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(formerly American Committee on the History of the Second World War)

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General Information

Established in 1967 “to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects,” the World War Two Studies Association, whose original name was the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican.

The Newsletter

The WWTSA issues a semiannual newsletter, which is assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the Library of Congress. Back issues of the Newsletter are available from the Institute for Military History and 20th Century Studies, 221 Eisenhower Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-1002.

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Annual Membership Dues

Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the WWTSA (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars. The Newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.
News and Notes

2004 Elections

Enclosed with this issue is the ballot for the 2004 elections for the association’s Board of Directors serving the 2004-06 term. Remember to vote for no more than eight candidates. Please mail the completed ballot to the association secretary at the indicated address by April 15.

Annual Business Meeting

The association will hold its annual business meeting in conjunction with the Society for Military History’s 2004 annual meeting in Bethesda, Maryland. The business meeting will convene at 11:00 a.m. on Saturday, May 22, in the Cabinet Suite of the Hyatt Regency Bethesda Hotel.

Association members may obtain the conference rate for hotel rooms by making reservations before April 20. Ask for the military history group rate when making your reservations. The costs are $149.00/night for single and double occupancy, $174.00/night for triple occupancy, and $199.00/night for quadruple occupancy. One bedroom parlor suites are $400.00/night. The King Terrace is $315.00/night.

The Hyatt Regency Bethesda is located at 1 Bethesda Metro Center, Bethesda, MD 20814 (tel: 301-657-6411; fax: 301-657-6478). The central reservation number is: 1-800-233-1234. The house reservation number is: 301-657-1234.

Further information about the SMH annual meeting is available at:

<http://www.history.umd.edu/Faculty/JSumida/smannualmeeting04/Hotel%20Data.htm>.

Russell F. Weigley

With sadness we note the passing of Dr. Russell F. Weigley, Distinguished University Professor (Emeritus) of Temple University and longtime member of the World War Two Studies Association Board of Directors, on March 3, 2004. Honored for his groundbreaking scholarship and analysis in such landmark works as The History of the United States Army (1967), The American Way of War (1973), Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (1983), The Age of Battles (1991), and A Great Civil War (2000), Professor Weigley stood as a towering figure in military history and World War Two studies for nearly fifty years. Colleagues, family, and friends mourn his loss.
The German History of World War II (Volume V, Part 2)

A Review Essay
by
Donald S. Detwiler


With this 1183-page tome, the authors of volume 5, part 1, of the German Defense Ministry's Research Institute for Military History's Germany and the Second World War, dealing with the German war effort through 1941, have carried their study to the end of the war. Departing from the narrative account of the war in volumes 1-4 and 6, focussing on the course of military and political events in one theater of operations after another, volume 5 takes a structural approach, describing and analyzing the administrative organization of Germany and occupied Europe, the planning and direction of the war economy, and the increasingly harsh exploitation of foreign workers, prisoners-of-war, and slave laborers. (The translation of volume six, on the global war, 1941-43, was published in 2001.)

Part I: "German Rule in the Occupied Territories 1942-1945" (pp. 5-291), by Hans Umbreit, is a sequel to his 396-page monograph, "Towards Continental Dominion," that opened the first part of vol. 5. There he described how each of the occupied territories was incorporated into Hitler's "New Order," from the annexation of Austria on the eve of the war to the seizure of eastern Poland and much of the western Soviet Union in 1941. He now provides, in the second part of volume 5, a detailed account of how each of the occupied, annexed, or "allied" territories was directly administered, indirectly controlled, or, in cases such as Finland and Italy prior to the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943, pressured to support the German war effort.

Umbreit begins with an account of German rule in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the "Government-General" (of Poland), Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and Northern France, France, Serbia, Greece, and the Occupied Eastern Territories. Regarding Denmark, as an example of his treatment, he writes: "Officially, the country was not one of the occupied territories. It did not pay occupation costs, but made credits available to cover German expenditure in the country. At the beginning there was no opposition worth mentioning, and agriculture and industry supplied their output to the Reich in substantial quantities" (p. 18).
German interests in Denmark were represented by Minister Cecil von Renthe-Fink of the German Foreign Office as Reich plenipotentiary to the Danish government until fall 1942, when Hitler, who thought little of his "wishy-washy" policy, and . . . did . . . [not] want in the long run to put up with the existence of the Danish monarch," had him withdrawn. "So as not to lose his influence on the situation in Denmark, the Reich foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, with support from the Reich ministry for the interior, came to an agreement with Himmler on a successor to Renthe-Fink acceptable to both of them," Dr. Werner Best, a senior SS officer who had served as head of the administrative department of the military commander in France before moving, in mid-1942, to the foreign ministry. On taking office as the new Reich plenipotentiary in November, Best "showed himself to be of prudent and independent mind, taking a . . . pragmatic attitude to Danish problems and stoutly defending his line when this attracted growing criticism from above. He made use for his purposes both of the foreign affairs ministry . . . and of the Reichsführer SS [Himmler] on whom he as an SS-Führer could call and from whom for a long time he enjoyed support. He saw making radical changes as detrimental if the prime aim of German occupation policy was to keep the Danes willing to supply, in particular, their agricultural produce" (pp. 18-19). On 11 November 1942, an "Enabling Act" was passed, limiting the government's dependence on the Danish parliament and strengthening the prerogatives of the Reich plenipotentiary. In March 1943, Best approved free parliamentary elections. But in summer 1943, "Best's policy of cooperation and his freedom of action came to an end when a wave of unrest, strikes, and sabotage swept the country. . . . On Hitler's instructions [German Foreign Minister] Ribbentrop laid the blame . . . on Best, directed him to present to the Denmark government an ultimatum making unacceptable demands, and after this had met with a quite predictable refusal told him to declare . . . [a] military state of emergency. . . . The Denmark government . . . resigned; the business of the ministries was then carried on by their senior civil servants under German instructions." (pp. 19-20). The declaration of the state of emergency, accompanied by the disarming of the armed forces (in the course of which there were shooting incidents, with casualties on both sides, while the greater part of the Danish fleet scuttled itself), spelled the end of Denmark's character as a model protectorate and led to Best offering his resignation. However, Best's knowledge of and skill in dealing with the complex political situation in Denmark led to his being retained as Reich plenipotentiary. But his authority was limited, so much so that without his foreknowledge the Danish police in September 1944 were disarmed and in part deported to Buchenwald. Yet he carried on, doing what he could to ensure orderly conditions in Denmark and the continued flow of exports to Germany, and in the end, he was instrumental in the inclusion of Denmark, unlike Norway, in the partial German surrender of 5 May 1945.6

The section on "The Occupation of Allied Countries" includes Umbreit's detailed treatment of Germany's wartime role in Finland, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as "territories such as south-east Prussia, Poznan as Reichsgau [National Socialist district] 'Wartheland', West Prussia with Danzig, and eastern Upper Silesia that were officially incorporated into the German Reich, and others . . . like Luxembourg, Alsace, Lorraine, southern Carinthia with Upper Carniola, Lower Styria, and Bialystok" that were placed under the administration of the neighboring National Socialist districts (p. 124).
Regarding Italy after the overthrow of Mussolini in summer 1943, Umbreit writes that the country's "exit from the war was immediately used by the Germans as an opportunity to let drop the burdensome theory of two Lebensräume for the Axis partners, and—harking back to old ambitions—to plan a new border for the Reich south of the Alps" (pp. 79-80). To this end, Hitler ordered, in fall 1943, the establishment of two operational zones. "The Adriatisches Küstenland [Adriatic Coastland] comprised the provinces of Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, Fiume, Quarnero, and Ljubljana—excluding a combat area on the coast—while the Alpenvorland [Lower Alps] took in those of Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno" (p. 80). According to Hitler's directives, the German high commissioners (Gauleiter Friedrich Rainer of Klagenfurt and Gauleiter Franz Hofer of Innsbruck) "were to run these areas solely in the German interest, and were authorized to install new civil authorities and appoint German administrative counsellors. In the way the Germans were arranging matters internally, these operational zones did not belong to the sovereign territory of the Italian Duce [as head of the Italian Fascist Republic]; but despite all their dissembling tactics, Mussolini quickly realized this, and in view of the clearly evident German intention to annex these provinces refused to accept the move." His protests were in vain. In their operational zones, the German high commissioners exercised executive power, issued ordinances, made personnel changes in the administration, attached German advisers with supervisory authority to the local prefects, set up special courts, and exercised the power of pardon. The protest of Mussolini's government "at being refused any influence in the operational zones" was futile; "Hitler pleaded 'military necessity', and refused any change in the arrangements that had been laid down."

Not long after the defection of Italy to the United Nations in 1943 and the German military occupation of central and northern Italy, major strikes and unrest broke out in the industrial cities in the north. A general strike in March 1944 was brought to an end after about a week by applying carrot-and-stick tactics: "material improvements and promises on the one hand were coupled with threats and the shooting of the main ringleaders on the other . . . ; between 1,200 and 1,300 of those who had taken part were sent on their way to Mauthausen" (p. 91). Far more serious than labor unrest and strikes were the assassinations and acts of sabotage by partisans, to which the Germans responded with ruthless reprisals. Following a bomb attack on a company of police marching through Rome on 23 March 1944 that claimed 33 lives, the Germans, "using a roughly 10 to 1 ratio, [took] 335 Italians . . . to the Ardeatine Caves on the outskirts" of Rome and killed them (pp. 92-93). "Up to the capitulation of the German forces [in Italy] on 2 May 1945, 44,720 persons had lost their lives in the partisan war, and 9,180 men, women, and children through reprisals" (p. 94).

Regarding German occupation policy in general, Umbreit writes,"the exercise of German rule was typified by a lack of unity within the administration that developed into a constant source of friction and sapped the efficiency in the occupation regime . . . . This had its origins in the progressive fragmentation of the Reich administration, which made orderly and effective management increasingly more difficult. As Hans Mommsen has put it, 'The purely personal approach to policy, the lack of feeling for institutions, the claim to represent the true interests of the movement . . . all helped turn the system of Nazi rule into a network of personal dependencies, rival organizations, competing claims to areas of competence, and unchecked personal tyranny by the Nazi elite'."
Umbreit opens his chapter on "The Ethnic 'New Order' through Genocide: The Murder of the Jews, Roma, and Sinti in the German Sphere of Power" by writing: "In accordance with the plans of the National Socialist leadership, the expansion of the Reich and the establishment of new international frontiers was to be accompanied by an 'internal reordering' of the German sphere of power. The most important aspect of this process was 'racial purification', involving the expulsion of whole segments of the population now considered undesirable. In the case of Poles, French, and Slovenes in the incorporated and civil administration territories, the expulsions began immediately upon occupation or soon afterwards. Yet this injustice was largely overshadowed by the merciless persecution to which the Jews in the occupied territories were now subjected, on the pattern established in the Reich. In their case persecution did not end with expulsion. The purpose of their deportation to ghettos and concentration camps, established mainly on Polish territory but also in the western part of the Soviet Union, was physical extermination. Only some of the able-bodied were given a 'period of grace' in which to work themselves to death."9

The German conquest of new Lebensraum from the Soviet Union, Umbreit continues, "was inseparably bound up with elimination of the Jewish population. By the end of 1941 hundreds of thousands of people had died in mass executions carried out by the Einsatzgruppen, SS, and police units in conjunction with the establishment of ghettos and Jewish councils. These murders continued unabated in 1942, in certain cases at the request of officers of the Wehrmacht or with their cooperation. The military leadership, too, considered 'Jews and circles friendly to the Jews' a threat to public order. Troop and camp commanders handed Jews over to the Einsatzgruppen and the SD [Sicherheitsdienst, the security service of the SS], or shot them in the course of punitive operations and reprisals. Roma were similarly treated. Military authorities decreed the wearing of distinguishing marks, established ghettos, confiscated Jewish property and dwellings, and instituted other discriminatory measures. Here and there, units of the Wehrmacht took part in the executions carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. But although the military leadership soon prohibited spontaneous participation by soldiers in SS operations, forbidding them even to watch or take photographs, it did not really distance itself. Despite growing criticism in the ranks of the armed forces and among the indigenous population, it frequently showed considerable 'understanding' for the crimes committed, while happy enough to invoke the official division of responsibilities in order to keep its own hands clean" (pp. 261-62).

To expedite the extermination of the Jews, "starting in autumn 1941, three extermination camps were set up in the Government-General at Belzec, Sobibór, and Treblinka. Their sole purpose was the immediate elimination of Jews transported from the Government-General and all over Europe. Such was also the purpose of the camp at Chelmo in the Warthegau and, mainly from 1943 onwards, that of Auschwitz-Birkenau in annexed eastern Upper Silesia. A sixth extermination camp was established in Majdanek, in the Lublin district, which had previously been a prisoner-of-war camp and then a labour camp" (p. 264). In the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, "the former fortress of Theresienstadt functioned as a staging post on the road to the east. It served both as an 'old-age ghetto' and as a 'model concentration camp' for propaganda purposes, as well as to support the fiction of Jewish resettlement. It was originally designated for Jews aged over 65 and especially--with an eye to the Wehrmacht–Jewish veterans of the First
World War who had been seriously wounded, or decorated. Later a number of prominent Jews were sent there. This privileged treatment was granted to very few, and even in Theresienstadt their chances of survival were slim" (p. 266).

In the course of his review of German efforts against the Jews in one European country after another, Umbreit reports that "the Germans failed to convince their Axis partner Italy to join in Nazi persecution of the Jews. Mussolini had certainly introduced numerous anti-Semitic measures, but they were not applied consistently. Substantial sections of the armed forces and the diplomatic corps were still moved by humanitarian considerations, eschewed the extreme racism and fanaticism propagated by the Germans, and went no further than declarations of willingness to cooperate and assurances of 'good' intentions. The Italian refusal to comply was to have some influence on the attitude of other states. The Italian occupation authorities openly opposed demands to surrender Jewish inhabitants and refugees, and, as in southern France and Croatia, impeded action by indigenous police forces instructed to do so. It was only after the Badoglio government changed sides that Jews in Italy and the Italian occupation zones in southern France and the Balkans fell into German hands. Deportations began immediately, except in Greece, where there was a six months' delay" (p. 273).

In addition to the Jews, Umbreit writes, "large numbers of Roma and Sinti living in the German sphere of power were also victims of racial persecution, although in their case German policy was less unified and consistent. In some occupied countries these minorities were left unmolested. In western Europe they suffered multiple discrimination, and many were interned in camps and deported. In Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union they were massively interned, used as slave labour, or deported to concentration and extermination camps. (From 1943 a separate 'Gypsy camp' was in operation at Birkenau.) Others were simply killed on the spot. In the east the near-systematic murder of Roma and Sinti by Einsatztruppen and police units, and occasionally by units of the Wehrmacht, assumed genocidal proportions. Time and again the Wehrmacht took Roma and Sinti for reprisal shootings. They were not only considered 'racially inferior', 'work-shy', and 'asocial', but were also accused of spying and propaganda on behalf of the enemy. . . . Approximately 220,000 Roma and Sinti were murdered, over two-thirds of whom (178,000) were from German-occupied territories."\(^{10}\)

Umbreit concludes his treatment of "The Ethnic 'New Order' through Genocide" by observing that "it will never be possible to determine the exact number of Jews, Roma, and Sinti murdered by Nazi Germany. There can be no doubt that at least 5 million people perished for no other reason than that they belonged to a discriminated minority condemned by the megalomaniacs in power. The anti-Semitic fanatics and sadists who were unleashed at lower levels would never have been able to perpetrate genocide on such a scale if they had not had a host of obedient helpers at their disposal. These 'ordinary men', as Browning calls them, did what was asked of them. They did it without enthusiasm but without protest, and very thoroughly."\(^{11}\) 1992; Canto paperback reprint, 1995) and, most recently, *The Origins of the Final Solution* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).

The final chapter in Umbreit's monograph-length contribution to vol. 5, part 2, of the German history of the war, "Collaboration and Resistance," opens with the observation that "by the
beginning of 1942 the prestige of National Socialist Germany had waned considerably in the occupied territories. . . . The fear that German rule might last indefinitely began to disappear with the entry of the United States into the war and the formation of a worldwide coalition against Hitler." Nevertheless, "collaboration . . . was still proclaimed voluntarily by the small number of collaborationist parties that sympathized with the occupying power for various, mainly ideological reasons and had counted on political benefits from their partnership with the Germans. For them, there was no going back." But their membership dwindled and "by 1943 at the latest their decline was manifest in unmanageable crises and splits . . . ." Moreover, "the Reich had . . . opposed their modest conceptions of national autonomy" within a German-dominated Europe. "Politicians like Hácha in the Protectorate [of Bohemia-Moravia], Clausen in Denmark, Quisling in Norway, Mussert in the Netherlands (who had sworn an oath of loyalty to Hitler), De Clercq, Elias, and Degrelle in Belgium, as well as Laval in France, Nedic in Serbia, Tsolakoglou in Greece, and the heads of the indigenous administrations in the Baltic general commissariats, all found themselves stalled by the Germans and used to facilitate the pursuit of German interests. State institutions with an appearance of legality were vitally important to the occupying power. Where necessary, it even allowed or installed new governments in order to have the necessary submissive administrations available" (pp. 278-79). "From the point of view of the occupation administrations, . . . practical cooperation with the relevant indigenous authorities and economic circles was imperative. Without their involvement at various institutional levels, German occupation rule—including the Holocaust—would have been difficult to implement. Not even willingness to work on the part of the industrial labour force and rural population could be dispensed with; it had to be maintained by material concessions at least until the end of the war." 12

Although Hitler "mistrusted collaborators, whom he saw either as weak-natured traitors to their own peoples or as potentially dangerous to the Germans themselves," he did not object to recruiting non-German volunteers if they belonged to "racially kindred" peoples. "The French formed a legion for 'the battle against Bolshevism' which . . . was first deployed in association with the Wehrmacht and finally . . . incorporated in the SS. Around 8,000 Frenchmen are estimated to have served in SS uniform" (pp. 281-82). Some 42,000 Belgians served with the SS, the army, the navy, or auxiliary formations, and "around 25,000 Dutch, 5,000 Danes, and 3,900 Norwegians fought in the Waffen-SS." However, "the mass of SS volunteers, who enabled it almost to double its size by mid-1944, came from eastern and south-eastern Europe. A significant proportion were ethnic Germans . . . " (p. 286).

On the eastern front, literally tens of thousands of prisoners of war sought "to avoid the hell of the camps" by volunteering to serve as paramilitary auxiliaries (Hilfswillige or Hiwis), providing a manpower resource for the Wehrmacht that "could not otherwise be met. Time and again, Hitler was forced to recognize the military's independent measures retroactively." 13 In addition, "Turkestanis, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians, North Caucasians, and, finally, Volga Tatars were formed into groups of a hundred and then 'legions'. They served in the Government-General and with the 162nd Infantry Division under Col. Ritter von Niedermayer in the Ukraine, providing the army with more or less battleworthy battalions officered by Germans, as well as a number of construction and supply units" (p. 282). After the German defeat at Stalingrad, many eastern volunteers became increasingly susceptible to "intensive Soviet propaganda promising
them immunity if they crossed the lines. . . . The number of desertions by whole units that killed their German officers and went over to the Soviets . . . increased alarmingly. . . . Battalions had to be disbanded and turned into construction or supply units. Others had to be withdrawn from the eastern front and transferred to western Europe, Italy, or the Balkans (p. 287).

Regarding the Soviet defector Gen. Vlasov, Umbreit writes that after having been taken prisoner, he offered his services to the Germans, arguing that "it would be impossible to break the resistance of the Red Army until it had been convincingly demonstrated that the country would not be downgraded to a German colony but could look forward to separate existence as a group of protectorates or a federation of states." Agreement to act on his proposal was withheld until "the late summer of 1944, when Germany's military situation was already hopeless, and Hitler expected it to be of little benefit. . . . A Russian Liberation Army (ROA), initially comprising two divisions of Russian eastern volunteers, prisoners of war, and eastern workers, was finally formed. . . . Vlasov was officially put in command of all Russian combat forces on 10 February 1945, but by that time they were no longer of the slightest political or military value" (pp. 284-85).

Considering German-dominated Europe as a whole, Umbreit writes that "the relatively small numbers who advocated political and ideological collaboration with the occupying power, the most extreme of whom are usually called 'collaborationists', as well as the larger number of men who, out of conviction, thirst for adventure, opportunism, or material need, joined the ranks of the Wehrmacht, SS, and German police as combat troops, policemen, and auxiliaries, cut themselves off from the overwhelming majority of their compatriots. The split in the societies of the conquered countries of Europe was one of the consequences of German occupation rule, and gave rise to a bloody settling of accounts bordering in some cases on civil war. The European post-war order rested largely on the prestige and influence of active sections of the population who had resisted criminal foreign oppression at the cost of great personal sacrifice and saw their actions as vindicated by history." In the concise overview of resistance in German-occupied Europe that follows, Umbreit observes that "the first moves in this direction had been made by governments in exile and unyielding individuals like Charles de Gaulle and . . . [that] London became the location of what Henri Michel has called 'the arsenal, bank, and headquarters of the Resistance'." He goes on to point out that there was serious concern in London about the Communist parties and their aims, but that, in some cases, the Communists and other parties in the resistance established joint leadership bodies to pursue their common goal. However, Umbreit continues, "no such cooperation occurred in Poland, in Greece, or--after an initial failed attempt--in Yugoslavia. Despite pressure from Moscow, Tito refused to recognize the London-based government in exile. Not until 1944 was he prepared to come to terms, following which a coalition government was formed in March 1945 under his leadership." Umbreit concludes his treatment of the resistance (and his contribution to the volume): "The resistance movements had opened a 'second front' in the occupied territories well before the Allied landing in Normandy. Their struggle began with the partisans in the Balkans and Soviet Union, and spread through Poland to southern and western Europe. The Germans could not permanently eradicate resistance even by means of the most ruthless terror. Freedom fighters played a part in the outcome of the war. Their revolt against German rule was, not least of all, a fight for right and human decency, which Nazi Germany--however bitter this may sound to the mass of those who fought for it--had
Part II: "Albert Speer and Armaments Policy in Total War" (pp. 293-381), by Rolf-Dieter Müller, is a sequel to his 382-page contribution to volume 5, part 1, on "The Mobilization of the German Economy for Hitler's War Aims," which concluded with Albert Speer's succession as armaments minister following the death of Fritz Todt early in February 1942.14

The first two chapters deal with "The German War Economy in Upheaval: 1942" and "Further Centralization of the War Economy, 1943/1944," i.e., the gradual consolidation of control under Speer in the course of the war. At the time he assumed his new responsibilities, "drastic changes in economic policy were being called for through the war having become, in December 1941, a world war and one of attrition against a clearly superior Allied coalition, and through the need to cope with the failure of the war plan so far" (p. 295). The Wehrmacht's military command-economy approach to arms production had played a decisive part in the stagnation and falling output, opening the way for Todt, "Hitler's building contractor and munitions minister . . . to make a convincing case for giving greater responsibility to firms to manage themselves, as the only way to set resources free for getting arms production going again and increasing output." But Todt personified a tradition in which compromises and trade-offs were the rule. The reforms to the war economy that he sought "would undoubtedly have taken a great deal of time and caused a great deal of friction before they finally succeeded. It was the minister's sudden death and the handover to Albert Speer, Hitler's surprise candidate with an unmortgaged past, that in fact turned the tide of German economic policy. A real time of new beginning for the war economy, this was the launch pad for a meteoric rise in output that reached a peak in the summer of 1944 and was raised by skillful propaganda into the myth of the German 'armaments miracle'."15

"For Hitler," Müller writes, "Speer was a fresh person to deal with, one unburdened with a history of causing past disappointments and disagreements. He found his favourite architect's downright youthful optimism exciting and persuasive" (p. 296). And, as a matter of fact, Müller explains, "in 1942 Speer's optimism was it seems not yet due to either recklessness or self-deception. What he was hearing from the representatives of industry about untapped reserves in the war economy, and what he knew from his own experience of wastage due to internal squabbles, wholly justified his commitment. . . . The cards Speer was putting his money on (giving industrialists and engineers key positions in the armaments effort), he had inherited from Todt, and he played them brilliantly. Yet anyone who sees Speer as the puppet of big business is misunderstanding his intentions, and the weight he carried within the Nazi hierarchy. His closeness to Hitler favoured the fulfilling of industrial interests, where Speer made these his own as a necessary condition for achieving new output records. He was not just playing at being the patron of businessmen—he was their patron so long as they willingly pursued his aims. If they mentioned to him the conditions that needed to be met or described resistance they were meeting, then the minister used all his influence to boost the effectiveness of his industrial aides. But he left no doubt that the only thing he wanted was to satisfy Hitler's wish for more and more weapons, and was prepared if necessary to have anyone who failed him or who stood in his way sent to a concentration camp or the guillotine" (p. 297).
At the time of his appointment in February 1942, Speer, like Todt before him, had authority over army armaments only, since the air force and navy had independent procurement organizations. But in view of the crisis on the eastern front, in the course of which Hitler (in December 1941) had assumed personal command of the army, munitions for the army were given priority. And with the authority of the dictator, whose confidence he enjoyed and to whom he had unhindered access, Speer immediately set out to restructure armaments development and procurement in the Third Reich, by-passing the armed forces' procurement offices and coopting and coordinating the German industrial managers and manufacturers, establishing what amounted to a system of industrial self-administration under his oversight. "It was not hard for the armaments minister to win the industrialists over. Private manufacturers were glad to see the Wehrmacht bureaucracy stripped of power, and to be able to look forward to regular, long-term orders. They themselves knew only too well what reserves still lay unused in the production process. Their readiness to make fresh efforts, and to gear their companies' policies towards fulfilling orders from the Wehrmacht, undoubtedly did bear the stamp of patriotism; but it was just as surely also influenced to a great extent by a more relaxed pricing policy and the prospects of rising profits."\(^{16}\)

"What decided the success of Speer's reform was . . . the day-to-day, practical work being done in the committees and rings," Müller writes. "The nucleus was formed by the main committees . . . for the individual armaments sectors--munitions, armoured vehicles and prime movers, weapons, general Wehrmacht equipment, and machinery." Main rings were formed for groups of products, such as iron ore production, steel-processing, metals, and electrotechnical products, and special rings were created for the parts-supply industry. "In this way the manufacture and delivery of items such as piston rings and valves were to be regulated and rationalized. The parts suppliers--with 51,000 small firms and a workforce numbering 3.8 million--formed, together with the producers of raw materials, the real backbone of the armaments industry. . . . The essence of the system (which was never laid down in detail), was not hierarchy or a dubious 'leadership principle', but organized collaboration and a balancing of interests that took the output of armaments as its yardstick of success" (p. 339).

To assure the success of the armaments program with which Hitler had entrusted him, Speer needed not only the dedicated cooperation of industry, but also the effective support of the plethora of central Reich authorities as well as National Socialist Party offices and organizations at the national and regional levels. To achieve this, on 17 September 1942 a decree was issued "on the integration of agencies and self-administration bodies of the armaments industry" that provided for the establishment "of twenty-six regional armaments commissions" charged with the organization of cooperation among manufacturers and coordination of the use of manpower in their respective districts. On each of the commissions sat an armaments inspector (the ministry's chief delegate for the district), representatives of industry, the heads of the state (Land) economy and labour offices, and the district chairmen of the National Socialist Party Chambers of Industry.\(^{17}\)

In developing a structurally integrated, nationally coordinated armaments program, Speer "formed a specially close relationship with young colleagues who had been seconded to him
from industry, such as Ernst Wolf Mommsen, Josef Neckermann, Willy H. Schliesser, and Hans Günther Sohl. 'Speer's kindergarten', as it was mockingly known, provided him with his most reliable and most effective management team in the armaments drive, and was a breeding-ground for those who were later, after Germany's defeat, to . . . [become] the top managers of the country's 'economic miracle'." Speer's ministry grew swiftly. "Almost every year saw a new group joining it," Müller writes: "the armaments offices of the OKW in 1942, naval armaments and the nucleus of the Reich economy ministry in 1943, and in 1944 air armaments and the Fighter Staff."18 Speer had not intended to create a huge bureaucracy, but "by early 1943 the armaments ministry with all its various areas of activity was employing around 70,000 staff, officials, and officers; their number swelled a great deal further by 1944, so that for a short while Speer's empire represented the largest ministerial bureaucracy in the Third Reich" (p. 325).

By late 1942, the armaments industry under Speer's direction was performing well, but the crushing German reverses on the eastern front and in North Africa in the autumn of 1942 and the winter of 1943 resulted in the loss of "virtually the whole of the year's production . . . . Replacements had to be produced if the front lines were to be held." Arms production was further increased at the expense of the civilian economy, in the context of the transition to "total war," as recommended and publicized by the minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbles (p. 352). Then, following the failure of the German offensive with the defeat at Kursk in summer 1943 and Hitler's call for a "new armaments battle" to replace the equipment lost in Russia and North Africa, "Speer obtained agreement to the whole of production being brought together in his ministry, and to his placing ruthless restrictions on civilian manufacture,"39 The restrictions on civilian manufacture involved closing down or converting thousands of factories, "a drastic incursion into the national economy, with a major effect on individual sectors, regions, company groups, owner relationships, and future prospects" (p. 381).

Until then, the procedure "had been to let the various sectors do their own 'thinning out'; but Speer could see that the consumer-goods industry could hardly be expected to dig its own grave." He reached an agreement "with the head of the security service [Sicherheitsdienst, or SD], SS-Obergruppenführer [SS-Lt. Gen.] Ernst Kaltenbrunner. The SD was to supply him with reports on the economy, so that closures and conversions could if necessary be called for." On 6 October 1943 in Poznan (Posen), Speer, at a conference of National Socialist Party district chiefs (Gauleiter), described "the vast extent to which the consumer-goods industry was still producing wholly inessential goods. . . . But then he went on to mention . . . his agreement with the SS: and that was making an undisguised threat. "The risk that went with the closures, the minister continued, he would willingly bear. There would be protests from a thousand quarters, and these too he would take on himself. All he had to say on the subject was that from now on the way certain areas of Germany had been getting themselves exempted from the closures would no longer be tolerated by him; he would, no matter what the cost, enforce the authority of the Reich, and he had discussed the matter with Reichsführer SS Himmler and taken measures of a kind likely to have a lasting effect." The party chiefs protested to Hitler that "on a politically delicate question like this, . . . [they] had to keep control in their [own] hands," with the consequence that "where Speer had decided on closures or conversions, the directives were always routed through . . . [them], making it possible for them to carry out the measures themselves within a given time" (pp. 382-83).
To supplement German capacity, Speer used production facilities in "allied countries and the occupied territories. The 'Powder from France' plan, designed to take the strain off large parts of the German chemical industry, was one of his practical measures, as was the 'Ivan' programme for producing munitions in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union. . . . In early 1943 he got Hitler's approval for 'all matters of exploiting the industrial power of France for armaments purposes being directly under the control of the ministry for armament and ammunition.'

The last major expansion of Speer's authority came in the aftermath of the heavy bombing raids on German air armaments factories early in 1944, which severely disrupted the production planning of Field Marshal Erhard Milch, state secretary in the ministry of aviation and director-general of armaments of the German Air Force. Under Göring, the German Air Force had not only been built up as an independent service branch, but also developed its own procurement program. Consequently, "since the spring of 1942 Speer and Milch had each been in control of about half of the final manufacture of armaments." Despite the potential for friction, if not outright rivalry in their respective positions, Speer and Milch developed a cooperative relationship and became personal friends. The crippling of the German aircraft industry just as the country was being subjected to increasingly destructive bombing created a major crisis, for more fighter planes than ever were urgently needed. Realizing that the German Air Force's procurement network could not master the challenge, Milch turned to Speer and asked for his help, with the understanding that air armaments would be taken over by Speer's ministry. With Hitler's approval, in March, a special "Fighter Staff" of "experts from the armaments ministry, air ministry, and industry . . . [was formed to] pool their efforts to see that sorely stressed aircraft production was relocated, better protected, and restored to peak output." The result was that "the fighter industry rose again from the ruins, producing more aircraft than ever before." Among the emergency measures taken, "the most important . . . was the introduction of the 72-hour week. Though Speer made special rations of food and clothing available, making the extra work possible, the effort was an extreme one; it could be made only because forced labourers from a variety of foreign nationalities slaved on building these aircraft in a murderous piece-work quota system."

The third chapter in Müller's 538-page monographic contribution to this volume, entitled "Basic Conditions of Wartime Production, and Civilian Factors" (pp. 449-583) begins with a systematic survey of raw materials with consideration, in turn, of the securing of domestically produced basic resources (e.g., steel and non-ferrous metals), the importing of raw materials, and the development of the synthetics industry producing, among other things, fuel from coal and synthetic rubber. This is followed by treatment of vital sectors of the economy, including agriculture, transport, and finance, as well as food rationing and the black market. The final segment of the chapter, on the "Organization and Exploitation of 'Fortress Europe'," concludes with accounts of German wartime trade with a dozen European countries and with Japan.

In his fourth chapter, "The 'Armaments Miracle', 1942-1944" (pp. 584-801), Müller traces the history of the production programs of the three service branches, such as the army's tank-building program of 1943 and its V-2 rocket program, the air force's development of V-1 flying bombs and jet fighters, and the navy's U-boat construction program. He reports on armaments output, 1942-1944, by category, and goes on to deal with the issue of the Wehrmacht's material
losses and level of armament. "In October [1943]," for example, "75 per cent of all tanks on the eastern front were under repair; only 370 were battleworthy. . . . From the late summer of 1943 onwards the Wehrmacht's quarterly losses in men and matériel on the eastern front matched those during the disaster at Stalingrad. It was only steady supplies from Speer's armoury that made it possible, time and again, to stabilize the fronts—albeit briefly—and to slow down the enemy advance" (p. 699).

In the consideration of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" with which chapter 4 concludes, Müller writes that Hitler rejected the development of biological weapons. "On 23 May 1942 the army general staff announced 'that the Führer, following a report by the Wehrmacht chief of staff, has ordered that preparations for bacteriological warfare are not to be made on our side. The Führer, however, demands supreme efforts in respect of means of defence and defence measures'" (p. 775). But "the Allies did not shrink from supporting the sabotage warfare of partisans in eastern Europe with poison and bacteria. The most spectacular case was the attempt on the life of Reinhard Heydrich, who fell victim to a hand grenade prepared with botulinus in England."

Another form of biological warfare employed against Germany was the dropping by the British of Colorado (potato) beetles, which contributed to "the extremely poor harvest in 1943." Müller's final chapter, "From 'Victory Programme' to the Collapse of the War Economy" (pp. 802-831), opens with an assessment of Speer's "victory programme," drawn up in March 1944, "that, after the hoped-for repulse of the invasion, would provide a basis for reducing the enemy's superiority in the principal types of weapons and for gaining a partial superiority by the start-up of new weapons systems. The armaments effort was thus fully in line with the illusionary hopes of the Führer, who intended to stabilize his dominion on the continent and continue the war until his enemies were exhausted and gave up" (p. 802).

Such illusionary hopes were reinforced by Speer's production report for July 1944, presented to Hitler shortly after the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him on the 20th of that month. Speer claimed that "the overall index of finished armaments had risen from 100 in January-February 1942 [when he had succeeded Todt] to 322. After a big leap from February to March 1944, followed by a much smaller monthly increase until June, there was once more a major increase from June to July." In claiming that the German armaments industry was "in mid-1944 . . . 'at the peak of its strength and performance'," Speer did not "disclose that with his armaments figures for July 1944 he had performed a daring sleight of hand. He had presented the total output from 1 July to 5 August to the Führer as the result for 'July'; in other words, he had falsified the monthly performance by an additional week. The ordnance office was obliged to use that figure too in its 'survey of the state of armaments' of 1 August 1944. Thus the minister's figure and the Wehrmacht's figure were identical, a manipulation regarded . . . as 'a one-off [i.e., one-time] measure' in the context of 'German industry's declaration of loyalty to the Führer'. An internal comparison with the preceding months' results shows that manufacturing levels were generally no more than being maintained, even though a number of the most important weapons did record increases, which were further enlarged by Speer's falsifications." Müller comments that "this was evidently just the final spurt of a marathon runner at the end of his strength, a last upsurge of the German war industry that could only be followed by a decline" (pp. 811-12). Regarding air armaments, "on which Speer's and Hitler's hopes were riding," Müller writes that "July 1944 saw
the largest monthly output figure for aircraft manufactured in Germany in the Second World War—4,075 machines. Over the same month, however, a total of 4,243 aircraft were lost, either damaged or totally, 2,083 of them not through enemy action. . . . Just over half of the aircraft newly delivered by Speer's factories were flown straight into the scrapheap by Göring's Luftwaffe—a result for which inadequate training due to meagre fuel allocations was largely responsible" (p. 813).

The speed of the German retreat from France, together with the condition of the transportation network, ruled out the kind of "ruthless comprehensive evacuation of [industrial] machinery and equipment . . . practiced in the east since 1943," but in view of "the close private-enterprise links within the northern French and Rhineland economic area," manufacturing facilities were largely not destroyed. "Before falling into enemy hands, the western industrial regions were to be merely 'paralysed' by the removal of crucial electrical equipment, but not damaged." In ordering this policy, Speer "was able to quote Hitler's statement 'that he can achieve the reconquest of the territories now lost in a short time'. It is doubtful," Müller comments, "that Speer himself seriously expected a recovery of the western territories; in which case his reference may be viewed as a concealed hint that the war was probably lost, and that thought should be given to future coexistence with Germany's neighbours in the west" (p. 818).

"By the beginning of 1945 only makeshift programmes were possible in the emerging 'islands' of the German war industry, turning Speer's 'economic miracle' into a chimera." As "a thank-you and a leave-taking," he distributed 300 copies of his stewardship report (Rechenschaftsbericht) of 27 January 1945 to leading members of his staff. "The difficulties of the past few months', it said, had prevented this circle of 'real and down-to-earth experts' from being assembled once more. His pride at having kept the war economy alive, in spite of the great damage done to it, could not conceal the fact that its death throes had already begun. Victory slogans and calls for higher performance, like those of the previous year, would have had no credibility in this circle. The only long-term outlook he left to the leadership team of the German war economy was 'to preserve for our nation what it needs to carry on living'" (p. 831).

Part III: "Management of Human Resources, Deployment of the Population, and Manning the Armed Forces in the Second Half of the War (1942-1944)" (pp. 833-1070), by Bernhard R. Kroener, is a sequel to his 368-page contribution to volume 5, part 1, on "The Manpower Resources of the Third Reich in the Area of Conflict between Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and War Economy, 1939-1942." As Kroener brought out in the first part of the fifth volume, Germany's manpower resources were already strained to the limit by fall 1941. Under the circumstances, the powerful Soviet counter-attack in winter 1941-42 confronted the German leadership with a grave challenge. The "strategic situation and the unexpectedly high losses in men and matériel," writes Kroener, made it clear "that all available resources in materials and particularly manpower would now have to be mobilized" (p. 835). In order to provide for an adequate workforce for industry and the economy, Hitler issued a decree on 21 March 1942 in which he named the Gauleiter (National Socialist Party District Chief) of Thuringia, Fritz Sauckel, General Plenipotentiary for Manpower (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz, or "GBA", the initials used in the translation to refer to Sauckel's office). The preamble to Hitler's decree stated: "To provide the necessary manpower for the whole war economy, including arms production, requires a single
agency equipped to meet the demands of the war economy, to control the deployment of all available manpower including foreign labour and prisoners of war and to mobilize all as yet untapped reserves of manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate [of Bohemia and Moravia], and in the Government-General and the occupied territories" (pp. 838-39).

Sauckel did not report to Speer, who had succeeded Todt the month before the creation of his post as GBA, but the two men, despite marked differences, developed a close working relationship. Contrasting them, Kroener writes that "Speer had set out to create an efficient, modern administration capable of meeting the arms production targets. Staff were in the main recruited not from the relevant administrative authorities but from local authorities and industry. This staffing structure was ideally suited to Speer's way of working and, combined with the confidence of manufacturers and direct access to Hitler, it lent his policies an impetus that was to form the basis of his almost mythical reputation as a miracle-worker in the area of armaments."

By contrast, Kroener writes, "Sauckel's approach was completely different. The National Socialists had always regarded the organization of working life as an eminently political issue. They had early rejected the concept of the 'labour market' as liberalist, preferring 'deployment of manpower', a phrase that echoed the terminology of the front lines and had a special resonance in wartime conditions. . . . It was ideologically appropriate for Sauckel to approach his work primarily as a Party official. As such, he set out to apply 'the powerful inner forces of the National Socialist philosophy on care and leadership' to the deployment of manpower. The machinations of Sauckel, Himmler, and to a lesser extent Speer explain the rise of special agencies in the second half of the war at the expense of the traditional instruments of the state executive, thus representing an important stage in the establishment of the Führer state, or National Socialist rule in Germany." As it responded to the threat of military disaster, "the ugly features of . . . [Hitler's] totalitarian regime now stood clearly revealed, its policy of contempt for humanity reflected most conspicuously in the way it treated its subjects, workers and soldiers alike" (pp. 843-44).

Kroener points out that "in his first major public speech as Reich minister for armament and ammunition on 18 April 1942, Speer said: ' . . . at my suggestion, Gauleiter Sauckel has been appointed general plenipotentiary for manpower by the Führer and invested by the Reich marshal [Göring], to whom he is answerable, with extraordinary powers to issue directives', thus astutely presenting himself as the key figure behind Sauckel's appointment! In this way, he let it be known that he had direct access to Hitler, leaving Göring to take responsibility for all the damaging raids Sauckel was subsequently to make on others' preserves. Speer wanted Sauckel to be at his beck and call. He wished him every success, and did not care how he went about achieving it." Most important, in Kroener's view, "the pressure [on Sauckel] to meet . . . [Speer's] demands [for manpower] ultimately dictated the inhuman methods he used. Thus Speer must be held at least indirectly responsible for Sauckel's excesses."

Turning to military manpower, Kroener writes that "in the summer of 1942, there were 8.7m. men serving in the Wehrmacht but there were still 5.1m. eligible for call-up who were in reserved occupations" (p. 878). In view of the need for replacements for the heavy losses during the foregoing winter, "it was . . . suggested to call up all men in reserved occupations, a measure
that had been suggested in the spring but had been blocked by Speer. Protected by its young minister, the armaments industry had managed at an early stage to obtain the necessary Führer directives to secure the position of younger employees. In the oil industry, where skilled replacements could not be got from other sectors, workers were completely exempt from call-up. In the Luftwaffe, a substantial number of skilled and unprotected workers in the armaments sector were registered as 'aircrew' to save them from being drafted into the army." At the beginning of August 1942, the chief of staff of the army, General Franz Halder, reported to the head of the high command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, that it was estimated that the army on the eastern front would be 750,000 below strength by 1 November (p. 879). When it became evident that these gaps in the field army "simply could not be filled," the military planners were "obliged to 'adjust the structure and organization of the army to the number of men available'." According to Kroener, "the planning experts, in the absence of any politically feasible alternative, tried to keep the war going with a series of makeshift stratagems, deliberately closing their eyes to the probable consequences of their actions. . . . From now on, as Jodl was later to complain at Nuremberg, the conduct of those at the centre of the military High Command was governed by professional fatalism and blind obedience against their better judgement" (p. 883).

Under the subheading "Measures to Reorganize and Rationalize the Army," Kroener writes that "by the late summer of 1942, divisions were operating on average at half strength." Disbanding shattered formations altogether and using their personnel to bring the others up to strength, had already been considered during the winter crisis of 1941-42, but, as then, "was again vehemently rejected by Hitler. The propaganda illusion that the war was already won, that it was merely a matter of bringing it to an end, could not admit the concept of depleted and exhausted divisions." The complex restructuring undertaken for the 1943 spring offensive (illustrated in three detailed diagrams on pp. 887-89), involved, among other features, designating 40 infantry divisions of three regiments as "first-class divisions," 23 of which were to be brought up to full strength by spring 1943, equipping eight front-line divisions of just one regiment "with heavy weapons specially suitable for defensive engagements," and classifying 54 divisions as "fortress divisions, losing the bulk of their means of mobility," accepting the "danger that these formations would be forced to leave much of their equipment behind in the event of a rapid retreat."30

In fall 1942 some 1,900,000 men were serving in the air force and "the service was considered—particularly by the army general staff—to be overmanned." In August 1942, the OKW had submitted to Hitler a proposal to transfer to the army some 50,000 men from the air force (and 10,000 to 20,000 from the navy), but it was not pursued. Instead, in September "Göring announced enthusiastically: 'The Führer has entrusted me with the task of welding my Luftwaffe into a strong body capable of joining in the land battle on the eastern front. I am therefore resolved to form a core force . . . a force that will be swift and relentless in attack and unyielding in defence.' The army was responsible for supplying the Luftwaffe field divisions, "but would not provide any staff support. This meant that senior and junior officers would be slow to acquire the special skills required in infantry fighting, and it would be a long time before the men were ready to go into action. But the situation at Stalingrad was deteriorating rapidly, and there was no time for this. At the beginning of January 1943, three divisions were hastily posted to the front, two of them with no experience of action. Most of the men subsequently joined other military
formations or disappeared without trace in heavily depleted field army formations. The losses, in the seven Luftwaffe field divisions that were eventually cobbled together, were catastrophic."31

Having exhausted its reserves in 1942, the Wehrmacht "increasingly sought, like industry before it, to recruit able-bodied men from the occupied and annexed territories. The military authorities, like their civilian counterparts, did not hesitate to use the methods of the press gang." Meanwhile, the Waffen-SS pursued "'ethnic Germans' . . . with such relentless determination that Keitel actually had to fight to keep the 3,434 German interpreters, linguists, etc. employed by the Wehrmacht."32 From December 1941 to December 1942, the strength of the Waffen-SS increased from 198,364 to 230,000, and by July 1943 it reached 433,400. At the end of 1942, there were 400,000 Russian auxiliaries (Hiwis) attached to the army on the eastern front and a further 150,000 involved in railway construction, mining, and the like. Kroener also mentions that "recent research has suggested that, in addition to 195,000 German troops, there were . . . 50,000 auxiliaries with the Sixth Army encircled at Stalingrad—in other words about 20 percent of the entire force" (p. 896).

By 1943, the need of the Wehrmacht for manpower became so critical that the German leadership had no alternative but to draw on the hundreds of thousands of armaments workers previously exempted from military service, replacing them in the factories with women. Hitler, who until then had vetoed any measure requiring women to leave the home, issued, on 13 January 1943, the "Führer decree on the full employment of men and women in the defence of the Reich," which "required women between 17 and 50 years of age to register for work" (p. 907). Another measure to which the Wehrmacht resorted in order to raise troops was to advance the call-up dates. "Recruits born in 1925 were called up on 1 May instead of in the autumn . . . . This signalled the appearance, in the second half of the war, of a vicious circle in which younger and younger age groups were called up earlier and earlier. This was the beginning of the Children's War" (p. 909).

In an "Excursus: Developments in the Army Officer Corps, October 1942 to May 1945" (pp. 918-942), Kroener writes that "at the end of September 1942, the field army alone was . . . 14,219 officers under strength." Under the circumstances, by the end of 1942, "there was no alternative but to throw the entrance procedure open to all sections of the population and introduce promotion based on performance."33 Continuing, alarmingly high losses since the summer of 1943, particularly among younger officers, made unavoidable further relaxations in the standards for commissioning, including the reduction of "all social and educational admission requirements" (p. 921). Although these changes were in line with National Socialist social policy, it would be a mistake, according to Kroener, to regard ideology as the moving force behind them. "Indeed," he writes, "all the changes in the social structure of the officer corps were the result of an inevitable chain of events dictated by the rapid expansion of the army, rather than any deliberate policy of ideological manipulation" (p. 938). Kroener concludes his excursus (which reviews the development of the officer corps since the First World War and is illustrated with seven diagrams and four tables) by observing that the process of social transformation of the army had been begun towards the end of the First World War, had been suspended during the Weimar Republic (when the armed forces were limited to 100,000), and had been resumed in a stronger form after 1933. What happened during the period 1942-45 represented the culmination
of a process begun much earlier. "Hitler and the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers' Party] leadership never concealed their view that the entire army officer corps was reactionary. However, despite intensive efforts on the part of the Wehrmacht High Command, a social levelling in the most important of the services had not yet been achieved when war broke out. In the winning phase up to 1941, the army officer corps was able to keep its traditional selection procedures largely intact, though they were increasingly under threat. Massive losses and the first setbacks heightened the latent tensions arising from an unbalanced age structure, and forced a radical reorganization of officer recruitment and promotion procedures, which the regime immediately turned to ideological advantage. With the social revolution in the officer corps, the fundamental features that had formed its identity and prevented it from becoming completely indoctrinated with the new ideology were gradually lost" (pp. 941-42).

Turning to structural changes in the German war economy during the last years of the war, Kroener writes that in 1943, "a clear decline in the volume of forced labour imported from the occupied western territories was . . . discernible . . . . In April, the military governor of Belgium and northern France, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, reported that week by week more workers liable for service were managing to escape deportation to Germany. His request for 500 more military police, to enable him to recapture those who had escaped, was refused by the OKW. . . . Between April and September 1943, 510,000 workers in Belgium and northern France received notice of conscription for work in Germany. Of these, only 330,000 (65 per cent) turned up for interview, only 107,000 (21 per cent) were selected, and only 73,000 (14 percent) eventually reached Germany" (pp. 961-62). Sauckel, the general plenipotentiary for manpower, had no greater success in Vichy France in late 1943 and the first half of 1944. He reported to Hitler in July 1944 that recruitment of workers in the occupied western territories was "practically at a standstill . . . . Preparations had been made in France for conscription by age group, but Field Marshal von Rundstedt [Commander-in-Chief West] had insisted that the programme could not start without his consent and the military situation so far made it impossible for him to give the go-ahead." In any case, "at the beginning of 1944, foreigners comprised on average 25 per cent of the entire workforce employed in industry and 20 per cent of those working on the land. The proportion of forced labour workers and PoWs was much higher in many industrial firms, with peak levels of 50 to 75 per cent in some cases" (p. 1003).

In his final subchapter, "The War in the East 1943/1944: The Wehrmacht's Road to Calvary" (pp. 1008-1064), Kroener writes: "In the spring of 1943, the German forces again occupied practically the same positions from which they had launched their offensive almost a year before. However, . . . the balance of strength between the Soviet and German forces had now shifted even further against the Germans. In the case of Army Groups North and Centre, the ratio was four Soviet soldiers to one German; in the case of Army Group South, it was already seven to one." The heavy losses in Operation Citadel, the tank battle in the Kursk salient in summer 1943, marked the beginning of the "retreat of the army in the east. By the spring of 1944, it had had to fall back more than 1,000 km in the south, about 300 km in the centre, and 200 km in the north" (p. 1009). Moreover, some no longer fully mobile units threatened by being surrounded were "forced to beat a hasty retreat leaving most of their equipment and heavy weapons behind. This is what happened in February 1944, when two army corps were surrounded near Cherkassky: 35,000 out of 58,000 men were eventually able to fight their way out, leaving their equipment
and even their wounded behind. Only six weeks later, the whole 1st Panzer Army was trapped at Kamenec-Podolsk. Here too, they managed to break out, but only at the cost of heavy losses in men and equipment" (p. 1011). The shortage of personnel led to a considerable reduction in the "trench strength' of the German infantry divisions . . . . In the First World War, an infantry division covered on average a 4.4 km stretch of front; in August 1943, an eastern army division covered 15.9 km. The average shortfall in formations in the eastern army rose to as much as 35-40 per cent. At the end of January 1944, the C-in-C Army Group North reported to the chief of the army general staff: 'The depletion of our forces will increase the pace of withdrawal day by day. It is no longer possible to form a continuous line of resistance'' (p. 1021).

Following the severe losses on the eastern front in summer 1943, the high command of the army further reduced the strength of its infantry divisions below the level to which they had been dropped in the restructuring in the spring of that year. "Compared with the strength of old-style infantry divisions, which had a nominal first-wave strength of 17,000 men at the beginning of the war, the new-style infantry division comprised only 10,708 German troops and 2,005 Russian auxiliaries. The planners' central consideration was to reduce the overall strength of the infantry while at the same time preserving its component parts." Moreover, "motorized units were slashed. A new-style artillery regiment had only 13 cars and 17 trucks at its disposal, although it also had 429 horse-drawn vehicles and 2,308 horses." But even these reduced standards were not met. "In the winter of 1943/4, none of the infantry divisions in the eastern army was ever at full strength. Actual strength was sometimes only half the already reduced nominal strength, and combat units inevitably sustained the heaviest losses." But even with the reductions in troop levels, the fact was that "by the early summer of 1944, the Wehrmacht had lost a total of 41 divisions in the costly engagements in the east. With the formations taken at Stalingrad and Tunis, the field army (including Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe field divisions) had lost 73 divisions in all since the beginning of 1943" (pp. 1026-29).

In the "Résumé" (pp. 1065-1070) at the end of his contribution to the volume, Kroener writes that "the consequences of the assassination attempt on 20 July [1944] for the structure of the military replacement system—the takeover of the replacement training army by Himmler, the appointment of Goebbels as 'Führer's plenipotentiary for the total mobilization of resources for war', and finally the . . . [National Socialist] Party's role in the organization of the defence of the Reich and of German ethnicity—all represent such a clear watershed in the way the Wehrmacht's personnel developed during the Second World War that it seems proper to devote a separate section to this final phase, that of the death throes of the Third Reich."35

In the Conclusion (pp. 1071-1090) signed by the three authors of the volume, they write that "the decline of Germany's ability to wage war, the first hints of which emerged towards the end of 1941, progressed rapidly during the second half of the war." Even before the defeat at Stalingrad a growing number of economic and manpower problems proved increasingly difficult to resolve. "Here and there the Germans still managed to score successes. But even before the shortages of matériel, they ran out of the reserves of manpower that might have enabled them to mobilize the number of combat troops they needed. . . . 'Total war' was a desperate attempt to delay the inevitable catastrophe . . . . It was only then that the bulk of human and material losses were suffered on the German side—not only on the fronts but also in the bombed cities and
among the streams of refugees that soon started to flow. The unspeakable sufferings of the troops and civilian population in no way diminished the energy with which . . . [Hitler's] regime brutally suppressed any resistance to its rule or to the continuation of the war. With his own end staring him in the face, the dictator also demanded the relentless continuation of the mass murder of all political and 'racial' enemies, of 'life unworthy to live', and of 'useless mouths', more particularly the completion of the genocide of the Jews. . . . There was no turning back and no way out. The 'rebellion of conscience' on 20 July 1944 and its failure proved that there was not a sufficient force in Germany to halt the catastrophe to which the dictator had eventually also condemned his own people" (p. 1090).

Bibliography, Index, Abbreviations List, Graphics, and Glossary of Foreign Terms.—The bibliography (pp. 1091-1132) lists unpublished archival sources, naming individual records at the Federal German Archives at Koblenz, the Federal Archives, Potsdam Dept. (now Berlin), the Federal German Military Archives, Freiburg, the Military History Research Institute, Potsdam, and the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry, Bonn, and notes "other archives consulted," without citing individual records, in London, Munich, Washington, Hamburg, Nürnberg, Prague, and Moscow. In the extensive listing of published sources, which includes articles as well as books, English translations of German works are cited, with publication data, in addition to the German originals. The index of personal names on pp. 1133-1142, as in the original German edition, does not list Hitler. The text is effectively augmented by 76 diagrams, 13 maps, and 122 tables printed in black and white, with captions, labels, headings, and (where appropriate) place-names translated into English. The front matter of the volume includes a seventeen-page list of abbreviations and acronyms, in which words and phrases are spelled out in the original German and their English translation is given, followed by a one-page glossary of foreign terms. (The text of the volume has been kept relatively free of untranslated terms or abbreviations, but many do occur in footnotes that readers who do not know German would not understand without the glossary and the list of abbreviations and acronyms.)

Notes


2. The first part of the English translation of volume 5, published in 2000 with the subtitle Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941, was reviewed in WWTSA Newsletter No. 63 (Spring 2001) on pp. 6-17. The first three volumes of the English translation of the projected ten-volume history of Germany in World War II from the German Defense Ministry's Research Institute for Military History, reviewed in WWTSA Newsletter No. 56 (Fall 1996), on pp. 5-24, dealt with the background of the conflict and with its course through 1941, except for the attack on the Soviet Union. That campaign was covered, through the end of 1941, by the fourth volume, which was reviewed in newsletter No. 62 (Fall 1999), pp. 7-26.
3. The English translation of volume six, on the global war, 1941-43, published in 2001, was reviewed in WWTSA Newsletter No. 67 (Spring 2002) on pp. 6-38. A publication date has yet to be announced for the English translation of the seventh volume, Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943-1944/45 ["The German Reich on the Defensive: Strategic Air War in Europe, War in the West and in East Asia 1943-1944/45"], by Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001; ISBN 3-421-05507-6). The series is to conclude with vol. 8, Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Der Krieg im Osten und Südosten ["The German Reich on the Defensive: The War in the East and Southeast"], vol. 9, Staat und Gesellschaft im Kriege ["State and Society during the War"], and vol. 10, Das Ende des Dritten Reiches ["The End of the Third Reich"]. In his "Introduction" to vol. 5, part 2, the director of the Research Institute for Military History, Prof. Hans-Erich Volkmann, writes that the last two volumes of the series "will give more space to mentality, cultural, and everyday history, counterbalancing the perspective 'from on high' that has predominated in earlier volumes with the effects of the war as these were experienced by ordinary people, and their reactions to them" (p. 3).

4. Vol. 5, part 2, p. 19. A lawyer and former judge, a member of the SS since 1931, and a senior Gestapo official before the war, Dr. Werner Best was promoted in 1942, on appointment as Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, from SS-Brigadeführer to SS-Gruppenführer and then in 1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer, corresponding to advancement from brigadier- to major- to lieutenant-general (Helmut Heiber, ed., Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 [Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962], p. 425, note 2). In the passage on p. 19 dealing with Best's service in France there is a mistranslation. The statement that Best "had since the middle of the year [1942] been . . . in France," should read "until the middle of the year" ["bis Mitte des Jahres" (on p. 14 of the German edition, cited in note 1 above)].

5. Ibid., pp. 20-21. There is a mistranslation on p. 21. The statement in the German original that Best's "Verhandlungsgeschick gebraucht wurde" (on p. 16 of the German edition), does not mean that "he was able to use his negotiating skills," but rather that his negotiating skills were needed.

6. Ibid., p. 22. In his treatment of occupied Denmark, Umbreit cites the subchapter on Denmark in Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims, vol. 2, The Establishment of the New Order (New York: Norton, 1974), pp. 107-121, which provides an account of the role Best played in the roundup of Jews in Denmark at the beginning of October 1943. Umbreit deals with this topic not in his initial overview of the occupation of Denmark as part of "Hitler's Europe" (pp. 18-22), but in the third segment of his contribution to the volume, "The Ethnic 'New Order' through Genocide: The Murder of the Jews, Roma, and Sinti in the German Sphere of Power" (pp. 261-277); there he writes that, forewarned of the German action, "over 7,000 Jews managed to go into hiding, and most of them escaped to Sweden. Of those that were captured, 477 were deported to Theresienstadt. At Best's insistence they remained there throughout the war, and almost all survived" (p. 267). In footnote 38 on the same page, Umbreit writes that Best's personal role in the forewarning of the Jews is "a matter of dispute." This is reflected in Best's fate after the war. After being condemned to death in Copenhagen in 1948, Best appealed his sentence and it was reduced in 1949 to five years imprisonment. In 1950 the Danish supreme court extended it to
twelve years. In August 1951 he was released and expelled under an order prohibiting him from residing in Denmark. Prosecuted in the 1960s for his role as an SS officer in mass murder in Poland in 1939-40, he was convicted but released after six months (in August 1972) for medical reasons. He died in 1989 (Heiber, loc. cit.; Mark M. Boatner III, *Biographical Dictionary of World War II* [Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1996], p. 38; Gerhard Taddey, ed., *Lexikon der deutschen Geschichte* [Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1979], p. 121).

7. Ibid., pp. 80-81. In his magisterial study of Mussolini's relations with Hitler, Sir William Deakin wrote: "This question of the frontier provinces represented for Mussolini the main historical humiliation to which his Republican administration had been subjected by the Germans" (F. W. Deakin, *The Six Hundred Days of Mussolini*, Part III of *The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism*, revised by the author [Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966], pp. 166-67).


9. Ibid., p. 261, where Umbreit notes that more detailed treatment of persecution of the Jews will be provided in Peter Longerich's contribution to the ninth volume of *Germany and the Second World War* (the German edition of which is in preparation).


12. Ibid., p. 280, where Umbreit cites in a footnote the statement in a briefing for Göring on 20 February 1943 that "you can't have a policeman running behind every plough."

13. Ibid., p. 282. By spring 1943, there were 320,000 Hiwis (p. 284).

14. Armaments Minister Todt was killed on the morning of 8 February 1942 when his plane exploded on taking off from Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia. Hitler immediately appointed Speer, who was also at Rastenburg at the time and had originally planned to fly out with Todt, as his successor (Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit, *Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941*, transl. by John Brownjohn, Patricia Crampton, Ewald Osers, and Louise Willmot, transl. ed., Ewald Osers.


16. Ibid., p. 299. The reference to "the Wehrmacht bureaucracy [being] stripped of power" refers particularly to the sidelining of OKW's war economy and armaments office under Gen. Georg Thomas, treated in detail under the subheadings "The Disempowerment of General Thomas" (pp. 302-307) and "Speer's Takeover of the Armaments Inspectorates" (pp. 307-314).

17. Ibid., pp. 330-31, incl. note 138. The regional armaments commissions by no means resolved problems in the labor sector, "which Hitler had put in the hands of Gauleiter [of Thuringia] Fritz Sauckel. Throughout the war all attempts by Speer, some of them with Wehrmacht support, to bring about a change in this area were largely unsuccessful" (ibid., pp. 317-18). The conflict between Speer and Sauckel is dealt with in detail in the third part of the volume, on pp.960-981.

18. Ibid., p. 324. In the concluding part of the volume, Bernhard R. Kroener notes that Speer's "de facto takeover of naval armaments . . . , a move made possible by Raeder's downfall [in January 1943, was] engineered by Speer with Dönitz's knowledge and consent," and that, "in close collaboration with Field Marshal Milch," Speer gained control of air force armaments "without a struggle in the following year" (ibid., p. 944).

19. Ibid., p. 363. Key functions of the economics ministry were transferred, under the "Führer decree on the centralization of the war economy, 2 Sept. 1943," to Speer, whose ministry for armament and ammunition became the ministry for armament and war production (ibid., p. 364, incl. note 40).

20. Ibid., pp. 396-97. Speer's policy in France led to a bitter conflict with Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia, whom Hitler had appointed as general plenipotentiary for manpower and who enjoyed direct access to Hitler and the support of Hitler's powerful secretary, Martin Bormann, who was no friend of Speer's. In a conference with Hitler arranged by Bormann on 4 January 1944 regarding Sauckel's forced deportation of foreign workers to Germany, Speer was able to get no more than "non-committal assurances that the workforce in his French arms factories would be left alone, and ended the meeting as the real loser" (ibid., p. 411).

22. Ibid., p. 419. One reason that the German Air Force's share in armaments was so large was
that it included not only aircraft and support services, but also the antiaircraft artillery, not only
the protecting the homeland, but also mobile units attached to the German Army in the field.

23. Ibid., pp. 419 and 423. On the latter page, the English translation writes of Speer's "good
friend Milch," which does not fully convey the force of the German original's "Duz-Freund
Milch" (on p. 391).

24. Ibid., pp. 423-25. Maximum wartime production was achieved in some factories in the
United States by operating two or even three eight-hour shifts, but this approach was precluded
in Germany by the acute manpower shortage.

25. Synthetic rubber, known by the acronym Buna, produced by polymerization of butadiene and
natrium (sodium), supplied 22 percent of Germany's total rubber requirement by 1939 (ibid., p.
477). In his consideration of Germany's economic relations with its Axis ally Japan, Müller
writes that "the most important trump card in the economic struggle against the western Allies–
the Japanese monopoly on rubber supplies–had been thrown away by the Germans back in early
1940 when the patent on Buna artificial rubber was sold to the United States" (p. 579).

26. After Japan entered the war against America and Britain in December 1941, the only way of
transporting trade goods was blockade-running, which was attempted only during the winter with
its long dark nights. In the winter of 1941/2, eleven of fifteen ships that had set sail from Japan
reached Europe, "delivering 75,000 tonnes of fats and high-grade ores." In the second winter,
1942/3, only four out of thirteen vessels reached Europe, with cargoes of tin, edible fats, and
enough rubber largely to satisfy the German requirement for 1943. "In the winter of 1943/4 the
last five German blockade-runners fit for the task sailed from Japanese ports carrying rubber.
Only a massive use of the Kriegsmarine [German Navy], involving it in heavy losses, made it
possible for at least one of these to reach Bordeaux with its precious cargo, which met Germany's
needs for rubber up to November 1944. After this failure, Hitler forbade any further use of . . .
[surface vessels] as blockade-runners" (ibid., pp. 579-581). "Surface vessels" is inserted, in
brackets, as a correction for the deleted mistranslation of Überwasserschiffen [on p. 542 of the
German original] as "submarines" on p. 581.

27. Ibid., p. 776. Botulinus is a bacterium that forms the deadly neurotoxin botulin. Wounded on
27 May 1942, Heydrich died on 4 June. Retribution for his assassination included the razing of
the village of Lidice.

28. Ibid., pp. 511, 526, 776, and 783. Müller writes that the "Colorado beetles, which would
ravage potato crops, were . . . brought to Britain" by the Americans (p. 774), and that the use of
them seemed "especially promising" because their "natural spread had just then crossed the
Rhine and the dropping of . . . [them] behind the German borders could therefore be concealed"
The use of the beetles, together with "exceptionally dry weather", contributed to an "extremely poor harvest in 1943 [that] had devastating consequences" (p. 526). (This reviewer has been told by Germans that adults as well as schoolchildren were sent into the fields on a regular basis to pick the red larvae off the potato plants before they could devour the leaves and thereby kill the plants.)

29. Ibid., p. 844. Kroener notes that "Speer's predecessor, Todt, had had to devote much of his energy to protecting the armaments industry from the recruiting offices' insatiable demands for manpower," but that "Speer was now in a position to pass demands on to Sauckel without having to answer for any of his mistakes or setbacks" (ibid.). Also after the war at Nürnberg Speer, who received a twenty-year sentence, was seen as having less to answer for than Sauckel, who was hanged.

30. Ibid., pp. 884-89. In addition to the diagrams on the reorganization of the army on pp. 887-89, there is a diagram showing the "Age structure of the 326th Infantry Division, as at 23 November 1942" on p. 900 and one showing the "Average age and front-line experience of 345th Motorized Infantry Division, as at 7 December 1942" on p. 901.

31. Ibid., pp. 890 (incl. footnote 197) and 891.

32. Ibid., p. 896, where Kroener explains that interpreters and linguists "became increasingly important to the Wehrmacht after 1942, as more and more foreign auxiliaries were recruited and Turkish and Cossack units were formed."

33. Ibid., p. 918, where it is noted that as of 1 October 1942 the army officer corps had declined to a low point of 180,765.

34. Ibid., p. 977. In contrast to the stance of the German theater commander in the west, Kroener observes, "the Wehrmacht mounted no effective opposition to Sauckel's systematic abductions or the operations of his units in the east and in Italy." The respect shown for the French "was in strong contrast to the indifference and contempt shown to Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Serbs, and to the Italians, who were regarded as traitors" (ibid., p. 981).

35. Ibid., p. 1070. The coverage of this final phase presumably will be included in the tenth and last volume of the Military History Research Institute series, Das Ende des Dritten Reiches ["The End of the Third Reich"], which has yet to be published in German.
EDITOR’S NOTE:

Due to a production error on pp. 28-29 of issue 70 (fall 2003) of this newsletter, endnote 16 included the text of the subsequent endnote on German anti-aircraft ordnance during World War II. The two notes should have read as follows:


17. Westermann, pp. 86-87 on flak in Poland, pp. 92-93 on flak in France and Hitler’s quashing publicity about it, and p. 121 on flak in North Africa. For a brief but well-informed overview of German anti-aircraft ordnance in World War II, see the segment “German Flak Defenses” on pp. 23-43 of Kenneth P. Werrell, *Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988). “Flak” is an acronym for *Flugzeugabwehrkanone* [“aircraft defense cannon”]. The standard 88-mm Flak gun, initially designed by Krupp engineers at Bofors in Sweden and refined in Germany in the 1930s, comprised about sixty percent of Germany’s heavy flak guns during World War II. It fired a 20.3-pound shell at a muzzle velocity of 2,690 feet per second (fps) to an effective ceiling of 26,000 feet. With its high muzzle velocity and accuracy, this versatile weapon was widely employed not only against aircraft, but as an anti-tank gun and a standard artillery piece. (The 1941 model of the 88-mm flak gun fired a 20.7-pound shell at a muzzle velocity of 3280 fps to an effective ceiling of 37,000 feet, but because of mechanical problems did not come into service until 1943; by February 1944 only 279 units had been fielded.) The 128-mm flak gun, which fired a 57.2-pound shell at 2,890 fps to a maximum ceiling of 35,000 feet, used a powder charge four times as great as the 88-mm gun, making its shell’s flight time only one-third as long. Werrell also reports that “the AAF lost 18,418 aircraft in combat in against Germany in World War II. The American airmen credit antiaircraft artillery with downing 7,821 of these, enemy aircraft with 6,800,” and he adds a consideration that Westermann treats in detail, that “flak also degraded bombing accuracy. A 1941 British report said the accuracy had been degraded by a figure of one-third. A similar study of [U.S.] Eighth Air Force bombing errors between May 1944 and February 1945 credits almost 40 percent of these errors to enemy guns” (Werrell, pp. 42-43).
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Lyons, Michael J. World War II: A Short History. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice


Mawdsley, Dean L. Cruise Books of the United States Navy in World War II: A Bibliography.
   and the Naval Historical Center, 2004.

Memories of World War II: Photographs from the Archives of the Associated Press. New York,

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Hampf, M. Michaela. “‘Dykes’ or ‘Whores’: Sexuality and the Women's Army Corps in the United States during World War II.” Women's Studies International Forum 27, no. 1, (2004): 13 (18 pages)


