat or use of force. The monarchy was retained, but the emperor was to be no more than a ‘symbol of national unity’.”

As mentioned at the outset, Part III of Germany and the Second World War, Volume VII: The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and Easi Asia 1943-1944/5, does not include a comprehensive history of the last years of the war in East Asia, even though one could certainly interpret that to be implied by the title of the volume. But the translated volume does not have the same title as the original. The full German title of the book published by the Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt in 2001 is Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 7: Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive -- Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943 bis 1944/45. If the main title of the volume had been translated to read Germany on the Defensive, rather than supplanting it with a translation of the German subtitle, it would have been clear to readers that the purpose of the segment on the war in East Asia in this volume, like the segments by Werner Rahn on “Japan and the war in Europe” and “The War in the Pacific” in the foregoing volume, was to show the global dimension of the world war in which Germany was engaged, together with its Axis ally in East Asia, elucidating the issues between them, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, and indicating how the strategy of the Allies against Germany was affected by their struggle against Japan in Asia and the Pacific. The contributions by Rahn and Krebs to the sixth and seventh volumes, respectively, of Germany and the Second World War fulfill this purpose admirably.

Notes

1. The first three volumes of the Oxford University Press translation of the series, reviewed in the fall 1996 issue of this newsletter, dealt with the background of the war and with its course through 1941, except for the campaign against the Soviet Union. This was covered, up to the winter of 1941-42, by the fourth volume that was reviewed in the fall 1999 issue. Those four volumes, carrying the account of the conflict to the time of the entry of the United States into the conflict, were followed by Vol. V, Part 1, a structural study, in historical context, of the organization and mobilization of the German war economy through the winter of 1941-42. That volume was reviewed in the spring 2001 issue of this newsletter. Part II of Vol. V, on the economy to 1944/45, was reviewed in the spring 2004 issue. Vol. VI, which had appeared before the second part of the fifth volume and dealt with the global war (including the conflict in Asia) into 1943, was reviewed in the spring 2002 issue.
2. The German edition was published as *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Hrsg.), Band 7, *Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive: Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Oстasien 1943 bis 1944/45*, by Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 848 pp., with a list price of €49.80 (equivalent to $68.00 on 28 July 2007). The original edition having appeared in 2001, the bibliography of the translation does not cite relevant works that appeared later.


5. See, in ibid., Vol. VI, Boog’s subchapters on “Indiscriminate Bombing: The Operations of Royal Air Force Bomber Command” (pp. 558-580) and “The Beginnings of Strategic Bombing by the Eighth US Air Force” (pp. 580-597).


7. Ibid., p. 55. Only by the end of May 1943 were 300 available, the minimum number of bombers considered necessary to conduct a raid in box formation, providing optimal protection against interceptors (p. 56).

8. The RAF’s Avro Lancaster, of which over 7000 were built during World War II, was comparable in size and weight to the USAAF’s B-17 Flying Fortress, but having been designed primarily as a night bomber, it had a smaller crew, with fewer gunners to fight off German interceptors, since fewer interceptors were apt to be deployed against night bombers than bombers attacking by day. As a consequence of carrying fewer gunners, guns, and ammunition than the B-17, the Lancaster normally carried a heavier bomb load than its American counterpart (of which over 12,000 were built) with its crew of ten. (The Lancaster, with its crew of seven, carried a bombload comparable to that of the American B-29 Superfortress that was developed later in the war and not used in the European Theater.) For technical details and bibliography, see in *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia* the articles on “Avro Lancaster” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avro_Lancaster], “B-29 Superfortress” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-29], “B-17 Flying Fortress” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-17_Flying_Fortress], and “Maximum reported B-17 & B-24 bomb loads” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_Reported_B-17_%26_B-24_Bomb_Loads], the last of which includes a chart showing “the huge bomb loads carried at night by Royal Air Force Avro Lancasters over Europe” and notes the weight of the machine-gun ammunition carried by B-17s at the expense of their bomb load: “The recommended number of rounds to be taken on the second Schweinfurt mission, October 14, 1943, was 6,800 rounds weighing approximately 2,040 lb. . . .”

9. The twin-engine de Havilland Mosquito, with a plywood structure of spruce and balsa, was initially built as a fast bomber without defensive armament, as that would have substantially reduced its speed ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito]).
10. “In the OBOE system, an aircraft was guided along a path at a fixed distance from a ground station with the aid of radio signals that it amplified and sent back (hence its German name of ‘Bumerang’); the time interval needed for the return of the pulses indicated the aircraft’s position. When a pilot kept on the planned course, he heard a constant tone -- similar to the sound of an oboe -- in his headphones. If he strayed, short and long pulses (dots and dashes) told him to make corrections. The circle the aircraft was tracing passed close to one side of the target, since after release the bombs would travel on a tangent, that is to say outwards. If the height and speed of the aircraft was known, all this could be calculated precisely. . . . A second ground station (called ‘Mouse’) sited around 160 km from the first (called ‘Cat’) was also able to calculate the course of the aircraft, and gave the signal to release the bombs when it reached the right point” (Germany and the Second World War, Vol. VII, p. 17). The OBOE system, which provided guidance for one plane at a time, was used by pathfinder aircraft (often the very fast, high-flying, two-motored plywood de Havilland Mosquito bomber) which marked the target by flares for the bomber force that followed.

11. In January 1943 only 23 aircraft were fitted with H2S, but by the following winter some 90% of RAF bombers carried it (ibid., p. 18). A brief account of its development and use during World War II (together with bibliographical references) is provided in the article in Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/H2S_radar>.

12. “In January 1943 . . . came the first use of new target indicators (TIs); the attack on Berlin on the 16/17th saw a ground marker triggered by barometric pressure to disintegrate in the air in a cascade of 60 coloured pyrotechnic candles, while that on Düsseldorf on the 31st featured sky markers on parachutes” (Germany and the Second World War, Vol. VII, p. 18).

13. Ibid., p. 20.

14. Ibid., pp. 27-28. Boog points out that “Essen was, after Berlin, the second most heavily bombed city in Germany,” as illustrated in Table 1.1.4, “Large-scale RAF raids on Essen, 1942-1945,” showing 36 attacks, during the last of which, on 11 March 1945, 1,053 aircraft dropped 4,737 tons of bombs (p. 26).

15. Ibid., p. 28.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 29.

18. Ibid., p. 45, where Boog cites Martin Middlebrook’s The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943 (Harmondsworth, 1984 [also New York: Scribner’s, 1980, and a new paperback edition, Cassell’s Military Classics, 2000]) as reporting that over half the new pilots from the Commonwealth came from Canada and a good third from Australia and New Zealand, and that there were also Norwegians, French, and Poles.

19. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

20. Ibid., p. 44.
21. Ibid., p. 33, where Boog in footnote 103 writes that Middlebrook “also confirms the government’s deliberate misleading of the public as to the true character of the bombing war. Even the bomber crews, too, were taken in by it, and most of them learned no more about their targets than did the public” (The Battle of Hamburg, pp. 382-4, 387-90).

22. Ibid., pp. 45-46, where Boog points out that “408 out of a total of 1,131 U-boats had been built on Hamburg slipways, and in the production statistics of the Reichsgruppe Industrie the city took second place after Berlin . . . ,” and comments: “The belief that Germany could be kept in check from the air after the war, with minimal support from a small expeditionary ground force, is reminiscent of the ‘air’ or ‘imperial’ policing of colonial peoples in the inter-war years.”

23. Ibid., p. 46. There had been serious misgivings about utilizing WINDOW because of concern that the Germans, once they saw its effectiveness, might themselves use it against British radar during air raids on England. But, as Boog explains on p. 44, several considerations led to the decision to begin employing it during the attack on Hamburg on the night of 24/25 July 1943. Among the most important was the fact that during the spring 1943 bombing campaign against the Rhineland and Ruhr regions, “around 36 per cent of the British bombers shot down had fallen prey to German night fighters equipped with radar.” Consequently, “the chief of Air Staff, Portal, felt that if WINDOW had already been used at the time 230 British bombers would still be flying.” Moreover, “the relatively feeble response of the German bomber force to the invasion of Sicily [on 10 July 1943] brought the realization that it was by now too weak to mount large-scale raids.” Ironically, the Germans were in fact already aware of the potential danger posed by WINDOW. In Flak: German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), Edward B. Westermann writes that “the German military had tested a similar device in the winter of 1942 in a series of trials over the Baltic Sea. These trials demonstrated that if the Allies employed foil strips (chaff) cut to half the length of the radar’s operating frequency, ground-based radar would be ‘badly affected.’ . . . The German military kept these trials absolutely secret, going so far as to prohibit work on counter-measures for fear that such measures might leak out and alert the Allies to the jamming method. In turn, the Luftwaffe began to pursue countermeasures only after the devastating raids on Hamburg” (p. 214).

24. Ibid., pp. 46-47.


26. Ibid., p. 50.

27. Ibid., p. 51. Details on the raids of 17 August on Peenemünde and of 23 August on Berlin from the RAF Bomber Command Campaign Diary for that month are posted on the Internet by the Bomber Command Association at <http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aug43.html>; with reference to the raid on Hannover on the night of 18/19 October, the diary at <http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/oct43.html> states that “one of the Lancasters lost . . . was the 5,000th Bomber Command aircraft lost on operations since the start of the war. By the end of this night, the bombers had flown approximately 144,500 sorties -- 90 per cent of them by night -- and lost 5,004 aircraft -- 4,365 by night and 639 by day -- over enemy territory, crashed in the sea or shot down over England by German Intruders or ‘friendly’ defences.”
28. Ibid. p. 52. A table on p. 54, “British and American air raids on Kassel,” shows that Bomber Command dispatched 528 bombers against the city on October 22nd, that 444 of these reached Kassel and dropped 1,824 tons of bombs, and that 42 aircraft were lost. The table shows that Kassel was not attacked again by the RAF, but that there were fifteen American daytime air raids against the city between 19 April 1944 and 9 March 1945 (none matching and only two approaching the scale of the final RAF raid). Kassel was an important target because of its industries, including the Henschel works, a major manufacturer of tanks and artillery, and the Fieseler aircraft works that produced the Me 109 fighter, the Fi 156 “Storch” reconnaissance plane, and the V-1 flying bomb, the world’s first cruise missile (p. 52).

29. Ibid., p. 53.

30. Ibid., pp. 57-59.

31. Ibid., pp. 60-62, where Boog explains that when the P-47 Thunderbolts were fitted with 75-gallon steel drop tanks in July 1943, their range was extended to 540 km, and when the British 108-gallon tank was introduced a month later, it gave the planes an operational radius of 600 km. However, this was not a sufficient range to provide fighter escorts to bombing missions much beyond the western borders of Germany. The picture changed with development and deployment, beginning in late 1943, of “the P-51 Mustang, which as a long-range escort fighter was to bring about a turning-point in the daylight bombing offensive.” (With external drop tanks, the P-51 had the range to escort bombers all the way to Berlin and back.)

32. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

33. Ibid., pp. 64-66.

34. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

35. Ibid., p. 79.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 83. Some two months later, on a direct order from Portal, Harris did conduct a major raid on Schweinfurt, on the night of 24 February 1944, following a daytime attack by 8th Air Force bombers (with long-range fighter escorts). Boog observes that “this was the first ever complementary attack as part of this bomber offensive” (p. 85).

38. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

39. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

40. Ibid., pp. 94-97, citing Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, CXXX, cols. 737-55.


42. Ibid., pp. 114-16. “A symptom of the shorter and poorer-quality training of Germany’s air force pilots is seen,” Boog writes on p. 128, “in the number of aircraft losses involving no action
against the enemy, which was mostly higher than those lost in battle,” and he illustrates the point with a table on p. 129, “Luftwaffe aircraft losses in first half of 1944,” showing that in each of the six months listed the loss due to “Enemy action” was exceeded by that due to “No enemy action.”

43. Ibid., p. 117.  
44. Ibid.  
45. Ibid., p. 108.  
46. Ibid., p. 107.  
47. Ibid., p. 122.  
48. Ibid., p. 128. According to the chart cited above in note 41, the Luftwaffe lost a total of 17,537 aircraft during the first half of 1944, 8,222 of them by enemy action.

49. Ibid., pp. 138-40.  
50. Ibid., p. 143.  
51. Ibid., p. 145.  
52. Ibid., p. 154.  
53. Ibid., pp. 154-57.  
54. Ibid., pp. 157-58.  
55. Ibid., p. 159.  
56. Ibid., p. 160.  
57. Ibid., pp. 162-63.  
58. Ibid., p. 172.  
59. Ibid., pp. 172-76.  
60. Ibid., p. 177.  
61. Ibid., pp. 216-17, with table on p. 217. The term flak is an acronym for Flieger-Abwehr-Kanone, meaning anti-aircraft gun.  
62. Ibid., pp. 224-25.  
64. Ibid., p. 227.
65. Ibid., p. 228.


68. Ibid., pp. 338-39.

69. Ibid., p. 340.

70. Ibid., p. 342.

71. Ibid., p. 343.

72. Ibid., pp. 344-45.

73. Ibid., p. 345.


75. Ibid., p. 375.

76. Ibid., p. 376.

77. Ibid., pp. 406-7.

78. Ibid., p. 408.

79. Ibid., pp. 416-17.

80. Ibid., pp. 418-420, with a table on p. 419 on the "Main German night raids on Britain, January - May 1944," giving, for each date, the target, the number of sorties, the number of monthly losses, the tonnage of bombs dropped, and the percentage on target.

81. Ibid., p. 421.

82. Ibid. The V-1 flying bomb, powered with a pulse-jet engine, had an explosive payload of about 830 kg (ibid., p. 429); the V-2 was a ballistic surface-to-surface rocket with a high-explosive warhead of 976 kg, with an impact velocity of about 3,500 km/h, "releasing an energy equivalent to the simultaneous collision of 50 railway engines of 100 t each. As it had no proximity fuse, a hole about 7 metres deep was created by its impact; this, however, directed the pressure wave upwards and not sideways as with the slower-impact V-1, thereby causing less damage than the flying bomb. On the other hand, its supersonic speed meant there was no defence against it, resulting in a major element of surprise." (ibid., p. 438).
83. Ibid., pp. 421-23.

84. Ibid., pp. 432-33.


86. Ibid., pp. 440-44.

87. Ibid., pp. 454-55.


89. Ibid., p. 465.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., pp. 466-67.

92. Ibid., p. 467

93. Ibid., pp. 470-71.

94. “Excursus: Allied and German Conduct of the War -- Similarities and Differences,” ibid., pp. 581-84.

95. Ibid., p. 581.

96. Ibid., pp. 581-82.

97. Ibid., p. 583.

98. Ibid., pp. 663-65.

99. Ibid., p. 665.

100. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987; repr., Norton, 1991), pp. 72-75. Urquhart published essentially the same account as an article entitled “The Last Disaster of the War” in The New York Review of Books, vol. 34, No. 14 (September 24, 1987), <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/4678>. In a review in The Journal of Military History (Vol. 59, No. 2 [April 1995], pp. 358-59) he writes that he regards Martin Middlebrook’s Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), which is also cited by Vogel, as the best book on the subject, having profited from its predecessors. In his memoirs (on. p. 72) and in his NYRB article, Urquhart, a former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations and biographer of Hammerskjold and of Ralph Bunche, wrote that he initially attributed Browning’s “refusal to take the latest news on German opposition seriously” to the general’s “ambition to command in battle,” but later came to realize that he had done him “a grave injustice. I did not fully realize until more than thirty years later, when Cornelius Ryan published his masterly account of the Arnhem battle, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster,
that ‘Market Garden’ was the offspring of the ambition of Montgomery, who desperately wanted a British success to end the war. In fact Browning himself, in expressing his doubts about the wisdom and scope of the operation, had used the phrase which Ryan took as the title of his book.”


102. After spending many years in Japan, Dr. Krebs served on the staff of the Military History Research Institute in Potsdam, 1996-99, and then became a member of the faculty of the Free University of Berlin. His extensive bibliography (including many titles in English) is on the Free University’s website at <http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~japano/mitarbeiter/krebs.shtml>.

103. Ibid., pp. 708-11.

104. Ibid., pp. 711-12.

105. Ibid., p. 717.

106. Ibid., pp. 778-80.

107. Ibid., pp. 780 and 810.

108. Ibid., p. 737, where Krebs refers the reader to the standard work on German-Japanese relations during the Second World War, Bernd Martin, *Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Vom Angriff auf Pearl Harbor bis zur deutschen Kapitulation*, Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, xi (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969).

109. Ibid., pp. 737-38.

110. Ibid., pp. 744-45.

111. Ibid., p. 739. In his monograph on the Japanese ambassador to wartime Berlin, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), Carl Boyd writes that “nearly 50 percent of lend-lease shipments entered the Soviet Union via Siberia, much of it by air but also much of it by cargo ship over the Pacific route to eastern Siberian ports, especially Vladivostok. Japan did not blockade shipments to Soviet ports because the Soviet Union, although at war with Japan’s ally, Germany, was neutral in the war between Japan and the United States... However, Washington feared that Tokyo’s policy might change and American vessels bound for Soviet ports would be intercepted whenever it suited Japan’s convenience, so after the attack on Pearl Harbor, this awkward arrangement was modified. In a somewhat unreal contrivance 15 American ships were transferred under lead-lease to the Soviet flag in November and December 1942, 125 by mid-1945” (p. 93).

112. Ibid., p. 763.

113. Ibid., p. 765.
114. Ibid., p. 741.
115. Ibid., p. 816.
118. Ibid., p. 828.
119. Ibid., pp. 828-29.
120. Ibid., pp. 829-30.
121. Ibid., p. 830. Herbert P. Bix, in *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000; repr., Perennial, 2001), writes that to make Secretary of State Byrnes’s reply of August 11 to Japan’s first surrender offer “more palatable to Hirohito, the army leaders, and Hiranuma, Vice Foreign Minister Matsumoto Shinichi (after discussions with Togo), and Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu resorted to mistranslation of several key works in the English text. In the operative sentence, ‘From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,’ Matsumoto changed ‘shall be subject to’ [reizoku subeki] to read ‘shall be circumscribed by’ [seigen no shita ni okareru]” (pp. 518-19). Bix goes on to write that this “change may have helped the still deeply divided Hirohito to accept peace. The next day, August 12, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. When Prince Asaka asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved, Hirohito replied ‘of course.’”
122. Ibid., pp. 830-32.
123. Ibid., pp. 832-33.
124. Ibid., p. 833. Regarding the mutiny, Bix writes that “an attempt by a small group of middle-echelon officers in Tokyo to reject Byrnes’s reply forced Hirohito to repeat his sacred decision on August 14. These last-minute coup attempts at the palace and at Atsugi air base did not amount to much and were aborted. Hirohito’s decision of August 10 had totally demoralized the military bureaucrats at Imperial Headquarters and stripped them of the will to fight. Once Army Chief of Staff Umezu had explained to his subordinates that the emperor “had lost all confidence in the military,” those in favor of fighting to the finish abruptly gave up” (*Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, p. 519).
125. Ibid., pp. 833-34.
126. Ibid., p. 835. That Hirohito was retained as emperor was due, in no small part, to an assiduous campaign to deny his responsibility for the war. In 2000, Prof. Herbert P. Bix (SUNY Binghamton), in his study of Hirohito cited above (winner of both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Circle Critics Award), documents conclusively that the emperor indeed played a far more active wartime role than affirmed in the assiduously crafted postwar legend reflected in
most histories of the war, though not in the work reviewed here. In his objective account, the original German edition of which was concluded and in production before the publication of Bix’s magisterial work on Hirohito and his times, Krebs does not focus sharply on the role of the emperor, but definitely makes his active role as supreme warlord very clear, as well as his suppression of dissent, even within the imperial family. Writing of dissatisfaction with the Koiso cabinet, following the fall of Tojo in July 1944, for example, Krebs writes: “The army retained its strong position, and it was felt, particularly in the peace party, that the cabinet was unlikely to change direction. The peace party included Konoe, and also Hirohito’s brother Prince Takamatsu, who was critical of the emperor because, on principle, he allowed only men in public office to express opinions and act . . . . His other brothers, Chichibu and Mikasa, were also in favour of seeking peace without delay, but the emperor would not allow them to approach him” (loc. cit., pp. 810-11).

127. Werner Rahn, “Japan and the War in Europe “ (pp. 161-189), and Werner Rahn, “The War in the Pacific” (pp. 193-298), in Research Institute for Military History, ed., Germany and the Second World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), reviewed in the Spring 2002 issue (No. 67) of this newsletter (pp. 6-38).
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U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
Accessions & Openings

October 1, 2006 – September 30, 2007


Part I. Washington, D.C. Area

A. Documents

General Records of the Department of the Treasury (Record Group 56)
111 cubic feet
Accession consists of unclassified files of the Treasury, 1941–96. Contact Archives II Reference.

General Records of the Department of Justice (Record Group 60)
2 cubic feet
Accession consists of records relating to the Nazi War Crimes of World War II. Records unprocessed. Contact the Archives II Reference Staff, 301-837-3510.

Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Record Group 65)
610 cubic feet
Accessions consist of records from the following FBI Central Records Classification System: Customs Laws and Smuggling (Class 54) cases from 1924–78 (0.25 cubic feet); Hatch Act (Class 101) cases from 1939–47 (0.75 cubic feet); Department of Energy Applicant Background Investigations (Class 116) cases from 1946–79 (40 cubic feet); Civil Unrest (Class 157) cases from 1957–78 (242 cubic feet); files relating to Espionage Violations (Classification 65), 1936–78 (40 cubic feet); Background Investigations of Applicants for Federal Employment, including Presidential and U.S. Court appointments, 1929–79 (32 cubic feet); and Investigations of Civil Unrest and Disturbances—Racial Matters, 1957–78 (256 cubic feet). All of these accessions contain some classified material that is not available for research. Contact Archives II Reference.

Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Record Group 218)
64 cubic feet
Accessions consist of records of International Joint Board/Committee files and agreements (ca. 1940–80) and operational planning and reconnaissance/surveillance programs files (ca. 1940–79). Records unprocessed. Contact the Archives II Reference Staff, 301-837-3510.

Records of the Department of Transportation: Maritime Administration (Record Group 357)
27 cubic feet
Files from the Division of Ship Design and Engineering Services, Maritime Subsidy Board, relating to trial trip reports of new ships, 1939–81. Contact Archives II Reference.
B. Special Media

Records of the Bureau of Ships (Record Group 19)
248 cubic feet
This series, Ship Engineering Drawings, 1940–60, consists of engineering drawings for the construction and modification of U.S. Navy ships and is an accretion to the Hull Series. The drawings include hull structure, system modernization, and booklets of general plans. The ships include hospital ships, repair auxiliaries, small aircraft carriers and LSDs. Materials opened and processed. Accession NN3-181-06-002 (A).

Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Record Group 38)
7.5 cubic feet
This series, Operational Archives, Maps and Charts, 1941–46, consists of strategic maps and photographic studies to plan operations in the European and Pacific theaters during World War II. Materials opened and processed. Accession NN3-038-04-004.

Records of the U.S. Bureau of Mines (Record Group 70)
2 cubic feet
This series, College Park and Avondale Metallurgy Research Center Drawings, 1936–85, consists of records relating to the construction of the College Park Metallurgy Research Center, originally named the Eastern Experiment Station, in 1936 and 1937 and the later transfer of research and administrative operations from this building to the Avondale Metallurgy Research Center from 1976 to 1978. Records relating to the College Park facility, located on the University of Maryland campus, include floor plans, site plans and maps of the area, studies and reports, letters sent and letters received, construction estimates, lists of construction materials and bills of sale, published brochures, and building dedication materials. Also included are photographs showing the progress of construction, later damage to the interior of the building, and demonstrations of experiments.

Records of the Bureau of Aeronautics (Record Group 72)
1,400 cubic feet

Records of the National Park Service (Record Group 79)
72 cubic feet
The series “Accretion to the Numbered Drawing Series, 1940–92,” consists of manuscript, annotated, published, and photoprocessed maps, plans, and drawings relating to the properties under the jurisdiction of the NPS National Capital Region and its predecessors. The records include early maps of the city of Washington as well as maps and plans of specific parks, parkways, city squares, triangles, circles, recreational centers, playgrounds, and grounds around public buildings, including general area plans, topographic surveys, landscape development and planting diagrams, property maps, lighting plans, street and trail plans, water and sewer plans, and plans for a wide variety of structures. Documented structures and grounds include the Washington Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, the White House, and Arlington National
Cemetery. These plans were prepared by several NPS offices, other Federal agencies, and architectural and engineering or construction contractors. Materials opened and processed. Accession NN3-079-07-001.

Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (Record Group 229)
7.76 cubic feet; 7,370 items
This accession consists of one series of black-and-white and color photographs that pictorially document the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States during World War II. The photographs cover a wide variety of subjects taken in Latin American countries including 1) basic economy including health, sanitation and the development of natural resources; 2) transportation and communication; 3) industrial, commercial, and financial development; 4) rationing; 5) tourism; 6) educational and cultural affairs; 7) and national defense. Photographs were made in both rural and urban settings. Photographs exist for most of the nations in Latin America, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Materials open and processed. Accession NN3-229-078-002.

Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter) (Record Group 338)
12 cubic feet (partial)
This series, Accretion to Maps and Plans of U.S. Army Facilities in Panama, 1911–93, consists of maps, drawings, architectural and engineering plans of structures built by or for the U.S. Army in defense of the Panama Canal. The structures documented are headquarters and administrative buildings; officer, enlisted, and family housing; magazines, warehouses, motor pools, stables; gymnasiums, theaters, golf courses, and other recreational facilities. The drawings include elevations, plans, sections, and details relating to construction: foundations, framing, and roofing, and some plumbing, electrical, and air conditioning systems. The drawings are of original construction as well as later additions and modifications. Also included are general construction plans and site plans that show building arrangements, roadways, and runways. Accession NN3-338-99-007.

Records of the United States Army Military District of Washington (Record Group 551)
3 cubic feet
This series consists of moving images of the Presidential funerals of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. The content includes extensive television news coverage of the events. The series also contains audio recordings reflecting the participation of the Military District of Washington in special events, including Presidential ceremonies, visiting foreign dignitaries, state funerals, honors and awards bestowed upon individuals and groups, and other such events. Also included in the audio series is a copy of Gen. John J. Pershing’s farewell speech to the Army in 1924. Accession NN3-338-83-31/32.

Part II. Regional Archives

Philadelphia—NARA’s Mid Atlantic Region Contact archival operations, 215-606-0100.
Records of the Selective Service System, World War I (Record Group 163)
1 cubic foot

Chicago—NARA’s Great Lakes Region Contact archival operations, 773-948-9001.

Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers (Record Group 77)
200 cubic feet

Records of the Forest Service (Record Group 95)
71 cubic feet

Fort Worth—NARA’s Southwest Region Contact archival operations, 817-831-5620.

Records of the Selective Service System, 1940– (Record Group 147)
2,905 cubic feet. Records are restricted and require screening.
Arkansas State Headquarters. Registration cards, classification ledgers, and appeal dockets, 1940–74.
Louisiana State Headquarters. Registration cards, classification ledgers, and appeal dockets, 1940–74.

Oklahoma State Headquarters. Registration cards, classification ledgers, and appeal dockets, 1940–74.
Texas State Headquarters. Registration cards, classification ledgers, and appeal dockets, 1940–74.

Kansas City—NARA’s Central Plains Region Contact archival operations, 816-268-8013.

Records of the Selective Service System (RG 147)
2,045 cubic feet
Des Moines, IA. Registration cards, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; classification records, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; docket books, Act of 1940.
Topeka, KS. Registration cards, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; classification records, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; docket books, Act of 1940.
St. Paul, MN. Registration cards, Act of 1940; classification records, Act of 1940; docket books, Act of 1940.
Lincoln NE. Registration cards, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; classification records, Act of 1940, dates of birth 1922–40 and 1941–57; docket books, Act of 1940.
Omaha, NE. Registration cards, date of birth 1922–40; classification records, date of birth, 1922–40.
Bismarck, ND. Registration cards, Act of 1940; classification records, Act of 1940; docket books, Act of 1940. Records are restricted and require screening.
Denver—NARA’s Rocky Mountain Region Contact archival operations, 303-407-5740.

Records of the Selective Service System, 1940– (Record Group 147) 817 cubic feet
Selective Service System offices in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Classification and registration records, 1940–75.

General Records of the Department of Energy (Record Group 434) 23 cubic feet

Laguna Niguel—NARA’s Pacific Region Contact archival operations, 949-360-2641

Records of the Selective Service System, 1940– (Record Group 147) 1,119 cubic feet
  State of California (including Alpine, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Los Angeles, Mono, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties) Registration Cards, Docket Books of Boards of Appeal, 1922–57. Materials are privacy restricted and require screening.

Seattle—NARA’s Pacific Alaska Region Contact archival operations, 206-336-5115.

Records of the National Park Service (Record Group 79) 10 cubic feet
History and Archeology Records, 1936–92. Records are subject to the Freedom of Information Act under exemption 3.

Records of the Selective Service System (Record Group 147) 583 cubic feet
Alaska State Headquarters at Anchorage, Classification Records, Year of Birth (YOB) 1922–57.
  Guam Headquarters at Agana, Classification Records, YOB 1924–57.
  Hawaii State Headquarters at Honolulu, Classification Records, YOB 1922–57; Special Registration of 1950, Medical, Dental, and Allied Specialists Classification Records, YOB 1901–32.
  Montana State Headquarters at Helena, Classification Records, YOB 1922–30.
  Oregon State Headquarters at Portland, Registration Cards, YOB 1922–57; Classification Records, 1922–30.
  Oregon State Headquarters at Salem, Classification Records, YOB 1922–57.
  Washington State Headquarters at Seattle, Classification Records, YOB 1922–57.
  Washington State Headquarters at Tacoma, Classification Records, YOB 1922–30; Alien Records, DSS Form 306, 1940–47; Board of Appeal, Docket Books, YOB 1922–30. Records may be screened for Privacy Act.

San Francisco—NARA’s Pacific Region Contact archival operations, 650-238-3501

Records of the U.S. Coast Guard (Record Group 26) 50 cubic feet
14th District, Hawaii. Captain of the Port files, 1937–42; and others.

Part III. Presidential Libraries

Herbert Hoover Library

The Hoover Library accessioned a five-foot accretion to the papers of Elliot Roosevelt, a scholar of the Hoover-Roosevelt transition. The library also accessioned four feet of research files of Mordecai Lee, professor of governmental affairs, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, from his recently published book, Institutionalizing Congress and the Presidency: The U.S. Bureau of Efficiency, 1916–33.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

Notable archival acquisitions include the papers, recordings, and research materials of Curtis Roosevelt, the eldest grandson of President and Mrs. Roosevelt; research files of Mordecai Lee related to the Office of Government Reports; an “Eyes for the Navy” certificate issued to J. W. Bridwell by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt; papers and memorabilia of Frederick C. Schneider, Jr., a member of the 240th Military Police Battalion stationed in Hyde Park during World War II, donated by his widow Helen M. Schneider; an April 14, 1945, edition of the Calcutta (India) Statesman announcing the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, donated by Ross D. Netherton; scrapbooks, photographs, and other historical materials of Helen Roosevelt Robinson, the daughter of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s half brother (donated by her granddaughter Nora Stark); Franklin D. Roosevelt and Al Smith autograph letters, 1924 (donated by the children of Joseph Nicolletti); materials related to the B-17 named My Day after Eleanor Roosevelt’s syndicated newspaper column (donated by Charles Belfry); facsimiles of recently discovered documents related to Otto Frank, the father of Anne Frank (donated by the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research); photographs and other archival materials that were part of a personal collection of FDR-related items (donated by Mrs. Helene Harris); and a previously unknown photograph and original negative of Franklin D. Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy inspecting the U.S. Navy Base Hospital #5 in Brest, France, August 20, 1918 (taken by Lt. Chester O. Tanner, USN Medical Corps and donated by John D. Tanner); a 1963 autographed letter from Harry S. Truman to Ben Holiber including a postscript in which Truman takes credit for naming Eleanor Roosevelt “First Lady of the World while she was still with us,” donated by John Lieber; an accretion to the papers of Curtis Roosevelt, President and Mrs. Roosevelt’s eldest grandson; correspondence and inscribed photographs from Henry A. Wallace to Charles and Juanita Roos, 1931–50, including many letters written during FDR’s first hundred days in office, purchased by the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute from Scott Pugmire of Sunland, CA, and donated to the library; the papers of Philip S. Brown, an official in the Resettlement and Farm Security Administrations, donated by his daughter Deborah Brown; a collection of 1920s and 1930s radical pamphlets and newspapers donated by State University of New York at New Paltz Professor David Krikun; an accretion to the papers of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., donated by his
daughter Beatrice Berle Meyerson; and a 16mm Ectachrome film of FDR’s campaign trip to Pittsburgh, PA, October 11, 1940, donated by Michael Kane.

Harry S. Truman Library

The library acquired the papers of Niles W. Bond, a State Department official during the Truman administration (less than one linear foot, ca. 1947–49). The papers include correspondence with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the Army regarding the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Korea. This collection is closed pending processing. The library acquired the papers of May Southern Wallace, sister-in-law of Harry S. Truman (less than one linear foot, ca. 1946–76). The papers include photographs, printed material, and scrapbooks concerning Margaret Truman and the Truman family. This collection is closed pending processing. The library acquired the papers of Martha Ann Swoyer, niece of Harry S. Truman (less than one linear foot, ca. 1940–91). The papers include copies of letters from Truman to Swoyer and other items. This collection is closed pending processing. The library acquired the papers of Alonzo Hamby, historian and biographer of Harry S. Truman (about 15 linear feet, ca. 1945–95). The papers include copies of correspondence and newspaper clippings, research notes, manuscript drafts, and other items mostly relating to Hamby’s books, *Beyond the New Deal* and *Man of the People*. This collection is closed pending processing. The library acquired the papers of John Robertson Clagett, an official in the War Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (less than one linear foot, ca. 1944–46). The papers include correspondence, photographs, and other items relating to Clagett’s work in the War Crimes Division. This collection is closed pending processing. The library acquired an accretion to the papers of Henry Reiff, a legal specialist in the Department of State (less than 1 linear foot, ca. 1945–2006). The accretion includes letters concerning the 1945 United Nations Conference in San Francisco, photographs, and newspaper articles. This accretion remains closed pending processing. The library acquired the Papers of Donald S. Dawson, administrative assistant to the President from 1947 to 1953 (14 linear feet, ca. 1930–2001), consisting of correspondence, memoranda, handwritten notes, photographs, scrapbooks, reports, and other items mostly relating to Dawson’s association with the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs, and his relationship with his wife, the film star Ilona Massey. This collection is closed pending processing.

The library has opened for research: the papers of Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army from 1950 to 1952 and Under Secretary of the Army from 1952 to 1954, consisting of correspondence, reports, newspaper clippings, memorandums, photographs, and speeches primarily relating to Johnson’s military career and his service as an official in the Department of the Army during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, 7.5 linear feet, 1940–55; the papers of Raphael W. Green, consisting of correspondence, photographs, memoranda, an annotated calendar, and other materials relating primarily to Green’s activities as Secretary for the United States Reparations Mission to survey Korea.
and Manchuria (Northeast China) in 1946, which was headed by Edwin W. Pauley, less than one linear foot, 1946–47, 1981; the papers of Lyle Watts, Chief of the Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, 1943–52, consisting of correspondence, memoranda, photographs, articles, and speeches concerning Watts’s career with the Forest Service and government forest policy, 3 linear feet, 1910–62; and approximately 1,400 pages of recently declassified documents mostly pertaining to U.S. relations with Russia, Germany, and Japan from the Harry S. Truman Papers (Psychological Strategy Board Files, President’s Secretary’s Files, Korean War File, and National Security Council Files), the Papers of Dean Acheson, and the Papers of Clark Clifford.

**Dwight D. Eisenhower Library**

The library added more than 17,000 pages to its holdings during the quarter from the accretions to the papers of Fred C. Scribner, Jr., and Abbott Washburn and the World War II Participants and Contemporaries collection. As part of its efforts documenting World War II, the Eisenhower Library continued the nationwide solicitation of personal papers, diaries, printed material, and photographs of veterans who served overseas or on the home front. Manuscript items were received from eight individuals this year. To date, the archives section has collected some 83 linear feet of material from 501 donors. Ten oral histories were accessioned: Sherman Adams (OH-539); Ruth Buchanan (OH-540); Jacqueline Cochran (OH-541); Barbara Eisenhower (OH-542); John S. D. Eisenhower (OH-543); Andrew Goodpaster (OH-544); Robert Hallman and James F. McCown (OH-545); Bryce Harlow (OH-546); Stewart E. McClure (OH-547); and George Tames (OH-548). The library received permission from Columbia University to change the restrictions on Malcolm Moos OH-503 from PRRCQ to PRCQ. The library accessioned the John Pendergrass collection of campaign materials, from larger posters, street banners, and broadsides as well as World War II memorabilia, which includes a survival kit, Mother’s flag, a Nazi spoon with swastika, and a collection of German currency. An additional accession includes papers from Robert Cutler and Abbott Washburn.

Museum items accessioned include Barbara Eisenhower Foltz collection of photographic albums dating from 1924 to 2006, totaling 104 albums; and a collection of albums presented to DDE upon his retirement from the U.S. Army, dating from 1911 to 1952.

**John F. Kennedy Library**

The library accessioned: an accretion to the Personal Papers of John Kenneth Galbraith, economist, educator, author, professor of economics, Harvard University (1949–75), correspondence and writings, 40 feet, closed pending processing; an accretion to the Personal Papers of Kay Halle, journalist, author, and Kennedy family friend, including management papers for the Kay Halle estate, including inventories, registers, tapes, books, and photographs, 2.25 feet, closed awaiting deed; Veterans Administration Records, including copies of Navy personnel files of John F. Kennedy, Joseph P. Kennedy, and
Robert F. Kennedy, 0.25 cubic feet; and three additions to the Miscellaneous Manuscripts Collection, including the papers of Mark A. Soden, navy pilot and roommate of Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., crew lists, correspondence, and photos of JPK, Jr, 0.250 feet, open.
An Annotated Guide to World War II Websites

by Mark Parillo and Jonathan Berhow

[In the Spring & Fall 2006 Newsletter, a series of website reviews appeared under the same title as above. The explanatory remarks for that article are reprinted here as an introduction to the website reviews printed in this issue of the newsletter.]

In the world of scholarship, the Worldwide Web in the last decade has developed from an intriguing novelty to an invaluable and often essential tool for research and teaching. While the Internet is not about to replace the reference library, archival collection, or classroom instructor, it can enhance the effectiveness of such traditional resources.

The great anomaly of the Worldwide Web is that its advantages for the researcher and teacher (flexibility of presentation, low cost, ease of use, accessibility) are also the reasons for disadvantages that undercut its very usefulness. Building websites is now relatively simple enough for virtually anyone with a will to create one. The Worldwide Web is flooded with sites on every conceivable topic. The sites vary in usefulness, quality, and reliability. A Holocaust denier can construct a website as easily as a serious scholar. So can gamers, re-enactors, modelers, and other hobbyists and buffs. Important contributions may be made by the untrained amateur, but sifting the wheat from the chaff—and the authentic from the intentionally or unintentionally altered—is sometimes difficult but always time-consuming.

“Surfing the ’net” can be recreational, but for the serious scholar and teacher it is more often a frustrating and cumbersome chore. The problems boil down to two: finding what is relevant to one’s project among the dizzying multitude of websites out there and assessing the reliability and value of what one may find. The standard search engines, such as the ubiquitous Google, help the web user with the first task, but there are few aids or shortcuts for tackling the second.

One response from scholars can be to ignore the Worldwide Web and continue with tried and true methods, which after all have worked for generations. This may be an attractive option for the many among us who are technophobes or who were not trained as researchers and educators in the Internet age. In the twenty-first century, however, this puts the scholar and teacher at a disadvantage. The Web can substantially stretch our research time and funding. And its misuse by our students, who are venturing into cyberspace all the time regardless of how we may view it, is a threat to the effectiveness of our teaching. It becomes harder for historians to ignore the Web with each passing day.

An annotated guide to websites can be of notable use in overcoming the disadvantages of the Web. Such resources already exist, though many suffer from limitations in the scope, quality, or comprehensiveness of their
website assessments. The Institute for Military History & 20th Century Studies at Kansas State University is launching an online annotated guide to World War II websites that is intended to be a reliable and easy-to-use reference for scholars. The URL for the guide is http://www.k-state.edu/history/institute/wwisiteguide.html. The site is not yet open for use but will soon be available. It will be continuously expanded and updated. Some sample site assessments follow.

Note: The terms used in the “categories” field have specific connotations, as described below. More than one term may be used.

antiquarian: contains much technical data on equipment, weapons, uniforms, or other minutiae
avocational: intended for gamers, re-enactors, modelers, etc.
bibliographic: contains bibliographic listings, bibliographic essays, annotated bibliographies, book reviews, historiographic essays, or other such material
educational: has resources for students and/or teachers
experimental: intended to invite interaction from the site visitor, such as a site with a message board
political: contains materials selected to support a political position or theory
recreational: intended for the pure enjoyment of vicariously experiencing historical events (e.g.: might include stories, photographs, and video clips selected for interest rather than scholarly value; might also include actual games or other interactive features)
reference: contains very basic information and/or links to other sites
scholarly: intended for researchers who are pursuing scholarly projects

Website Title: “World Wars: World War Two”

URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/

Subject: General World War II.

Category:
Recreational
Educational
Experiential

Author: The bbc.co.uk/history production team

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Special Edition: The Secret War
Nuremberg: The Nazis on Trial

Description: “World Wars: World War Two” is part of the BBC’s history website, which collectively is an engaging and massive effort of some 10,000 pages covering ancient, British, and recent history as well as the two world wars and the Cold War. Leaning toward the British involvement in the war, each topic listed above under “Table of Contents” is followed by a handful of subtopics in the form of articles, timelines, image galleries, videos, or games, with an icon preceding each entry to indicate which of these media is employed. Furthermore, each topic ends with “Fact Files” that provide synopses of various related aspects of the main topic (e.g. The “Gathering Storm” Fact Files contain the entries on the “Declaration of War on Germany,” “Evacuation,” and “Conscription Introduced.”) The site provides several image galleries including Axis and Allied propaganda posters, the Royal Air Force, and aerial reconnaissance, and articles from contributors such as Duncan Anderson, Peter Hart, Richard Holmes, and Richard Overy.

What makes this site such an excellent resource for educators and fun for students or enthusiasts is the high level of interactive content. The site boasts a very busy message board, interactive timelines like the “D-Day Clockwatch,” audio files of speeches from Winston Churchill and interviews of British veterans, and animated campaign maps. Educationally, the site offers a “Practical History” component with articles, activities, quizzes, and sources of history where browsers are invited to “Chart the emergence of a British standing army,” learn “How to Do History,” or discover the “Historian’s Role.”

Links: “World Wars: World War Two” offers few external links but organizes its internal links in a useful and navigable way. Links to other BBC history webpages appear on the main World War Two page and on the right hand column of pages exploring particular subjects as “Related Topics” and “Related Links” respectively. One highlight here is the “WW2 People’s War: An archive of World War Two memories – written by the public, gathered by BBC” containing 47,000 stories and 15,000 photographs.

Last Updated: Unknown

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: The BBC’s online effort is very well organized ~ a browser will not get lost five or six pages into this site despite its size. Its graphic presentation is subdued but inviting and attractive without being overwhelming or confusing. Readability and navigability are not sacrificed for looks.

Reliability of Content: All articles and images are fully attributed.

Audience: General public, students and educators
Rating: *******

** Website Title: “Naval Historical Center: Preserving Legacies, Inspiring Sailors”

URL: http://www.history.navy.mil/index.html

Subject: World War II Naval History

Category: Scholarly
Avocational
Recreational
Reference
Bibliographic
Antiquarian

Author: Naval Historical Center

Table of Contents:
New Items and Events
  New Items
  Events at the Center
  News from the NHC
  New Images Posted

FAQ
Online Resources
  The Navy Art Gallery Online Exhibits
  Naval Aviation Topics and Information
  Guide to U.S. Naval History Organizations
  Library Online Reading Room
  Library Special Collections
  Operational Archives Online Documents
  Online Photograph Collection
  Ships’ History
  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
  Traditions of the Naval Service
  Underwater Archaeology

Publications
  Bibliographies
  By Sea, Air, and Land
  Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons, Volume 1
  Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons, Volume 2
  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
The Naval Historical Center (NHC) “is the official history program of the Department of the Navy,” and its website offers a considerable amount of bibliographic information, primary documents, articles, and other historical data probably most useful to researchers, serious enthusiasts, and college students: its “For Kids” Section is quite weak. What the site contains is self-explanatory using the navigation bar on the left side of the main page (see Table of Contents). For specific World War II content, a browser may want to start at “Wars and Conflicts” which will direct them to a page where it is possible to search “Naval History by Period: World War II, 1941-1945.” As per the NHC’s mission, most of the information available deals with the U.S. Navy, but some non-U.S. topics are covered as well (e.g. German submarines U-505, U-571, and U-1105). Of special note are the “Online Reading Room: Publications, Documents, and Subject Presentations,” where many original documents, articles, and Special Research History publications are organized chronologically, topically, and alphabetically by title,
and the “Online Photograph Collection” that affords large, high-quality, downloadable images.

Links: A few links are scattered throughout the site.

Last Updated: 9 February 2007

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: The NHC’s website generally amounts to a utilitarian, unattractive listing of information, which tends to hurt its useability and potential engagement for younger students. Its organization is slightly redundant but not problematic.

Reliability of Content: The resources available at this site are well referenced and the bibliographic aspect of this site is one of its high points.

Audience: Researchers, enthusiasts, students.

Rating: * * *

Website Title: “The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings”

URL: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/

Subject: Pearl Harbor

Category:
Scholarly
Recreational
Reference
Political
Experiential

Author: Pearl Harbor History Associates, Inc. (“Keeping the record straight. Remembering Pearl Harbor.”)

Table of Contents:
Pearl Harbor Attacked (http://pearlharborattacked.com/)
Pearl Harbor Message Board
USS Arizona Remembered
Free Pearl Harbor Brochure
Pearl Harbor Shop
Pearl Harbor Links
Description: A subset of Jewell's "World War II Resources" ("Primary source materials on the Web. Original documents regarding all aspects of the war."), "The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings" (PHA) website is divided into two main and two secondary components. "Pearl Harbor Attacked" is a link to a site containing, among the other items listed above, a long list of links and an active message board. "The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings" is the documentary foundation of this historical effort, where the nine investigations into the attacks are available as transcriptions that can be viewed online or downloaded as .zip files. To aid browsers, the first secondary component provides three "[s]uggested research path[s]" to help navigate the 25,000-page report, including an extensive "Listing of Additional Files" containing intelligence reports, Magic intercepts, policy documents, and photographs. The second links to other documents and photographs outside the purview of the Congressional Hearings. Though there is a political angle to PHA, in that all debates over the historical record contain a political element and Jewell is interested in quashing the FDR conspiracy angle of Pearl Harbor, the value and focus of the site is the documents provided.


Last Updated: Unknown, but the message board is in current use.

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: PHA is relatively ugly site, its organization and presentation out of date. Most of the pages, with the exception of "Pearl Harbor Attacked," were created in 1996 and 1997. This does not, however, detract from the primary purpose of the site: accessing primary documents.

Reliability of Content: The attribution of documents at PHA is excellent, and the author even goes to pains to explain to readers the attention to the "faithful reproduction of the source documents" under the "Read This" link.

Audience: General public, researchers, students.
Rating: ** * * *

Website Title: “Anarchy Archives: An Online Research Center on the History and Theory of Anarchism”

URL: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/index.html and http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/spancivwar/Spanishcivilwar.html

Subject: Anarchy and the Spanish Civil War

Category:
Recreational
Educational
Reference
Bibliographic

Author: Dana Ward, Professor of Political Studies at Pitzer College, with contributions from students at the Claremont Colleges.

Table of Contents:
The Cynosure
  Michael Bakunin
  William Godwin
  Emma Goldman
  Peter Kropotkin
  Errico Malatesta
  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
  Max Stirner
  Murray Bookchin
  Noam Chomsky
  Bright but Lesser Lights
Cold Off the Presses
  Pamphlets
  Periodicals
Anarchist History
  Worldwide Movements
  First International Paris Commune
  Haymarket Massacre
  Spanish Civil War
    History
    Bibliography
    Buenaventura Durruti
    Graphics
Art and Anarchy
Bibliography
Timeline

Description: “Anarchy Archives” presents one of the least addressed issues in World War II websites, with the exception of limited treatment of fascism: ideology, in this case, anarchist ideology. The World War II-related content of this site is the “Spanish Civil War” component found under “Anarchist History” on the website’s main page. Relevant information is shared through links to other websites in the “History” section (e.g. “Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives,” “Essays on the Spanish Civil War,” “Spanish Civil War Factbook”), a “Bibliography” with works listed from 1934 to 2006, a link to a webpage on Spanish anarchosyndicalist Buenaventura Durruti, and “Graphics” with photographs and copies of posters from the war. The Spanish Civil War is not covered as comprehensively or as interactively as more general sites often afford their subjects, but what “Anarchy Archives” sets out to do it does well, and, unlike many other online history efforts, makes a genuine attempt at fostering disagreement and an objective perspective of its topic through eleven critical essays by prominent figures (e.g. Joseph Conrad, Karl Marx, Joseph Stalin.) accessible under “Critics Corner” at the bottom of the main page.

Links: Most of what is available from “Anarchy Archives” on the Spanish Civil War is off site with the bulk of links listed in the “History” section. Unfortunately, a few links are broken throughout the site.

Last Updated: Unknown

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: “Anarchy Archives” is spartan but attractive and easily navigable. It is clearly the work of an educator who knows how to make information accessible to students, and, although perhaps not a popular topic, the general public.

Reliability of Content: The reliability of the content of the linked webpages varies by site. The essays from “Critics Corner” are attributed to their authors, but the source or sources of the photographs are unknown.

Audience: High school and college students, general public

Rating: * * * *

Website Title: “Imperial Japanese Navy Page”

URL: http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm
Subject: Japanese Navy

Category:
Avocational
Recreational
Educational
Reference
Bibliographic
Experiential
Antiquarian


Table of Contents:
Images and Data
Images
Mine
Aircraft Carriers
Battleships
Heavy Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
From My Friends
Photos and Video Caps
Models
Data
Naval Guns
Torpedoes
Radar
Japanese Warship Names
Japanese Naval Officers
Bibliography
Economic Data and War Production Statistics
Games
Info Sources and Links
What’s New?

Online Forums
Tony Tully’s Message Board
j-aircraft.org IJN Ship and Aircraft Message Board
Other Cool Sites
Mechanisms of I.J.N. Warships in 3-D

Special Features
The World’s Best Battleship: The Sequel!
The Guns n’ Armor Page!
Imperial Japanese Naval Aviation
Sensuikan! [operational histories of Japanese submarines]
Kido Butai! [operational histories of Japanese aircraft carriers]
Long Lancers! [operational histories of Japanese destroyers]
Junyokan! [operational histories of Japanese cruisers]
Senkan! [operational histories of Japanese battleships]
Tokusetsu Kansen! [operational histories of Japanese auxiliaries and other ships]
Mysteries and Untold Sagas of the Imperial Japanese Navy
The Pacific War in Maps
Kaiten Attack!
Admiral Furashita’s Fleet
Articles of Interest
Featured Book

Description: Mainly a site for enthusiasts (gamers, modelers, and the like), the “Imperial Japanese Navy Page” is a labor of love that is able to move past idiosyncratic antiquarianism. The “images and Data” side of the site, apart from the obvious, features two frequently-trafficked message boards and an essay by Parshall, “Why Japan Really Lost the War” (found under both “Economic Data and War Production Statistics” and “How and Why” at the top of the main page), on the economic disparity between the United States and Japan that relies on Paul Kennedy and John Ellis’s work. “Special Features” is primarily packed with articles and accompanying technical data, but “The Pacific War in Maps” combines interactive campaign maps of naval battles in the Pacific with accessible, descriptive text. It is this entertaining and engaging writing – and the evidence that Parshall enjoys his subject, has a sense of humor, and doesn’t evince the possessive pettiness of so many rivet-counters – that could prove infectious for all students of history.

Links: Close to one hundred links are provided for modeling, books, general naval and World War II sites, games, and related topics. None appear to be broken.

Last Updated: 6 February 2007

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: The organization and graphic quality of this website is unsophisticated, but this ends up being an advantage rather than a detraction as is sometimes the case. A handy navigation bar appears at the bottom of each page, and an introductory segment titled, “What can you do here, you ask?” makes the site very user-friendly.

Reliability of Content: Though not a “registered” historian, Parshall, who has an MBA, and other contributors back up their knowledge of the Japanese Imperial Navy with a partially annotated bibliography that includes several primary sources and scores of secondary ones. Parshall is also co-author (with Anthony Tully) of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington: Potomac, 2005).
Audience: Enthusiasts, general public, students. Parshall admits to giving students priority in the “Feedback and Assistance” link, and students may be interested in the participatory aspect of popular history that this site offers.

Rating: * * * *

Website Title: “Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge”

URL: http://www.battleofthebulge.org/

Subject: U.S. Veterans of World War II.

Category:
Avocational
Reference
Experiential

Author: Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge

Table of Contents:
Forum
VBOB Officers
VBOB Chapters
2002 Convention
Bulge Certificate
Quartermaster
VBOB ConfRoom
Reunions
Picture Gallery
Bugle Bugle
WWII Musings
Memebership
Monuments
Arlington Cem.
Gen. Ord. 114
Links
Div. Fact Sheets
History – Taps
Web Awards

Description: “Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge” is a commemorative veterans’ site of very limited utility to non-veterans of this battle. What little may be useful can be found under “WWII Musings,” “Monuments,” “Links,” and “Div[isional] Fact Sheets.” “WWII
Musings” is a bi-monthly publication put out by John Bowen from the VBOB’s Maryland/D.C. chapter and is based on his research of the National Archives and Records Administration’s Unit Records (1994 to 2003 editions are available on the site as .pdf files). Slightly more than a dozen photographs of stelae commemorating the battle and the Americans who fought there make up the “Monuments” section. The links, however, are many (see below), and of special note is the link to an audio documentary, “Prisoners of War: A Story of Four American Soldiers,” from the Vermont Folklife Center Radio website. The “Picture Gallery” comprises just two photographs and the message board is “currently unavailable.” There is really no historical treatment of the Battle of the Bulge provided by this site outside of the sparse information relayed through the “Divisional Fact Sheets.”

Links: “Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge” posts links to military units, miscellaneous World War II sites, monuments and memorials, and military re-enactors.

Last Updated: 9 January 2007

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: This site is neither well designed nor maintained. There are no navigational issues owing to the simplicity of the site.

Reliability of Content: There is no attribution for the images or for most of the text.

Audience: Veterans

Rating: * *

Website Title: “The Rutgers Oral History Archives: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War”

URL: http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/

Subject: General World War II.

Category:
Scholarly
Recreational
Educational
Reference

Author: Rutgers Oral History Project staff. Sandra Stewart Holyoak, Director.

Table of Contents: (See Description)
Description: An excellent example of what can be done in the way of commemorative oral history is “The Rutgers Oral History Archives.” Starting with interviews of alumni from the colleges of Rutgers and Douglass, the website is an effort to record and share the experiences of U.S. service personnel and those on the home front during the major conflicts of the last half of the 20th Century. The product of this effort, which is now in excess of 400 oral histories, is viewable through the website’s “Interviews” and “Documents” databases. Transcripts of interviews may be browsed by alphabetical index, class, conflict, branch, unit, or medals earned by the participants. Diaries, letters, photos, and memoirs of those interviewed are presented under “Documents.” Additionally, this section contains the partially-completed digital archive of the “Barefoot Bulletin,” a World War II-era newsletter based on the missives of twenty-nine servicemen from Red Bank, New Jersey, and an alphabetical obituary of Rutgers alumni who died during World War II. Educators and researchers may find the discussion on oral history methodology under “About Us” informative, while, since the project is still in the making, qualified potential participants are invited to contribute their stories via a link on the website’s homepage.

Links: “The Rutgers Oral History Archives” offers a helpfully annotated list of primarily general World War II and oral history related links.

Last Updated: Unknown

Technical Aspects: Nothing of note to report.

Presentation Quality: This unadorned website is simply presented and very easy to navigate. Though the homepage may appear too busy and confusing due to the use of multiple fonts and an unbalanced layout, most of what browsers probably wish to access is not difficult to find and has been explained above.

Reliability of Content: All interviews and related content are well catalogued and referenced by the extensive staff members who work on this project.

Audience: Veterans, general public, researchers, educators, students.

Rating: * * * * 

Website Title: “Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum”

URL: http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/

Subject: Franklin D. Roosevelt

Category:
Scholarly
Recreational
Reference
Experiential

Author: The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. Administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. Website developed in collaboration with Marist College.

Table of Contents:
Research
Education
Museum
Pare Lorentz Film Center
Special Events
New Deal Museum Store
Staff Directory
Site Index
Links
Search
FAQs

Description: “The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum,” administered by the National Archives and Records Administration, produces a well-run and good looking website offering a digital archive of online documents, photographs, audio and video files, and a book catalogue. Especially impressive is the site’s large database of generally high quality online photographs of not just the Roosevelts, the Great Depression, and the New Deal, but also containing over 500 downloadable images of World War II that range from depictions of training camp maneuvers and war bond rallies, to combat and concentration camps. As with the rest of what is available here, these are browsable and searchable by keyword. While this vast bank of images is valuable to a wide swath of visitors, perhaps of more use to the researcher, educator, and student are the “Research” and “Education” categories.

The “Research” page is user-friendly for both the novice (e.g. “How to Do Research at the Library,” “How to Cite Materials,” “Books about the Roosevelt Era,” “Frequently Asked Questions about Franklin and Eleanor”), the professional (e.g. “Roosevelt Era Manuscript Collections at the Library” and at “Other Repositories,” “Research Grants and Internships”), and for all parties concerned, with search engine links to finding aids, photos, and book collections. It is on the “Research” page that a browser will find the “View Selected Online Documents” link to thousands of pages of digitized documents from FDR’s White House safe, German and British diplomatic files, the Henry T. and John Hackett papers, Fireside Chats as well as audio file recordings of the President. Indeed, the strength of this website is how useful it can be to so broad an audience.
As for “Education,” this section is organized into sections “For the Student” and “For the Teacher.” K-12 is designed more for elementary students: biographies of the President and First Lady and interactive content such as “Puzzles and Activities,” historical information like the “Roosevelt Timeline,” and fascinating trivia in the form of a facsimile of FDR’s prep-school report card: young and old alike, however, may want to give “The Roosevelt Rap” a miss. The “Education Programs” link on the illustration of the tree at the center of the “Education” main page describes the educational modules available through the FDR Library and Museum designed for elementary through college-age students, as well as teacher workshops of varying length.

**Links:** Most of the links offered relate to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, plus there are close to a score more links involving “Other Connections,” such as “Social Security History Page,” “Tennessee Valley Authority,” and “Yalta” from Yale Law School’s Avalon Project.

**Last Updated:** Unknown

**Technical Aspects:** Nothing of note to report.

**Presentation Quality:** If the information and other resources on the “Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum” website are potentially useful to a wide audience, it is certainly easily navigable by the same. Those responsible for the organization and presentation of this site succeeded famously in their efforts to create a very workable, user-friendly site. Especially in light of the volume of data managed, this was no easy task.

**Reliability of Content:** The documents and photos on this site have been painstakingly catalogued, as might be expected from a presidential library, as well as annotated for easy reference.

**Audience:** Scholars, educators, students, general public

**Rating:** * * * * *
Recent Articles in English on World War II
Selected Titles from an Electronic Compilation
By Jonathan Berhow and Elizaveta Zheganina


Fuchs, Anne. “‘Ehrlich, Du Lüg’st Wie Gedruckt’: Günter Grass’s Autobiographical Confession and the Changing Territory of Germany’s Memory Culture.” *German Life and Letters* 60(2) (2007): 261-75.


Winter, P. R. J. “Churchill, British Intelligence, and the German Opposition Question.”


Recent Books in English on World War II
Selected Titles from an Electronic Compilation
By Jonathan Berhow


Durflinger, Serge Marc. *Fighting from Home: The Second World War in Verdun,*


Dissertations on World War II in English, 2001-2007
Selected Titles from an Electronic Compilation
By Jonathan Berhow


Converse, Allan D. "Churchill’s Armies at War: Morale and Combat Efficiency in the 50th (Northumbrian) and 9th Australian Divisions, 1939-1945." Brandeis University. 2007. 589 pp.


Hastak, Astrid. “‘I Was Never One of Those Fräuleins’: The Impact of Cultural Image on German War Brides in America.” Purdue University. 2005. 504 pp.


Knaff, Donna B. “‘This Girl in Slacks’: Female Masculinity in the Popular Graphic Art of World War II.” The University of New Mexico. 2006. 219 pp.


Wraight, Jamie L. “‘Die Schlechte Seite’: Holocaust Survivors’ Perceptions of Region, Landscape, Space and Place in Auschwitz.” The University of Toledo. 2004. 194 pp.
