NEWSLETTER

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General Information

Established in 1967 "to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects," the World War Two Studies Association, whose original name was the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican.

The Newsletter

The WWTSA issues a semiannual newsletter, which is assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the Library of Congress. Back issues of the Newsletter are available from Robin Higham, WWTSA Archivist, through Sunflower University Press, 1531 Yuma (or Box 1009), Manhattan, KS 66502-4228.

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Annual Membership Dues

Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the WWTSA (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars. The Newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.
News and Notes

1997 WWTSA Elections and Membership Renewal

All members of the World War Two Studies Association are eligible to vote for the eight directors of the association who will serve three-year terms through 1999. In addition, this year the chair and secretary-treasurer for the 1997-99 term will be elected. Please indicate your choices on the ballot included in this newsletter, detach it, and mail it as directed by January 31, 1997.

Also included in the newsletter is the 1997 membership renewal form. Membership dues are payable at the beginning of the calendar year.

Donations to the World War Two Studies Association

To help defray costs of the WWTSA that may not be covered by membership dues, the Kansas State University Foundation, which is eligible to receive contributions that are tax-deductible to the extent provided by law, has kindly established a dedicated account to which donations may be made for the use of the World War Two Studies Association. Members and supporters of the association are invited to send to the secretary, together with their membership dues, separate checks or money orders made out to the "KSU Foundation," indicating (on the "purpose" line) that they are for "Friends of the WWTSA" or "Account No. F40752."

As in the past, such donations could facilitate keeping dues, particularly for students, at a relatively modest level, and could, in addition, provide welcome means to cover otherwise unreimbursed association expenses.

Annual Business Meeting

The World War Two Studies Association will hold its annual business meeting in conjunction with the American Historical Association conference at the New York Hilton Hotel in January 1997. The meeting will be from 5 to 7 p.m. on Friday, January 3, in Room 507 of the Hilton. All WWTSA members are welcome to attend.

WWTSA Panel at the 1997 AHA Conference

The World War Two Studies Association will host a scholarly session in conjunction with the 1997 American Historical Association conference in New York. The session will be held in the New York Hilton, rendezvous Trianon, from 9:30 to 11:30 a.m. on Saturday, January 4.

The session is entitled "Where Do We Go From Here? The History of the Pacific War After Fifty Years: A Panel Discussion," and will be composed of the following participants:

Chair: Jonathan G. Uitly, University of Chicago
Waldo H. Heinrichs, San Diego State University
Ronald H. Spector, George Washington University
Yang Daqing, Harvard University

Since this is not an official AHA-sponsored event but rather a session conducted by an affiliated society, WWTSA members may attend even if not registered for the AHA conference.

WWTSA Panel(s) at the 1998 AHA Conference

The World War Two Studies Association will host one or more scholarly sessions in conjunction with the 1998 American Historical Association conference in Seattle, January 8-11, 1998. Those wishing to present papers or organize panels should contact WWTSA secretary Mark Parillo to coordinate their efforts and facilitate communications with the AHA conference organizers. Those interested are reminded that the AHA deadlines for proposals are 1 February 1997 for panels sponsored by affiliated societies.

Call For Papers

13th Naval History Symposium
Annapolis, Maryland
2-5 October 1997

The Department of History of the United States Naval Academy is sponsoring the 13th Naval History Symposium. The Symposium will take place from Thursday through Sunday, 2-5 October 1997 in Annapolis, Maryland. Paper sessions will be held on Friday and Saturday.

In keeping with tradition, there is no central theme for the Symposium. The organizers anticipate a wide range of naval topics extending across broad temporal and cultural ranges. As in the past, individuals who presented papers at the previous Symposium (1995) are not eligible to present papers in 1997 but are welcome to serve as session moderators or commentators.

If presenting a paper, please send a 250-word or less abstract, a 1-page vita, and a list of any audio-visual equipment required. If proposing a session, please send the information requested above for each presenter. If chair or commentator of a session, please indicate field(s) of interest and send a 1-page vita.

Please send your proposals to:

William McBride
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telephone: (410) 293-6290 or (410) 293-6250
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Deadline for submission of proposals is 28 February 1997.
The German History of World War II (Vols. 1-3)
A Detailed Report

by

Donald S. Detwiler


Oxford University Press is to be congratulated on its publication of translations of the first three volumes of the projected ten-volume history of Germany in the Second World War being written under the aegis of the German Defense Ministry's Military History Research Institute. Moved after unification from Freiburg to Potsdam, this agency of the German government, headed by a brigadier general on the active list, but staffed largely by highly qualified civil servants, has provided the base for an internationally recognized team of professional historians to produce, on a carefully orchestrated collaborative basis, what is clearly emerging as the most comprehensive, thoroughly documented history of the origins, assumptions, and course of the Second World War in German perspective.
The German Series to Date (volumes 1-4, 5/I, & 6)

Considering initially the original edition, as of fall 1996, roughly half the projected ten-volume series has been published in German. The first four volumes, on the background and the political and military course of the war in Europe and the Mediterranean to December 1941 are rounded out by the thousand-page first half of the fifth with economic and administration coverage through 1941 and the sixth, carrying the account, extended to a global scale, to early 1943. These six tomes, with an average length of some 900 pages, do not provide a single, panoramic narrative; there are well-written narrative segments, but it seems evident, on the basis of what has been published, that more complete coverage than would otherwise have been possible has been achieved in the series so far by having built it out of more than two dozen thematically interlocking, individually written scholarly studies on the most significant aspects and phases of the background and course of the war. In terms of scope, coherence, and intrinsic importance, at least half of these contributions, each the sole responsibility of a single scholar, could easily stand alone as book-length monographs representing substantial additions to the field. But the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The value of the individual contributions comprising each volume and, in turn, the value of each volume as a major segment in the series is immeasurably enhanced by the skill with which each part has been designed to complement the next in its meticulously documented treatment of the particular aspect of the approaching and then unfolding war on which it focuses.

The thematic unity of each multifaceted volume is underlined by well-crafted, substantial introductory and concluding essays. Each volume includes maps, graphics, an index of names, and an extensive bibliography with full citations of the works named in the copious footnotes. The resulting coverage, seen as a whole, is not seamless, nor is it intended to be, for the internal coherence of many of the individual contributions makes a certain amount of overlapping unavoidable. Moreover, the detailed consideration of intimately related events from different perspectives inevitably leads to differing and at times contradictory interpretations. This reflects the fact that, the effectively coordinated scholarly coherence of the contributions to this series notwithstanding, these volumes are not an official history. The suggestion that they might be, writes Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt, the chief historian of the Institute, on the first page of his introduction to volume 1, "is open to misunderstanding. It is not the [Military History Research] Institute's task to produce work expressing 'the viewpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany.' Such a viewpoint does not exist and therefore cannot be given. By a valuable tradition, the Institute enjoys academic freedom in its work and publications. The authors on its staff are responsible to the learned world for their research and conclusions."

Among the most significant of their conclusions, and one which runs through all the volumes published to date, was noted by Peter Paret in his review of the translation of the first volume: "The dispassionate analysis of the war by a working group of German scholars with unequalled command of the relevant archival sources constitutes an important voice in support
of those historians in the debate [regarding German history, i.e., the Historikerstreit] who reject efforts of some of their colleagues to deny the singularity of actions that many Germans carried out in the name of their country during the war.6

Volume 1: The Build-up of German Aggression

The dramatic success of the National Socialist regime in organizing and mobilizing for its purposes the resources of the German nation during the six and a half years from Hitler's appointment as chancellor to his unleashing of the Second World War in Europe was not the work of any one person, but the consequence of carefully coordinated efforts in many sectors of the state, the society, and the economy. The first volume of this new history of Germany and World War II traces these efforts in four parallel studies, each dealing with a fundamental aspect of the transformation of the Weimar Republic of early winter 1932-33 into the Third Reich of late summer 1939:

- the ideological and political mobilization of German society for the war;
- the rebuilding and preparation for war of the German economy;
- the reestablishment and build-up of the German armed forces; and
- the restoration of German sovereignty and recovery of Great-Power status.

Each of the three volumes in translation under consideration in this review is important, but the methodological thoroughness with which the first volume covers the four tracks of prewar history, synthesizing the literature in several languages, has led to it having been recognized, since its initial publication in German in 1979, as a landmark in contemporary historiography. For that reason it commands considerably more space in this review than the second and third translated volumes in the series, although each, in its way, represents an indispensable resource for the reader for whom the German original is inaccessible.

Part I, "Ideology, Propaganda, and Internal Politics as Preconditions of the War Policy of the Third Reich" (pp. 9-155), by Wolfram Wette, starts with a seventy-two page chapter on "Militarist and Pacifist Ideologies in the Last Phase of the Weimar Republic," beginning, after a carefully balanced definition of the problem and explanation of the approach being taken, with a concise analysis of the National Socialist ideology of violence and Hitler's plans for aggression.7 Regarding the militarism of the "nationalist opposition," Wette explains that "the 'nationalist' opposition' of the Weimar period was . . . not only opposed to the republican parties but to the Weimar form of government and democracy as such," going on to describe, for example, the organization and programs of the Stahlhelm, the largest and most influential veterans' organization, and of the right-wing German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei).8 In his account of the "soldierly nationalist" literary movement that included Werner Beumelburg, Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger, and Ernst von Salomon, among many others, Wette cites a devastating contemporary critique of an anthology edited by Ernst Jünger (who in 1995 celebrated his hundredth birthday) by the prominent
socialist writer Walter Benjamin, who found by 1930 that "what was developing here beneath the mask of a wartime volunteer and a post-war mercenary was in fact the unmistakable form of a Fascist class-warrior, and when these writers speak of the nation, they mean a state ruled by that class."9

Wette's survey of the Weimar Republic continues with copiously annotated treatments of the stance first of the Protestant churches and then of the Catholic church and the (Catholic) Center Party10, followed by subchapters on the liberals, on the socialists and trade unions, on the isolated pacifist movement, and on the German Communist Party and the Comintern11, and concluded with an essay on the deluge of books and films on war that began at the end of the twenties.12

The second chapter, "Propaganda Mobilization for War," begins with a review of National Socialist propaganda before 1933, describes the control systems established and utilized from 1933 to 1939 in order to achieve "Ideological Gleichschaltung" within Germany, concisely analyses Hitler's and Goebbels' "peace speeches," 1933-1936, in conjunction with the National Socialist policy of deception, and considers the ever greater role of the armed forces in preparations for war signalled, after 1936, with increasingly overt saber-rattling and "advance disclaiming of war-guilt."13 The third and concluding chapter, "Organizing Society in Preparation for War," systematically analyses the impact of the programs dealt with in the foregoing chapter, explaining, in specific terms, what happened and how.14 The discussion of the military in the second chapter deals with institutional and ideological issues, but in the first section of the third chapter, Wette writes:

"Within four days of forming his government, the new chancellor set about gaining the co-operation of the chief army leaders. He attached key importance to the role of the military in consolidating his power, as is clear from the fact that in addressing the army commanders on 3 February 1933 he unfolded to them the essential features of his whole long-term policy. Thus, the military leaders were aware of his plans for conquest and expansion from the outset."15

In the conclusion of his third chapter, Wette writes of the regimented Volksgemeinschaft [National Community]:

"The aim of the Hitler regime was, by organizing society in all its aspects, to extend into everyday life the authoritarian rule of the Führer state.16 The Volksgemeinschaft propaganda and the educational strategy that went with it were designed to make this political and social exercise of authority palatable to the population--which did not constitute a homogeneous group, sociologically or politically--and compensate it for the effective denial of its rights. It will probably never be exactly known how far the dictatorship was able in this way to break down the inner solidarity of particular classes and groups and to substitute an emotional identification with the whole community, or how far the claim to have done so was mere demagogy. Undoubtedly the uncertainty of law, and the fear of denunciation and reprisals that was closely bound up with the system of compulsory organization, contributed in large measure to the resigned attitude of the German people at the outbreak of war. The average, simple citizen who had welcomed the regime's bloodless victories in foreign affairs between 1933 and 1938, but who had not completely shed his reservations concerning it and above all did not want a war, found himself entangled in a web of compulsion, intimidated and incapable of deviating from the system."17
Part II, "The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for War," is a 214-page study by Hans-Erich Volkmann. Its seven chapters trace the transformation of the German economy from the world depression to the eve of the war, with particular consideration of the effort to achieve autarky, the measures introduced under the Four-Year Plan, and the role Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia, and much of South-east Europe in Germany's economic mobilization for war. In sophistication and detail Volkmann's contribution is comparable to the opening part of the volume by his colleague Wette. In 1989, ten years after the publication of the German edition, Volkmann prepared the following bibliographical note to be included, at the end of his first chapter, in the English edition, illustrating his approach to the subject:

"The relationship between National Socialism and the leaders of the economy," Volkmann writes, "continues to be the subject of new studies. It was also the theme of a series of lectures at the University of Augsburg. Regrettably, the lecturer narrowed down the problem to the support given to Hitler by big business, without making clear the motives of economic policy which ultimately led German big business to turn away from the Weimar Republic and towards National Socialism. The National Socialist alternative to the free market and world-wide economy, i.e. autarky within a large economic area, as formulated with the co-operation of renowned representatives of big business, was not fully understood by the author. Cf. Bernecker, "Kapitalismus und Nationalsozialismus." Neebe, Geschäftsträger, 176 ff., 274 n. 17, questions the thesis that big business ultimately supported the National Socialist economic policy for its autarky and large-area economic programme. Such a rash judgement can only be arrived at if one works exclusively from documents without tracing the co-operation of big business and National Socialism in economic policy beyond the period 1930-3. Neebe lacks the history-of-ideas approach to the subject. The same flaw is unfortunately exhibited also in the extensive and worthwhile study by Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. Both studies are based exclusively on documentary sources and the primary and secondary political-history literature, without the least regard to the literature on economic policy and economic theory of the period analysed by them (cf. also Volkmann, Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich, i, esp. 23-47). They are thus unable to mark out the intellectual background against which political and economic decisions were made. Both authors tend towards a personalized view of history, but this cannot ultimately explain why German private industry came to such a speedy arrangement with National Socialism as soon as the latter came to power, or why during the Third Reich almost complete identity of economic objectives was achieved, with the result that conflicts remained almost entirely confined to the organizational and administrative sphere. Turner is still deeply rooted in the totalitarianism theory. A very differently structured study is that by Teichert, Autarkie. It reveals the ideological background against which economic policy, and especially foreign-trade policy, was possible and was being realized in practice. The author refers in particular to the spate of articles on geopolitical and strategic thinking; this had an influence which should not be underrated on the formulation of economic, and more especially foreign-trade, theory and programmes. The study establishes the existence of a link between radically motivated expansionism, in the sense of living-space theory, on the one hand, and a power-political and eventually economically motivated expansionism on the other."

Volkmann's monographic study provides an invaluable synthesis of international scholarship on the Third Reich's economic preparations for the war, but many historians, including this reviewer, will not fault Turner for having spared his readers the kind of discussion of "the literature on economic policy and economic theory of the period" that Volkmann criticizes him for having omitted. Had Turner overlaid his well-informed and meticulously documented political account with a thorough consideration of the often technical and sometimes abstruse
literature on economic policy and theory, his book might well, in the end, have been far less convincing and accessible than it is. In the last analysis, neither political nor economic history alone can provide ultimate explanations of the steps that led to the consolidation of National Socialist economic control in the Third Reich, but Turner's classic is a milestone in our understanding of the process, and its value is not in the least diminished by the way in which it is complemented by Volkmann's authoritative study.

Part III, "The Rearmament of the Wehrmacht," by Wilhelm Deist, is a 166-page monographic account of the build-up of the German armed forces from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the Second. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which had the force of law in Germany, the task of the German army was "limited to maintaining order within the territory [of Germany] and control of the frontiers" (Article 160). This restriction and the 100,000-man personnel ceiling were regarded widely as unacceptable. For this reason, the grand coalition government under the chancellorship of the Social Democrat Hermann Müller in October 1928 "accepted responsibility for the secret rearmament measures of the Reichswehr. The real importance of this development was not the amount of money for secret rearmament measures from the budget of the defence ministry, and later from the budgets of other ministries, but rather the undermining of the parliamentary system by the use of government decrees. In a matter which was very sensitive at home and abroad, the right and power of the Reichstag to control expenditure were nullified by the concerted action of executive organs."25

In his first chapter, largely on the Weimar period, Deist focusses on the important role played by General Wilhelm Groener, who served as defense minister (Wehrminister) from January 1928 to April 1932 (when Franz von Papen became chancellor and General Schleicher defense minister). As Ludendorff's successor at German supreme headquarters at the end of the war, he had initiated the understanding between the army and Friedrich Ebert's government after the fall of the monarchy, and had served in the cabinets of three chancellors in the early 1920s. "Uniquely cognizant of the political, economic, technical, and military problems of warfare," Deist writes, "... he made the first real attempt to make the Reichswehr an integrated military instrument of the general policy of treaty revision, as formulated by Stresemann."26 As minister of interior as well as defense, Groener imposed a ban on the activities of the National Socialist paramilitary organization, the SA (Sturmabteilungen, storm troopers), which was opposed by General Kurt Schleicher, the ranking officer in the ministry, and, on the appointment of Franz von Papen as successor of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning on 1 June 1932, Groener's successor as defense minister.

The course toward rearmament set by Groener was not changed by Schleicher, but was pursued more overtly during five and a half months as defense minister. During his own chancellorship, however, from early December 1932 to late January 1933, Schleicher was increasingly criticized, within the officer corps of the German army, because of his "frequent use of the Reichswehr for political tasks. For this reason," writes Deist, "the appointment of
Hitler as chancellor and Blomberg as defence minister . . . appeared to many officers as in some degree a return to normal conditions, which they had long desired.  

"In February 1933 Hitler had described the build-up of the Wehrmacht as the most important precondition for re-establishing Germany's position as a great power," but, writes Deist at the beginning of his third and concluding chapter, "The Wehrmacht of the Third Reich" (following his accounts, in the second, of the rearmament of the army and navy and the build-up of the Luftwaffe), "the present survey of the individual stages of German rearmament has shown that the arming of the Wehrmacht as a whole was anything but planned and orderly. Rather, it was essentially an uncoordinated expansion of the individual services. There was no Wehrmacht armament programme as such. . . . The services made their basic decisions without consulting . . . each other." This continued until 1938, when Hitler abolished the position of Minister of War and established the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) as his instrument of personal command. In his final chapter, Deist shows the relationship between the restructuring of the high command of the armed forces and their Gleichschaltung, reviews Hitler's increasing role in operational planning from the annexation of Austria to the beginning of the war, and concludes that the German military leaders' "tendency to concentrate on technical and tactical questions of their own services implied a renunciation of responsibility in the larger question of the means and ends of military policy, a responsibility of which many were no longer aware. But this tendency also implied the self-degradation of the senior officers to mere recipients of orders. In this way the Wehrmacht became an instrument in the hands of the dictator."

Part IV, "Foreign Policy and Preparation for War," by Manfred Messerschmidt, the concluding segment of the volume, is a magisterial 175-page account representing a state-of-the-art synthesis of scholarship on the political and diplomatic background of the war, including relevant considerations in the foregoing parts of the volume, and taking the more important secondary literature into account in concise explanatory footnotes. "The last days and hours before the outbreak of war," Messerschmidt writes, "show Hitler vacillating between the attempt to keep Britain out and the determination, expressed no doubt in an exaggerated manner, to fight on two fronts if he had to. A clear line of reasoning is hard to find. Mussolini offered mediation, but Hitler would not have it."

The thirteen-page concluding essay, signed by the four authors of the volume, ends with the following paragraph:

"The step-by-step realization of Hitler's continental programme--historically speaking, a new attempt to establish Germany as a great power and a world power--entered a new phase with the German attack on Poland on 1 September 1939. The expectation that the subjugation of Poland would provoke only formal protests from the Western powers was shattered by their declaration of war on Germany on 3 September. Twenty-five years after the outbreak of the First World War, the lights in Europe were again extinguished. A military machine was set in motion whose destructive power exceeded anything previously known and affected almost every corner of the European continent. This catastrophe was the result of policies pursued by Germany since 1933, which were
aimed at expansion and war. These policies were not only based on Hitler's Lebensraum ideology, but were also an expression of the claims to power and influence that groups of major importance in Germany had been advancing without interruption since the turn of the century.33

**Volume 2: Germany's Initial Conquests in Europe**

**Part I, "Politics and Warfare in the First Phase of the German Offensive,"** by Bernd Stegemann, the first of the nine parts in this 444-page volume, is a twenty-five page overview of international relations, diplomacy, and grand strategy during the first year of the war in Europe, concluding with consideration of the question of Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union.34

**Part II, "Action Plans and Situation Assessments of the Luftwaffe and Navy before the Outbreak of War,"** includes a chapter by Klaus A. Maier, "Total War and Operational Air Warfare," with a concise review of German air-war theory and an extensively documented discussion of "Situation Assessment and Mission-Planning,"35 followed by an overview, by Bernd Stegemann, of "Germany's Second Attempt to Become a Naval Power."36

**Part III, "Hitler's First Blitzkrieg and Its Consequences for North-eastern Europe,"** by Horst Rohde, is a five-chapter study that includes consideration of the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940.37 Clear black-and-white maps are based on, but not equal to, the colored maps of the original German edition.

**Part IV, "The First Phase of the War at Sea up to the Spring of 1940,"** by Bernd Stegemann, provides coverage of the war in the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Arctic, and of the mine war as well as the submarine war.38

**Part V, "Securing the Northern Flank of Europe,"** includes chapters on German and Allied strategy by Klaus Maier, and on the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Bernd Stegemann.39

**Part VI, "The Battle for Hegemony in Western Europe,"** a hundred-page survey by Hans Umbreit, has a subchapter on the military opposition to an extension of the war and a chapter on the policies and defense efforts of the neutrals, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg.40 In his account of the campaign in the West, Umbreit devotes considerable space to the question whether (and if so, to what extent), as the British retreated to Dunkirk, "the Germans failed to exploit their favourable situation systematically."41 He notes that on 23 May 1940, Kleist, whose armored forces had reached the Channel, "reported that more than half of his tanks were out of action: his formation had lost a lot of its fighting-power and would not be able to stand up to a major counter-attack."42 Hitler, who visited his field commander's headquarters the next day, "concurred with Rundstedt's view that it would be more useful to leave the further attack
to the infantry and to halt and bring together the badly worn-out armoured forces." Umbreit does not rule out the possibility that Hitler may briefly have thought in terms of meeting halfway those in England, who, unlike Churchill, might have come to terms with him, but he leaves no doubt that he regards a basic consideration (if not the overriding one) to have been that the "German armoured formations were to be saved as far as possible. They had new tasks awaiting them—in the next few weeks and perhaps again in the not too distant future." Umbreit concludes his treatment of the German victory in the West with subchapters on Italy's entry into the war, the German-French armistice, and the initial steps in the establishment of "The 'New Order' in Western Europe." Part VII, "The Operational Air War until the Battle of Britain," by Klaus A. Maier, provides a concise overview. Part VIII, "The Second Phase of the War at Sea (until the Spring of 1941)," by Bernd Stegemann, covers the naval war from the spring of 1940 to the spring of 1941, a period during which German naval units, as a consequence of the fall of France, were able to operate from French Atlantic ports. Part IX, "Direct Strategy against Britain," opens with Hans Umbreit's treatment of Churchill's determination to continue the war and Hitler's plans and preparations to land in England, followed by Karl A. Maier's account of the Battle of Britain and a concluding essay by Umbreit on Hitler's return to an indirect strategy against England. Volume II ends with an essay entitled "Germany's Situation in the Late Autumn of 1940," which concludes with the following assessment of Hitler's dilemma, once it became clear that the war would continue despite his successful campaigns against Poland, in Scandinavia, and in the West:

"The Mediterranean had been left to Mussolini; the German admirals pressed for a campaign there, and the generals would have preferred it to fighting in the east, but Hitler did not regard this as a sound alternative. He refused to envisage doing more than come to the rescue of Mussolini, whose 'parallel war' had proved a disaster, because, while a determined push in the Mediterranean area seemed to promise success for a time, it could not be decisive for the outcome of the war. Hitler continued to postpone the solution of the 'problem of Britain.' As he saw it, another 'blitz campaign' in the east would bring back the war to the direction originally intended; moreover, by removing Germany's last potential adversary on the Continent it would destroy British hopes and thus put an end to the conflict. 'It followed, however, that if Hitler failed in this, he would have lost not merely a campaign, but the war itself.'

Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941 (From Italy's declaration of non-belligerence to the entry of the United States into the war)
This large, five-part volume carries the account of the war in the east to the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and in the west to the eve of the American entry into the conflict.

Part I, "Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940," by Gerhard Schreiber, is a 294-page study that begins with a chapter on Mussolini's "non-belligerence." The second chapter is an account of Italy's entry into the war and its initial consequences. The third is a study of the strategic dilemma of the Axis in the summer and fall of 1940. Chapter 4 deals not only with Hitler's ideas about German expansion, but also with "the aspirations of German ruling circles at the time" regarding a colonial empire.

Part II, "Germany, Italy and South-east Europe: From Political and Economic Hegemony to Military Aggression," a 144-page study, is also by Gerhard Schreiber. In the first chapter, "Unequal Heirs of the First World War," he reviews the interwar history of Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece. In the second he examines German and Italian policy--and rivalry--in the region until the outbreak of the war, and the moves toward a "Balkan Bloc" after its outbreak. The third chapter, an account of the background, course and impact of the Italian Balkan campaign from its beginning until the eve of German intervention, is entitled "Mussolini's Invasion of Greece: The Beginning of the End of Italy's Great-Power Status."

Part III, "German Intervention in the Balkans," by Detlef Vogel, 105 pages in length, begins with a review of German Balkan policy from autumn 1940 on, and focusses on preparations for German intervention in Greece. The second chapter begins with an account of the signing of the Tripartite Pact by Yugoslavia on 25 March 1941, the coup d'état that followed two days later, and Hitler's announcement to his military leaders, within a few hours, "that he was determined to crush Yugoslavia and eliminate her as a state as soon as possible." The third chapter is on the German campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece and the fourth on the German airborne capture of Crete and the British evacuation of many of their forces, though only at the cost of heavy losses to the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean.

Part IV, "Politics and Warfare in 1941," by Gerhard Schreiber, eighty-two pages in length, begins with an essay on "The Anglo-American Association and Its Consequences for British Strategy," and continues with an important three-part essay on "Hitler's Strategic Deliberations in Connection with the [Planned] Attack on the Soviet Union," dealing in turn with his "Attempts to create a Forefield in the West," epitomized by the Franco-German agreements of May 1941 reached in Paris between Admiral Jean-François Darlan on the one hand and General Walter Warlimont and Ambassador Otto Abetz on the other, with German strategy in the Middle East, culminating in German intervention in the Anglo-Iraqi War of May 1941 and its sequel, the five-week Syrian War of June-July 1941, and with "Planning for the Period after Barbarossa."
Part V, "The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa," by Bernd Stegemann, a 112-page study, begins with a detailed account of the British offensives in North and East Africa, leading to the conquest of Tobruk in Cyrenaica (in western Libya) and of Italian East Africa, enabling Emperor Haile Selassie to return to Ethiopia. The second chapter deals with the impact of German intervention in the naval and air war in the Mediterranean, the third with the Axis reconquest of Cyrenaica but not Tobruk, the fourth with the Sollum Front, the fifth with the naval and air war in the theater, and the sixth and final chapter with Operation Crusader, the British counter-offensive.

The "Conclusion" of the third volume closes with the following reflection on the historical importance of the war in the Mediterranean: "It first became evident there how small the aggressors' room for manoeuvre had become as the war continued its course after the late autumn of 1940. The events of 1941 provided the first concrete signs that the Axis no longer held the initiative; in the second half of 1942 this fact could no longer be denied, and by the first half of 1943 it had become obvious. In the words of contemporary observers, in the summer of that year Germany definitely ceased to be the 'hammer' and became the 'anvil.'"

**CONCLUSION**

The first three volumes of *Germany and the Second World War* provide the finest coverage available in English on the background, origins, and course, well into 1941, of World War II in Europe from the German perspective. They do so, moreover, in readable form, with copious references to the relevant international scholarly literature, which is listed in their extensive bibliographies. These volumes, and those that will succeed them in the series as they are translated and published, will be indispensable to serious students of the World War II era and they consequently should be made available in college, university, and major public libraries.

**Notes**

1. On the Military History Research Institute's origins, mission, and structure, see the report by Roland G. Foerster published in the *WWTS Newsletter* in fall 1992 (No. 48, pp. 21-25), reprinted from the summer 1992 issue of *Army History* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History). The institutional and historiographical context in which the ten-volume series on the history of the German Reich (i.e., traditional Germany as a whole) and World War II is being written is concisely explained by Earl F. Ziemke in his review article on the first three volumes in German (vols. 1, 2 and 4), "Germany and World War II: The Official History?," *Central European History*, vol. XVI (1983), pp. 398-407.
2. For bibliographical reference, the following information regarding the publication of the series is available:

- Volume 1, on the origins and preconditions of the war: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, herausgegeben [i.e., edited, henceforth, hgg.] vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt [MGFA], Band [vol.] 1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt [DVA], 1979 [767 pp. and two folding colored maps, DM 78.00 (but in the 1995 German *Books in Print* listed as remaining at the subscription price of DM 58.00 until publication of the second half of the fifth volume, i.e., Band 5/II), ISBN 3-421-01934-7]). A reprint of this volume has been published, without the series title, as Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich Volkmann, and Wolfram Wette, *Ursachen und Voraussetzungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges* ["Causes and Preconditions of the Second World War"] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989 [954 pp., ISBN 3-596-24432-3, DM 28.90]), with a new foreword (noting the publication of the paperback edition on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the German attack on Poland ["aus Anlaß des 50. Jahrestages des deutschen Angriffs auf Polen"]).

- Volume 2, on the establishment of German hegemony in Europe: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, hgg. vom MGFA, Bd. [vol.] 2 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1979 [439 pp. with maps, graphics, etc., DM 78.00 (but in 1995 also listed at the series subscription price of DM 58.00 until publication of vol. 5/II), ISBN 3-421-01935-5]).

- Volume 3, on the war in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and southeastern Europe through December 1941: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, hgg. vom MGFA, Bd. 3 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984 [vii & 735 pp. with maps, graphics, etc., DM 78.00 (subscription price, as above, DM 58.00) ISBN 3-421-06097-5]).

- Volume 4 (the translation of which is tentatively scheduled to be published by Oxford University Press in January 1997 as a volume of 1,400 pp. with 11 maps and 23 figures, at $165.00 [ISBN 0-19-822886-4]), on the German attack on the Soviet Union, carrying the account to the crisis of winter 1941-42: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, hgg. vom MGFA, Bd. 4: *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* ["The Attack on the Soviet Union"], by Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Gerd R. Ueberschär (Stuttgart: DVA, 1983; 2nd unrevised printing, 1987 [xix & 1,172 pp. with colored endpaper maps and graphics, plus a supplement (Beiheft) with 27 folding colored maps, DM 78.00 (subscription price, as above, DM 58.00), ISBN (for both the volume and the supplement) 3-421-06098-3]). As in the case of the first volume in the series, a paperback edition of this volume has been published on a stand-alone basis, without the series title: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Gerd R. Ueberschär, *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* ["The Attack on the Soviet Union"] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991 [1,376 pp., ISBN 3-596-11008-4, DM 29.90]). For an evaluation of this "monumental" volume, see the concluding pages of Earl F. Ziemke's review article cited in note 1.

- Volume 5, Part I (publication date of a translation has yet to be announced), on the organization and mobilization of what came to be called Hitler's "Fortress Europe": *Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, hg. vom MGFA, Bd. 5/1: Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs ["The Organization and Mobilization of the German-Dominated Sphere"], Halbband [Part] I: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen, 1939-1941 ["War Administration, the Economy, and Manpower Resources, 1939-1941"] by Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit (Stuttgart: DVA, 1988 [xviii & 1,062 pp., with numerous maps and graphics (listed on pp. 1,017-1,024), DM 78.00 (subscription price, as above, DM 58.00), ISBN 3-421-06232-3]).

- Volume 5, Part II, on which no publication date has been announced for the German edition, not to mention an English translation, is to cover the organization and mobilization of the Third Reich and German-occupied Europe from 1942 to the end of the war.
- Volume 6, on the expansion of the conflict to a world war, 1941/42-1943: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, hg. vom MGFA, Bd. 6, Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, and Bernd Wegner, Der Globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative, 1941-1943 ["The Global War: The Expansion to a World War and the Change (i.e., the loss by the Axis) of the Initiative, 1941-43"] (Stuttgart: DVA, 1990 [xix & 1,184 pp. with numerous maps and graphics (listed on pp. 1,117-1,121) [DM 78.00 (subscription price, as above, DM 58.00), ISBN 3-421-06233-1]), carries the treatment of the war to the German withdrawals from Tripolitania in North Africa in January 1943 to Manstein's counter-offensive on the Russian front in March 1943 after the German loss of Stalingrad and the retreat from the Caucasus, and to the collapse of the German U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic in May 1943.
- Volume 7, in preparation, has the working title Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Der Krieg im Westen und im Mittelmeerraum ["The German Reich on the Defensive: the War in the West and in the Mediterranean Theater"]
- Volume 8, in preparation, has the working title Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Der Krieg im Osten und Südosten ["The German Reich on the Defensive: the War in the East and the Southeast"].
- Volume 9, in preparation, has the working title Staat und Gesellschaft im Kriege ["State and Society during the War"]:.
- Volume 10, in preparation, has the working title Das Ende des Dritten Reiches ["The End of the Third Reich"].

3. See, for example, Bernd Wegner's "Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942/43 [The War against the Soviet Union, 1942-43]," on pp. 759-1093 of Volume 6, cited above. The individual authorship of each contribution is recognized, in the inevitably frequent cross-references in the series, by the practice of identifying the individual collaborator responsible for the specific passage being cited in another of the collaborative volumes. E.g., Schreiber's note 4 on page 3 of the third English volume, "4. Cf. vol. i of the present work, IV.1.1 (Messerschmidt)," and his note 179 on page 127 of the same volume: "179. See vol. ii of the present work, V.IV (Stegemann). On political and military developments extensively
Woodward, *British Foreign Policy*, i. 118-31" (where-by the full bibliographical reference, except the name of the publisher, is in the bibliography on p. 816 [publishers’ names being listed neither in the German originals nor in the translated volumes]).

4. In the English translation, the extensive bibliography of the German original, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* ["The German Reich and the Second World War, Band [vol.] 1, Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der Deutschen Kriegspolitik ["Causes and Preconditions of German War Policy"] (Stuttgart: DVA, 1979), has been expanded to include publications into the late 1980s, as has also been done with the updated German paperback reprint published the year before the English translation, *Ursachen und Voraussetzungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges* ["Causes and Preconditions of the Second World War"] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989). The bibliography of the Oxford University Press edition includes numerous citations of English translations (usually in brackets) in addition to citations of the German originals. (Neither the German original of the first volume in the series nor the English translation include the chronology on pp. 931-941 of the Fischer paperback edition of the first volume.)

5. *Loc. cit.*, p. 1. Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt served as Chief Historian of the Military History Research Institute from 1970 to 1988. For listings of the principal works of Professor Messerschmidt and the other contributors to the series, see the notes on the authors in each volume.


9. *Ibid.*, p. 35, cited from Walter Benjamin, "Theorien des deutschen Faschismus: Zu der Sammelnschrift Krieg und Krieger, herausgegeben von Ernst Jünger" ["Theories of German Fascism: On the Anthology War and Warriors, edited by Ernst Jünger"], *Die Gesellschaft* 7/2 (1930), pp. 32-42. For insight into a cast of mind foreign and often inaccessible to the Anglo-American reader, see the translation of the best-selling postwar autobiographical *apologia* of one of the most articulate of these militants (an acknowledged right-wing assassin), Ernst von
Salomon, *The Answers of Ernst von Salomon to the 131 Questions in the Allied Military Government "Fragebogen"* (London: Putnam, 1954), translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon from *Der Fragebogen* ["The Questionnaire"] (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1951). See also the translation of one of the most widely read works of this genre, Ernst Jünger, *The Storm of Steel: From the Diary of a German Stormtroop Officer on the Western Front*. translated by Basil Creighton (Howard Fertig, 1996).


11. Wette notes that German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, who in 1926 shared the Nobel Peace Prize with his French counterpart, Aristide Briand, sharply attacked the German pacifist leader (and chairman of the German Peace Society [Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft], 1914-1929) Ludwig Quidde, who in 1927 shared the Nobel Peace Prize with the president of the French Human Rights League [Ligue des Droits de l'Homme], Ferdinand Buisson, for damaging revelations concerning the secret German rearmament program that Stresemann supported. This was by no means the first time the historian Quidde (former executive secretary of the Prussian Historical Institute in Rome) had aroused ire in Berlin, for a generation earlier his name had become a household word as the author of a twenty-page essay reprinted as a pamphlet over two dozen times in the year of its publication, *Caligula. Eine Studie über römischen Cäsarenwahnsinn* ["Caligula: A Study of Roman Imperial Insanity"] (Leipzig: W. Friedrich, 1894). Ostensibly a carefully documented scholarly article on a first-century Roman Emperor, it was so transparent a satirical attack on the already controversial (not to mention vulnerable and sensitive) Emperor William II that Quidde was imprisoned for three months for the crime of lèse majesté. After the fall of the monarchy, the essay was reissued in a sixty-three-page booklet, together with the author's reminiscences and a bibliography: *Caligula. Eine Studie über römischen Cäsarenwahnsinn, ergänzt durch Erinnerungen des Verfassers: Im Kampf gegen Cäsarismus und Byzantinismus* ["Caligula--A Study of Roman Imperial Insanity, with Reminiscences by the Author: In the Struggle against Caesarism and Byzantinism"] (Berlin-Friedenau: Hensel & Co., 1926); see *The Kaiser's Double: Being a Translation by Claud Field of the Celebrated Pamphlet by Prof. Ludwig Quidde, Entitled "Caligula: A Study in Imperial Insanity"* (n.p., n.d.).

12. *Ibid.*, "The Wave of War Books and Films from 1929 Onwards," pp. 77-82, with twenty-eight annotations, in one of which (416 on p. 77) Wette acknowledges Prof. F. L. Carsten of London having informed him that Dorothy Woodman was a *New Statesman* reporter, "and that


23. This passage is printed on pp. 193-94, under the heading "Bibliographical Note (1989)" at the end of Volkmann's first chapter (not as an annotation, but as a continuation of the text).


30. Messerschmidt's text, pp. 543-717, includes a total of 824 notes, including source citations as well as explanatory annotations.

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34. Vol. 2, pp. 5-29.


39. *Ibid.*, "German Strategy" (Maier) & "Allied Strategy" (Maier), pp. 181-205; "Operation Weserübung" (Stegemann) and "Securing Germany's Political and Military Hold on the Occupied Territory" (Stegemann), pp. 206-225.


42. *Ibid.*; where Umbreit, in note 16, cites "Fourth Army War Diary, 23 May 1940, BA-MA W 6965a" (a document located in the German Military Archives).


50. Vol. 3, p. 278; Schreiber’s first chapter, on Mussolini’s "non-belligerence," pp. 8-98, has 454 footnotes; the second, on Italian intervention, pp. 99-179, has 426; the third, on the strategic dilemma of summer and autumn 1940, pp. 180-277, has 491; and the last, on German colonial ideas, pp. 278-301, has 91.


52. Ibid., "Germany's Balkan Policy in the Autumn of 1940 and the Spring of 1941," pp. 451-478, with 170 notes.

53. Ibid., p. 481. "From the Coup in Yugoslavia to the Outbreak of War on 6 April 1941," pp. 479-496, has 86 notes.

54. Ibid., "The German Attack on Yugoslavia and Greece," pp. 497-526, has 159 notes; "The Capture of Crete," pp. 527-555, has 130. As noted on p. 553, German aircraft sank six British warships and heavily damaged seven others, but "as Halder himself admitted, the remaining ships of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean were sufficient to maintain Britain's dominant position there," as documented in his diary entry for 4 June 1941 (cited in footnote 119 on p. 553, where Vogel cites two further sources that report that after the costly evacuation of Crete the British still had available at their anchorage in Alexandria, Egypt, at least one aircraft carrier, two battleships, two cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers).

55. Ibid., "The Anglo-American Association and Its Consequences for British Strategy," pp. 559-572, with 80 notes. (In the review copy of the third volume sent to this writer, the "Preliminary Note," and the first page of this chapter are inverted.)

56. Ibid., "Hitler's Strategic Deliberations in Connection with the Attack on the Soviet Union," pp. 573-640, with 334 notes.

57. Ibid., "Attempts to Create a Forefield in the West" (the first section of the chapter cited in note 56), pp. 574-589, with specific references (and corresponding citations in footnotes) to the agreement of 23 May 1941 between Germany and Vichy France on Syria, Iraq, and North Africa, and to the (signed but unratified) Paris Protocols of 27-28 May 1941 on p. 582.
58. Ibid., "Chances and Dangers for German Strategy in the Middle East" (the second section of the chapter cited in note 56), pp. 589-623, with coverage of German intervention in Iraq on pp. 600-601 (with a two-page map on pp. 602-603) and of the seizure by Australian, British, and Indian forces of the Vichy-French-controlled mandates of Lebanon and Syria), and their transfer to the authority of General de Gaulle, on pp. 613-617 (with a map on p. 614).


60. Ibid., "The British Take the Offensive in North and East Africa," pp. 643-653, with maps on pp. 647 and 649; maps of East Africa will be found in the opening part of the volume, in connection with Italy's entry into the war, on pp. 260 and 265.

61. Ibid., "German Intervention and Its Effects on the Naval and Air War in the Mediterranean," pp. 654-672, with 72 notes and two maps, one of the Mediterranean as a whole (pp. 660-61) and one of the Battle of Cape Matapan, 28 March 1941 (pp. 666-67).


65. Ibid., "Operation Crusader," pp. 725-754, with 61 notes, nine maps, and a table on p. 751 showing British, German, and Italian strength and losses in Operation Crusader.

66. Ibid., on the last page of the unannotated "Conclusion" (pp. 755-767) signed by Gerhard Schreiber and Detlev Vogel.
Recent Books
Selected Titles from a List Compiled by James Ehrman


*American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History.* Edited by Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, with the assistance of Marc Frey (Westview Press, 1996)


Bergerud, Eric M. *Touched by Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific.* (Viking Penguin, 1996)


Boisclaire, Yvonne R. *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun.* (Clearwood Publishers, 1996)


Bonn, Keith E. *When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945.* (Presidio Press, 1996)


Brandt, Nat. *Harlem at War: The Black Experience in WWII*. (Syracuse University Press, 1996)


Browning, Robert M. *U.S. Merchant Vessel War Casualties of World II*. (Naval Institute Press, 1996)


Caine, Philip D. *Vanishing Footsteps: True Stories of WWII Escape and Evasion*. (Brassey’s, Incorporated, 1997)


Center of Military History Staff. *The War in the Mediterranean: A WWII Pictorial History*. (Brassey’s, Incorporated, 1997)

Center of Military History Staff. *The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas*. (Brassey’s, Incorporated, 1997)

Center of Military History Staff. *The War Against Japan: Pictorial Record*. (Brassey’s, Incorporated, 1996)


Cohen, Maynard M. *A Stand Against Tyranny: Norway's Physicians and the Nazis.* (Wayne State University Press, 1997)


Cotton, M. C. *Hurricanes over Burma.* (Seven Hills Book Distributors, 1996)


Delaforce, Patrick. *The Polar Bears: Monty's Left Flank: From Normandy to the Relief of Holland with the 49th Division.* (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1995)

Delaforce, Patrick. *Monty's Iron Sides: From the Normandy Beaches to Bremen with the 3rd Division.* (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1995)


Faitelson, Alex. *Heroism and Bravery in Lithuania 1939-45.* (Gefen Books, 1996)

Feuer, A. B. *Commando! The M Z Unit's Secret War Against Japan.* (Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1996)


Goldstein, Donald M., Katherine V. Dillon and Michael J. Winger. *Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge: The Story and Photographs.* (Brassey's, Incorporated, 1996)


Handel, Michael I. Editor. *Intelligence and Strategy in the Second World War.* (International Specialized Book Services, 1996)

Harlan, Louis R. *All at Sea: Coming of Age in World War II.* (University of Illinois Press, 1996)


Heide, Sigrid, translated by Norma Johansen and Kanskje I. Morgen. *In the Hands of My Enemy: One Woman's Story of World War II.* (Southfarm Press, 1996)


Hodgson, Marion S. *Winning My Wings: A Woman Airforce Service Pilot in World War II.* (Naval Institute Press, 1996)
Hogan, Michael J., editor. *Hiroshima in History and Memory.* (Cambridge University Press, 1996)

Hogg, Ian V. *Dictionary of World War II.* (NTC Publishing Group, 1996)


Humphreys, Roy. *To Stop a Rising Sun: Reminiscences of Wartime in India and Burma.* (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1996)

Ienaga, Saburo. *World War II: Japan’s Last War.* (Elsevier Science, 1996)

Infield, Tom. *Fifty Years after the War: The People Who Were There Recall the Major Events of World War II.* (Camino Books, Incorporated, 1996)

Irzyk, Albin F. *He Rode up Front for Patton.* (Pentland Press, Incorporated, 1996)


Jeffries, John W. *Wartime America: The World War II Home Front.* (Ivan R. Dee Incorporated, Publisher, 1996)


Maher, Brendan A. *A Passage to Sword Beach: Minesweeping in the Royal Navy*. (Naval Institute Press, 1996)


Newton, Verne W. Editor. FDR and the Holocaust. (Saint Martin's Press, Incorporated, 1996)


Ovenden, Keith. A Fighting Withdrawal, the Life of Dan Davin: Writer, Soldier, Publisher. (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1996)


Padfield, Peter. War Beneath the Sea: Submarine Conflict During World War II. (John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 1996)

Patterson, Dan. Lancaster: RAF Heavy Bomber. (Howell Press, 1996)

Pearson, Ross A. *Australians at War in the Air, 2 Vols.: 1939-1945.* (Seven Hills Book Distributors, 1996)


Richardson, James E. *Underage Angel.* (Amherst Press, 1996)


Schwab, Gerald. *OSS Agents in Hitler's Heartland: Destination Innsbruck.* (Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1996)

Scott, Stuart R. *Battle-Axe Blenheims: No 105 Squadron RAF at War 1940-1.* (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1996)


Sexton, Donald J. *Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide.* (Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1996)


Smith, Bradley F. *Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945.* (University Press of Kansas, 1996)


Smithers, A. J. *Taranto 1940: Prelude to Pearl Harbor.* (Naval Institute Press, 1996)


Tarling, Nicholas. *Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War*. (Cambridge University Press, 1996)


Tent, James F. *E-Boat Alert: Defending the Normandy Invasion Fleet*. (Naval Institute Press, 1996)


United States Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: Documentary History. (Gordon Press Publishers, 1996)


Vance, Heidi S. Shadows over My Berlin: One Woman's Story of World War II. (The Southfarm Press, 1996)


Wainstock, Dennis D. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. (Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1996)


Wegener, Peter P. The Peenemunde Wind Tunnels: A Memoir. (Yale University Press, 1996)


Weinberg, Gerhard L. Germany. Hitler and World War II. (Cambridge University Press, 1995; paperback reprint, 1996)


Werrell, Kenneth P. Blankets of Fire: U. S. Bombers over Japan During World War II. (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996)

Williams, Keith. *British Writers and the Media in the 1930s: Mobilizing the Medium.* (Saint Martin's Press, Incorporated, 1996)


Worthen, Frederick D., Joseph Rosacker, Tyrus C. Gibbs, Charles P. Conley, Charles J. Philage, John E. Pace, Otis F. Hair, Bennie W. Hayes, Glenn A. Tessmer. *Against All Odds.* (Fithian Press, 1996)


Zaloga, Steven J. *KV-1 and 2 Heavy Tanks, 1939-45.* (Stackpole Books, 1996)


**Recent Journal and Periodical Articles**

*Selected Titles from a List Compiled by Susannah U. Bruce*

"1940's" (reprints from past issues; special section) *The New York Times Magazine* April 14 '96, pp. 87-92.


"Adolf Maps It Out" (Recon photos of England in WWII; N. J. Clarke) *History Today* 45 November '95, pp. 5-6.


"Changing Sensibilities" (World War II posters) American History June '95, v 30, pp. 82.


"Commemorating the end of the Second World War in Europe" (B. Boutros-Ghali in Moscow) *UN Chronicle* September '95, v 32, pp. 54.


Decker, Andrew and Schroeder, Mariana. "Blocking the Black Market" (drawings stolen from the Bremen Kunsthalle at end of WWII by Soviet Union to be returned to Germany) *Art News* April '95, v 94, p. 46.

Desmond, Edward W. "Finally, a Real Apology" (Japan apologizes for war conduct) *Time* Aug 28 '95, v 146, p. 47.


Gilmore, Allison B. "We have been Reborn': Japanese Prisoners and the Allied Propaganda War in the Southwest Pacific" Pacific Historical Review 1995 64(2), pp. 195-215.

Goedegeboure, Jaap "A Procession of Antiheroes: The Netherlands in the Shadow of World War II" (Dutch literature) Society July/August '95, v 32, pp. 60-2.


Griffith-Roberts, Carolanne. "Hail to World War II" Southern Living November '95, v 30, pp. 44.

Harrison, E. D. R. "Not with Sentimentality, but with Passion for Germany': Nazi Policies in Occupied Poland" German History [Great Britain] 1995 13(2): 233-244.


Heehs, Peter. "India's Divided Loyalties?" (alliance of the Indian National Army with the Japanese during World War II) History Today July '95, v 45, pp. 16-23.


"The Historians' War or the Home Front's War? Some Thoughts for Western Historians" Western Historical Quarterly 1995 26(2), pp. 185-196.


Homan, Gerlof D. "We Must...and Can Stand Firmly': Dutch Mennonites in World War II" Mennonite Quarterly Review 1995 69(1), pp. 7-36.


Hunt, George W. "Of Many Things" (songs heard as a child in WWII) America August 12-19 '95, v 173, pp. 2.


Jackson, James O. "On the Eastern Front" (Russians reflect on World War II) Time May 8 '95, v 145, pp. 78-9.

Jackson, Paul. "Maestros of the Storm" (European conductors at the Met) Opera News July '95, v 60, pp. 36-8.


Jellinek, George. "On the Home Front: World War II, the Met and the American Singer" Opera News July '95, v 60, pp. 30-3


Kristof, Nicholas D. "Why Japan Hasn't Said That Word" (apologies for World War II actions) New York Times (Late New York Edition) May 7 '95, (Sec 4) p. 3.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "Battle's Ex-Foes Meet on Okinawa" New York Times (Late New York Edition) June 24 '95, pp. 3.


"The Legacies of World War II" (panel discussion) *Technology Review* May/June '95, v 98, pp. 50-9.


"Life Celebrates 1945" *Life* Life Celebrates 1945 '95, v 18, pp. 4-5+


Lotchin, Roger W. "The Historians' War or the Home Front's War? Some Thoughts for Western Historians" *Western Historical Quarterly* 1995 26(2), pp. 185-196.


Meisler, Stanley. "The Hermitage" (display of impressionist works confiscated from Germany during WW II) *Smithsonian*, March '95, v 25, pp 40-4+.


"Memories of the Big One" (life in New England during World War II) *Yankee* August '95, v 59, pp. 40-5+.

"The Met at War" (World War II) *Opera News* July '95, v 60, pp. 34-5.


Morgan, Len. "Memories of the War" *Flying* v 122, November '95, pp 90-1.


Nemecek, Sasha. "Out of the Lab and into the Fire" (Two controversial Smithsonian exhibits) Scientific American, February '95, v 272, pp. 21+.


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Election Ballot for 1997-99 Term

**Directors.** Three-year term. Select no more than **eight**, including write-ins.

- [ ] Dean C. Allard
- [ ] Stephen E. Ambrose
- [ ] Carl Boyd
- [ ] Edward Drea
- [ ] Carlo D'Este
- [ ] Roy K. Flint
- [ ] Alfred Goldberg
- [ ] Waldo Heinrichs
- [ ] Alfred F. Hurley
- [ ] David Kahn
- [ ] Richard H. Kohn
- [ ] Carol M. Petillo
- [ ] Ronald H. Spector
- [ ] David F. Trask
- [ ] Alan Wilt
- [ ] Robert Wolfe

**Chair.** Three-year term. Select **one**.

- [ ] Donald S. Detwiler

**Secretary-Treasurer.** Three-year term. Select **one**.

- [ ] Mark P. Parillo

Please return the completed ballot to:

Mark P. Parillo  
Department of History  
Kansas State University  
Eisenhower Hall  
Manhattan, KS  66506-1002

Please return ballots by **January 31, 1997**.
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Membership is open to all who are interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $15.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $5.00 for up to six years. There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the WWTSA secretary (not through an agency or subscription service) in U.S. dollars.

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