AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

NEWSLETTER

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Attachments:
Membership Renewal Form
Annual Ballot
Established in 1967 "to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects," the American Committee on the History of the Second World War is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, East and West Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The ACHSWW meets annually with the American Historical Association. As noted below, the 1989 annual meeting will be held in December in San Francisco.

THE NEWSLETTER

The ACHSWW issues a semiannual newsletter (assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the National Serial Data Program of the Library of Congress). Back issues of the newsletter are available through the ACHSWW Archivist (at the address on the letterhead) from Sunflower University Press). The first eighteen issues (1968-1978) are available as a spiral-bound, 360-page xerox paperback (ISBN 0-89126-060-9) for $36.00. Subsequent back numbers are available as single, unbound issues for $3.00 each. (There is no postal charge for prepaid orders to addresses in the United States; there is a $4.00 shipping charge for orders to foreign and Canadian addresses.)

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP DUES AND SUPPORT

Membership in the ACHSWW is open to anyone interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $10.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. (Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $2.00 for up to six years.) There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the committee (not through an agency or a subscription service) in U.S. dollars. (The newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.)

The annual membership renewal and information form is attached. Please complete and return it to the secretary, together with your remittance. As noted on the renewal form, members are invited, as in the past, to make tax-deductible contributions, beyond the amount of their dues, to a dedicated grant-in-aid account at Southern Illinois University, to help defray operating costs not covered by regular dues.
COMMITTEE ELECTION

Attached to this newsletter is the ballot for election of committee directors for three-year terms from 1990 through 1992. Please return the ballot to the secretary by the end of January 1990. It may be enclosed with the membership renewal form and remittance, or sent separately.

THE 1989 ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the ACHSWW will be held in conjunction with that of the American Historical Association in San Francisco, California, 27-30 December 1989, at the San Francisco Hilton and Tower.

Annual Business Meeting.--The 1989 business meeting is scheduled for Thursday, 28 December, 5:00-7:00 p.m., in the Teakwood Room of the San Francisco Hilton. The agenda will include reports by the Chairman of the ACHSWW, Arthur L. Funk, on the activities of the International Committee, of which he is vice-president, including plans for the international committee's conference to be held in Madrid in 1990, in conjunction with the International Congress of Historical Sciences. The agenda will also include a presentation by a senior committee director, Prof. Harold C. Deutsch, on the development of a national (and possibly international) federation of World War II roundtables.

Joint Session with the AHA.--The joint session, organized and proposed to the AHA Program Committee by the Chairman of the ACHSWW, Prof. Arthur L. Funk, is scheduled to be held in Continental Ballroom 6 of the Hilton from 9:30 to 11:30 a.m., on Thursday, 28 December:

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A FIFTY-YEAR RETROSPECT

Chair: Agnes F. Peterson, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and the Coming of War,
Norman Graebner, University of Virginia

Comment:
Edward M. Bennett, Washington State University
Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University
Williamson Murray, Ohio State University

Mrs. Peterson, a director of the ACHSWW, has for many years been a curator at the Hoover Institution, with responsibility for the Central and West European collections. Prof. Bennett, the author of a study of American-Soviet relations before and during World War II, Prof. Kimball, an
ACHSWW director and editor of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence, and Prof. Murray, author of a study of the European balance of power on the eve of World War II, will comment on Prof. Graebner's paper. For the proposal to the AHA Program Committee, Prof. Graebner described his paper in the following terms:

"My interest in the coming of war to Europe in 1939 began when I decided to offer the subject of 'Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for a European Policy, 1937-1939,' as my Harmsworth inaugural lecture at Oxford in the spring of 1979. That lecture was published by Oxford University Press of Oxford. Since that time I have continued to work on the coming of the war in British and American archives, with the intention of producing a six-chapter volume on the coming of the war. I have decided to continue my focus on Roosevelt and Chamberlain as the two men who must carry the major responsibility for the defense of the Versailles system against the encroachments of Hitler. Obviously they failed, but in their failure are many lessons.

"Before I complete this project I shall examine the full American diplomatic record with Britain, France, Germany, and Russia; the same for British policy. I shall also look at the documentary record of Germany's policy in the late 1930s; as for France and Russia, I shall examine their policies through the eyes of British and American diplomats. The reports of William Bullitt from Paris, for example, are remarkable in their analysis of French foreign policy. In addition to all this work in primary records, I shall examine all the major works on British, French, Russian, American, and German foreign policy for the late 1930s. It will be a rather complete effort to understand the coming of the war. I shall ask every conceivable question that one might ask about why wars come, relying heavily for this framework on the writings of Michael Howard, although I have written much on the coming of American wars myself.

"It seems to me that the AHA meetings in 1989 should have at least one session on the events of 1939. Inasmuch as a complete analysis of the coming of the war is in order, I believe that I can deal with it better by offering a long paper than by dividing the subject into a series of papers which never come to the heart of the matter. I plan to make this suggested paper the final chapter of my little book, dealing largely with the six weeks before the outbreak of war on September 1. As I suggest, however, my analysis will include a thorough examination of the period from 1936 to 1939."

Other Sessions.--The chairman of the Finnish Committee on the History of the Second World War, Prof. Olli Vehvilainen of the University of Tampere, will give a paper entitled "Finnish Historians and the Winter War" in a session on Friday, 29 December, 2:30-4:30 p.m., in Continental Parlor 9 of the Hilton. The session, with Elizabeth K. MacLean, Otterbein College, as chair, and H. Peter Krosby, SUNY, Albany, as commentator, includes two other papers: on U.S. historians and the winter war by Keith W. Olson, University of Maryland, and on Soviet textbook treatment of it by David Williams, Ohio University.
Several other sessions touch on aspects of the war:

On Thursday afternoon, 28 December, A Clash of Cultures: New Perspectives on American Occupations of Germany, Austria, and Japan includes a paper by Rinjiro Sodei of Hosei University, Tokyo, entitled "The War Continued: The Occupation of Japan as a Cultural War between Victor and Vanquished."

A session on East European Federation, 1939-43: The Polish and Czechoslovak Plans and Allied Reactions, with Piotr S. Wandycz of Yale as the commentator, is scheduled for Friday morning, the 29th.

That afternoon, there will be a session, under the chairmanship of John C. Cairns, University of Toronto, on The Enemy within, the Enemy without: France and the Refugee Problem of the 1930s, at which Robert O. Paxton, Columbia University, an ACHSWW director, will comment on three papers, including one on espionage and the French internment of refugees, 1939-1940.

On Saturday morning, the 30th, Marlene Mayo, University of Maryland, will chair and comment at a session on Japanese American "Intelligence" Operations during World War II, in which one of the papers will be on Japanese-Americans, the OSS, and the Pacific War.

Early in the afternoon (1:00-3:00 p.m.) of the 30th, the final day of the meeting, Henry Friedlander, City University of New York, will comment at a session on Terror and Collaboration: The Nazi Revolution in Eastern Europe during World War II, at which papers will be given on Majdanek and on collaboration.

A CONFERENCE REPORT

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War in Europe: A Report on the Conference at the American University of Paris by Donald S. Detwiler

The Second International Conference on International Relations at the American University of Paris was held, as previously announced in this newsletter, during the last week of September. The conference was sponsored by the university (a fully accredited American undergraduate college at 31, avenue Bosquet, 75007 Paris, France) with foundation support; my own participation—and hence this personal report—was made possible by a grant from the George Soros Foundation of New York.

Conducted in English, French, and Russian (with simultaneous translation) under the able chairmanship of Professor David Wingate Pike of the host institution, the eight half-day sessions of the meeting provided a forum for a well-structured series of presentations, followed by discussion, concerning the outbreak and early phases of World War II. The volume of proceedings to be edited by Prof. Pike should represent a useful contribution to the literature.

A key problem addressed in several sessions was Soviet policy—not only toward Poland, the Balkans, the Baltic states, and Finland, but also toward Japan and, above all,
toward Germany, with which the USSR concluded on 23 August 1939 a non-aggression pact (providing for the partition of Poland) and a treaty of friendship on 28 September (adding Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence). Considering the progress being made in the Soviet Union in institutionalizing perestroika, prying open a closed society, it was disappointing that several scheduled Soviet participants, including Yuri Afanasyev, Rector of the Soviet Institute of Historical Archives, and Roy Medvedev, author of Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Knopf, 1972), were not able to come or were delayed until the meeting was almost over by what one of them euphemistically referred to as "bureaucratic problems."

The first two speakers in an early session of the conference on "The Road to War" focussed on the Soviet Union's simultaneous negotiations in summer 1939 with the Western powers and with Germany that culminated in the Russo-German Pact of 28 August. Aleksandr Oganovich Chubarian, Director of the Institute of World History in Moscow, explained the dilemma in which Stalin found himself and concluded that the Russo-German Pact was essentially the only option he had. If the Western powers had followed a more active policy during the 1930s, an anti-Hitler front could probably have been formed before it was too late. Even in August 1939, had Britain and France really wanted it, an agreement might still have been possible; until the eve of the conclusion of the pact with Hitler, Stalin had hesitated to sign, had kept the Politburo in the dark, and even on the 23rd had caused Molotov to give the German ambassador contradictory replies.

Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and author of June 22, 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1965), in his presentation, took an altogether different approach to the Soviet dictator's decision. He emphasized the tradition of Soviet cooperation with Germany going back to Rapallo, and suggested that, given a choice, Stalin had always had an inclination to work with Germany rather than the unpredictable West, with its pretensions to moral superiority, and that gradually, in the late 1930s, this pro-German inclination came to prevail.

John A. Lukacs, Professor of History at Chestnut Hill College, Pennsylvania, and author of The Last European War: September 1939/December 1941 (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), broadened the discussion by offering for consideration several fundamental points which, in his opinion, are still not clarified after fifty years of research and debate.

(1) Lukacs' first point was the question of Stalin's policy at the time of Munich. "Churchill himself, when he wrote his incomparable volume, The Gathering Storm, in 1948, three years after the war, still proceeded from the assumption that Munich was not only a moral disaster, which it was, but also a great practical disaster, because the Russians had an alliance with France and Czechoslovakia and would have fought." There
still is, Lukacs observed, a standard interpretation according to which what happened in Munich was the turning point in Stalin's mind and led to the rapprochement with Germany. But Lukacs does not consider this to be true. Everything that has appeared indicates that the Soviet Union, like France, had no desire to fight for Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich. A war in 1938 would have been a disaster: Hitler would probably have won his war in 1938, because Britain and France were even less prepared for war than in 1939. But what is essential, according to Lukacs, is that the Russian attitude at the time of Munich, on the basis of evidence appearing now, has to be rethought: "At the most, what Stalin might have done, in the case of war in October 1938, was not support Czechoslovakia, but possibly attack Poland--and there is evidence of that, although it is fragmentary."

(2) Turning to the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union in the months before the war, Lukacs posed his second question: Was a Western-Russian treaty in the summer of 1939, even with the best will on the part of the Western Allies, at all possible? He regarded this as an open question that ought to be discussed in greater detail. Pursuing this line of enquiry might be contrary to what had been said in the opening address at the conference, that "it is not the business of the historian to consider alternatives." Lukacs disagreed with this; life consists of alternatives or--perhaps better expressed--potentialities. Every human actuality carries within itself the seed of potentialities. Therefore, Lukacs maintained, it is "proper, just, and reasonable" to discuss whether the elements of a Western-Russian treaty in 1939 existed. In his opinion, the elements of such an agreement, under close scrutiny after fifty years, will be found to have been much less important than they seemed at the time. "What happens in 1939," Lukacs continued, "is that the European situation changes drastically; the temporary and illusory situation, whereby in 1918 and 1919 the two great powers of the world, the United States and Russia (soon to become the Soviet Union), withdraw from European affairs, comes to an end. Both the United States and Soviet Union return to the European scene, and their alliance and their friendship is solicited by both sides. There is no question that, at that time, Germany was able to offer more to the Soviet Union than the Western Allies." By arrangement with Hitler, Stalin was able to recover some of those territories that the Bolshevik Revolution and Lenin had lost. The time has now come, Lukacs said, for a re-examination whether a Western arrangement with Stalin in 1939 was at all possible or feasible. "My inclination," he added, "is perhaps--but hardly so." The West could not afford to give Stalin what he wanted.

(3) The third issue Lukacs suggested for reconsideration is that of Hitler's intentions regarding the West in 1939 and, in that connection, the implications of his hints to the Western Allies that he might make a deal with the Soviet Union if they left him no alternative. On 11 August 1939, Hitler told
the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, Carl J. Burckhardt, that everything he did was directed against the Russians, but that if the West were too blind or too dumb to comprehend that, he would have to reach an understanding with Russia, defeat the West, and only then turn against the Soviet Union, in order to take the Ukraine, which he needed [see Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939 (Munich: Callwey, 1960), p. 348]. In Lukacs' view, Hitler, knowing that Burckhardt was well known and highly regarded in London, used him to convey this warning of the consequences of continued support for Poland.

(4) The unresolved question of Hitler's intentions toward the West brought Prof. Lukacs to his fourth point: Precisely what were Hitler's views of Joseph Stalin and of the Soviet Union from 1937 to 1939? Lukacs sees this as an open question. Hitler hardly mentions the Soviet Union in his many political and military discussions held during this period. The accepted view, based on Hitler's testimony from Mein Kampf onward, is that he had one overall ambition, to destroy the Soviet Union and make Eastern Europe and European Russia a German fief. Perhaps that is true, but it may not be that simple, as suggested by more and more evidence of Russo-German contacts during that period. In any case, Lukacs regards the question of how Hitler's views in this area may have developed during the years 1937-39 to merit further consideration.

(5) Lukacs' fifth point for reconsideration is the content and significance of the Russo-German treaties. The widely-held view that the Hitler-Stalin pact of 23 August 1939 made the outbreak of the Second World War possible is, in his opinion, "complete nonsense." The German decision to launch the war was not made in the six days between the signing of the pact and the invasion of Poland. Everything indicates, from Plan Green [to attack Czechoslovakia in fall 1938] onward, that if there had been no pact with Stalin on the 23rd of August, Hitler would still have attacked Poland—maybe on the 26th of August, as originally planned, maybe on the 1st of September. The Russo-German Pact did make Hitler breathe easier, but it had no real effect on his decision to invade Poland. Considering a potential alternative, Lukacs asked what would have happened twenty days after the German invasion of Poland had there been no Russo-German pact? His speculative answer (it could be no more than that) was that the outcome could well have been very much like what happened in reality; the Russians would probably have marched in and taken a slice of eastern Poland, with Stalin sending a note to Hitler informing him of his action and telling him that the German conquest of western Poland was fine with him.

In connection with the Russo-German pacts, Lukacs added, there should also be reconsideration of the secret protocols between Germany and the Soviet Union. The geographical division between the German and Russian spheres of influence was, in part, unclearly drawn, and there was no clear definition or understanding of what the "spheres of influence" into which eastern Europe was to be divided represented. The incorpora-
tion of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, for example, irritated Hitler, for it went beyond what he thought was intended by his understanding with Stalin over spheres of influence. Points of comparison can be drawn between Stalin's agreements with Hitler and those he later made at Teheran and Yalta, insofar as Churchill and Roosevelt, for practical reasons and without using the word, divided Europe with Stalin.

(6) The postwar tragedy of the division of Europe--Lukacs' sixth point for reconsideration--was visible in 1939, for by 1939 the Western powers were no longer able to defeat Germany alone. Might they have been able to do so earlier? Some argue that the Second World War was avoidable because Hitler could have been stopped in 1936. But considering the timidity of the French military, the caution of the French politicians, and the attitude of the French people, France was no more in condition to go to war against Germany in 1936 than Britain, for much the same reasons. "The idea that Germany could have been stopped in 1936," said Lukacs, "is a chimera, a delusion." And by 1939, the Western powers, particularly Britain, knew that Germany could only be defeated with the help of the Soviet Union, or of the United States, if not both. It has long been clear that the British understood how much they depended on the United States in 1939, even before Churchill became Prime Minister. But it also should be recognized, Lukacs went on, that by 1940, British foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the Cripps mission to Moscow, had begun to take a new line: if the alternative is all of Europe dominated by the Germans or the Eastern part of Europe dominated by the Soviet Union, let the latter prevail; half of Europe is better than none.

(7) The seventh and final issue that Prof. Lukacs suggested for reconsideration was the role of ideology during the opening phase of the Second World War. In September 1939 the Daladier government in France began a harsh campaign of repression against both German Communist exiles in France and against the French Communist party, thereby courting the anti-Communist right, which eight months later played a key role in bringing about the fall of the same government because of dissatisfaction due to Britain and France not having been able to go to war in Finland. "The British and French plans to go to Finland in March 1940," Lukacs observed, "rank high among the greatest imbecilities of the Second World War." Yet the idea of going to war in Finland had been popular in the West, particularly in France, because it was seen as a way of supporting the valiant Finns and striking a blow at the Germans. It had been Russia, not Germany, that had attacked Finland in November 1940 and imposed harsh peace terms in March 1940, but because of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and Russia's role in Poland, people tended to dismiss the differences between National Socialism and Communism, as Lukacs noted, in the spirit of "the English wag who in August 1939 said, 'Now all the isms are wasms.'"
Among those at the Paris conference who addressed issues raised by Lukacs was Professor Gabriel Gorodetsky of Tel Aviv University, recently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, and author of Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). In an article in The Russian Review (vol. 47, 1988, pp. 145-170), "The Origins of the Cold War: Stalin, Churchill and the Formation of the Grand Alliance," Gorodetsky defines and documents the role of Sir Stafford Cripps in forging the American-British-Russian alliance. During Harry Hopkins' visit to Moscow on the eve of the first Churchill-Roosevelt summit in August 1941, a month before the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission, Cripps urgently recommended to Hopkins, in what Gorodetsky characterizes as "three crucial meetings" (p. 160), an alliance based on "immediate military cooperation sustained by long-term political agreements. The assistance to Russia was to be granted not as 'merely sparing to a partner or ally what we feel we can spare but rather as the point upon which we should concentrate all our efforts.' Cripps even provided Hopkins with a draft telegram to Stalin, couched in terms that he hoped Roosevelt and Churchill would adopt in their forthcoming meeting. . . . It is easy to imagine Churchill's rage," Gorodetsky continues, "when during the cruise [to the rendezvous with Roosevelt in Placentia Bay, in which Hopkins sailed with the British] he became aware of Hopkins's unequivocal commitment to Russia as a result of his contacts with Cripps. Churchill's hopes of impressing on Roosevelt the priority of the Middle Eastern campaign receded. To avoid a confrontation in their first personal meeting, Churchill postponed discussion of the contentious Russian issue to the very last session, when Cripp's draft telegram to Stalin was hastily adopted verbatim" (ibid., pp. 160-61).

In the conclusion of his article, Gorodetsky writes that "to comprehend the intricacy of the war diplomacy, it is . . . essential to shed the idealized vision of Anglo-American cooperation and realize that the special relationship consisted of cooperation while bargaining for supremacy. . . . It is a remarkable tribute to Churchill's statesmanship that he succeeded during a long and crucial period of the war in imposing his strategy on the Americans, and particularly on Roosevelt, a success out of all proportion to the resources at his command" (ibid., pp. 169-170).

The session at the Paris conference on the Winter War was chaired by Professor Jukka Nevakivi of the University of Helsinki. His colleague from the University of Tampere, Professor Olli Vehvilainen, explained Finland's carefully coordinated military and diplomatic strategy. Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali of the University Institute for Advanced International Studies in Geneva analyzed "The Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations," an action taken in December 1939 "in a manner," as Professor John C. Cairns of the University of Toronto succinctly phrased it in his commentary, "neither in accord with its covenant nor desired by the victim." [For a concise account of the Winter War, with well-documented coverage of

In the final session, the Paris conference was summed up, from the Western and Soviet viewpoints, respectively, by the Australian historian Robert O'Neill, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, and, although he had arrived only toward the end of the meeting, by Vladimir Konstantin Volkov, Director of the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies in Moscow.

Addressing himself directly to the questions that had been raised concerning Soviet policy on the eve of the war and during its early phases, Prof. Volkov stressed that one cannot understand the role of Russia at the beginning of the Second World War without taking into account the sense of terrible insecurity that prevailed in the summer of 1939—an insecurity rooted in the knowledge of the weakness of the country and its armed forces, grave concern about Japan in the Far East, and total ignorance of Hitler's intentions in the West. Notwithstanding other considerations, the Russo-German non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939, with its secret provision for the partition of Poland should be seen, in Volkov's opinion, as a desperate attempt to keep a mortal threat at arm's length. But this applied only to the non-aggression pact, he emphasized, not to the treaty of friendship concluded just over a month later. The Russo-German Treaty of 28 September 1939, whereby—in addition to its other provisions—Lithuania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence, was a tragic mistake; it represented a grave problem that would long concern Soviet historians no less than their Western colleagues.

The extent to which it was a matter of concern in the Soviet Union was indicated by an account in the International Herald Tribune (Paris), the day Volkov spoke, 30 September. In a Washington Post Service story from Moscow, David Remnick reported on the public protest the day before of members of a Soviet parliamentary commission against the government's refusal to acknowledge their findings regarding the existence of the secret Russo-German protocols of 1939 and the fact that these protocols led to the annexation of the Baltic countries—findings in agreement with Baltic activists who have denounced the protocols as illegal acts leading to the end of the region's independence. According to Remnick, the commission's chairman, Alexander N. Yakovlev, an ally of President Gorbachev in the Politburo, was reported in an interview published in the Communist Party daily, Pravda, on 18 August 1989—on the eve of mass protest demonstrations in the Baltic states commemorating
the fiftieth anniversary of the Russo-German Nonaggression Treaty of 23 August 1939, the first of the two pacts—to have "publicly conceded for the first time" that the secret protocols existed, but had gone on to insist that they had nothing to do with the region's annexation. The parliamentary commission's final report, which linked the annexation to the Russo-German agreements, was signed by all but four of the twenty-six members; in addition to Yakovlev, two prominent Central Committee members, Georgi A. Arbatov and Valentin M. Falin, as well as a member of the Ukrainian party apparatus did not sign it. When the commission chairman publicly "distorted" the panel's findings in the Pravda interview, a telegram was sent to President Gorbachev, appealing in the name of openness (glasnost) for his intervention. Gorbachev did not answer the commission directly, but, according to a New York Times report from Moscow on 23 September by Bill Keller, he stated on 19 September, to a meeting of party leaders, that "there were no grounds to doubt the decision on the entry of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union, the choice made by their peoples!" (cited as a quotation, perhaps from a press release). The Lithuanian Legislature, however, on 23 September, adopted "by a vote of 274 to 0 [with two abstentions] . . . the report of a special parliamentary committee that asserts Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Estonia, were occupied by the Red Army and forcibly annexed as the result of a secret pact between Stalin and Hitler" [New York Times, 24 September 1989, p. 5 (Midwest Edition); in the report, headlined "Lithuania Declares Annexation by Moscow Invalid," it is evident from the context that the term "committee" refers to the special commission of the Supreme Soviet reported on in the International Herald Tribune]. On 29 September, the day after the fiftieth anniversary of the Russo-German Treaty of Friendship, the second of the Hitler-Stalin pacts, the one that sealed the fate of Lithuania—Latvia and Estonia already having been consigned to the Soviet "sphere of influence" by the initial pact in August—the special parliamentary commission went public in Moscow, as reported in the International Herald Tribune, under its vice-chairman, Yuri Afsanayev, Rector of the Soviet Institute of Historical Archives (who had not appeared, as scheduled, at the Paris meeting the day before).

Prof. O'Neill, author of The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939 (New York: James H. Heineman, 1966) began his summing-up with a parable: One day a fox looked up and saw a raven flying backwards in the sky. The fox asked, "Comrade Raven, why are you going backwards?" The raven answered, " Didn't you know, Comrade Fox? This is perestroika!" "Oh," said the fox, "so that's what perestroika is. I shall have to try it, too." He started walking backwards and he soon backed into a cave where there was a bear. The bear caught him and mauled him so badly that he only narrowly escaped with his life. As he was limping away, he looked up, again saw the raven flying backwards, and called out, "You rascal! Look what perestroika has done to me!" The raven looked down and re-
sponded, "Comrade Fox, you should understand that perestroika is strictly for the upper echelons."

But perestroika cannot be just for the upper echelons, O'Neill stressed; it must apply to the most basic elements, particularly the archives. Until it does, we shall have an incomplete picture of the past, particularly of the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. This conference has shown that among major inadequacies in the evidence currently available, one of the most serious is in national documents--particularly those of the USSR and the Eastern European countries. Another major inadequacy is in the area of intelligence. We can never have a thorough understanding without knowledge of the information available. How much, for example, did Hitler know of Chamberlain's thinking and that of his cabinet members? How much of what a butler at a British Embassy stole got into the Axis network? A great deal of work remains to be done in this field, in which previously unavailable materials are being opened for research that can yield important new insights.

"Brooding over most of our deliberations has been the enigmatic figure of Stalin," observed O'Neill, who went on to note and comment on the various interpretations of the dictator given in papers that dealt with him directly or touched on his role. Addressing the Soviet participants in the conference as those to whom original sources on Stalin are most accessible, O'Neill said: "For long-standing reasons, almost nothing you say on Stalin will escape criticism. You will be seen as being either too partial for nationalistic or ideological reasons, or too hostile for immediate, current political reasons. The best way to handle the situation would be to advance on a broad front, publishing several contending views, leaving the members of the historiographical community to take their choice, confirming or rejecting the arguments advanced by their verdicts over the years."

Perhaps the most notable contribution to the conference, O'Neill suggested, was the new light shed on Poland, mentioning the papers by Keith Ruthven Sword of the University of London, "The Division of Poland"; by Antoni Czubinski of the Instytutu Zachodniego in Poznan, "Western Poland under Nazi Occupation"; by George Urbaniak, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, "Eastern Poland under Soviet Occupation"; and by Gerhard Krebs, "Japanese-Polish Relations and the European Crisis"; as well as commentary from Anita Jean Prazmowska of Queen Mary College, London, Norman Davies of the London School of Economics, and Malcolm Mackintosh of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

O'Neill synopsized and reviewed the conference as a whole in a manner that would have done him credit had he written his paper at leisure, over a period of weeks, on the basis of a full set of manuscripts, rather than having had to compose it almost extemporaneously. (Few of the papers had been, as requested, made available in advance, but copies of most were given to the conference chairman at the beginning of the meeting, though some were withheld until after they had been read.)
After acknowledging what the conference organizer and chairman, Prof. David Wingeate Pike, and the sponsoring institution, the American University of Paris, had done to make the conference productive, Prof. O'Neill closed with an expression of special thanks to the Soviet participants for their contributions in a time that is promising, but in which they also surely face challenges that must be daunting to them. "I hope they will feel our sympathy and support," he concluded. "We can't do much for them. They have to work out their own solution. But they and we cannot fail but be strengthened by recalling the terrible past, from 1939 to '41, out of which we have struggled to reach this point."

OTHER CONFERENCES

World War II Conferences, Washington, March 1990

The Center of Military History and the American Military Institute are holding consecutive, closely coordinated conferences on "The Coming of the Second World War: The Last Years of Peace, the First Months of War," at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza at Crystal City, Virginia, on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. (one Metro stop from Washington National Airport), 26-29 March and 30-31 March, respectively. ACHSWW members and others who are interested may register to attend, on payment of a registration fee to cover the costs of overhead (not including meals, for which separate reservations are to be made). Dr. Judith Bellafaire, Conference Coordinator, Field and International Division, Center of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20314-0200, kindly provided draft schedules for the conferences, reflecting the tentative program as of 27 October 1989. That many of the sessions (or papers within sessions) will be of interest to ACHSWW members should be evident from the following selection:

The Center of Military History (Conference of Army Historians) program includes:

Tuesday, 27 March

15.30-17.30: "World War II Records of the U.S. Army," with William Walker, Archivist of the Army; Tim Mulligan of the National Archives (who is preparing a guide to World War II records); William H. Cunliffe, Chief of the Special Archives Division of the National Archives; and Hannah Zeidlick of the Center of Military History.

Thursday, 29 March

8.30-10.00: "Perceptions of the Other Side of the Hill: Enemies and Allies," with papers on military attaches and observers in Eastern Europe (by Col. David Glantz, Combined Arms Center), in Britain (by Prof. Ted Wilson, Univ. of Kansas & CMH), and in the U.S. (by Dr. Alfred M. Beck, Office of Air Force History).

10.30-12.00: "Intelligence," with papers on U.S. Army and on Japanese signal intelligence.

13.30-15.00: "U.S. Army in the War against Japan," with Dr. Stanley Falk on "The Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-43."
The American Military Institute meeting program includes:

Friday, 30 March
9.30-11.30: "Preparing for War during the 1930s: The Navies," with Dr. Dean Allard, Director, Naval Historical Center.
13.30-15.15: "ENIGMA and Intelligence," with Dr. David Kahn giving a paper on "ENIGMA in the West, 1939-1940."
15.30-17.15: Concurrent sessions on "The British Commonwealth and the Coming of the War," with Canadian historians; on "The Battle of France" with French and German participants; and on "The Air War," with, tentatively, Dr. Horst Boog of the Military History Research Office in Freiburg.

Saturday, 31 March
9.30-11.00: Concurrent sessions on the war in China with Dr. Edward Drea of the Center of Military History and Lt. Col. Edward O'Dowd of the U.S. Military Academy; on the development of armored forces through the summer of 1940, under the chairmanship of Dr. Tim Nenninger, National Archives; and on strategy and direction, under the chairmanship of Colonel Harold W. Nelson, U.S. Army Chief of Military History, with Professor Alan Wilt of Iowa State University, Colonel Roland Forster of the Military History Research Office in Freiburg and, tentatively, Major General Robert Bassac, Chief of the French Army Historical Service, Vincennes.

World War II Conference, Siena College, 31 May - 1 June 1990

Siena College is sponsoring its fifth annual multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1990 will be 1940--though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics welcomed include: Fascism and National Socialism, the war in Asia, Spain, literature, art, film, as well as diplomatic, political, and military history, and also popular culture and women's and Jewish studies dealing with the era. Obviously, the Blitzkrieg, England under the Blitz, Dunkirk, Vichy, Quisling, etc., will be particularly appropriate. Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics of relevance are also solicited. Please send inquiries and proposals to Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II, Department of History, Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y. 12211.
International Committee Meeting in Madrid, Aug.-Sept. 1990

In conjunction with the quinquennial meeting of the International Congress of Historical Sciences, being held in Madrid from 26 August through 2 September 1990, the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, with which the ACHSWW and corresponding committees in other countries are affiliated, will hold its quinquennial meeting as well. It is tentatively planned that there will be a symposium on Friday, 31 August 1990, and Saturday morning, 1 September, followed by the general business meeting of the representatives of the national committees constituting the International Committee, at which International Committee officers for the next five years will be elected. The symposium consists of a series of sixteen papers by national committee representatives addressing themselves to the general theme, "The Road to War." Although the program remains to be confirmed by the International Committee, tentative arrangements have been made for a paper to be given by one member of the ACHSWW on the development of the atmosphere of America's relations toward Germany from the 1920s to 1941, and for a paper to be given by another member on America's involvement in the Far East. Detailed information on the 1990 meeting in Madrid will be provided in the spring 1990 issue of this newsletter.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

National Registry for the Bibliography of History

The National Registry for the Bibliography of History, sponsored by the Association for the Bibliography of History, solicits listings of bibliographical projects in progress, in any field of history, by historians and bibliographers in the United States and Canada. This project is designed to reduce possible duplication of projects, and to serve as a medium of information concerning work now in progress. The listing is published each year in American History: A Bibliographical Review (Meckler & Co.) and is also circulated to interested publishers from time to time. For information and registration forms, write Prof. Thomas T. Helde, Director, National Registry for the Bibliography of History, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.
Naval Historical Center Fellowships, Grants, and Internships

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, has established the Secretary of the Navy's Research Chair in Naval History. This is a senior fellowship that supports one year in residence at the Center to assist in the research or writing of a major monograph concerning the history of the U.S. Navy. Applications are welcomed from specialists in national security affairs, foreign relations, or the history of science and technology, who have an interest in naval history, as well as from diplomatic, military and naval historians.

The award amounts to approximately $55,000 per year plus allowances, as regulated by the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. This law provides for the exchange of personnel between the federal government and institutions of higher education. Permanent employees of the federal government are not eligible for this position. Applicants must be citizens of the United States. The application deadline is 28 February 1990.

In addition, the Center will make two postgraduate research grants, named in honor of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, of up to $2,500 each, to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should have either the doctorate or equivalent credentials, and they must be U.S. citizens. The deadline for submitting applications is 28 February 1990.

The Center will award the Read Admiral John D. Hayes fellowship of $7,500 to a predoctoral candidate who is undertaking research and writing on a dissertation in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants must be U.S. citizens who will have completed all requirement for the doctorate except the dissertation by 1 June 1990. The deadline for applications is 28 February 1990.

The Center welcomes internship applications from undergraduate history majors who wish to spend up to four weeks engaged in applied history projects in the Washington Navy Yard. Limited funds are available to support living expenses. Historical research, archival and curatorial assignments are available.

Applicants for the senior fellowship, the post-graduate grants, the predoctoral fellowship, and internships should direct their inquiries to the Director, Naval Historical Center, Bldg. 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374.

AN ENQUIRY

A writer for children's magazines, Ms. Betty Hollman, Box 172, Flagstaff, Ariz. 86002, remembers that as a fifth- or sixth-grader in Connecticut during World War II, she and her classmates collected scrap metal, gathered milkweed pods (to be used for life jackets), etc. She wonders if such drives were nationwide, and if there are estimates just how much children gathered and what became of it. She would appreciate hearing from anyone with information on the subject.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE by Donald S. Detwiler


The Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual, as noted in the spring 1986 issue of this newsletter, is "a vehicle for substantial contributions to the history of the Second World War--an era that stood in the shadow of the Holocaust, on which [the annual] . . . is primarily but by no means narrowly focussed." Its continuing breadth of focus is suggested by articles in the last three volumes such as Guy Stern's "Writers in Extremis," (vol. 3, pp. 87-105), Michael H. Kater's "Problems of Political Reeducation in West Germany, 1945-1960" (vol. 4, pp. 99-123), and Goetz Aly and Susanne Heim, translated by Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman, "The Economics of the Final Solution: A Case Study from the General Government" (vol. 5, pp. 3-48).

For historians of the Second World War, however, the most valuable feature of the Simon Wiesenthal Annual may well prove to be the review essays comprising as much as a third of each volume. In "Klaus Barbie, the United States Government, and the Beginnings of the Cold War," vol. 3, pp. 261-276, George O. Kent, in his article on Alan A. Ryan's Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), Ryan's official report on the Barbie case, and four related books, not only reviews the literature on the case, but places it in historical context. In the same volume, pp. 289-300, Christopher R. Browning provides, in his critique, "The Revised Hilberg," an introduction not only to Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European Jews, rev. ed., 3 vols. (continuously paginated), (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), but to the controversies over the decision-making process that led to the Holocaust (between "intentionalists" and "functionalists") and over the question of the role (i.e., tacit acquiescence or complicity) of the victims. In the subsequent volume, in what elsewhere would be considered a full-length review, "A Note on the Genesis of the Final Solution" (vol. 4, pp. 337-39), Raul Hilberg reviews Christopher Browning's Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985).

In vol. 4, a note on review essay policy (p. 307) is followed by two well-informed, complementary critiques of the 687-page monograph by Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm,
Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981): Alfred Streim, "The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen" (translated by Henry Friedlander and Martha Humphreys), and Charles B. Burdick, "Tradition and Murder in the Wehrmacht."

The Policies of Genocide, edited by Dr. Gerhard Hirschfeld of the German Historical Institute in London, provides Anglo-American readers access to German scholarship on what may be the most daunting problem-complex of the war with five papers: Christian Streit, "The German Army and the Policies of Genocide"; Jürgen Förster, "The German Army and the Ideological War against the Soviet Union"; Falk Pingel, "Resistance and Resignation in Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps"; Lothar Kettenacker, "Hitler's Final Solution and its Rationalization"; and Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich." The editor has supplied a detailed "Chronology of Destruction" (pp. 145-156). The book includes maps, a glossary, and a selective list of accessible books and articles in English (complementing the papers' copious, scholarly annotations).

A REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN ENCYCLOPEDIA

The publishers of a compact encyclopedia on World War II in Europe are seeking contributors of articles from 100 to 4000 words. Garland Publishing, Inc., of New York City is soliciting writers who can cover subjects such as the leaders, organizations, equipment, tactics, and battles of the war. Anyone interested in contributing should contact the editor of the projected volume, David T. Zabecki, Am Alten Turmplatz 9, D-6652 Bexbach, West Germany.

RECORDS DECLASSIFICATION AT THE U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Two sets of records from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations have been declassified: Office of Naval Intelligence, Monograph Files: Germany, 1939-45 (11 cubic feet); and Ship Movement Division, General Correspondence, 1920-42 (21 cubic feet). These records are in Record Group 38, available in the Military Reference Branch (202 523-3340).

More than 1000 identification photographs (less than one cubic foot) of the crew of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee have been accessioned by the Still Picture Branch. Bottled up in Montevideo Harbor in 1939, the ship was scuttled and its crew members interned. These records of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Record Group 373) are available in the Special Archives Division.
AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1990 MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION, DUES, AND SUPPORT

Annual dues of $10.00 ($2.00 for students with U.S. addresses) are payable at the beginning of January 1990 to the American Committee on the History of the Second World War (ACHSWW). There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted in U.S. funds.

To defray committee expenses not covered by regular membership dues or available institutional support, tax-deductible contributions are invited to a Southern Illinois University grant-in-aid account, the administrative cost of which is fully borne by the institution. Donations by separate check or by money order, made out to SIU Grant-in-Aid Account 6-23358, may be sent to the committee secretary, together with dues and the membership form below.

Please return to:

Prof. D. S. Detwiler
Secretary, ACHSWW
Hist. Dept., SIUC
Carbondale, IL 62901

Name: ____________________________
Address: ____________________________

Particular field(s): ____________________________

Enclosures:

Membership dues:________

Donation to SIU Grant-in-Aid Acct. 6-23358:________

(Members may also enclose the ACHSWW election ballot for the 1990-1992 term with this membership renewal form.)
AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

ACHSWW ELECTION BALLOT FOR THE 1990-1992 TERM

As a nominating committee, the present directors recommend that the members of the ACHSWW elect eight directors from the slate below for three-year terms expiring at the end of December 1992. Please indicate on this ballot your choice of no more than eight directors (including the names of those you may care to write in) and return the ballot with your membership renewal or separately to the secretary in January 1990.

FOR DIRECTOR (vote for eight):

____ Martin Blumenson, Washington, D.C.
____ Philip A. Crowl, Naval War College (ret.)
____ William H. Cunliffe, National Archives
____ Robert Daalder, Univ. of Calif. at Los Angeles
____ Stanley L. Falk, Office of Air Force History (ret.)
____ Brig. Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (ret.), University of North Texas
____ Richard H. Kohn, Office of Air Force History
____ Maurice Matloff, Center of Military History (ret.)
____ Ernest R. May, Harvard University
____ Allan R. Millett, Ohio State University
____ Gaddis Smith, Yale University
____ Ronald H. Spector, University of Alabama
____ Mark A. Stoler, University of Vermont
____ Gerhard L. Weinberg, University of North Carolina
____ Earl F. Ziemke, University of Georgia