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General Information

Established in 1967 “to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects,” the World War Two Studies Association, whose original name was the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican.

The Newsletter

The WWTSA issues a semiannual newsletter, which is assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the Library of Congress. Back issues of the Newsletter are available from Robin Higham, WWTSA Archivist, through Sunflower University Press, 1531 Yuma (or Box 1009), Manhattan, KS 66502-4228.

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Annual Membership Dues

Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the WWTSA (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars. The Newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.
News & Notes

WWTSA Annual Business Meeting

The World War Two Studies Association’s annual business meeting was called to order at 5:30 p.m. on Friday, January 7, 2000, in the Miami Room of the Chicago Marriott Hotel. Association secretary Mark Parillo opened the proceedings with special mention of the recent death of WWTSA Permanent Director H. Stuart Hughes.

It was noted that Professor Hughes served in the OSS in World War II and subsequently became a full professor at Harvard University and, later, at the University of California at San Diego. He was best known for his contributions to intellectual history, producing such seminal works as Consciousness and Society (1958), though his history of contemporary Europe (Contemporary Europe: A History) was also very successful, going through four editions. While still at Harvard, Professor Hughes ran unsuccessfully against Edward Kennedy for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate, then campaigned as an independent against Mr. Kennedy that fall. His involvement with the World War Two Studies Association began when Henri Michel, a historian who published a World War II journal from the Prime Minister’s office in Paris, set up the French Committee on the History of the Second World War and helped organize the International Committee on the History of the Second World War as well. Michel knew Professor Hughes and sought his assistance in establishing an American Committee. The World War Two Studies Association thus owes a debt to H. Stuart Hughes as one of the organization’s founders.

It was also announced that the International Committee for the History of the Second World War will be sponsoring a two-part symposium at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, to be held in August 2000 in Oslo, Norway. The first session, “National and International Dimensions of the War,” will take place on Friday, August 11th, with the second, titled “The Legacy of the War in a Long-Term Perspective,” occurring the following day. Professor Mark Stoler of the University of Vermont will be offering a paper, “The Second World War in American History and Memory,” on behalf of the World War Two Studies Association. We greatly appreciate his efforts. Those interested in attending the congress or viewing the program can visit the conference World Wide Web site at http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/english/index.htm.

As WWTSA treasurer, Parillo reported the association’s continued solvency and noted that there is now a small reserve in the “Friends of the WWTSA” account recently established at the Kansas State University Foundation. He reported that last year’s switch to a different mailing service for the newsletter has provided some moderate savings in operating expenses. He expressed appreciation of the Department of History and the College of Arts & Sciences at Kansas State
University for their continued support of the association.

Members were urged to take note that the WWTSA-sponsored scholarly session, "The Battles Continue: World War II Issues in the 1990s" would take place the following morning, January 8th, at the Marriott. Parillo thanked Dr. Ed Drea of the Department of Defense, Professor Emeritus Grant K. Goodman of the University of Kansas, Professor Jeffrey Roberts of Tennessee Tech University, and Professor Robert Pois of the University of Colorado at Boulder for their participation in the upcoming program.

The secretary announced plans to organize a session for the 2001 American Historical Association annual meeting in Boston on the ongoing efforts of World War II historians in the field of oral history. There was some discussion of other possible sessions and a call for further suggestions. Members interested in organizing or participating in scholarly sessions in conjunction with future AHA meetings were invited to contact WWTSA secretary Parillo. The next AHA annual meeting will be at the Sheraton Boston, Westin Copley Place Boston, and Boston Marriott Copley Place hotels on 4-7 January 2001, and the following year the meeting will take place in San Francisco, at the San Francisco Hilton, Renaissance Pare 55, and Hotel Nikko on 3-6 January 2002. Members were reminded that the WWTSA may sponsor as many panels as it wishes for these meetings and that, as an affiliated society of the AHA, the association gets its sessions listed in the AHA program but does not necessarily have to submit its program proposals to the AHA Program Committee for approval, which means that the deadline for proposals is three months later than for the AHA Program Committee.

Under the heading of new business, Parillo reported that Roger Pao of the History Tournament Station had requested WWTSA sponsorship for the American History Bowl competition for high school students. Members wishing to support or assist this venture should contact Roger Pao at 405 Glen Bonnie Lane, Cary, NC 27511 (e-mail: hsttournamentstation@MailCity.com).

The floor was opened to other business. Some general discussion of trends in World War II studies historiography ensued, including some suggestions for features in future newsletters. The meeting adjourned at 6:25 p.m.

**WWTSA Web Site Update**

WWTSA Associate Editor and webmaster James Ehrman has updated the association Web site by compiling cumulative files of bibliographic listings from recent issues of the newsletter. There is a collection of recently published books and another of recently published articles. This will make searching the bibliographic listings quicker and more convenient. The Web site URL is: [http://h-net2.msu.edu/~war/wwtsa](http://h-net2.msu.edu/~war/wwtsa).
WWTSA SESSION ON WORLD WAR II ISSUES IN THE 1990s

On January 7, 2000, at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association held in Chicago, Illinois, the World War Two Studies Association sponsored a session titled “The Battles Continue: World War II Issues in the 1990s.” Edward Drea, U.S. Army Center of Military History (retired), chaired and commented on a three-member panel whose common theme was memory and history -- that is the participants’ recollection of events and the historian’s reconstruction of those events. The session was well attended by a diverse mixture of academic and government historians, museum curators, and World War II veterans. A lively question and answer period followed the papers.

Dr. Grant K. Goodman, Professor Emeritus in History, University of Kansas, recounted the Japanese Foreign Ministry and cabinet’s reluctance in 1993 to confront incontrovertible documentary evidence of sexual slavery and the Japanese government’s attempts to ignore, downplay, or dismiss the historical evidence and participants’ memory. Professor Goodman’s “My Own Gaiatsu (Foreign Pressure) or, Whatever Happened to the “Comfort Women” first described the Foreign Ministry’s reaction to his role in disclosing the Imperial Japanese Army’s official sponsorship of organized prostitution. From that departure point, he addressed the larger issue of Japan’s unwillingness to confront its wartime past. This well-organized, witty, and insightful paper provoked numerous questions from the audience about Japan’s selective memory of World War II, the role of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, and the continuing confrontation between former comfort women and the Japanese government.

Dr. Jeffrey Roberts, Associate Professor, Tennessee Tech University, used the 1995 Smithsonian Air & Space Museum’s failed Enola Gay exhibit as a vehicle to question first the motives of the display’s advocates in the professional historical community and second, by extension, to underscore the changing and growlingly exclusivist nature of the American Historical Association, which, at least by implication, favors only selective memories. “The Enola Gay Exhibit as a Failure of the Historical Profession” forcefully argued that exhibit supporters dismissed any criticism of the original exhibit as products of “myth or ignorance of relevant scholarship.” Despite apologists’ assertions of violation of academic freedom, Roberts saw the academic campaign and the American Historical Association’s role as displaying a hypersensitivity to race and disturbing willingness to marginalize dissenting views, particularly those of military or diplomatic historians. As might be expected, Roberts’ views stimulated a discussion not only about the AHA situation, but also over the ripple effect cancellation of the exhibit has exerted on subsequent museum displays. We should all look forward to Dr. Roberts’s forthcoming book on the atomic bomb debate which Prager will publish late this year or early next.

Finally Dr. Robert A. Pois, Professor University of Colorado, raised the fundamental issue of preserving memory within a secular experience in “The Uniqueness of National Socialism and the Question of Historical Judgments.” In an academic age when the impotence of human reason and the impossibility of universal moral judgments are regarded as positive attributes when writing history, Professor Pois confronted the audience with the basic question of
memory and history involving the preservation of the memory of the Nazi destruction of European Jewry without either 1) submerging the Holocaust into superficial and unrelated generalities, or 2) insisting the Holocaust is so unique as to become immune to historical analysis and judgment. He concluded that reasoned argumentation and empathetic understanding offer the guide that enables historians to draw conclusions about the past and form hypothesis about it. Such an approach allows for individual manifestations to be seen in a wider general developments. Professor Pois paper and his remarks on attempts to trivialize veterans’ recollection of events added fuel to the discussion.

All three papers tackled the disturbing but fashionable notions that belief and emotion, not reason and empiricism, govern the writing of history; in short, that different intellectual and political movements create their own forms of relative “knowledge.” One believes the Japanese government coerced young women into organized, state-sponsored prostitution, or one does not. One believes the atomic attack on Hiroshima was either a necessary act of war, or one does not. One believes the Holocaust was a unique event transcending analysis, or one does not. The three fine presentations addressed particular historical events of World War II and by so doing illuminated larger contemporary issues of the historical profession particularly relevant to the current study of military history. After all, if history is merely today’s agenda, then it holds no claim to a discipline.

Submitted by Ed Drea.
Reviews by Donald S. Detwiler


Known to historians of the Second World War for *The Last European War—September 1939/December 1941* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), his more recent study, *The Duel: 10 May – 31 July 1940: The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1991), and several other works dealing with the period¹, John Lukacs has now produced a detailed account of events in London during five of the eighty days considered in *The Duel*. In his new volume, Lukacs reconstructs Winston Churchill's achievement, from Friday, May 24th, through Tuesday the 28th, in rallying the government he had been appointed to lead on May 10th in its firmly uncompromising stance against Hitler. Effectively drawing on primary sources at the Public Record Office in Kew, the Churchill Archives at Cambridge, and the Mass-Observation Archives at the University of Sussex, in addition to specialized studies and contemporary press reports, Lukacs presents a carefully documented day-by-day account of that five-day span, juxtaposing the public perception of the catastrophic reverses in France with the secret deliberations during no fewer than "nine War Cabinet sessions during the three days of 26 and 27 and 28 May."²

On Monday, May 20th, a German armored spearhead under General Ewald von Kleist had reached the English Channel. By Friday the 24th, when Lukacs' detailed account begins, following an introductory background chapter, "The Hinge of Fate," the magnitude of the catastrophe that had befallen the Allies in France was apparent. On Sunday the 26th, the French premier, Paul Reynaud, flew to England and informed Churchill and his War Cabinet colleagues of "the near hopelessness of the French military situation,"³ and that although "he himself would fight on, . . . he might soon be replaced by others of a different temper."⁴ Reynaud proposed a joint Anglo-French request to Mussolini (coupled with concessions as an inducement) that he explore with Hitler the prospects for a settlement.⁵ In supporting Reynaud's initiative at a War Cabinet session that same afternoon, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, said that he

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²Lukacs, *Five Days*, p. 146. "After 10 May 1940, the War Cabinet consisted of five men—Churchill, Halifax, and Chamberlain and the two leaders of Labour, Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, who were brought into the coalition, making it a National Government" (ibid., p. 68).

³Lukacs, p. 111.


⁵Lukacs, pp. 105-112; Churchill, p. 107.
"thought that if we got to the point of discussing the terms of a general settlement and found that we could obtain terms which did not postulate the destruction of our independence, we would be foolish if we did not accept them."6 Churchill opposed the proposal because, as he later put it in his memoir-history of the war, "once we started negotiating for the friendly mediation of the Duce, we should destroy our power of fighting on."7 But he gives no hint of the pains to which he went to convince his Tory colleagues, Chamberlain and Halifax, of the importance of rejecting Reynaud's proposal. Lukacs' vivid account of these three men and of their interaction enables the reader to appreciate an aspect of the prime minister's leadership during that time that is not even remotely suggested in Churchill's own postwar account.8


This "history of the evolution of our knowledge of Hitler" (p. xi) is a copiously annotated, critical study of the development of scholarship on the German dictator since his emergence as a figure on the world stage. In his opening chapter, Lukacs reviews the "extraordinary, and continuing, interest in Hitler during the last fifty years" (p. 2) and surveys the most important works on him from the account of his rise to power by Konrad Heiden to Ian Kershaw's preliminary profile of the dictator.9

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6 Lukacs, p. 117, noting that he supplied the italics.


8Rather than suggesting that there had been serious consideration (let alone advocacy) of compromise in the War Cabinet, Churchill wrote that he "found ... [his] colleagues very stiff and tough" (ibid., p. 107). On page 186, Lukacs concludes his account of the episode with the acknowledgment by Lord Halifax's biographer that Churchill had been right: "Churchill's instincts proved correct. Halifax had attempted to bring logic and reason to a problem long since devoid of either" (citing Andrew Roberts, *The Holy Fox: A Biography of Lord Halifax* [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991], p. 226). In a footnote on the same page, Lukacs cites Roberts further: "Churchill wrote in *Their Finest Hour*, "Future generations may deem it noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda. ... We were much too busy to waste time upon such academic, unreal issues." In fact, future generations might find it just as noteworthy that there were five meetings [in reality, nine (Lukacs' insertion)], some of which went on for as long as four hours, solely on that very subject" (ibid., 227-28). The passage in *Their Finest Hour* that Lukacs quotes Roberts as citing occurs at the beginning of the ninth chapter, "The French Agony" (loc. cit, p. 153).

9Heiden's study of Hitler until the end of June 1930, not long before the death of Hindenburg, and Hitler's merger of the powers of the presidency with those of the chancellorship in 1934, published by Europa Verlag in Zürich in 1936, appeared in translation by Ralph Manheim as *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1944) and has recently been
In his second chapter, Lukacs considers historians' treatment of the first thirty years of Hitler's life, i.e., to 1919, as well as Hitler's own self-portrayal, not only in *Mein Kampf*, but also in his earlier writings and speeches, with particular attention to what seem to have been the milestones in his life and the points at which his political ideas and world-view crystallized. Hitler, blinded in October 1918 in a gas attack at the front, was in a hospital in Pomerania at the time of the armistice and the abdication of the emperor in November. "One man," Lukacs notes, "who understood the searing experiences of Hitler," hearing the crushing news of the defeat and collapse of the German Empire during his convalescence, "was Churchill. In the first volume of his memoirs of the Second World War, Churchill began a chapter with the description of Hitler in that hospital. Written in 1948, it is still a most penetrating summary description." reissued as a paperback (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1999). Lukacs takes into account Kershaw's *Hitler* (London and New York: Longman, 1991), a concise volume in the "Profiles in Power" series, edited by Keith Robbins, as well as the British historian's earlier works, *The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, Bavaria, 1933-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). But the first volume of Kershaw's major biography, *Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1998; New York: Norton, 1999), appeared only after Lukacs' book had been published. In a review of Kershaw's new work in *The Spectator* (19 September 1998), Lukacs described it as "the most impressive biography of Hitler in the English language," noting that it "is near-encyclopaedic, demonstrating his extensive acquaintance with German sources and studies. It rests on the solid fundament of his earlier studies and researches about German opinion and sentiment during the Hitler era" (p. 39).

10Adolf Hitler, *Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 1905-1924*, ed. by Eberhard Jäckel together with Axel Kuhn (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980, 1315 pp.). Lukacs mentions that the editors, on learning that several items—"sixteen or seventeen out of a total of nearly seven hundred documents"—were spurious, published a note regarding them in the prominent Munich journal of contemporary history, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (April 1981, p. 304).

11Lukacs, *The Hitler of History*, p. 61, footnote, citing the chapter "Adolf Hitler," dealing with the early rise of Hitler and Weimar Republic, in the first volume of Churchill's work on *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948; paperback repr., New York: Bantam, 1961), pp. 47-59. In *The Duel—10 May–31 July 1940: The Eight-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1991), pp. 40-41, Lukacs pointed out that Churchill, as a practicing journalist, had "composed a portrait of Hitler in 1935: 'What manner of man is this grim figure who has performed these superb toils [meaning the raising up of Germany] and loosed these frightful evils [meaning Hitler's persecutions and terror]?" In November 1935 he wrote: 'Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face in public business or on social terms have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism.' As late as September 1937 he wrote: 'If our country were defeated I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations.' There was nothing hypocritical in these phrases. They were not the results of the sometimes undue, and
In his third, fourth, and fifth chapters, Lukacs considers in turn the treatment of Hitler as a reactionary or a revolutionary of a new kind; the character of his radically nationalist régime; and his abilities as a statesman and a strategist. In the sixth chapter, "The Jews: Tragedy and Mystery," Lukacs turns to the historiography of the Holocaust, noting the extent to which allegations "that the Holocaust had been arranged behind Hitler's back by Himmler, Heydrich and others, and against Hitler's intentions" have been effectively refuted,12 and commending as "most valuable" books by Uwe Dietrich Adam and Gerald Fleming and an "extraordinarily intelligent and relatively small volume by the Swiss Philippe Burrin."13

The seventh chapter is about the treatment of Hitler's place in German history; the question of the responsibility for his rise to power of conservative, nationalist elites; the challenge of understanding Hitler's support among the German people; and the complex and controversial question of the relationship between his régime and the Roman Catholic Church.14

therefore exaggerated, British habit of rhetorical fairness. Nor were they polite phrases masking hate. The hate—if that is what it was—that would animate Churchill against Hitler came later. Even then it was less of a hate for a man than the hate of what that man had wrought. Even after the war, writing about Hitler, Churchill described how Hitler's sufferings in 1918 'did not lead him into Communist ranks. By an honourable inversion he cherished all the more an abnormal sense of racial loyalty and a fervent and mystic admiration for Germany and the German people.' The italics are mine." (For the relatively positive impression Hitler made on another seasoned foreign observer in early March 1938, see Lukacs' account of Hitler's meeting with a former President of the United States in his chapter on the year "1938" in A Thread of Years [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998; paperback repr., 1999], pp. 261-67, and his article "Herbert Hoover Meets Adolf Hitler" in The American Scholar, Vol. 62, No. 2 [Spring 1993], pp. 235-38.)

12Loc. cit., p. 179, where Lukacs cites several articles by Martin Broszat, Eberhard Jäckel, and Jost Dülffer in German publications, but also Gitta Sereny and Lewis Chester in the London Sunday Times, 10 July 1977. Lukacs also discusses (on pp. 195-96) the relationship between Adolf Hitler and the Jewish physician Dr. Eduard Bloch, who cared for his mother during her terminal illness, citing the documentation from Bloch quoted in Ernst Günther Schenck, Patient Hitler. Eine medizinische Biographie ["Hitler as a Patient: A Medical Biography"] (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1989) and referring to Bloch's article about Hitler in Collier's, 15 and 22 March 1941.


14Lukacs cites the conclusion reached by the Austrian Roman Catholic historian Friedrich Heer that "neither in German Catholicism nor in the Vatican did Hitler meet an opponent who was worthy of him [der ihm gewachsen war]" (p. 217, where Lukacs, in his own English translation,
In the eighth chapter, Lukacs first considers apologists and revisionists, including David Irving, noting the unfortunate influence of this "amateur historian" and citing examples of his "methods," and then turns to the German "Historians' Controversy" (Historikerstreit) of the 1980s, which arose, he writes, because the time had arrived when "respectable German professional historians had come to find it proper to reconsider the place of the Third Reich—and, at least indirectly, of Hitler—in the history of Germany and of Europe in the twentieth century." Referring to two of the more prominent conservative participants in the controversy, Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber, Lukacs concludes that in their "defense it must be said, in all fairness, that while elements of a rehabilitation of Hitler may be implicit in some of their writing, that does not seem to have been their purpose. They were moved by a passionate bitterness against what to them seemed an unfortunately broad—yet inadequate—and anti-nationalist consensus among German historians. They wanted not to rehabilitate but to explain. Yet many of their explanations amounted to a kind of relativatization that ought to be dismissed. Nolte and Hillgruber, as well as most of their supporters and followers, are not admirers of Hitler but defenders of Germany and of the history of the German people during the Third Reich. But since the history of the Third Reich is inseparable from that of Adolf Hitler, they inevitably find themselves (at times at least) defending Hitler, too."

In his concluding chapter, "The Historical Problem," Lukacs writes that "on 2 June 1945, hardly a month after Hitler's suicide, Pope Pius XII spoke before the College of Cardinals about 'the satanic apparition . . . of National Socialism.' With all respect due to this much, and sometimes unjustly, criticized pope, I am inclined to agree with Friedrich Heer: 'Again this is being metaphysical, removing something from history and from the responsibility for history, acquitting Catholics of their responsibilities. For a "satanic apparition" no one is responsible—at best, an exorcist. . . . The pope overlooks entirely that this "satanic apparition" was a very concrete human incarnation who, before all in the Munich so loved by the pope but also elsewhere, was promoted and helped into power by very responsible and notable men. . . ."" 

cites Heer's study, Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler. Anatomie einer politischen Religiosität ["The Belief of Adolf Hitler: The Anatomy of a Political Religiosity"] [Munich: Bechtle, 1968], p. 471). Lukacs goes on to acknowledge the at times "even inspiring record" of a number of the Catholic clergy, but points out that "some of the responses to Hitler by otherwise non-Nazi or even anti-Nazi members of the hierarchy are less than inspiring, especially in retrospect" (and, in an extended footnote on pp. 217-18, cites a number of specific examples).

15The characterization as an "amateur" occurs on p. 229, where Lukacs writes of the British author's "evolution from a young sympathizer of Germany and things German to a 'rehabilitator' of Hitler and then to his indubitable admirer and partisan"; in a long footnote on pp. 230-31, Lukacs cites nine passages in David Irving, Hitler's War (New York: Viking, 1977) as "a very random sampling of Irving's 'methods'" (briefly noting his objection to each).

16Ibid., p. 233.

17Ibid., p. 236.

With a text that is stimulating and sometimes provocative for the specialist, yet accessible to the general reader and informative for the student, and with a wealth of footnotes providing judiciously selected excerpts from and often incisive commentary on the extensive literature, Lukacs’ concise volume of slightly less than three hundred pages is a very welcome contribution to our understanding of Hitler and to the scholarship devoted to him and to his place in history.


These two readable, extensively documented monographs, published as revisions of British doctoral dissertations, are valuable and well-informed contributions to the study of Spain during the Civil War and the Second World War.

Leitz’ book, based on a wide reading of the scholarly literature in English, French, German, and French and on extensive research in German, British, Spanish, and American archival sources, provides a far more detailed account of Spanish-German economic relations from the beginning of the Civil War to the end of World War II than has heretofore been available.19

In the first two chapters, dealing with the Civil War, Leitz brings out the extent to which Franco succeeded in limiting German penetration of the Spanish economy, even though the Germans had "put Franco's victory at risk by withholding war matériel in the second half of 1938," with the consequence that, when the war ended, "Nationalist Spain was far from having become an economic colony of National Socialist Germany" and Berlin's principal leverage was the enormous debt incurred for German aid during the conflict.20 After the beginning of World War II, moreover, Spain "became increasingly reliant on Britain for imports . . . Franco benefited from a British policy of economic appeasement which included the provision of wheat and the organization of American oil and cotton supplies."21 Another factor that reduced German

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19Leitz was able to use Spanish archival materials opened only in the 1990s, but mentions that "access to Franco's personal records remains limited" (p. 224).

20Leitz, p. 90.

21Ibid., p. 224. On 8 October 1940, at a time when Hitler was planning a joint Spanish-German attack on Gibraltar that would be thwarted by Franco, Churchill explained in the House of Commons the policy of his government to provide Spain desperately needed imports: "There is no country in Europe that has more need of peace and food and the opportunities of prosperous trade than Spain, which has been torn and tormented by the devastation of a civil war into which the Spanish nation was drawn by a series of hideous accidents and misunderstandings and from the ruins of which they must now rebuild their united national life in dignity, in mercy, and in honour. Far be it from us to lap Spain and her own economic needs in the wide compass of our blockade" (*The Times*, 9 Oct. 1940, cited by E. Allison Peers, *Spain in Eclipse, 1937-1943* [London:...
influence in Spain was that the value of the Spanish debt was severely discounted by the bidding
war for the one natural resource that Germany most needed from Spain, wolfram—the ore
containing tungsten, used for hardening steel for armor-plating and armor-piercing projectiles. 22

In his conclusion, Leitz writes that it was clear even during World War II that German aid
totalling "nearly RM580 million . . . to support Franco in the Spanish Civil War had not yielded
long-term economic benefits. Although the abnormal conditions created by [the] Second World
War did have an impact on this failure, it is doubtful whether Franco would have allowed an
economic colonization of Spain even under peacetime conditions. . . . In the end, only a total
German victory in Europe would have brought Nationalist Socialist plans for an economic
colonization of Spain back on course." 23

The purpose of Michael Richards' study of the Franco régime is "to analyse the interaction of
the ideological, social and economic aspects of Francoism's establishment in power during and
immediately after the Civil War. . . . In large part, it is a study of the brutalities of everyday life
as lived by substantial sections of the population in the course of the Civil War and in its
aftermath, and an attempt to suggest some ways in which they may be explained." 24 "The
Francoist ideology," as Richards explains in detail, "was composed of Catholicism, specifically
Spanish myths, exacerbated nationalism and European fascism." 25 The "brutalities of everyday
life" to which he refers were suffered most acutely by the working classes, particularly in the
urban centers that had supported the defeated Republicans, as a consequence of the authoritarian
régime's attempt to implement a policy of economic autarky (i.e., economic self-sufficiency),
even at the cost of widespread deprivation, especially during the early years of World War II. 26

22This is treated in detail in Chapter 5, "Nazi Germany's Struggle for Spanish Wolfram and
Allied Economic Warfare" (ibid., pp. 170-199, including 125 footnotes). Regarding the bidding
war for wolfram, a former U.S. diplomat who served in Spain during the Second World War
subsequently wrote that the Anglo-American "device for depriving the Germans of wolfram was to
offer higher and higher prices for it, and we raised prices to what must have seemed to the
Spaniards (and to the Germans) astronomical levels. Since we had dollars to spare, and since the
sums were chicken-feed to us, there was almost an element of unfair competition in what we
did—particularly since we doubled and tripled the price of the petroleum we were selling to Spain
in order to recover a part of our costs" (Willard L. Beaulac, Franco: Silent Ally in World War II


24Richards, p. 2.

25Ibid., p. 16.

26"The US Red Cross found 'appalling conditions of starvation and need of every kind' in
the capital. In the summer of 1941 this organisation was 'feeding more than 20,000 starving people
in Madrid [and] 30-40,000 [were] living in ruins without a roof over their heads'" (Richards, p.
143, citing a report, dated 19 August 1941, in the Foreign Office records at the Public Record
Richards' study is based on extensive research in contemporary records not only in Madrid, but in regional archives, and on the increasingly critical and objective body of Spanish scholarship on the Franco era published since the death of the dictator and the accession of King Juan Carlos in 1975. Richards systematically analyses the political economy of Franco Spain during the era from the outbreak of the Civil War to the end of the Second World War, showing how the deprivations resulting from a radical policy of autarky were rationalized (and approved by the authorities) as a necessary element in 'the ascetic regimen that Francoism imposed," for the sake of the "moral and economic reconstruction" of Spain.

Although the conservative Spanish Catholic church had been very closely allied during the Civil War with the Franco régime in the bitter struggle against the anti-clerical Republic, differences between the church and the Falange emerged during the Second World War "over relations with Nazi Germany, for example, or because of the apparent social radicalism of some fascist 'revolutionaries', or the evident contradiction between Christian charity and the unending repression and domination. By this time, church, party and military were enmeshed, not only in a network of common ideas, but in a 'pact of blood' entered into during the war itself. The fall of Mussolini, moreover, and the social conflict in Italy that followed, made elite groups and much of society generally adhere desperately to the dictatorship one way or another for fear of a return to civil war."29

Richards observes that in Spain "writing the history of Francoism with any claim at all to objectivity was hardly initiated until the 1980s. Forgetting the recent past in postwar Spain was both enforced by authority and employed as personal and collective strategies of survival. This 'pact of oblivion', as it was known in political circles, became an important condition of the


28 Ibid, pp. 3 and 4.

29 Ibid., p. 172.
process of the peaceful transition to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s."  

Richards' monograph, which draws on recent Spanish scholarship as well as on contemporary records and publications, provides so unsparring a picture of the era he takes under consideration that one can understand why it was for so long passed over in silence.


An historian from China now teaching at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maochun Yu wrote his monograph on the U.S. intelligence effort in China during World War II as a doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley. Primarily on the basis of recently declassified records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) at the National Archives (Record Group 226) and "newly published Chinese materials"31, Yu provides a narrative account of his subject from the time of the establishment, in summer 1941, of the office of Coordinator of Information (COI), the predecessor of the OSS, until the transfer to the U.S. Navy of the China detachment of the OSS successor organization, the War Department's Strategic Services Unit, in fall 1946.32

30Ibid., pp. 9-10.

31Yu, p. xv.

32President Roosevelt created the office of Coordinator of Information, under (then) Colonel (later Major General) William J. Donovan, by executive order on 11 July 1941. On 13 June 1942 he divided it "into two parts: the Office of War Information, or OWI, [that] would 'plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information'... [and] the Office of Strategic Services, to be headed by Donovan, [that] would handle everything else" (ibid., pp. 70-71). The "OSS was disbanded by Executive Order 9621, dated 20 September 1945 and effective 1 November" (H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., *Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992* [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995], p. 127). Many of its personnel were transferred to the State Department's Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), others to the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU) under Brigadier General John Magruder, the former Deputy Director of OSS for Intelligence (Yu, p. 251). Before the SSU was abolished in turn in 1946, its operating unit in China was transferred, for "limited control and full logistical support," to the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet (ibid, p. 262). For an early but well-informed overview of the dismantling of the OSS and the establishment two years later of the CIA, see chapter 11, "OSS and CIA: The Espionage Gap," in *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, by R. Harris Smith [Berkeley: University
In his extensively annotated study, Yu describes the complexity of the setting in which the OSS functioned in China, where the Allied war effort against Japan was handicapped by the implacable hostility between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, by divisions within the Chinese Nationalist camp and turf battles among rival American agencies, and by fundamental differences in outlook, policy, and war aims between the Americans, British, French, and Chinese. In the course of the war, the OSS collaborated in China, at one time or another, with "virtually all of the major players—with Detachment 101 under army commander Stilwell, with SACO under the navy and Tai Li's BIS, with AGFRTS under Chennault of the 14th Air Force, [and] with the Chinese Communists in Yenan..." Augmented by transfers from the European Theater following the defeat of Germany, the personnel strength of the OSS in China peaked in July 1945 at 1,891.

After the dissolution of the OSS late in 1945, intelligence work was continued in China by former OSS personnel under the aegis of the China Detachment of the War Department's successor organization, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU/China), in order to provide continuing intelligence coverage of "the Soviet Union's expansion in China and adjacent areas." Once it had been decided, in fall 1946, that U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn from China, leaving only a military advisory group, the intelligence unit that had functioned in China under the SSU was transferred, for logistical support, to the U.S. Seventh Fleet, "in order to disassociate officers of California Pres, 1972; paperback repr., New York: Dell, 1973], pp. 361-383)

Loc. cit., p. 268; OSS Detachment 101 functioned as a guerilla warfare unit in Burma; SACO, the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization, was a collaborative enterprise of the Chinese Nationalist Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) under General Tai Li and the U.S. Naval Group, China, under Captain (later Rear Admiral) Milton E. Miles, who reported directly to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral King, in Washington, while simultaneously serving, from September 1942 until November 1943, as OSS coordinator in China (Yu, pp. 75 and 127); AGFRTS was the "Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff," based in Kunming, China, several hundred miles southwest of the wartime Nationalist capital of Chungking; and the "Dixie Mission" to the Chinese Communist headquarters in Yenan, China, included an OSS contingent "to report on the military capabilities of the Japanese in north China and to assess as well the military potential of the Communists" (Smith, OSS, p. 263). In his treatment of SACO and of Tai Li, Yu draws on new Chinese material, the memoirs of the late Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, A Different Kind of War, prepared by Hawthorne Daniel, with a foreword by Arleigh Burke (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967 [authorized reprint, Taipei: Caves Books, 1986]), and an unpublished manuscript by Admiral Miles at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., and he also includes eleven photographs provided by Admiral Miles' family among the twenty illustrations in his volume. (Further information on the role, background, and connections of Tai Li is provided by Archimedes L. A. Patti in the biographical sketch on pp. 491-92 of his book reviewed below.)

Yu, p. 226.

Ibid., p. 258.
in the military advisory and executive groups from connection with an intelligence agency," and it was that unit, Seventh Fleet's External Survey Detachment 44, as it was known, that became, after the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the following year, "the [new] Agency's first China contingent."

The subtitle of Yu's book, "Prelude to Cold War," refers to the conflict between the United States of America and the Chinese Communists, which was heralded by the killing in north China of an OSS officer, Captain John Birch, on 25 August 1945. When the Japanese capitulated earlier that month, Birch headed one of the OSS teams immediately sent to strategic areas previously under Japanese control. Yu summarizes the account of the incident given in U.S. Army records (based on the testimony of a surviving member of Birch's team) and cites the conclusion of "an investigation conducted by the U.S. judge advocate of the China theater . . . [that] 'Capt. Birch's conduct immediately prior to his death indicated a lack of good judgment and failure to take proper precautions in a dangerous situation, [but] nevertheless the actions taken by the Chinese Communist Army personnel fell short of according the rights and privileges due even to enemy prisoners of war and constituted murder. . . . The shooting was done maliciously. . . . The killing was completely without justification.'" However, writes Yu, it "was by no means an isolated incident 'provoked' by the murdered man. . . . It transpired because the Communists tenaciously tried to keep all American influence out of the geographically important Shandong Peninsula and Northern Jiangsu, which guard the entrance in the Gulf of Chihli (Bo Hai Gulf) to Port Arthur (Lü Shun) and Dairen (Da Lian)—both under Soviet occupation since mid-August 1945; and because the CCP troops were actively searching for the Birch party to prevent it at any cost from meeting the person Captain Birch was instructed to see, General Hao Pengju, formerly a puppet collaborator, with whom the CCP was conducting a hasty and most secret negotiation." In his "Epilogue," Yu points out that the OSS, focussed on the struggle against Japan, was oblivious to Chinese Communist espionage against the Chinese Nationalists, as illustrated by an OSS intelligence digest on Yenan compiled in June 1945, where, in a listing of Communist personalities, "Kang Sheng, intelligence chief of the entire Chinese Communist Party, who ran an overarching espionage system all over China, was called simply an 'intellectual'." Under the

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36Ibid., pp. 261-62. Yu explains that the transfer of SSU/China to the U.S. Navy had been initiated by General George C. Marshall, who at the time was in China attempting to mediate the conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, and who "wanted to dissociate his mission from SSU" (ibid.).

37Ibid., pp. 239-240.

38Ibid., pp. 235-36.

39Ibid., p. 276. In his subchapter on "Communist Intelligence and Tai Li's Turn to America" (pp. 40-44), Yu recounts the penetration of the Chinese Nationalist BIS by Communist agents, the discovery of which, early in 1942, mortified General Tai Li, bringing him "to the lowest point in his career." Tai Li's consequent determination "to modernize and overhaul his internal security and counterespionage system at any cost," Yu writes (citing an "unpublished
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the OSS itself was vulnerable to Communist Chinese infiltration. "There is ample evidence," Yu writes, "that throughout the war, Communist intelligence was able to penetrate OSS operations in China . . . Many Chinese typists and interpreters . . . were secret agents working for Yenan. As revealed in recent materials published in China, they stole U.S. documents, organized secret Communist Party activities, often forged intelligence, and fed American intelligence agencies in China falsified information."40

In connection with his account of OSS operations in China during the Second World War, Yu provides concise coverage of Allied intelligence operations, conducted from southern China, in Indochina, which the Japanese had occupied but left under French administration until 1945. On 9 March of that year, however, the Japanese suddenly took control, arrested the French governor general, seized administrative buildings and public utilities, interned all French troops, and, as champions of a policy of "Asia for the Asians," proclaimed Vietnamese independence and set up a puppet régime. Yu recounts how, shortly after this Japanese coup, which led to the collapse of the Allied network for rescuing fliers downed in Indochina, Ho Chi Minh and his followers were engaged as agents of the Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS).41 However, Yu does not discuss in depth Ho Chi Minh's role before March 1945 or OSS operations in Indochina (handled from the OSS base in Kunming, China), drawing, as he might have, from the detailed treatment to be found in Archimedes Patti's book on Vietnam.42 The fact that Patti's work on "the last battle of World War II," as he calls the Vietnam conflict (on the first page of chapter 1) is

40 Ibid., p. 276.
41 Ibid., pp. 203-208, citing on p. 207 the account by Charles Fenn in Ho Chi Minh: A Biographical Introduction (London: Studio Vista [and New York: Scribner], 1973) of Ho's emergence in 1945 as a revolutionary leader in Vietnam. Yu notes that when Fenn (the OSS officer in Kunming who recruited Ho) was warned by Chinese Nationalist intelligence that "Ho and most of his people were Communists," he checked with his headquarters in Chungking and was instructed to go ahead with him "regardless" (p. 206). On page 39 of Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1965—The United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), Ronald H. Spector writes that "in March 1945 officers of the U.S. Army Air Forces Air Ground Aid Service contacted Ho Chi Minh in Kunming and agreed to supply him with communications equipment, medical supplies, and small arms in return for intelligence and assistance in rescuing Allied pilots," citing Fenn and referring also to Lloyd Shearer, "When Ho Chi Minh Was an Intelligence Agent for the U.S.," Parade, 18 March 1973, p. 8.

neither cited in Yu's monograph nor listed in the AHA Guide to Historical Literature suggests that it may have come to be overlooked in the deluge of publications on Vietnam, so it is reviewed here, as an authoritative contribution to the historiography of the end of the Second World War in Southeast Asia and the background of the Vietnam War, complementing Yu's important contribution on the OSS in China and the origins of the Cold War in central and northern East Asia.

Archimedes L. A. Patti's Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) is both a history and a memoir. It is a uniquely well-informed, readable history of the Vietnam conflict from its background in World War II until the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps and the disestablishment of the French High Command in Saigon in mid-1956. At the same time, it is an engaging personal memoir by the French Indochina desk officer first in OSS headquarters in Washington, D.C., and then in Kunming, China, who led the OSS mission to Hanoi, in August and September 1945, to arrange for the release and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and for the formal surrender of the Japanese in northern Vietnam.

In "Part One: Washington," in which he writes of his service at OSS headquarters before he was transferred to China, Patti provides background information on Indochina during the war, on President Roosevelt's opposition to seeing it returned to colonial status, on preparations by the French to take control of Indochina as soon as the Japanese were defeated, and on Ho Chih Minh. By late 1944, Patti writes, Ho was already engaged in southern China in "part-time work with OSS and OWI [Office of War Information] officials in conducting Allied propaganda. In Kunming, Kweilin, and Liuchow he made good use of OWI's facilities to improve his English and knowledge of American history, customs, and current world events. Betweentimes he provided the BIS with Japanese military information from Indochina, carried out his Viet Minh organizational work, and proselyted among rival nationalist groups."

Meanwhile, Ho's


44In the "Bibliographical Note" at the end of Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1965—The United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), Ronald H. Spector writes that although Patti's book "appeared too late to be used in ... [his work.] ... Mr. Patti generously called the attention of the author to the documents on which his account is based" (p. 384). Patti's book was written years before the OSS records utilized by Yu were transferred to the National Archives and declassified for public use, but Patti states in his preface that his "dispatches and reports ... stored with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency were almost intact and were made available" to him (pp. xviii-xix). Readers familiar with R. Harris Smith's history of the OSS (cited in an earlier note) may remember the photograph taken on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's proclamation of the independence of Vietnam, on 2 September 1945, showing how, when "the band struck up the 'Star Spangled Banner,' . . . OSS Col. Archimedes Patti (left foreground) and Viet Minh military genius Vo Nguyen Giap (right foreground) saluted" (caption to the illustration on p. 355).

45Loc. cit., p. 55.
followers, under Vo Nguyen Giap, carried out forays in Vietnam against French and Japanese outposts, provoking severe French reprisals. Giap was planning to unleash a rising against both the French and the Japanese when, late in November 1944, Ho returned from China to Tonkin, "met with Giap and other militants . . . , and persuaded them that an armed insurrection at that moment would be premature and doomed. To keep up their spirits while discouraging any rash course which would jeopardize the whole movement, Ho created the Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam and placed Giap in full charge. Initially the Brigade concentrated on the dissemination of propaganda and instructions to the general population on resistance tactics, but it became the precursor of the . . . People's Army with Giap at its national commander . . . ."46

On his way back to China, Ho learned that "a downed American pilot . . . [who had] bailed out after a raid on Saigon" was with one of Giap's units and instructed that "the flyer . . . [be] escorted not merely to the border but to the American authorities in China."47 On his return to Kunming in February 1945, Ho reported to "his OSS and OWI friends . . . that the French army was deploying its forces in the mountainous areas of Tonkin and Laos and that the Japanese forces were doing the same thing . . . . What he did not know was that his new Propaganda Brigade was about to be the target of a French Army mop up operation in which the 'rebels' were to be decisively eliminated. The operation had been scheduled for the week of 10 March. . . . [But] if Ho . . . [and Giap, who had remained in Tonkin] were ignorant of the intended eradication of their little force," Patti continues, "the French were taken even more unaware by the Japanese, who struck on the evening of 9 March, before the French operation could begin. . . . The Japanese disarmed and confined the French military forces and their leaders . . . . and stripped French officials of all authority—from [Governor General Jean] Decoux to the lowest clerk. . . . Thus Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh became double beneficiaries of a great stroke of good fortune. They were saved from their would-be French exterminators . . . and the Vietnamese people were temporarily 'liberated' from their French 'masters.'"48 Moreover, the Japanese coup severed the channels of political and military intelligence from Indochina, denying General Claire Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force target intelligence and an underground rescue system for downed fliers and depriving the Chinese Nationalists information on Japanese troop dispositions, which they needed in order "to deploy their meager and ill-equipped forces along the Indochina border." Despite American reluctance to become involved in Indochina, "it was imperative that clandestine communications and operations be reopened if Allied plans against the Japanese in China and the Pacific were to prosper," so in March 1945 arrangements were made with Ho Chi Minh for the Vietminh to set up a network to provide intelligence and assist in rescuing downed Allied fliers, in return for communications equipment, medical supplies, and small arms.49

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46Ibid., p. 56.

47Ibid.

48Ibid., pp. 56-57.

49Ibid., p. 57; on pp. 53-55 Patti recounts how a Vietminh request in August 1944 "for American help in their struggle for independence and for the opportunity to fight alongside the
In "Part Two: Kunming" (pp. 61-147, with endnotes on pp. 544-552), Patti writes of his service as Indochina desk officer with the OSS in China from his arrival in Kunming on 13 April 1945 until his flight to Hanoi on 22 August 1945, describing his first personal meeting, on 27 April, in a Chinese village near the Indochinese border, with Ho Chi Minh, and noting British support to the French in Indochina in May 1945, provoking an American protest, and the subsequent decision at the Potsdam Conference in July to divide Indochina at the sixteenth parallel, with operations in the north assigned to the China Theater and in the south to the Southeast Asian Theater.

In "Part Three: Hanoi" (pp. 151-374, with endnotes on pp. 552-568), Patti provides a detailed account of his mission to Hanoi from 22 August through 30 September 1945 as head of the OSS Mercy Team charged with arranging for the release and repatriation of Allied prisoners-of-war in northern Indochina and also "acting as the initial intermediary in arranging for the surrender of Allies against the Japanese" was delivered by an OSS officer to the U.S. Consul General in Kunming, but that consideration of any such collaboration was quashed in October 1944 when President Roosevelt instructed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to "do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina."

Ibid., pp. 83-88, where Patti writes that "in his astuteness, Ho had asked for nothing; he had merely exposed me to the potential value of his political-military organization. And he would bide his time, asking no commitments" (p. 87). At this meeting Patti first learned of the famine of 1944-45, of which he later wrote, "with the passing months I came to a better understanding of Ho's concern and grief. Aside from the loss of nearly two million people—many of them children—the famine had seriously affected the health of the surviving Tonkinese [north Vietnamese]. It had also fanned their hatred for the Japanese and French oppressors and strengthened the people's determination to fight and win back the right to live" (p. 133, italics in original).

When the China-Burma-India Theater had been divided late in 1944 into the Southeast Asian Theater under Admiral Mountbatten and the China Theater under Generalissimo Chiang (with General Albert Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff), Indochina had been assigned to the latter. When Mountbatten informed Wedemeyer in mid-May of his intention to support the French "guerilla" groups in Indochina, Wedemeyer asked what arrangements had been made to insure that equipment provided would be used against the Japanese. Mountbatten did not answer the question, gave no information regarding the number or locations of the French units involved, and went ahead with the operation without "consent from either Wedemeyer or Chiang," provoking Wedemeyer's protest on 25 May and report to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (p. 122). The division of Indochina between the two Allied commands, with the area north of the sixteenth parallel assigned to the China Theater under Chiang and Wedemeyer and the area to the south under Mountbatten, was approved at the Potsdam Conference on 24 July. On 1 August 1945 the U.S. ambassador in Chungking delivered to Chiang President Truman's message advising him "of the decision at Potsdam and expressing the hope that he would concur. Truman's message, carefully worded and emphasizing that the division was 'for operational purposes,' implied it had no other connotations. Ten days later Chiang replied with a conditional concurrence" (p. 131).
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the Japanese military forces... to the Allied Powers," as he told the Japanese commander in Hanoi. On 19 August 1945, three days before Patti arrived there, the Vietminh had taken control of Hanoi, where, on 2 September, the day the Japanese signed the terms of surrender on the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay, he witnessed Ho Chi Minh proclaim the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and announce the formation of a provisional government. On 28 September the surrender of the Japanese commander in Hanoi was accepted by General Lu Han on behalf of the Allied Commander of the China Theater, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

In southern Indochina, in the Southeast Asian Command under Mountbatten, Indian Gurkhas and French paratroopers arrived on 12 September 1945, followed the next day by their British commander, Major General Douglas D. Gracey, who "imposed censorship on the indigenous press, proclaimed martial law, declared a strict curfew, and banned all demonstrations and public meetings." His restrictive measures soon provoked a strike and demonstrations in Saigon, which led him to agree to the recommendation of the Commissioner of the French Republic (appointed by General de Gaulle), Jean Cédile, that the French colonial troops still confined as POWs after having been interned by the Japanese in March be released and rearmed. This was done and in what Patti describes as "Cédile's coup," they seized control of Saigon on the night of 22-23 September. The next day saw "an orgy" of random, racist violence on the part of the French colonials against the native Vietnamese in the city that severely exacerbated the racist-nationalist-colonialist polarization in Cochinchina (i.e., southern Vietnam) that was among the ugliest features of the coming war.

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52Ibid., pp. 159.

53Patti's paraphrased description and interpretation of Ho's speech, as sent to Kunming at the time, is on pp. 251-52 of his book.

54Patti, pp. 360-62. Insofar as northern Indochina was in the theater of which Chiang was supreme commander, it was appropriate for his representative to accept the Japanese surrender. As a corollary to accepting the surrender, it had also been agreed, over French objections, that Chinese Nationalist forces would monitor the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina. However, as Patti puts it, "the Chinese lingered long enough to get the maximum 'squeeze' from the French: between 28 February and 14 March 1946 the French signed a series of agreements with the Chinese yielding their prewar rights and privileges in China. According to the 14 March agreement, the relief of the Chinese occupation army would begin on 15 March and be completed by the thirty-first, but in fact the last Chinese unit did not leave Haiphong until October 1946" (p. 381).

55Citation from R. Harris Smith, op. cit., p. 340; for detailed treatment, see Patti, pp. 307ff.

56Patti, pp. 315-318.

57Patti writes of "an orgy of French violence," explaining that the French civilian population of Saigon that "had lived in fear... rejoiced [that the soldiers of the regular army and the French Foreign Legion had been released, had been permitted by the British to take over the
Patti concludes the third part of his book with a detailed account of his conversation with Ho Chi Minh on the evening of 30 September 1945, after the formal surrender of the Japanese in northern Vietnam and Cédile's coup in Saigon and on the eve of his departure from Hanoi (soon followed by his assignment to the Indochina desk of the Strategic Services Unit in Washington). The Vietnamese leader, deeply concerned about what had happened in southern Vietnam, expressed his hope that, with American help, it might still be possible to avert open conflict. He told Patti about his personal life and political background, and about having been a communist since 1920, but "he... reflected aloud," Patti writes, "how wrong he had been ever to believe that the French, British, or Russian communists would concern themselves with the Vietnamese problem. In all the years that followed, no one of the so-called liberal elements have come to the aid of colonials. I place more reliance on the United States to support Viet Nam's independence, before I could expect help from the USSR."\(^{58}\)

In "Part Four: Aftermath" (pp. 377-449, with endnotes on pp. 568-570), Patti writes that Ho, during the months following the end of the war, "was desperately trying to align his newborn nation with the West and... wanted to put to rest the French charges that he and his Viet Minh were tools of Moscow, but we took no notice of his signal."\(^{59}\)

On 6 March 1946, 'Ho Chi Minh entered into a tenuous 'accord',... not with the Paris government but with a lesser official representing the military in Indochina. As Ho was soon to learn, the accord did not bear the imprimatur of the Quai d'Orsay [i.e., the French foreign ministry or the French government in Paris], and the provisions binding the French to recognize city, and had made it possible, after years of Japanese occupation, finally to put the native 'Annamites' (Vietnamese) in their place. Their moment of victory had arrived, so also their moment of revenge. Instantly they reacted as one savage mob on the rampage. Banding in gangs of three, four, six, and even more, French men and women roamed the streets of Saigon in search of Vietnamese. They found many still unaware of the French coup and set upon them savagely with sticks and fists. In their orgiastic fit the French broke down doors to ferret out cowering 'Annamites' from their homes or places of business to administer 'a well-deserved and proper thrashing.' No one they found was spared—men and women, young and old, even children were slapped around, spanked, and shaken. For most victims the beatings were severe; some were maimed for life. In general, after the beatings, the victims were pushed and shoved into cars or trucks and sent off to the nearest jail for the crime of being Vietnamese. Some with deep gashes and bleeding wounds were just left lying in the streets as being too messy to handle. The number of victims was reckoned, even conservatively, in the high hundreds and probably reached into the thousands.

"All this took place before the eyes of the French and British military who stood idly by, apparently enjoying the sport" (pp. 316-317, where Patti also mentions that his counterpart, the head of the OSS team in southern Vietnam, the ranking American in Saigon at the time, "called on General Gracey to protest the French behavior and British collusion, but Gracey would not receive him").

^{58}\text{Ibid.}, p. 373.

^{59}\text{Ibid.}, p. 381.
the DRV as a 'Free State' having 'its own parliament, its own Army, and its own finances' was never honored. Instead, French troops occupied Viet Nam's major cities and the cycle of violence begun with Cédile's coup in Saigon in September 1945 began in the north, as related by Patti:

"The end began on 20 November [1946] when an armed clash took place in the port of Haiphong between the French Navy and Viet Minh shore troops over customs control. The exchange lasted two days before a local agreement ended the dispute. But [the High Commissioner of France for Indochina], . . . then in Paris and indignant at what he deemed Vietnamese effrontery, cabled his deputy in Saigon . . . to 'teach those insolent Annamites a lesson.' Three days later the French delivered an ultimatum to the Viet Minh authorities demanding the withdrawal of their troops from the area within two hours. When it was ignored, French troops supported by offshore batteries from the cruiser Suffren attacked the Chinese quarters in the port city resulting in some twenty-five thousand casualties, including six thousand dead.

"Surprised by the ruthless attack, Ho, still the negotiator, tried to avoid a full-scale confrontation and appealed to the French for a cease-fire. The French military . . . ignored Ho's call for moderation and intensified their attacks. On 19 December the local militia (Tu Ve) destroyed the Hanoi power station, signaling a general attack on the French. Ho and his government fled into the jungle. Thus the Indochina war, which had been originally sparked by Cédile's coup in Saigon but to some extent contained through French military force and Ho's attempts to negotiate, became a full-scale reality."

Patti concludes his narrative with an overview of the course of the war, and the increasing involvement of the United States, until the final French withdrawal in July 1956. With a chronology extending through 1976 (Appendix I, pp. 451-474), a detailed "List of Abbreviations and Terms" (pp. xi-xvi), "Selected Biographical Briefs" (Appendix II, pp. 475-497), short essays on "Political Parties" in Vietnam in the 1940s (Appendix III, pp. 498-534), four charts on parties and organizations (pp. 535-38), a "Selected Bibliography" (pp. 571-76), and a detailed index (pp. 577-612), Patti's book is not only a readable, first-hand account of the end of World War II in Indochina and an accessible introduction to the background of the Vietnam War, but a useful reference work as well.

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60Ibid., p. 382.

61Ibid., p. 383.


McIlvaine, Bill. “Lord Root of the Matter: Despite poor health that often left him on the brink of death, Harry Hopkins became Franklin Roosevelt’s unofficial ‘Deputy President’ and an important liaison with Allied leaders during World War II.” *American History*. April 1, 2000 35 (1): 30.


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