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OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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GENERAL INFORMATION

Established in 1967 "to promote historical research in the period of World War II in all its aspects," the American Committee on the History of the Second World War is a private organization supported by the dues and donations of its members. It is affiliated with the American Historical Association, with the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and with corresponding national committees in other countries, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, East and West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The ACHSWW meets annually with the American Historical Association.

THE NEWSLETTER

The ACHSWW issues a semiannual newsletter (assigned International Standard Serial Number [ISSN] 0885-5668 by the National Serial Data Program of the Library of Congress). Back issues of the newsletter are available through the ACHSWW Archivist (at the address on the letterhead) from Sunflower University Press. The first eighteen issues (1968-1978) are available as a spiral-bound, 360-page xerox paperback (ISBN 0-89126-060-9) for $36.00. Subsequent back numbers may be ordered as single, unbound issues for $3.00 each. (There is no postal charge for prepaid orders to U.S. addresses; there is a $4.00 shipping charge for orders to foreign and Canadian addresses.)

MEMBERSHIP

Membership in the ACHSWW is open to anyone interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual membership dues of $10.00 are payable at the beginning of each calendar year. (Students with U.S. addresses may, if their circumstances require it, pay annual dues of $2.00 for up to six years.) There is no surcharge for members abroad, but it is requested that dues be remitted directly to the secretary of the committee (not through an agency or a subscription service) in U.S. dollars. (The newsletter, which is mailed at bulk rates within the United States, will be sent by surface mail to foreign addresses unless special arrangements are made to cover the cost of airmail postage.) A membership renewal form is regularly attached to the fall newsletter.
COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

The eight directors listed in the lower left-hand margin of the first page of this newsletter were elected to three-year terms from January 1989 through December 1991.

THE 1988 ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the ACHSWW was held in 1988 in conjunction with that of the American Historical Association in Cincinnati, 28-30 December 1988.

The Business Meeting

Prof. Arthur L. Funk of the University of Florida convened the 1988 business meeting at 5:00 p.m., Wednesday, 28 December, in Buckeye Room A of the Hyatt Regency. The secretary and newsletter editor, Prof. Donald S. Detwiler of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, gave the treasurer's report, which was unanimously accepted.

Prof. Funk noted that the AHA Program Committee had scheduled two joint sessions with the ACHSWW for the current annual meeting: the first on Wednesday afternoon, just prior to the business meeting, and the second on Friday afternoon, the 30th. At Prof. Funk's invitation, Prof. Gerhard L. Weinberg of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill commented briefly on the joint session that had just ended, "The Munich Crisis After Fifty Years," at which he had given a paper with the same title. He mentioned that the session had been well attended even though it had been scheduled at the same time as the session on the Waldheim case, which was also of interest to World War II historians, and in which Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., a fellow director of the ACHSWW (and a member of the Waldheim Commission) had participated.

Prof. Detwiler, as program chairman for 1988, announced that Prof. Alvin D. Cox of San Diego State University unfortunately would be unable to return to the United States from Japan, where he was on a Fulbright professorship, to participate in the session on Friday, "World War II in the Far East: Chennault, China and Air Power."

Turning to future meetings, Prof. Funk, as program chairman for the 1989 annual meeting (which is to be held in San Francisco), announced that he had submitted to the AHA program committee a proposal for a joint session on "The Origins of the Second World War--A Fifty-Year Retrospect." It is to be chaired by Mrs. Agnes F. Peterson of the Hoover Institution at Stanford. The session is to be based on a major paper that Prof. Norman A. Graebner of the University of Virginia has agreed to give. He is currently engaged in research for a book on the outbreak of the war in 1939. Professors Edward
M. Bennett of Washington State University, Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers University at Newark, and Williamson Murray of Ohio State University are to serve as commentators. [The AHA Program Committee has meanwhile approved the proposed session.]

Regarding a proposal for the December 1990 annual meeting, together with the AHA, in New York, several possibilities were considered, including a session that would commemorate the centenary of the birth of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1890, but no formal decision was reached.

The chairman of the ACSWW announced that he had received an announcement of a conference to be held in Berlin (East) from 31 August to 4 September 1989, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War and the fiftieth of the unleashing of the Second, conducted by the Military History Institute of the German Democratic Republic and the Central Institute for History of the Academy of Sciences of the G.D.R. Representatives of the International Committee on the History of the Second World War and the International Commission on Military History were being invited, as well as scholars from sixteen states in Europe, America, and Asia. Costs incurred in Berlin by foreign guests would be borne by the hosts. No detailed information had been provided regarding the program. No one present at the meeting indicated that he or she would be able to travel to Berlin to represent the ACHSWW at the East Berlin meeting.

Prof. Detwiler reported that a conference on "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Opening of the Second World War" will be held at the American College in Paris in September 1989. [Information on the program of this conference, which has been organized by Prof. David Wingeate Pike, an ACHSWW member, and in which historians from Belgium, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Poland, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, and the United States will participate, is provided elsewhere in this newsletter.]

The chairman of the ACHSWW, who is a vice-president of the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, reported on plans for ACHSWW participation in the program of the International Committee scheduled in conjunction with the International Historical Congress in Madrid in August 1990. The theme of the International Committee's program for 1990 is "The Road to War: Public Opinion, Attitudes and Mentalities in Relation to the Future War." There are to be sixteen papers on topics such as "The Future War and Public Opinion in Great Britain and France," "The International Communist Movement, Peace and War," and "The Religious Forces and the Problem of War." Prof. Funk described the two proposals that he had received, in response to a poll of the ACHSWW directors, for papers to be given at Madrid. The Director of the Captured German Records Staff at the National Archives, Robert Wolfe, a specialist on German-American relations, proposed that he present a paper on American attitudes and policy toward Germany, tentatively entitled "From the Dawes Plan
through Lend Lease to 'Shoot on Sight': The Course of American Relations with the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich." Dr. Ronald H. Spector, the Director of Naval History, an authority on the Pacific War, proposed a corresponding paper on American attitudes regarding a possible war with Japan. It was agreed that the committee chairman should recommend both papers for presentation at the Madrid congress and he agreed to do so.

Prof. Funk announced that the Director of the Belgian Center for Research and Studies on the History of the Second World War, Jean Vanwelkenhuysen, had resigned from the post of President of the International Committee for the Second World War, to which he had been elected as successor of the founding president, Henri Michel. The Norwegian historian Prof. Magne Skodvin of Oslo University has been elected to serve as Acting President of the International Committee until the next plenary business meeting of the international committee, which is being held at the time of the historical congress in Madrid in 1990, when a president can be elected for a full five-year term.

As a participant, Prof. Funk reported on the symposium on Soviet-American Relations and the History of World War II held in Moscow in October. [The summary report of the U.S. Project Coordinator, Prof. Warren F. Kimball, follows below.]

Gen. Collins reported on the Battle of Normandy Museum in Caen and the work of the U.S. Committee for the museum and its advisory Board of Historians, of which he is chairman and Prof. Funk executive secretary. [A detailed account of the opening of the museum was carried in the Fall 1988 issue of this newsletter.]

Dr. Lawrence H. McDonald of the U.S. National Archives, who had spoken at the 1988 annual meeting on the OSS Records Project (and provided a paper and documentation on these records for the ACHSWW's Spring 1989 Newsletter), returned for a follow-up report. In addition to an update on the OSS records [noted elsewhere in this newsletter], he reported on other matters pertaining to work on the Second World War at the National Archives, including the reorganization taking place in conjunction with the building of "Archives II," the new archives building under construction (and to be opened in '94) on the campus of the University of Maryland at College Park, on the outskirts of the District of Columbia. He also said that his National Archives colleague Timothy P. Mulligan, who had been with the captured German records, has been working since fall 1988 on a guide to American military records of the Second World War. It is expected to require at least four years to complete, but should be published during the fiftieth commemoration of U.S. involvement in the war. The guide is to cover sixty National Archives records groups, largely the records of military agencies, but some civilian agencies, insofar as their records pertain directly to the military conduct of the war. The guide will identify—if not describe—some records
in the custody of federal agencies rather than the National Archives. The planned guide is to have thirteen chapters: Strategy and Planning, Administering the Military Establishment, Mobilization and Training, Armaments Production, Guarding the Home Base, Supply and Support Services, Scientific and Technological Research, Intelligence, the War at Sea, the War in the Air, the Ground War in Europe and the Mediterranean, the Ground War in Asia and the Pacific, and Occupation and Reconstruction.

The final action of the meeting was the unanimous approval of a resolution suggested by Prof. Detwiler and supported by Gen. Collins and Prof. Weinberg that the committee, through a letter to the Austrian Embassy, request publication of the Report of the Waldheim Commission and the related documentation.

The meeting was adjourned a few minutes before 7:00 p.m.

Joint Session of the ACHSWW with the AHA:

World War II in the Far East: Chennault, China, and Air Power

At 1:00 p.m. on Friday, 30 December 1988, in Convention Center North 214, the joint session on the air war in the Far East was convened by Brig. Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (ret.), former head of the history department at the Air Force Academy, now professor of history and chancellor at the University of North Texas. He announced that Prof. Alvin D. Coox was in Japan on a Fulbright professorship beginning on the first of December and could therefore not participate in the session as planned; moreover, Prof. Michael Schaller, who had been scheduled to comment, had informed him earlier in the day that he was leaving Cincinnati immediately because of a family emergency. As a second commentator (in addition to himself), Dr. Hurley introduced Dr. Mark Parillo, a member of the department of history of the University of Alabama, who on short notice had kindly agreed to participate in the session, offering a comment on the role of Japanese air power in China.

In her paper on "Chennault and China, 1937-1945," Ms. Martha Byrd of Davidson, North Carolina, the author of A World in Flames: A History of World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1970) and of a recent full-length biography of General Claire Chennault, briefly reviewed Chennault's personal background and his increasingly frustrating career in the U.S. Army, which ended in 1937 with his retirement and his decision to accept the invitation to go to China as an aviation consultant to the Chinese government. She then described his vital contribution to the development of the Chinese Air Force, his leading role in the establishment of the American Volunteer Group (the "Flying Tigers," American pioneers in clandestine air warfare) on the eve of the formal entry of the U.S. into World War II, and his controversial record, after having been recalled to active
duty in 1942 as a general officer, as the principal American air leader in China. She explained how Chennault was able to provide the kind of professional help the Chinese needed in the air program, and how, in personal terms, he was able to establish an enduring relationship both with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Madame Chiang, head of the Chinese National Commission for Aeronautical Affairs. In the course of her paper, Ms. Byrd concisely dealt with many of the issues explained in detail in her biography of Chennault [on which information is available in the bibliographical section of this newsletter].

Gen. Hurley introduced Prof. Parillo, noting that he had completed his doctoral studies at Ohio State University in 1987 under the direction of Prof. Allan Millett, writing a dissertation on the Japanese merchant marine in World War II, which is now being prepared for publication. In the course of his lucid overview of the role of Japanese air power in China during the Second World War, Prof. Parillo stated that because the Sino-Japanese conflict antedated the global conflict by ten years, it became, along with the Spanish Civil War, a laboratory for the weapons and theories of air power. The Japanese had no independent air force: the Imperial Army and Navy jealously guarded their own, separate air services. Their deep-seated rivalry made any sort of unified aerial branch all but impossible, but the services did see the war with China as an invaluable opportunity for testing their air arms.

In his concluding comment, Gen. Hurley noted the extent to which the use of air power in the China-Burma-India Theater foreshadowed its subsequent use in clandestine air operations in the Far East, in Berlin, and in other trouble spots. In assessing the role of Chennault and of air power in the Far East, one should bear in mind the severely limited resources available in the China Theater. "China was the last ally," he observed, "that received much benefit from the enormous American success in mounting a training and production effort that both made up for its severe lack of preparation before the war and helped to swamp its enemies."

THE WALDHEIM CASE AND THE WALDHEIM COMMISSION REPORT

On Wednesday afternoon, 28 December 1988, just before the annual business meeting reported on above, an American Historical Association session on Politics and History: The Case of Kurt Waldheim was held under the chairmanship of Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., USA (ret.), former Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army, who had served as a member of the Waldheim Commission.

In the first paper, "The Case of Kurt Waldheim: War Criminal or a Cog in the War of Extermination?," Prof. Gerhard Botz of Salzburg University dealt less with Waldheim's role during

Speaking on "The Historian as Waldheim Biographer," Prof. Robert E. Herzstein of the University of South Carolina, author of Waldheim: The Missing Years (New York: Arbor House/William Morrow, 1988), said he had initially become involved in the Waldheim case as a consultant to the media. He had soon learned, however, that a case of that sort required long-term study, and that his short stints as a research consultant were not adequate. What he needed was time to study the records—without an impossible deadline and without having someone looking over his shoulder. So he decided to back away from the public arena and write a biography of Waldheim. Doing this not only required many visits to the archives, but also a number of interviews with Waldheim himself. In connection with this personal contact, Prof. Herzstein said, "I must confess that my task was made easier by a lack of antipathy." He acknowledged that his detachment had led to harsh criticism, but that it probably would not have been possible for him to have followed through with his work on Waldheim in the way that he had, if he had believed that Waldheim had been "a kind of low-level Eichmann or Heydrich."

The conclusion he reached in the end was that Waldheim "was an ambitious bureaucrat who had served various masters, a man caught up in the work of units that committed atrocities, and a careerist who concealed and at times lied about his past."

In addition, Prof. Herzstein said, he considered that Waldheim had been "an accessory to the commission of illegal activities," even though he may have been an unwilling accessory. There was no doubt about his having assisted in deportations, executions, and reprisals. But even though Waldheim had facilitated these actions, he had never ordered them, nor been in a position to do so. Moreover, said Prof. Herzstein, "Waldheim was not a Nazi"—clearly stressing the not. Most of Waldheim's activity, according to Herzstein, was normal military-bureaucratic work. Although it was obvious that Waldheim could not have been innocent about the perpetration of war crimes, "the man should not be confused with the real criminals, for that trivializes the nature of their crimes and diminishes respect for the sufferings of their victims."

Among the issues brought out in the discussion following the two papers was concern that the final report drawn up (in German) by the Waldheim Commission, together with the supporting documentation, had not yet been formally published. At the ACHSWW business meeting held later the same afternoon, a resolution calling for publication of the report was unanimously adopted. In January 1989, the ACHSWW chairman wrote to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, requesting that the
"Austrian Government . . . make available the complete text, with annexes, . . . to historians."

On 17 February 1989, Dr. Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, Counselor for Cultural Affairs of the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008 (202 483-4474), responded to Prof. Funk that, after having consulted the competent authorities, he could provide the following information:

"The Commission of Historians was created for the sole purpose of submitting an expert opinion to the Austrian Federal Government. The Report therefore remains at the Government's disposal. Immediately upon its submission, the Report was made public by the Federal Government. Since then, the report, including its annexes, can be obtained free of charge through the Federal Press Service (Bundespressdienst), Ballhausplatz 1, A-1014 Wien [i.e., Vienna, Austria], Telex: 847/75585. More than a thousand copies of the report have already been distributed to interested parties. Hence, the report is freely accessible also to historians all over the world. The Austrian Government does not plan any other steps with regard to this Report."

Dr. Trauttmansdorff added that this information might be included in the newsletter of this committee, and that one should feel to contact him if the Embassy could be of any further assistance in this matter.

Meanwhile, at the request of the newsletter editor, Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., USA (ret.) kindly prepared the following report on the work of the Waldheim Commission and on his view of the case and its implications—not least for the soldier engaged in a war in which atrocities are committed.

The Waldheim Affair
by
James L. Collins, Jr.

In the late summer of 1987 an International Commission of Military Historians was formed to look into the actions of then German Army Lieutenant Kurt Waldheim during the period 1942-45. The Chairman of the Commission, who alone selected the other Commission members, was chosen by the Austrian government in July of 1987. He was Dr. Hans Rudolf Kurtz, a jurist by training who had retired from the Swiss military as head of their Military Library, of which the Military Historical Service was an element. Dr. Kurtz has attended a number of international meetings both of the Committee on the History of the Second World War and of the Commission on Military History. As a result, most of the members he chose to serve on the Waldheim Commission were active in one or both of
those international bodies. The member from West Germany, Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt, was Chief Historian of their Military History Office. As Waldheim had served in the German Army and most of the German military archives were under his supervision at Freiburg im Breisgau, he was a logical first choice. Professor Jehuda Wallach, President of the Israeli Military History Commission, who had access to Holocaust documentation, and Professor Gerald Fleming of Great Britain, who had written extensively on the Hitler era, were also early choices. A Belgian, Dr. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, then President of the International Committee on the History of the Second World War, was a citizen of a country, like Switzerland, which had no direct involvement with Waldheim's past. The U.S. National Archives had been the repository of the World War II captured German documents before they were returned to West Germany and still retained microfilms of most of them. Thus Mr. Robert Wolfe, then Assistant Director of the Military Archives Division and a scholar of international reputation, would have been the logical American member of the Commission. However, as an active federal employee he was forced to decline the invitation. As a second choice, Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., a retired officer, was able to obtain U.S. government permission to join the Commission. In addition to having served for a dozen years as the U.S. Army's Chief of Military History, in 1987 he was President of the U.S. Commission on Military History and was known to Dr. Kurtz.

Early in September of 1987 the Commission met as a group for the first time in Vienna. They discussed their mission, allocated tasks, deplored the Yugoslavian government's unwillingness to allow a Yugoslav historian to join our group, and decided to invite a Greek historian (of German extraction) to attend sessions as an "expert." He could not be made an official member of the Commission, as the act of the Austrian parliament authorizing the Commission stipulated six Commissioners. However, Professor Haagen Fleischer of the University of Crete was treated for all intents and purposes as a full member.

After several days filled with meetings the Commission members dispersed to their various countries to pursue their investigations using national resources. For the U.S. member this meant primarily the National Archives and hopefully the results of the extensive research into the Waldheim affair conducted by the World Jewish Congress. Unfortunately, the WJC was not very helpful, prejudging the International Commission of Historians to be a "whitewash operation." However, some individuals, such as Professor Herzstein, who had done research work for the WJC, were most cooperative.

One of the criticisms of the Commission was that it had no written terms of reference, although all members of the Commission were in agreement from the first meeting on what had to be done. Thus, at the second meeting in late October, the need for specific terms of reference was discussed and the scope generally agreed on, although they were not finalized and signed by the chairman until the third meeting, in early December 1987. They were:
The International Commission of Historians
designated to establish
the Military Service of Lieutenant Kurt Waldheim

Terms of Reference

This independent Commission has been established to
determine the facts concerning the wartime service of Kurt Waldheim and of his participation in National Socialist organizations. The political content of his doctoral dissertation will also be examined.

The Commission may interview witnesses and examine documentary evidence in National and private archives without restraint.

The Austrian Foreign Ministry, while defraying the expenses of the Commission, has no power to alter the final report of the Commission.

Vienna, December 3, 1987

Prof. Dr. Hans Rudolf KURZ
President of the Commission
These terms of reference were somewhat expanded from the request of the Austrian government to the Commission, which in effect asked whether Dr. Waldheim committed any war crimes in the period 1942-45. This expansion caused some consternation when the report was submitted, as many officials felt the Commission had exceeded its mandate. However, the members of the Commission felt they could not carry out a thorough job without looking at some events prior to 1942. There was no inquiry into Dr. Waldheim's actions during the Russian campaign, as little documentation was available.

Meetings of about a week apiece were held in October and late November. Witnesses who had served with Lt. Waldheim or had knowledge of his service were interviewed. Previously unknown documents, principally from Yugoslavia, started to surface and it was agreed the work would not be complete without a further check of those repositories. Two Commission members visited the archives in Belgrad and Zagreb and reported back at the final meeting in late January.

Not much of significance came to light, but this activity apparently galvanized several Yugoslav researchers and journalists to attempt to sell items of dubious authenticity to various media representatives. In fact, a copy of a message purporting to show that Lt. Waldheim had directed the movement of refugees, hostages, and prisoners to concentration camps was reportedly sold to a German newspaper for about $30,000 (this telegram was later determined to be a forgery). Other, similar papers were alleged to be in Yugoslavia, either in official archives or in the hands of private individuals. As a result, the Commission decided to send a member to check out again the principal archives and sources in Zagreb. The results were not dissimilar to the earlier visit. Many allegations but little to back them up.

Ten days before finishing the report, the Commission interviewed President Waldheim. The scheduled two-hour meeting stretched into almost four but did not add substantially to available knowledge. The answer given to many questions was "I was not there then," "I knew nothing about it," or "I do not remember." There was little of importance derived from this meeting which the Commission had hoped would clear up questions on the activity of Lt. Waldheim and his knowledge of war crimes and atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht in the Balkans.

The report was finished on the 8th of February and presented to the Chancellor of Austria that evening. A courtesy call on President Waldheim with a copy of the report was made later by the Commission Chairman accompanied by several members.

Among the conclusions of the report was that no facts pointing to the direct involvement of Lt. Waldheim in war crimes were found. While additional documents may eventually turn up, based on the evidence at hand there was no "smoking gun." On the other hand, documents were found indicating
that Lt. Waldheim, contrary to his earlier protestations, had knowledge of atrocities. Nothing could be found indicating he had tried to put an end to these illegal acts or to disassociate himself from them. However, it must be conceded that although he held a relatively important position as an intelligence officer in the headquarters of an army group in the Balkans, it was not a policy-making position and he had no command authority. He was the officer who prepared the daily intelligence report and could not help knowing of the brutal reprisal measures taken against the Greek and Yugoslav populace. The execution of hostages and the indiscriminate slaughter of women and children--at a ratio of 100 initially and later of 50 for each German casualty--was directed by the German High Command and Lt. Waldheim had no capability of changing the order.

The Commission concluded that President Waldheim had attempted to cover up his service in the Balkans and had not been candid about his past. The record showed that in answering questions about his wartime activities after they first surfaced, his responses were incomplete, evasive, and frequently misleading. It was only after being faced with documentary evidence that his memory improved and then only selectively.

After publication of the Commission's report, it was alleged that a certain conclusion had been changed as a result of pressure from the Austrian government. This was incorrect. An early draft of the conclusions had somehow reached the media. One of these conclusions dealt with Waldheim's "moral culpability." After discussion within the Commission it was agreed that as the members were not jurists, neither were they theologians, any conclusions about moral culpability had no place in the report. That conclusion was then deleted before any information surfaced that anyone in the Austrian government was unhappy with that conclusion.

It certainly is the duty of an officer to refrain from activities contrary to the laws and customs of war. He should actively oppose any such actions he observes and the excuse of "only following orders" is not valid. However, it must be remembered that conditions under Hitler were not those usually encountered in Western Civilization. People were executed for such crimes as listening to radio broadcasts of the BBC. Vengeance for infractions of Nazi rules was visited not only on the violator but on his or her family as well. The withholding of ration cards in the "Greater Reich" during wartime was a powerful persuader. Additionally, warfare in the Balkans was a brutal matter on both sides. The rage and frustration of the German military at being ambushed by unseen assailants who melted into the brush, at being shot at by guerilla snipers, at discovering a missing comrade chopped into pieces is quite understandable. While the German reprisal actions were inexcusable, it would take a singularly courageous lieutenant staff officer to actively oppose them. After the war, war
crimes tribunals tried some of the commanders in the Balkans. A number were executed, including General Lohr, who was the Army Group Commander on whose staff Lt. Waldheim served. However, his chief of staff and his immediate superior were never tried as they had no command authority. It is doubtful if they would escape trial today, as the Nuremberg Tribunal established the war crime category of "aiding and abetting" a war crime or a crime against humanity, to put it in layman's language. While atrocities will continue to occur even in the best regulated armies, they must be actively condemned and the perpetrators punished, as in the My Lai incident in South Vietnam. Hopefully, these incidents will decrease and never reach the level of the atrocities in the Balkans during the Second World War.

In conclusion, the International Commission of Military Historians worked long and hard to develop the facts of the wartime service of Lt. Kurt Waldheim in the Balkans. The Commission felt the facts did not indicate that he participated in any war crimes, nor did he actively oppose any of the atrocities committed by the troops under the command of the headquarters of which he was a member. After the war he attempted to bury his service in the Balkans and was afflicted with selective amnesia about that period. The Commission's conclusions were unanimously agreed to by the members, no mean feat, as getting a half dozen fiercely independent military historians to agree to anything—even where to go for dinner—is quite extraordinary.

[signed:] James L. Collins, Jr.
Middleburg, VA
4 March 1989

SYMPOSIUM ON SOVIET-AMERICAN WARTIME RELATIONS (OCTOBER 1988)

Professor Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers University (and, during 1988-89, Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions at Cambridge University, England), has kindly provided the following summary report on the Third Soviet-American Symposium on US-USSR Relations and the History of World War II. Prof. Kimball is the U.S. Project Coordinator for this series of conferences.

"This was the third of a projected six symposia on the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, sponsored in the USSR by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and in the U.S. by the ACLS/IREX. This meeting was held in Moscow, USSR, 16-25 October 1988. The subject was Soviet and American relations—diplomatic, military, and cultural—leading up to and during the conferences in Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran in late 1943. Following the format of previous conferences, papers were exchanged in advance to allow time for translation, brief (10-15 minute) oral summaries were given at the
symposium, and then lengthy discussion followed. Eleven Ameri­
can scholars participated, and nine Soviet scholars presented papers. The meetings were held in Moscow at the Central House for Tourists, a very large hall where the facilities were excellent (if a bit cavernous). Soviet hospitality was warm and genuine, and included an invitation to dinner for the entire delegation at one or the other homes of two Soviet historians.

"The broad topics dealt with in the papers included (a) Second Front arguments and decisions, (b) postwar planning, including matters of international organization, postwar Germany, and economic reconstruction, (c) media/cultural images in both the U.S. and the USSR, (d) strategic issues in the Pacific War, and (e) evaluations of Soviet historical sources.

"Although none of the Soviet papers contained evidence that demonstrated new archival material, the tone and quality of the papers and discussions indicated that glasnost is having a salutary effect. On a number of occasions Soviet historians publicly disagreed with each other when one or the other supported an American argument. More important, it was the consensus of the American delegation that, for the most part, the scholarly level of the Soviet papers was very good. In fact, in some cases members of the American delegation have encouraged the Soviet scholars to submit their piece for publication in American scholarly journals. Moreover, we remain convinced that Soviet historians welcome our public pressure in support of their efforts to gain access to Soviet archives. We were told that a senior Soviet historian is leading a group of researchers 'in the Foreign Ministry archives.' Time will tell precisely what that means.

"Equally constructive are the various initiatives for joint publication that have gotten underway as a direct result of this project. In addition to continued publication in the Soviet Union of many of the American papers, two publication projects have gotten past the talking stage. One, suggested by some American participants, calls for the translation into English and publication of those new documents contained in two recent Soviet (Russian-language) collections of documents on U.S.-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet relations during World War II. Soviet historians understand American requirements that this include access for the American editors to the original documents, and negotiations on specifics as well as a possible broadening of the project are underway. The second projected publication, suggested by the Soviets, is a series of essays on Soviet, American, and British history during the war, written by historians from each country. That too is being discussed by a group of historians from the three countries.

"The Fourth Symposium will examine Soviet-American relations--diplomatic, cultural, and military--during 1944. It will be held in the United States at a place and time to be determined. . . ."
American Historical Association Meetings, 1989-1991

In a February 1989 mailing to affiliated societies, the AHA announced that at the annual meeting in December 1989 at the San Francisco Hilton & Towers the room rates will be $54.00 for a single, $64.00 for a double, and $20.00 for each additional person. The annual meeting in December 1990 is scheduled to be held at the New York Hilton & Towers in Rockefeller Center, with a convention rate of $68.00 for single rooms and $82.00 for doubles. The annual meeting in December 1991 will be held at the Chicago Hilton & Towers (formerly the Conrad Hilton). "In the final phase of the bidding," wrote Ambassador Samuel R. Gammon, Executive Director of the AHA, "the Hilton was able to offer us single rooms at $57.00 a night, appreciably under the best price of the Washington, DC Sheraton."

Dr. Gammon added that a poll of AHA members taken last fall regarding the December 27-30 dates for the annual meeting (since 1888) had been inconclusive. A further poll is to be conducted later in 1989 to see if another set of dates commands greater support. In any case, there will be no change in the time of the annual meeting of the AHA [and of the ACHSWW, which meets with it] before 1992 at the earliest.

International Conference in Paris, September 1989

The Second International Conference on International Relations, entitled "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Opening of the Second World War," is to be held at the American College in Paris, 26-30 September 1989, under the chairmanship of Professor David Wingate Pike.

There are to be seven sessions. Prof. Klaus-Jörg Müller of the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg and Prof. John A. Lukacs of Chestnut Hill College, Pennsylvania, are to be among the participants in the first, on "The Road to War." General Dimitri Volkogonov, Director of the Institute of Military History in Moscow, is to deliver a paper in the session on "The Abandonment of Poland and the Phony War." The participants scheduled for the session on "The Nippo-Soviet Pacts and the Reaction of Nazi Germany" are Academician Sergei L. Tikhvinsky, Moscow, and Professors Yutaka Akino and Sumio Hatano from Tsukuba University, Bernd Martin from Freiburg University, and Donald S. Detwiler from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Professors Olli Vehvilainen of the University of Tampere and John C. Cairns of the University of Toronto are to participate in the session on "The Finno-Russian War." Sessions are scheduled also on "Poland under Occupation," on "The Implications of the Soviet-German Pacts for the Western European Democracies," and on "The Italian Question."
The official languages of the conference will be English, French, and Russian. Professional interpreters are to be at hand. Plans are being made to publish the proceedings. For information, please contact Prof. David Wingate Pike, Chairman, 1989 Conference, The American College in Paris, 31, avenue Bosquet, 75007 Paris, France.

OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center Research Grants

The USAF Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) announces research grants to encourage scholars to study the history of air power through the use of the USAF historical document collection at the Center. The Center will make several awards up to $2,500 each to individuals who meet the criteria in this announcement and are willing to visit the Center for research during fiscal year 1990 (ending 30 September 1990). Recipients will be designated "Research Associates of the USAF Historical Research Center."

Criteria.--Applicants must have a graduate degree in history or related fields, or equivalent scholarly achievements. Their specialty or professional experience must be in aeronautics, astronautics, or military-related subjects. They must not be in residence at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and be willing to visit the USAF Historical Research Center at Maxwell for a sufficient time to use the research materials at the Center for their proposed projects.

Topics of Research.--Proposed topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, administration, strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technology, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil-military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations. Preference will be given to those proposals that involve the use of primary sources held at the Center. Proposals for research of classified subjects cannot be considered for research grants. As a general rule, records before 1955 are largely unclassified, while many later records remain classified. Examples of classified subjects include nuclear weapons and war planning, weapon systems now in the Air Force inventory, and Air Force operations during the Vietnam War.

Application Deadline.--Applicants can request an application from the Commander, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6678. They must return the completed applications by 31 December 1989.
An Editorial Enquiry (World War II in the Pacific)

Professor Richard L. Blanco of the Department of History at the State University of New York College at Brockport, Brockport, NY 14420 (716 395-2377), an ACHSWW member, writes that he is the editor of a series of encyclopedias entitled "Wars of the United States," to be printed by Garland Publishing, Inc., of New York. Having arranged for contracts to be issued to editors for several volumes, including World War II: Europe, he is now seeking an editor with expertise on World War II in the Pacific. The planned volume is to be about 850-900 pages in length and to include some 800 entries about the war against Japan. Anyone interested in this project should contact Prof. Blanco directly.

A Search for War Art from Holland

A request has been received from the national museum of the Netherlands for assistance in the preparation of a special exhibit on World War II. On 4 April 1989, J. Baruch, Assistant Keeper, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, wrote to the ACHSWW: "The Dutch History department of the Rijksmuseum organises every year an exhibition about Holland and the Second World War. The exhibition for 1990 will be about war art. The exhibition will deal with the theme of what is called 'war art' or in Germany 'Kunst der Front.' The Allied governments and some governments in exile, like the Dutch government in London, as well as the Nazi government, appointed painters to record the war on the spot, in as many aspects as possible. Sometimes private institutions and magazines did the same. Notwithstanding the advanced techniques in film and photography, an old tradition was purposefully continued: besides news value, war art possessed propaganda value."

"The exhibition," the letter continues, "will pay special attention to this aspect of propaganda, together with the question if and how strongly the war art was subject to censorship, once it came to exhibition or publication . . . . "What we are looking for is drawings, paintings, etc., made in Holland by official and non-official war artists. . . . ."

References have been found to the work of a Combat Artists Corps attached to the U.S. Navy, though they may well never have been anywhere near Holland, to war artists with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who may have been in Holland, and to a collection of drawings made by artists who worked for Life magazine. This last collection, if it could be located, might include some war art from Holland. If anyone has information on war art made in Holland, or has access to such works, it would be very much appreciated if photocopies or photographs, together with information about the artist, could be sent to J. Baruch, Assistant Keeper, at the Rijksmuseum, Postbus 50673, 1007 DD Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
The Journal of Military History

Beginning in January 1989, the journal of the American Military Institute is being published by the Virginia Military Institute and the George C. Marshall Foundation under the title of The Journal of Military History, with Prof. Henry S. Bausum of Virginia Military Institute as editor. This journal is a continuation of Military Affairs, which was edited through 1988 by Prof. Robin Higham of Kansas State University, the Archivist of the ACHSWW and a member of our board; in recognition of his service to the American Military Institute, he has been named Editor Emeritus.

Annual membership in the American Military Institute, which includes a subscription to The Journal of Military History, costs $25.00; institutional subscriptions are $30.00. Those interested in reviewing for The Journal of Military History may request a reviewer's interest sheet from the office of the editor at the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, where a new roster of reviewers is being assembled.

The January 1989 issue of The Journal of Military History (identified as Vol. 53, No. 1) carries several contributions pertaining to the Second World War, including articles on the Army Medical Department and Pearl Harbor, and on P.O.W. survival in the Far East. Continuing the bibliographical coverage long provided by Military Affairs, it also includes a ten-page bibliography of recent journal articles in military history by Dr. Alan C. Aimone of the library of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

ARCHIVAL RESOURCES

U.S. National Archives Accessions and Openings

In the Civil Reference Branch, the following State Department "Lot Files" (Record Group 59), are now open for research: Spanish and Portuguese Desk Officers' Files, 1942-58 (approximately four cubic feet); and records of the Legal Advisor Relating to War Crimes, 1942-46 (approximately three cubic feet).

In Record Group 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupational Headquarters, World War II, one cubic foot of records of the Allied Control Commision, Italy, 1943-47 has been declassified and is now open for research.

In the National Archives Gift Collection (Record Group 200), the personal papers of General Richard K. Sutherland, 1942-45, have been declassified. Gen. Sutherland served as Chief of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur. The size of the collection is not indicated.
In the Military Reference Branch, 910 cubic feet of records of U.S. Army Commands (Record Group 338) that have recently been declassified are available for research, including 343 cubic feet of Army Corps records, 1941-47, and 491 cubic feet of records of U.S. Army Commands, including unit histories.

The Civil Reference Branch (202 523-3238) has announced the accession and availability for research of 217 cubic feet of records, ca. 1940-53, of the War Assets Administration (WAA) (Record Group 270), including chronological and subject files of the Office of the Administrator, WAA historical files, Advisory Council subject files, General Board action files and transcripts of proceedings, Real Property Review Board files, and subject files of the Office of Real Property.

The Motion Picture Sound & Video Branch has announced the accession from the CIA of 406 reels of motion picture film produced or acquired by the OSS during World War II. The films relate to such subjects as the assessment of Axis industrial, mineral, and agricultural resources; sociological portraits of the Japanese people; use of military equipment and explosives; and methods of sabotage and training of OSS agents and commando units.

The Still Picture Branch has recently opened to researchers the Marine Corps Photographic Reference File, ca. 1940-58 (Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 127), a selection of 3,000 items chosen from the main USMC photographic files not yet available for research. The reference file represents selected views related to general USMC activities, World War II, and the Korean War, with coverage of combat, equipment, medical activities, prisoners, recreation, etc.

The Herbert Hoover Library, Parkside Drive, P.O. Box 488, West Branch, Iowa 52358 (319 643-5301) has recently opened the Papers of Frank Mason (six cubic feet). Mason served as an aide to Hoover; he accompanied him on his 1946 survey of the world food supply situation. His papers contain correspondence with Hoover regarding Allied occupation policies in Germany and his efforts to collect materials for the Hoover Institution at Stanford.

The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 259 Albany Post Road, Hyde Park, New York 12538 (914 229-8835), has recently accessioned and made available to researchers the Papers of Joseph P. Lash (three cubic feet), including material relating to his writings and to the Spanish Civil War, as well as drafts of an unpublished autobiography.

In the Legislative Reference Branch (202 523-4185), five cubic feet of the Amerasia Papers Collection (Records of the U.S. Senate, Record Group 46) have been declassified and are open.
The work of preparing finding aids for the OSS records accessioned from the CIA by the National Archives is being done by a team of volunteers led by a member of the professional staff, Dr. Lawrence H. McDonald. Appended to this newsletter is a facsimile copy of a ten-page document found in the files of the Washington office of the OSS Director (Folder 355, Box 573, Entry E-190), a memorandum on "Anglo-American Cooperation in East Asia" by John P. Davies, Jr., a Foreign Service Officer then on the staff of Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the U.S. commander in China. In the U.S. State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States: China, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), there is a page-and-a-half memorandum by Davies, "The China and South East Asian Theaters: Some Political Considerations" (pp. 188-89), with an editorial footnote that an unsigned, undated copy had been transmitted by the Chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division to the Secretary of State at the end of December 1943 and that Davies was in Cairo with Stilwell in November. The appended memorandum evidently was prepared on the eve of the Cairo conference, at which Churchill and Roosevelt, accompanied by the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, met with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Gen. Stilwell, who was serving as the generalissimo's chief of staff.

Another impression of the scope of the OSS records, and their wealth of detail on the human dimension of the war, has kindly been provided by one of the ten volunteers preparing descriptive lists of the nearly 3,000 cubic feet of material recently accessioned from the CIA.

Stories from the OSS Records at the National Archives

by

William H. Hassler
National Archives Volunteer

The object of an OSS mission on 15 Dec 1944 in the vicinity of Insmingen close to the Mitterwald forest was to report on enemy intentions, defenses, and dispositions. Knowing that the Germans would very likely allow people bringing food supplies with them to pass through their lines, the OSS decided to send two agents in the disguise of shepherders guiding a flock of sheep. With the help of a native of Lorraine, forty-five sheep and a dog were procured and followed in a jeep by two other OSS officers on the trip to the American outposts at the edge of the forest. Rains had recently inundated the region and the agents had terrific difficulties getting their flock of sheep under control. They practically had to carry
them over some of the swollen brooks and nurse them across bridges. Unfortunately, the entourage was spotted by enemy observers and a decision was made to cancel the operation. The OSS report on this mission concludes: "They presented quite a sight when they returned to Metz--an American Lt. chauffeur, two wet, bedraggled sheepherders, and a large sheep all squeezed into one jeep. The sheep was presented to the men by the owner as a small reward for their efforts."

Discovering accounts of OSS activities like the one above is rewarding for the ten volunteers at the National Archives who are writing descriptive lists of OSS records. The lists simplify the job of researchers wanting to use the millions of pages of records now available. During the two years I have worked on this project with Archivist Larry McDonald, I have examined hundreds of boxes of OSS records and prepared descriptive lists for the following files:

- Entry 125 - Field Files: Bern, Stockholm and Caserta
- Entry 158 - OSS Seventh Army Records
- Entry 160 - OSS New York Secret Intelligence Branch

Currently I am working in records of the OSS London Secret Intelligence Branch, part of the 742 boxes comprising Entry 190 - Director's Office and Field Station Records. These particular files contain numerous accounts of OSS projects as well as providing glimpses into the daily activities of the various London offices, including Lt. William J. Casey's arrival in London and his subsequent involvement in OSS actions.

Sometimes the "unexpected" is discovered in what are often routine files. For example, several folders in Entry 190 contain daily journals of an OSS detachment with the Ninth Army in France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany from late 1944 through the end of the war in Europe in 1945. Along with formal, routine daily summaries of the detachment's activities prepared for forwarding to higher headquarters, and copies of incoming and outgoing radio messages, one individual often wrote a very informal account of his observations of the daily routine.

The journals begin with the formation of the detachment on 25 August 1944 and describe its movement from Southampton across the channel to a landing at Utah Beach. By 6 September the detachment had reached a bivouac area near Liffre and "set up tents in rain, entire detachment taking hands." Most of these early journals are handwritten, as are some of the later ones, but the majority are typewritten. Although there are copies of orders listing assigned personnel, I have been unable to pinpoint the specific individual who wrote the journal. The journals contain detailed accounts of OSS recruitment and training of agents, movement of OSS personnel, relaying of intelligence, etc. Here are descriptions of some of these activities:

"5 March. Early in the evening, Lt. Col. Clement and Maj. Jenssen, CIB, . . . roared in with a report that two alleged British agents were being held at the Schoesberg Civilian
Interrogation Center after coming into the American lines after carrying out a mission in Germany. The CO of the detachment immediately went to Heerlen, where he contacted Flt. Lt. Dunipace, 2IV, and acquainted him with the situation, whereupon they both took off to look over these two jokers. Both of these agents, after a careful preliminary interrogation, turned out to be London-trained agents (German nationality), one a W/T and the other an observer. They had been parachuted into Germany at a point about 10 mi. from Siegen on 2 January at 0300. Upon landing they found themselves about 25 yards from a large building and were immediately fired upon and had to abandon all equipment in a mad scramble to escape. From that time till the night of 3-4 March they had made their leisurely way, by bicycle, to Duisburg, stopping at the homes of friends and relatives. The black market was patronized for food, costing them 6000 R.M. for the two-month period. During the entire journey there was only one control. For papers they carried Army medical discharges, driver's permits, identification cards, and replacement identification cards (all London-made). Under cover of night, fog, and a large eastbound convoy, they crossed the Rhine via the Duisburg bridge on the night of 3-4 March about 2400. Capt. Puffert, CO, CIC, released the two men (Barth and Schumacher) to the CO of the OSS Det., who in turn gave them into the custody of Flt. Lt. Dunipace, who immediately rushed them to Brussels for an intensive interrogation.

"22 March. Big news of the day and something that justified our existence for once. Contacted Godfrey ... at 2200 and he had a scoop! He had located elements (15-20 tanks, trucks, supplies) of the elusive 116 Pz Div among other choice items. We rushed the info to G2. . . ."

In another series of files (Entry 125 - Bern, Stockholm and Caserta Field Files), I discovered a report that told about a remarkable young woman who was seeking readmission to the United States in 1945. In June of that year, Aune Irene Janhonen, a 25-year-old native-born American of Finnish descent, was a refugee in Sweden, where she was applying for registration as an American citizen and for a passport to return to the U.S. Irene was born in Detroit, Michigan. When she was 12 in 1932, she accompanied her parents to Russia together with a group of several hundred people recruited by the Karelia Aid Association in the U.S. to help build up the remote and backward Karelia section of Russia, near Finland. She attended Karelian schools until 1938 when she obtained a Russian passport to aid in finding employment. She worked as a secretary and translator for the People's Commissariat of Trade until evacuated in 1941 to central Russia, due to the invasion of Russia by Finnish troops. Shortly after the family's return to Karelia a year later, her parents died.

Irene was recruited as a translator for the Russian Army but was sent to a "spy school" near Moscow and given training in radio operation and espionage techniques. She was para-
chuted into Finland in September 1943 with instructions to report information concerning Finnish airfields, factories, warehouses, military strength, etc. However, she immediately surrendered to Finnish authorities, who used her for six months as a double agent, transmitting false information to Russia. She remained in Finland working for an army radio battalion until the armistice between Finland and Russia. In November 1944 she fled to Sweden and was accepted as a political refugee.

After receiving the necessary documents, she came to the U.S. in June 1946 with plans to return to the Detroit area.

And, finally, who cannot sympathize with the plight of an OSS officer in Germany after the war ended. This thirsty individual apparently thought he was being overlooked, so on 30 July 1945 he wrote to the American Embassy in London and asked to be put on the list of those entitled to receive a case of Coca-Cola every week. His letter has become part of the OSS records at the National Archives.

[Newsletter Editor's Note.—Appended to this newsletter, following the November 1943 memorandum on Anglo-American Cooperation in East Asia, are the cover sheet and the table of contents for Entry 125 – Bern, Stockholm and Caserta Field Files, together with three pages of folder descriptions:

Page 16, with Folder 254 (Box 16) on "Operation Quartz," a plan to mix explosives with Swedish ore being sent to Germany, so as to destroy German blast furnaces;

Page 24, with Folder 392 (Box 28), regarding the case of Aune Irene Janhonen, as reported above by Mr. Hassler; and

Page 40, with Folder 644 (Box 54), including reports on Italian partisans, and Folder 655 (Box 55), including material on relations between the Italian Communist Party and the USSR.]

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES by Donald S. Detwiler


Ms. Byrd, who presented a paper on Chennault at the joint session of the ACHSWW with the AHA at the annual meeting in December 1988 in Cincinnati, has provided a sympathetic but by no means uncritical account of Chennault's career. An officer in the Army Air Corps for twenty years, he retired in 1937 and went to China. During the first years of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, he served as a military aviation advisor to the Chinese government and, in 1940-41, played a leading role in the establishment of the American Volunteer
Group, the "Flying Tigers," which, as Ms. Byrd observes, represented "the first U.S. experiment with a clandestine air force" (p. 106). On being recalled to active duty in 1942, he commanded combined Sino-American air operations and played a controversial role, carefully recounted and evaluated by Ms. Byrd, in the politics and strategy of the China Theater. Returning to China after the war, he established Civil Air Transport, or CAT, a private air freight company, which flew military transport missions during the Chinese Civil War. In 1950, CAT was secretly purchased by the Central Intelligence Agency. As chairman of the board, Chennault remained associated with CAT, but by the mid-1950s was no longer actively involved. He died in 1957.

Ms. Byrd's readable, extensively annotated biography of Chennault is a welcome contribution to the history of the Second World War, and particularly of Sino-American relations and the role of airpower in Asia during the war.


Readers of Ms. Byrd's biography of Chennault, which focuses on the Sino-Japanese War and World War II, will find here more detailed treatment of his airline through the mid-1950s.


This well-written study of Sino-German relations from 1928 to 1941 examines political and economic ties between the two countries, as well as the military connection established by Colonel Max Bauer in the late 1920s and continued by Gen. Hans von Seeckt, who visited China in 1933 and 1934, and Gen. Alexander von Falkenhausen, who returned to Germany in 1938. When Hitler discontinued trade relations with the Soviet Union after coming to power in 1933, China represented for Germany a potentially vital source for raw materials and possibly also a significant market for German goods. Kirby's treatment of Germany's role in China's financial, industrial, and military development during the years before Hitler opted for Japan against China, is based on research in German- and Chinese-language sources in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the United States, as well as interviews with Chinese and German sources. The final chapter, "Aftermath, 1938-1941," traces the unravelling of Sino-German ties from February 1938, when Joachim von Ribbentrop became German Foreign Minister and Berlin recognized the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, to the Chinese declaration of war against Germany in December 1941. Kirby's work is a contribution not only to the history of modern China and Sino-German relations, but to the background of the Second World War in Asia and the history of the Axis.

In his introduction, Prof. Eastman of the University of Illinois defines the question addressed in this study in the following terms: "What were the reasons for . . . [the] abrupt reversal of political fortunes [of the Chinese Nationalist regime] between 1937 and 1949? Was it the strains of the anti-Japanese war that had made the Nationalist regime susceptible to revolutionary overthrow? Or was it, as Kuomintang partisans have long contended, that the United States Government betrayed the Nationalists by withholding support and material aid at critical junctures of the civil war with the Communists? Or did the flaws that were evident in the Nationalist regime before 1937 somehow render it vulnerable to Communist insurgency in the later 1940's?" (p. 3)

Eastman seeks answers to these questions in the case studies comprising this volume, dealing with the problem of regionalism as reflected in the relationship between Yunnan and the central government in Chungking; with peasants and taxes during the Sino-Japanese War and, in a separate chapter, after the war; with the Youth Corps and the Ko-hsin Movement, reflecting politics within the regime; with the Nationalist Army during the Sino-Japanese War and, in the subsequent chapter, during the Civil War; and with the gold yuan reform of August 1947. In the final chapter, "Who Lost China: Chiang Kai-shek Testifies," Eastman examines the writings of Chiang himself, demonstrating that, in the generalissimo's own view, "the causes of . . . defeat lay within the Nationalist regime itself, which he [Chiang] believed had become during the civil war period not just corrupt and inefficient, but virtually moribund" (p. 212). But even earlier, during the Second World War, "lack of honest, technologically competent, loyal subordinates was his [Chiang's] worst problem," according to Chennault, as cited by Eastman (p. 213).

Historians of the Second World War will find particularly useful chapter 6, "The Nationalist Army During the War of Resistance" (pp. 130-157, with endnotes, many of them explanatory, on pp. 254-261). The traditional Wade-Giles system of transliteration of Chinese names and terms is used, and a Chinese character list (pp. 299-306) precedes the index.


In this lucid study, which concludes with a concise bibliographical essay, the author of *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981) traces the course of Japanese policy from the breakdown of the Washington Conference system (the Far
Eastern equivalent of the Versailles system, as reaffirmed at
Locarno) to Pearl Harbor, explaining the interaction of devel-
opments in Europe and Asia, and how distant and relatively lo-
calized wars merged in the world conflagration. Iriye is par-
ticularly effective in elucidating the escalation and merger of
conflicts in Asia and the Pacific and their interaction with
events in Europe and America. Because the United States was
engaged in a global war from the time of the Japanese attack
and Hitler's declaration of war in early December 1941, it is
easy for Americans to forget that World War II did not begin
as a single, global conflict. Prof. Iriye's contribution to
the "Origins of Modern Wars" series explains how the Sino-
Japanese War of 1937-1945 began, how the Pacific War of 1941-
1945 began, and how the two were related to each other and to
the war that began in Europe in 1939.

P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe,
Origins of Modern Wars, Harry Hearder, general editor (London
Published in the same series as the volume on the War in
Asia and the Pacific considered above, Prof. Bell's work re-
views various explanations for the origins of World War II in
Europe, analyses the underlying ideological, economic, milita-
ry, and diplomatic factors that contributed to the coming of
the war, and recounts the course of events from 1932, when Eu-
rope was at peace, to June 1941, when Hitler, by his invasion
of the Soviet Union, began the transformation of his European
war into a world war--a transformation completed by his declar-
ation of war on the United States in December of the same year.
Prof. Bell's well-structured study represents a significant
contribution, both for its balanced review of previous works
in the field and for his concise narrative of the "coming of
the war, 1932-1941."

Gerhard L. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes
of World War II, Tauber Institute Series, No. 1 (Hanover and
pp. bibliog. index.
The six chapters in this compact volume, which is avail-
able as an inexpensive paperback, provide valuable insight into
the history of the war. The opening chapters, "World War II:
provide in some fifty pages an overview of the course of the war
and the relationship between the European and Asian theaters.
The next two chapters deal with Hitler and the United States,
chapter 4 presenting a new look at Hitler's declaration of war
on America. Chapter 5 is on "German Colonial Plans and Policies,
1938-1942," and chapter 6 on "July 20, 1944: The Plot to Kill
Hitler." The concluding bibliographical essay stresses works
in English, but also notes standard works in other languages.

Published as a sequel to Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. by Edward Mead Earle, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943, xi & 553 pp.), this new volume (printed simultaneously in cloth and paper) includes essays by Henry Guerlac on Vauban, R. R. Palmer on Frederick the Great, Guibert, and Bülow, and Edward Mead Earle on Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List as they appeared in 1943, without significant change; essays by Felix Gilbert on Machiavelli and Sigmund Neumann on Engels and Marx in rewritten form; and essays by Gordon A. Craig on Delbrück and by Hajo Holborn on the Prusso-German School in revised form. The other twenty-two essays in the 1986 volume are new.


The "Bibliographical Notes" (pp. 877-932) represent the equivalent of a well-informed, up-to-date bibliographical essay on modern military history, with sophisticated consideration of related aspects of political and intellectual history as well.


This large, encyclopedia-format, double-column volume presents a full-length account of the life and times of the conservative, Catholic aristocrat who was one of the last chancellors of the Weimar Republic, complementing von Papen's autobiographical memoirs, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1952). Considering Hitler's accession to power inevitable, he supported him at the beginning of his regime as vice-chancellor and subsequently as ambassador to Austria on the eve of its annexation and as ambassador to Turkey during the war. Acquitted of major war crimes by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg but shunned in postwar
Germany as an accomplice if not partner of Hitler, Papen found, in the last years of his long life (1879-1969), a biographer to write this candidly sympathetic, copiously documented work. It is not a definitive, objective study of Papen, but, as pointed out by Prof. George O. Kent of the University of Maryland in a very critical review essay, "Problems and Pitfalls of a Papen Biography," Central European History, Vol. XX, No. 2 (June 1987), "for all practical purposes, an official biography" (p. 194, n. 2).

Notwithstanding the flaws identified by Prof. Kent, the biography of Papen by Professor and Mrs. Adams is a valuable contribution to the understanding not only of Papen's career, but the social and political milieu in which he lived. In many ways, he was one of the most representative Germans of his time. This biography can be helpful in understanding the cast of mind--so different from the Anglo-American--of many patriotic, conservative Germans who, each in his own way, were hardly less involved in the activities of the Hitler regime than Papen, and who, after its fall, emerged as impenitent and with as strong a sense of personal integrity as did he.


In his article (with 151 backnotes, pp. 256-260), Prof. Deutsch re-examines, on the basis of recently declassified information, the military performance of several commanders in the European Theater of Operations: four Britons, Wavell, Auchinleck, Montgomery, and Alexander; four Americans, Eisenhower, Clark, Bradley, and Patton; and one German, Rommel.

In his conclusion, he notes that Patton and Rommel were "the two top practitioners of the creative use of intelligence dealt with in this study" (p. 255). He notes also that there were "sharp contrasts in relations between commanders and their intelligence departments. Bradley, for example, was rather ill-served because he was not too deeply concerned with matters of intelligence. Patton, in contrast to this, made large demands upon his intelligence people to their great inspiration and feeling of self-worth. . . . They became as eager to perceive the offensive angles of a situation as he was. In contrast the G-2s and intelligence staffs of the other armies were usually inclined to be defense-minded" (p. 255).

Regarding the use of Ultra, Prof. Deutsch reached the conclusion "that it was rather under-used. Except for Montgomery, none of the commanders had really been intimate with the medium until after the invasion. Only Eisenhower and Patton were full converts in the West; the latter not until the time of Mortain. Bradley used it somewhat gingerly; Monty's attitude was stand-offish" (p. 256).
ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA

We will be able to save ourselves a good deal of trouble and misunderstanding if at the outset of our participation in and contact with the South East Asia Command we clearly distinguish where American and British interests lie.

In so far as the British are fighting the Japanese enemy and seeking to punish aggression, we are united with them. But we are not to the same extent united with the British in their attempt to regain their colonial empire — unless American foreign policy and public sentiment have undergone a revolutionary change yet unannounced in these distant parts.

There still exist at home highly vocal and influential publishers and men in public life who will be ready to brand our collaboration with the British in Burma, Malaya, Indochina and Sumatra as snatching British, French and Dutch colonial chestnuts out of the Japanese fire. The question will be asked, "Why should American boys die to repossess colonies for the British and their French and Dutch satellites?"
For us to distinguish in this theater the precise limits of our national interests is one of the most difficult tasks confronting us. The repossession of the British Empire in Asia is merged with the war against Japan. Military and political strategy are so intermingled that the distinction between the two is easily blurred. When the British and we fight our way into Burma, we shall be not only prosecuting the war against the common enemy but also recapturing a portion of Britain's Empire. Until we are able to distinguish just how far we should involve ourselves in the plans and actions of our allies, we shall be running the risk of finding ourselves -- because of a laudable zeal to get things done -- in a dangerously false position.

As serving to clarify this confusing situation, it may be useful first to put ourselves in the British position, estimating their position in East Asia as they see it.

The British are confronted with two major tasks in East Asia. One is the reoccupation of their Southeast Asian Empire. The other is the defeat of Japan.

The British Government realizes that because of Pearl Harbor and Bataan, the United States feels committed to the defeat of Japan. As the British Government has been able to depend upon the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of the war against Germany, so it may depend upon us to bear the brunt of the war against Japan.
That being the case, the British Government is not so impulsive as to place the defeat of Japan -- no inexpensive project -- as the principal task before it.

The reacquisition and perhaps expansion of the Empire is an essential undertaking if Britain is to be fully restored to the position of a first class power. Therefore reconquest of Empire is the paramount task in British eyes. The raising of the Union Jack over Singapore is more important to the British than any victory parade through Tokyo.

This British evaluation is revealed by their remarkably deliberate time-table, their unwillingness to employ against the enemy resources which for some time have been at their command, their military inaction, present and past, rationalized by the invocation of Acts of God, and the route which they wish to follow in assuming the offensive. This interpretation does not impute heroic qualities to the British Government; it does imply that it has lost none of its political acumen.

Matters would, of course, be very much more clear cut for the British if they could confine themselves to the task of taking back the Empire and delegate to us the enterprise of defeating the enemy outside of the precincts
of British Colonies. London and New Delhi, however, must take into consideration in their planning the complicating facts that (1) the United States, in pursuit of victory over Japan, is and will be operating from British Empire bases into other parts of the Empire held by the enemy, and (2) the British Government is committed to action against the enemy beyond Singapore and Hong Kong.

Decision with regard to the latter can be deferred until the issue arises months or years hence. American presence in India and plans for joint action against Japan in Burma and Malaya at the earliest possible moment are, however, an immediate problem.

The British openly admit that they are embarrassed by our presence in India and our plans for going into Burma and Malaya. The presence and therefore display of American military strength in British colonies embarrasses them because, invidiously, British Prestige thereby suffers. And the British Empire, British officials in India are frank to admit, is based to a very considerable extent on a facade of prestige.

The British are further embarrassed by our attitude on the colonial question. Obvious American disinclination to engage in colonial expansion, the American record of championing Asiatic states threatened by aggression and repeated American pronouncements extolling the virtues and benefits of liberty and self-determination have in the past given the United States a good reputation in Asia. Our
standing remains relatively high among Asiatics despite
the growing belief in China and India that we are now
acquiescing in British colonial ambitions. While feeling
some appreciation for our present silence on the colonial
question, the British are, nevertheless, still acutely
apprehensive lest there occur some ingenuous American
outburst on the subject of liberty for colonial peoples
which might come to Asiatic ears.

Similarly, the British are uneasy over the presence
in this theater of American civil affairs officers. Obvi­
sously, the British are not anxious for American civil ad­
ministration of any part of their Empire, however
transient. Yet they cannot with good grace say, "Give
us fighting men and materiel but keep your Army's civil
administrators at home." The British must therefore find
a way of neutralizing the normal course of American par­
ticipation in this particular military function.

American impatience to assume the offensive in Burma
is vexatious to the British. This is due primarily to
their realization that American plans call for the use
of Chinese troops. The British are frankly afraid that
the Chinese will retain or claim any section of Burma
which they recapture. Political considerations dictate,
therefore, that the reoccupation of Burma should ideally
be accomplished only by Empire forces in the wake of a Japanese withdrawal caused by an outflanking of Burma. The British consequently regard our insistence on prompt offensive action against Burma as scarcely better than bedevilment. But, again, because they must play the host to us and have need of what we ungrudgingly give them, they feel that they must find ways to dissuade us and the Chinese from going into Burma other than resorting to a blunt refusal.

China's potentialities in the post-war world cause the present British Government some anxiety. It recognizes that if China emerges from this war strong and unified, China will (1) endanger, as a focus of nationalist infection, Britain's Asiatic Empire; (2) attempt, paradoxically perhaps, imperialistic expansion of its own; and, (3) threaten British claims to Hongkong.

Our commitment to the creation of a strong, unified, independent China can therefore hardly be viewed by the British Government with gratification. If successful, our aid to China program will help to create what British imperialists fear. And yet, in view of the sentimental enthusiasm for China in Britain as well as in the United States, the British Government dare not openly oppose our help to China.
It is evident from all of the foregoing, then, that the British Government and the Government of India find themselves in an awkward position with regard to their American guests in India. We embarrass them by our very presence, for the fact that it is necessary for us to be here reflects on British prestige. Our good reputation among Asiatics and our attitude toward the colonial question embarrass them. They are nervous lest we attempt independent civil administration in reoccupied British colonies. Our endeavor to make them join us in a Burma offensive disturbs and irritates them. Finally, they find themselves in opposition to our determination to make China a major power.

Yet they have to bear with us. Because they need our men and material -- and our lend-lease -- they cannot afford to put us out of India, as they would like to do.

The least unsatisfactory escape from their dilemma would seem to be: accept us (for they have no alternative), consolidate us with themselves for "efficient" cooperation and then, by dominating the integrated partnership, bring us into line with their policy and action.

So there is established the South East Asia Command, in which we, and, so far as it can be arranged, the Chinese are to cooperate with the British under a British Supreme Commander. And the Supreme Commander in person of Lord Louis Mountbatten combines all of the qualities calculated
to appeal most to Americans -- forthrightness, vigor and
glamour. But, alas, we shall never know what confidential
orders His Lordship carries from Mr. Churchill designed to
inhibit his natural vigor, unless events, perchance, continue
to suggest them. Meanwhile, Admiral Mountbatten's
British subordinates and Government of India officials em-
phasize their desire to integrate personnel as well as
effort, not only in military affairs but also in matters
which have far-reaching political implications.

The foregoing is an appreciation of the British posi-
tion. What, then, of the American position?

Our mission is (1) to increase the combat effective-
ness of Chinese forces in the war against Japan and (2)
to defeat Japan. In so far as British plans and efforts
contribute to these two ends we will and must give them
full and willing cooperation.

By the same logic, we are in duty bound to oppose
policies likely to retard or frustrate the accomplishment
of our mission.

The resurrection of Britain's Empire in Asia may be
said to lie outside the scope of our mission.

Our position, however, is not so clear-cut in fact as it
is in principle. In seeking to carry out our mission to
defeat Japan we shall, as has been noted, invade territories
over which Britain claims colonial domination. Thereby
collaterally we become involved in an enterprise outside
has ominous implications for the future.

Our participation in Britain's campaign to recreate its Empire likewise places us in a false position with regard to the American public. It is obvious that more than any other American force we are vulnerable to criticism, even if unwarranted, as being dupes of British imperialism.

It is evident, then, from what has been said, that the Anglo-American partnership not only embarrasses the British, but also threatens to discomfit and compromise us. However, we are scarcely more able than the British to extricate ourselves from it. To accomplish our mission, we have as much need of the British as they have of us. The partnership cannot be dissolved.

But this does not mean that we should resign ourselves unreservedly to being compromised. We are still able to exercise a considerable degree of control over our course. For example, so long as we retain OWI as an independent American mouthpiece of psychological warfare we can attempt to rationalize our policy to East Asia on our own terms -- yet without offending the British. We can hope thereby to mitigate such hostility to us as will develop among colonial peoples and can perhaps even win a larger degree of cooperation than might otherwise be forthcoming. This can be accomplished only if our psychological warfare program preserves a purely American identity.
With regard to another field, civil administration, we can still guide our destiny somewhat. The British have already made it clear that they have no intention of permitting us to exercise independent civil administrative functions in northern Burma. The same restriction will doubtless be true of other colonial areas. They will, however, be glad to accept our civil administration officers in staff positions or possibly in the field, providing they are under close British control. They will do this because, so long as we are associated, it is to their advantage to place us in a position where Americans cannot formulate policy but where we will be identified with their policy and where they can capitalize on our good reputation in Asia.

We can guide our destiny with regard to civil administration only if we remain completely aloof from it. Participation in civil administration in colonial Asia will place us in a false and compromising position. Unless, of course, the American and British Governments are prepared to implement in Asia Articles II and III of the Atlantic Charter.

By John Davies
BERN, STOCKHOLM AND CASERTA FIELD FILES

Bern/Stockholm/Caserta Field Files. This series of field files includes intelligence reports, counterintelligence personality studies, and general correspondence. Covers period 1942-1945. Arranged numerically by subject and thereunder chronologically. Volume is 24 cu. ft. (CIA Job No. 76-755).

... quoted directly from the SF-115

These field files contain agent intelligence reports, including partisan activities and operations, counterintelligence personality studies, general memorandums and correspondence, maps, and some photos covering OSS activities in Switzerland, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Balkans. They primarily cover the period 1944-45 although there are some earlier documents. Arranged by subject and within folders, chronologically.

... Descriptive list compiled by
William H. Hassler, 10 Feb 1988
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