AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

NEWSLETTER

Number 26   Fall 1981

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Attachments (following page 113)
Information and Membership Form
Special Fund Contribution Form
1981 Committee Election Ballot
MEMBERSHIP, DUES, AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Membership is open to anyone interested in the era of the Second World War. Annual dues, payable at the beginning of January for the calendar year, are $10.00 for individual or institutional members and $2.00 for currently enrolled students. There is no surcharge for foreign members or U.S. members with foreign addresses, but it is requested that dues be remitted in U.S. dollars if possible. Those wishing to join or to renew their membership are invited to fill out the lower part of the information and membership form (the first of three unnumbered pages at the end of this newsletter) and to return it with the appropriate remittance. Please give your name, address, and statement of interest as you would like to have it appear in the membership directory to be compiled this winter (noting if you wish to have the newsletter sent to a different address from the one listed in the directory).

With inflation increasing committee expenses and contributing to the curtailment of university support, prompt membership renewal in January is requested. Moreover, any supplemental support will be very much appreciated. As noted on the second unnumbered page at the end of the newsletter, a special account has been set up at the Southern Illinois University Foundation for this purpose. The cumulative issue of the newsletter (Spring 1981, No. 25) could not have been produced without virtually exhausting the ACHSWW Special Fund, nor could the expenses of the committee chairman's participation in planning meetings of the International Committee--of which he is vice-president--and also the International Commission on Military History have been reimbursed without subsequent contributions. Contributions to the fund can be made by check, sent, as explained on the form, directly to the SIU Foundation, or enclosed with membership dues, to be forwarded to the foundation by campus mail. Those preferring to write only one check may add a contribution to their dues; anything over ten dollars will be used by the secretary to purchase (at no charge) a bank money order, made out as a contribution to the foundation by the donor, to whom the copy will be returned as a receipt. The SIU Foundation, which levies no charge for administering this fund, keeps down its expenses in connection with it by providing receipts only to those who specifically request them for their records. There are places on the attached form to indicate by check mark that an individual receipt or that information on the SIU Foundation should be sent to the contributor or, for that matter, to someone considering a contribution.
COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

The three-year terms of nine of the directors and of the committee's two officers end on 31 December 1981. Following established practice, the directors, acting as a nominating committee, have selected a slate of incumbents and new candidates. These nominations are recorded on the ballot attached as the final unnumbered page at the end of this newsletter. Committee members are requested to follow the instructions for voting on the ballot, and to return the ballot to the secretary at their earliest convenience. To ensure maximum participation despite delays, the ballots will not be tallied until February.

THE 1981 ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the ACHSWW is being held this year, as in the past, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. The 1981 meeting place is Los Angeles, California. The Business Meeting is scheduled for Monday, 28 December, from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m. in Santa Barbara A of the Los Angeles Bonaventure Hotel at Fifth and Figueroa. As announced in the AHA program, the joint session will be held in the Emerald Bay Room of the same hotel on Wednesday morning, 30 December, from 9:30 to 11:30:

104. AMERICAN COMMANDERS AND THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Bonaventure, Emerald Bay Room
Joint Session with the American Military Institute and the American Committee on the History of the Second World War
CHAIR: Carl Boyd, Old Dominion University

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and His Use of Intelligence in the Pacific Theater
E. B. Potter, United States Naval Academy

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Intelligence, and the War Against Japan
Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., United States Army Center of Military History

COMMENT: Harold C. Deutsch, United States Army War College
REPORTS ON THE AUGUST 1981 INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS

The following reports from the Secretariat General of the International Committee on the History of the Second World War were received on the meeting of the International Committee on 12 August 1980, and on the meeting of the International Committee for the Historical Sciences on 18 August 1980. (Sent by surface mail, they arrived after the fall 1980 newsletter had gone out, and unfortunately could not be included in the special cumulative spring 1981 issue of the newsletter.)

COMITE INTERNATIONAL D'HISTOIRE
DE LA DEUXIEME GUERRE MONDIALE

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

B-1000 BRUXELLES
Place de Louvain 4, bte 20
Tél. 02/218.45.27

20 October 1980.

STATUTORY MEETING HELD AT BUCAREST ON TUESDAY 12TH AUGUST, 1980

On the occasion of the Fifteenth International Conference on Historical Sciences at Bucarest from 10th to 17th August, 1980, the International Committee for the History of the Second World War held its five-yearly statutory meeting on Tuesday 12th August, 1980, in the room located behind the small hall of the "Palais des Congrès".

The PRESIDENT, Mr. Henri Michel, opens the meeting at 17.55 hrs. At the Bureau the following persons are present: Henri Michel, President, Arthur L. Funk and Pavel A. Jiline, Vice President; Harry Paape, Treasurer, and Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Secretary-General. Committee members present are (in alphabetical order of
country): Ndrek Plasari (Albania), Herbert Steiner (Austria), Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen (Belgium), Hristo Nestoroff (Bulgaria), William Alec B. Douglas (Canada), Jan Liptak (Czechoslovakia), Martti Julkunen (Finland), Henri Michel (France), Andreas Hillgruber (F.R.G.), Wolfgang Schumann (G.D.R.), Elizabeth Barker (Great-Britain), Gyula Juhasz (Hungary), Giorgio Rochat (Italy), Takashi Saito (Japan), Harry Paape (Netherlands), Tadeusz Jedruszczak (Poland), Gheorghe Zaharia (Rumania), Louis-Edouard Roulet (Switzerland), Arthur L. Funk (U.S.A.), Pavel A. Jilovine (U.S.S.R.), Tone Ferenc (Yugoslavia).

Before dealing with the agenda of the General Assembly, the PRESIDENT announces that Mr. Jovan Marjanovic has stepped down from the Committee (for reasons of health), and he requests Mr. Tone Ferenc to pass on to Mr. Marjanovic the Committee's best wishes for his recovery.

1. Treasurer's report

The TREASURER gives an account of the financial development. The assets of the International Committee have increased: from 41,227.12 Dutch florins on 1st August 1975 to 64,350.16 Dutch florins on 31st July 1980. This gratifying development is due to regular receipts of membership fees, increased interest received, and a reduction of the cost of publishing the Bulletin. The PRESIDENT points out that the cost has also diminished since the decision was made to charge, to the national committees, the travelling expenses of Bureau members. Therefore, the cost of the San Francisco conference (15,088.75 Dutch florins) does not cover the expenses incurred by the Bureau, but is related to the contribution made by the International Committee towards the expenses of the reporting members and of the members of the International Committee.

Having thanked the Treasurer, the PRESIDENT consults the Assembly who unanimously pass the accounts kept by the Treasurer during the past five years. Mr. Zaharia and Mr. Vanwelkenhuyzen are appointed auditors of the Treasurer's accounts.

2. Membership development

The PRESIDENT relates the fact that a few memberships have been lost: Indonesia, Ireland, and New Zealand. Other contacts are severed, but should be renewed. Therefore, the PRESIDENT requests the Secretary General and the Treasurer to try to re-establish relations with Australia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. However, among the membership changes there are also a few new candidacies: the PRESIDENT announces those of Cuba, Spain, Tunisia and the Vatican. The Bureau have already been able to examine the applications, and have without any exception pronounced themselves in favour of them. However, the decision rests with the General Assembly. At the end of the debate, the Assembly unanimously votes in favour of admitting Cuba, Spain and Tunisia as members. They unanimously elect (with one abstention, Albania) the Vatican. The PRESIDENT invites the Secretary General to take the necessary steps to ensure that a Spanish member be appointed in order to facilitate continuous contact.
At the President's suggestion, the SECRETARY GENERAL proposes the candidacy of Portugal. The "Academia Portuguesa da Historia" has expressed the wish to become a member of the International Committee. This proposal is unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT recalls his repeatedly expressed hope that in the committee, more room will be offered to members coming from under-represented continents. So far, a Chinese historian, Professor Liu Simu, has been taking part in the work of the Conference, and has presented a paper. He hopes this will be a first step towards Chinese membership. But also in respect of increased affiliation of African countries, a great deal of work remains to be done. The PRESIDENT hopes to establish useful contacts during a conference to be held at Benghasi. He also wishes to develop relations with historians from the Arab world. He invites the Tunisian member, Mr. Béchir Ben-Aissa, to work towards this goal. Finally, he suggests to the Assembly to admit a Moroccan historian, Mr. Ben Djelhoun. This proposal is adopted with unanimity.

3. Secretary General's report

The SECRETARY GENERAL explains the outlook for publishing the Bulletin. He expects to be able to revert to a frequency of two issues per year. The liaison function of the Bulletin is most important. In fact, it is the only link between members during the five years' interval between assemblies. The role of the General Secretariat is limited to collecting the information provided by the national committees. Therefore, the editing is done by the respective national committees. All the general secretariat does is to reproduce and distribute the material it receives. The ideal situation would be a distribution effected by the national committees. So far, this arrangement has materialized with several countries. It should become the rule. A most efficient agreement on this point exists with the American committee which receives a single copy. The Americans reproduce it and send it to all their members along with the Newsletter to which they subscribe. Since the American Newsletter is also of great interest to many members of the International Committee, Mr. FUNK asks whether the general secretariat could reproduce it and send out copies, if only to the national committees of Europe. This proposal is unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

The SECRETARY GENERAL then discusses the colloquia held since the San Francisco Conference of August 1975. There have been sixteen such meetings, under the aegis of the International Committee and organized on a wider or smaller scale by various national committees:

- **France, Paris**, 8th to 10th December 1975, the 4th session of the French-British colloquium, "French-British relations between 1st September 1939 and 10th May 1940".
- **Italy, Florence**, 26th to 28th March 1976: "Italy from Liberation to Republic".
- **France, Paris**, 10th to 12th March 1977, the first session of a French-German colloquium, "France and Germany from 1932 to March 1936".
- **Poland, Warsaw**, 6th to 9th September 1977: "War and culture, 1939 to 1945".
- Bulgaria, Sofia, 27th and 28th May 1978: "Antifascist Resistance in those European countries which were members of the Tripartite Pact, 1939 to 1945".
- Finland, Helsinki, 2nd to 6th June 1978: "The Great Powers and the Nordic countries, 1941 to 1945" and "The organisation of the High Military Command during the Second World War".
- Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, 17th to 21st July 1978: "The Military, economic and diplomatic participation of Brazil in the Second World War".
- Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 26th to 29th September 1978, second session of the French-German colloquium, "France and Germany from March 1936 to September 1939".
- Hungary, Budapest, 2nd to 4th November 1978: "War Propaganda and underground press in South-East Europe during the Second World War, 1941-1945".
- U.S.S.R., Moscow, 11th to 12th September 1979: "The causes of the Second World War".
- Poland, Cracow, 22nd to 24th October 1979: "Universities and scientific Institutions in the sphere of influence of the Axis-powers, 1938-1945".
- Canada, Ottawa, 14th to 16th November 1979: "War as a national experience".
- Romania, Bucharest, 10th to 17th August 1980, on the occasion of the XVth I.C.H.S., "Propaganda during the Second World War: methods, means, results".

In addition, there has been a colloquium at Katowice on which the next Bulletin will report more extensively.

The PRESIDENT recalls that the colloquia take place under the aegis of the International Committee which, however, does not organize them. The organisation is to be done by the national committee of the country where the colloquium is held. Consequently, the invitations are to be sent out by the organizers. All the International Committee can do is to announce the colloquium in its Bulletin.

4. The "Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale"

The PRESIDENT refers to another possibility to make the activities of the International Committee better known: through the "Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale". Now in its thirtieth year, the Revue has, in 119 issues, published 450 articles, 1,200 reviews, and 50,000 book titles (in its three-monthly bibliography). It has now changed its course. The French Committee, which by nature is interdepartmental, having no administrative successor, the "Institut d'Histoire du Temps présent" may be a suitable one. This Institute pursues its own activities, amongst which a place may be found for research on the Second World War. However, the "Revue" follows an independent course, and will be directed by its founder, Henri Michel, also in the future. Its editorial board is headed by Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, member of the Institute; Georges Pedroncini, professor at the Sorbonne, is chief editor, Annie Dechaux and Jean-Marie d'Hoop are editorial secretaries. The "Revue" will appear under the aegis of the "Institut des Relations Internationales" (Duroselle), the "Institut d'Histoire Militaire" (Pedroncini), the three historical services of the French Army, Navy and Air Force and the "Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine" at Nanterre. As a result, the scope of the "Revue" will be extended to include World War I (Pedroncini), the years between the Wars (Duroselle), and World War II (Michel). The "Revue" will continue to be a French publication, of course. However, it will be wide open to the International Committee. In fact, the PRESIDENT intends to publish news of the International Committee in it, for which he relies on the Secretary General. Another plan concerns the publication of critical reviews of the colloquia, announcements of coming colloquia and reports on the activities of research units.
5. Composition of the Bureau during the next five years

The PRESIDENT points out that, as directed by the Articles of Association, the Bureau members are elected for five years. But their mandate may be extended by the Assembly General. On the other hand, there has been established a tradition based on two considerations: one is the urge to preserve continuity to assure that the Committee keeps functioning as it should; on the other hand, the wish to promote renewal. This problem was discussed by the Bureau on 9th August. The members have considered in what way the various "currents" can be represented. In addition, in their debates they try to arrive at proposals reflecting the consensus of those present. This is an established habit based on unwritten law. The conclusions are those conceived between colleagues, and are adopted unanimously. It is important that this practice continues also in the future. Within the Bureau, everyone speaks on a basis of perfect equality. Considering its composition, the Bureau guarantees that harmonious suggestions are made - suggestions likely to facilitate the decision, which is to be taken by the statutory Assembly only.

The PRESIDENT reveals that at a given moment, he considered to withdraw from the coming election by the Assembly. Fortunately, however, his health has been restored. In addition, the French Committee unanimously wish him to continue in office, and a great number of friends have insisted that he pursue his activities for the International Committee also in the future.

In a single sweeping movement, the General Assembly applaud to confirm unanimously that they re-instate Mr. Henri Michel for another five years as President of the International Committee.

The PRESIDENT thanks for the confidence shown in continuing him in office, and resumes his remarks on the balanced formula which the Bureau has elaborated. He proposes to place the whole thing before the Assembly for their approval of its effort-saving aspects. The Bureau considers that it will be good to continue vice presidents General Jiline and Professor Funk in office. This settles the matter of the International Committee. The following subject concerns the vacancy left by the regretted Mr. Marjanovic. The Bureau would have been happy to welcome his successor taking his place, but following one's own inclination has proved difficult. The position requires past experience in the work of the International Committee. Therefore the Bureau has thought of approaching a representative of the Polish historians and a representative of the British historians. These two groups have shown remarkable activity for a long time. At the British end, the name of Sir William Deakin has come up. The Polish historians still have to agree on a one-person candidacy.

Thereupon Mr. JEDRUSZCZAK immediately proposes Professor Dr. Czesław Madajczyk, President of the Historical Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Having thanked Mr. Jedruszczak, the PRESIDENT continues to explain the proposed structure of the Bureau. From now on there will be four vice presidents, plus two members having equal rights. Due to the success of the organization of the 15th I.C.H.S., the Rumanian historians have won a new claim to the International Committee's recognition. Therefore the Bureau thinks of General Zaharia. Also, they still have the idea of welcoming Mr. Marjanovic's successor. In this way,
the Yugoslav historians continue to be represented, i.e. by Mr. Tone Ferenc. In short, it is a carefully elaborated formula on which the Bureau requests the Assembly to pronounce themselves.

The Assembly unanimously adopts the proposal introduced by the Bureau.

Finally, the PRESIDENT proposes to renew the mandates of the Treasurer and the Secretary General. The Assembly unanimously adopts the proposal.

The Bureau will henceforth consist of: President: Henri Michel (France); Vice Presidents: Sir William Deakin (Great Britain), Arthur L. Funk (United States), Pavel Andreevitch Jiline (U.S.S.R.), Czesiaw Madajczyk (Poland); Members: Tone Ferenc (Yugoslavia), Cheorghe Zaharia (Rumania); Treasurer: Harry Paape (Netherlands); Secretary General: Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen (Belgium).

6. Future colloquia

The PRESIDENT reports that he has been notified by Professor Enver Ziya Karal that the colloquium "The Middle East during World War II", scheduled to be held in Turkey in 1982, cannot take place due to currency problems. This is regretted by the PRESIDENT, who says that Turkey seemed particularly suitable to organize such a colloquium. He fails to see any country that could take over here.

To make up for this, Professor ROULET confirms that the colloquium "The neutral countries during the Second World War" will be held in Switzerland in the autumn of 1982, during four to six days. The venue is a dual one: Neuchâtel and Lausanne.

Mr. FERENC assures those present that the Yugoslav Committee abides by its plan to organize a colloquium on "German minorities in the countries of Central Europe during World War II". Yet, a discussion reveals that it would be interesting to extend the scope of the subject by including all minorities. However that may be, the theme and the dates of the colloquium are still to be laid down.

Dr. SCHUMANN announces that in 1984, in the German Democratic Republic, there will be held a colloquium on "The post-war plans of the nations involved in the war in Europe". This subject includes the United States, since it intervened in Europe.

Professor ROCHAT reports that the Italien Committee plans a colloquium on "The European rural societies during the years between the Wars", to be held in Florence in 1983.

The PRESIDENT expresses his pleasure at these projects, and expects others to materialize by 1985, which will then complete the programme of the International Committee for that year. He especially hopes that a colloquium will take place in the Far East. Mr. SAITO suggests the possibility of a co-operation between Japan, South Korea and India.
7. Sixteenth I.C.H.S. in 1985

The meeting-place for the Sixteenth I.C.H.S. has not been fixed yet. A choice must be made between the German Federal Republic and Venezuela. The decision rests with the General Assembly meeting to be held during the I.C.H.S. in the afternoon of 17th August, 1980. The PRESIDENT approaches General Jiline and the Secretary General to attend this meeting as representatives of the International Committee. The statutory Assembly of this Committee authorize them to vote for the Federal Republic of Germany as the venue for the next five-yearly conference.

For this Sixteenth I.C.H.S., the PRESIDENT suggests that the International Committee adopt "The War Economy" for its working theme. This proposal is unanimously adopted by the Assembly. However, the ensuing discussion stresses the need to specify the subject. At any rate, logistics (belongs to Military history), financing (too technical) and work (dealt with in 1970 at Moscow) are to be excluded. Mr. ROULET insists that the points to be highlighted are to be described clearly. Mr. ROCHAT suggests that two or three specialists be nominated to present reports having an international outlook. These suggestions are approved by the Assembly, which entrusts the Bureau with the task of laying down these ideas.

The meeting ends at 19.45.

(Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen)
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR HISTORICAL SCIENCE (I.C.H.S.)

General Assembly of Sunday, 18th August 1980

The I.C.H.S. convenes, for its second General Assembly, during the Fifteenth International Conference on Historical Science. It takes place on Sunday 17th August 1980, in the Nicolae Iorga amphitheatre of University I in Bucarest. The Assembly will meet under the direction of the new Bureau elected on 9th August, this being its first function.

The meeting is opened at 16.00 hrs the Chairman, Mr. Aleksander Gieysztor. Among the various announcements made by him is the information that China has presented its application for entry. This will be examined by the Bureau, to be submitted to the next Assembly General that will convene in 1982. The same applies to the candidacies of Algeria and Vietnam. On that occasion the Assembly will also deal with the application for membership presented by Nigeria which country could not be welcomed on 9th August because the documents had not been submitted in good time.

The main point on the Agenda is the venue of the Sixteenth Conference on Historical Science scheduled for 1985. The Assembly has to decide between the Federal Republic of Germany, in either of the cities of Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Stuttgart or Munich, and Caracas, Venezuela. The Bureau has studied this problem, and submits to the Assembly an option for a city in Germany. What tipped the scale in this choice was the distance and the cost, which were as many points against Venezuela.

Put to the vote, the option of the Bureau is seconded by the General Assembly by 38 votes in favour of Federal Germany (27 national committees and 11 affiliated international bodies, including the International Committee for the History of the Second World War) against 11 for Caracas (8 national committees and three affiliated international bodies).

Therefore, the Sixteenth I.C.H.S. will take place in the German Federal Republic.

Professor Guillermo Morón, President of the National Committee of Historians of Venezuela, very elegantly announces that he intends to take part in the Sixteenth I.C.H.S. in Federal Germany, adding that without further delay he proposes Caracas as the venue for the Seventeenth I.C.H.S. in 1990. This announcement is acclaimed by those present.

The meeting-place for the General Assembly of 1982 has not been decided upon yet.

The meeting ends at 17.37.

(Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen)
FORTHCOMING MEETINGS AND A SPECIAL COLLECTION

Announcements of a symposium in March 1982 in Kingston, Ontario, on "Armies of Occupation" and another the following month at West Point, New York, on "The Theory and Practice of American National Security" are followed by a call for proposals or papers for entire sessions for the annual meeting of the Western Association for German Studies being held in October 1982 at the University of Texas at El Paso, whose library houses the S. L. A. Marshall Military History Collection, based on the personal library and papers of the late military historian, who died four years ago, augmented by subsequent donations, and maintained as a special collection with a semi-annual newsletter prepared by Thomas Burdett, Curator of the Marshall Collection, U. T. El Paso Library, El Paso, Texas 79968.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE NINTH ANNUAL MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

The Department of History of the Royal Military College of Canada will hold its 9th Annual MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM, March 18-19, 1982. The theme for this year's conference is "ARMIES OF OCCUPATION". The following speakers will be presenting papers:

HUGH SETON-WATSON
Institute of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London - Keynote Address

FERNAND OUELLET
University of Ottawa - The British in Quebec, 1759-1774

A.S. KANYA-FORSTNER
York University - France in the Western Sudan 1880-1899

PETER KENEZ
University of California, Santa Cruz - Whites and Reds in South Russia, 1917-1921

ANTONY POLONSKY
London School of Economics, University of London - Germany in Poland During the Two World Wars

GORDON DANIELS
Centre of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield - The United States in Japan, 1945-1952

The fee, including all sessions, buffet and banquet, will be $50.00. For information please contact Dr. R.A. Frete or Dr. A.H. Ion, Department of History, The Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 2W3, telephone 613-545-7607 or 545-7248.
ANNOUNCEMENT
of the
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY SYMPOSIUM
on
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY
1945-1960
presented in cooperation with the
ASSOCIATION OF GRADUATES, USMA

The purpose of the Symposium is to reconsider the American approach to national security during the aftermath of the Second World War and the era of the Cold War. Although the panelists will discuss political and strategic issues of long-standing importance, they also will examine topics that illuminate the institutional, economic, and intellectual history of the period. The Symposium will begin with registration at West Point on Wednesday afternoon, 21 April 1982, and will conclude with the last session on Friday morning, 23 April. The agenda for the sessions is attached.

ADMINISTRATION

Registration forms and additional information will be mailed to prospective attendees in early January 1982. The registration fee will be $6.00.

Accommodations will be available at the Hotel Thayer which is located at West Point. The current rate is approximately $38.00 per night.

Meals will be available at the Hotel Thayer and at the West Point Officers Club. There will be separate arrangements for a banquet on the evening of 22 April.

Attendees are responsible for their transportation to West Point. Commercial bus transportation to West Point from JFK and LaGuardia airports is available via the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan.

POINT OF CONTACT

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY SYMPOSIUM

on

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

1945-1960

Wednesday, 21 April 1982
Registration and Cocktail Party

Thursday, 22 April

PANEL I

Moderator: Ernest R. May, Harvard University

Authors: Richard D. Challener, Princeton University

"The Concept of National Security"

David A. Rosenberg, University of Chicago

"The Politics of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy"

Commentators: John Lewis Gaddis, Ohio University

Melvyn P. Leffler, Vanderbilt University

PANEL II

Moderator: Gaddis Smith, Yale University

Authors: I.M. Destler, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

"The Presidency and National Security Organization"

Douglas Kinnard, University of Vermont

"Civil-Military Relations: The President and the General"
Commentators: Thomas H. Etzold, Naval War College
Andrew J. Goodpaster, General, USA (Ret.)

Thursday Evening, 22 April

BANQUET
Address: Michael Howard, Oxford University
"A European Perspective on American National Security"

Friday, 23 April

PANEL III
Moderator: Henry F. Graff, Columbia University

Authors:
Martin J. Sherwin, Tufts University
"Role of the Intellectuals: The Case of J. Robert Oppenheimer"
Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University
"Economic Foreign Policy"
Gary W. Reichard, Ohio State University
"Domestic Politics of National Security"

COMMENTATORS:
Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
Joan Hoff Wilson, Indiana University

SUMMATION

Conclusions: Norman A. Graebner, University of Virginia
(Visiting Professor of History, USMA)
October 7-9, 1982  The Sixth Annual Meeting of the Western Association for German Studies will be held in El Paso, Texas. The University of Texas at El Paso will host the conference. The Association welcomes papers in history, literature, politics, geography, art, music and other fields relating to German-speaking Europe. Proposals for papers or entire sessions should be sent with abstracts to one of the following Session Directors by April 1, 1982.

Twentieth Century

Professor Irmgard Hobson, Department of Foreign Languages and Literature, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030

Nineteenth Century

Professor Harry Ritter, Department of History, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA 98225

Eighteenth Century and earlier

Professor Gerald L. Soliday, History Program, Box 688, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75080

General and Themes

Professor Jürgen Fröhlich, Department of Modern Languages, Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711

Guest Speakers, Discussion Groups and Faculty Seminars

Professor Mark Cory, Department of Modern Languages and Literature, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588

Professor Evan B. Bukey, Department of History, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 72701, will serve as Program Director.
In response to the 187-page cumulative listing in this committee's 25th newsletter, issued this past spring, the Chief of Military History in Washington and the Director of the Library for Contemporary History in Stuttgart thoughtfully provided important additional material which will be carried in the spring 1982 issue, together with reviews of several recent publications, including the invaluable cumulated index to the "U. S. Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States," with an introduction by Fredrick Aandahl, published earlier this year by Kraus International Publications.

The balance of this issue is devoted to a retrospective bibliography, compiled in 1979, of publications of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation; a selection of Library of Congress announcements of materials available through the Photoduplication Service; and recently declassified material from Records Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency, now available at Modern Military Branch, U. S. National Archives.

The National Archives records include:

1. An October 1945 report on the Mediterranean and Northwest African Theaters by Group Captain R. E. Humphreys from SRH-037, Reports Received by U. S. War Dept. on Use of Ultra in the European Theater, WWII.

2. SRH-108, a report by the late Warrack Wallace, a special security officer stationed in London who was assigned for a month in 1944 to Headquarters, Third Army, documenting the application of Ultra intelligence on a day-to-day basis.

3. Selections from SRH-040, "Magic" Diplomatic Extracts presented to General George C. Marshall during July 1945, reproduced as an illustration of what was presented to the Chief of Staff during the period following the collapse of Germany and preceding the use of the atomic bomb on Japan: the account of the extraordinary appeal by the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union to seek peace at almost any price, his rebuff from Tokyo, and the strength of the forces available to defend the home islands.
PUBLICATIONS

Publications of the institute have been divided into the following groups:

a. Source publications
   Reports of trials
   German and Dutch documents
   Miscellaneous

b. Monographs

c. Miscellaneous

d. "The Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Second World War"

On behalf of the institute its books are being published by Martinus Nijhoff, publishers, Lange Voorhout 11, The Hague, Netherlands. We presume that in most cases copies can be ordered through ordinary trade channels. Following details can be supplied.

a. Source publications

Reports of trials

1 - Max Blokzijl, zijn berechting, veroordeling en executie (Max Blokzijl, his trial, sentence and execution), 96 pages. Buyten en Schipperheyn, Amsterdam, 1946. Out of print.

Mr. Blokzijl was the foremost Nazi propagandist during the German occupation.

Mr. Van Genechten, a Flemish "activist" in the first World War, was one of the legal experts of the Dutch Nazi Movement.


Mr. Mussert was the Leader of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands.


General Christiansen was Commander-in-Chief of the German armed forces in the Netherlands.


Hanns A. Rauter, an Austrian national-socialist, was Higher SS- and Police Leader in The Hague. He was Himmler's principal representative in the occupied Netherlands.

The series has been concluded.

German and Dutch documents


Mr. Rost van Tonningen was the financial expert of the National Socialist Movement and one of Himmler's keenest followers in the Netherlands. He committed suicide while in prison after the war. This first volume of his correspondence contains an introduction of about 260 pages and some 300 documents, all with additional footnotes. The summary in English also contains digests of all documents. The second volume is in preparation but will not be published before 1983.

The publication contains an introduction of 438 pages and 656 documents, nearly all in German (most of these from the archives of the Hauptamt Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS and the SS-Personalhauptamt), all with additional footnotes. The summary in English also contains digests of the documents.

Miscellaneus


Out of print

125 of the most striking articles published in Netherlands underground papers. Names of authors have been added. The summary in English contains also short abstracts of all articles.


This anthology of the most striking passages from the institute's vast collection of wartime private diaries is based on a selection made by Mrs. T.M. Sjenitzer-van Leening. There are about 220 fragments taken from 100 diaries. Abstracts in English have been omitted.

b. Monographs

1 - Dr. L.J.A. Trip - De Duitsche bezetting van Nederland en de financiële ontwikkeling van het land gedurende de jaren der bezetting (The German occupation of the Netherlands and the financial development of the country during the years of occupation), 75 pages. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1946.

A brief study written by the late president of the Netherlands bank.


A comprehensive survey of the strike movement that swept Holland in the spring of 1943. A detailed study by Mr. B.A. Sijes on the origin of the strike in the industrial district of Twente has been added as an Annex. Some 150 pages of German documents on the strike are included in the original language.
3 - Dr. P.H. Winkelman - Heusden geteisterd en bevrijd
(Heusden, disaster and liberation), 82 pages. With
an English summary. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,
1950.

In November 1944 the town hall of Heusden, a
small town in the Southern part of the country,
was blown up by the Germans. Some hundreds of
people, who had taken shelter there, lost their
lives. Dr. Winkelman made a careful investigation
into the precise facts.

4 - B.A. Sijes - De razzia van Rotterdam, 10-11 November
1944 (The Rotterdam razzia, 10-11 November 1944),
285 pages. With an English summary. Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1951.
Out of print.

On November 10 and 11, 1944, the Germans succeeded
in rounding up some 50,000 men and boys in the
town of Rotterdam. Mr. Sijes gives a full description
of the organization of this mass-manhunt.

5 - B.A. Sijes - De Februari-staking, 25-26 Februari
1941 (The strike of February 25-26, 1941), 237
pages. With an English summary. Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1954.
Out of print. Reprinted by H.J.W. Becht, Amsterdam,
1978.

Background, development and effect of what has
been the first mass-strike in German-occupied
Europe, and, perhaps, the first anti-pogrom
strike in history. Includes the full text (in
German) of the report of the strike that was
drawn up by the Higher SS- and Police-Leader,
H.A. Rauter.

6 - L.E. Winkel - De ondergrondse pers, 1940-1945 (The
underground press, 1940-1945), 414 pages. With many
illustrations and facsimiles and a summary in English.
Out of print.

Contains full details of the Netherlands under-
ground press and "case-histories" of over 1,100
different underground papers.

A study of one of the sectors of Dutch economic life during the German occupation in which much attention has been paid to the basic problem of economic collaboration.


A detailed history of the Netherlands Railways 1940-1945 in which special attention has been paid to the problems of administrative cooperation with the Germans and to the famous railway-strike, September 1944-May 1945.


A detailed history of the resistance group which acted as a banker for about the entire resistance movement.


A touching account of the Holocaust in the Netherlands, of which so far in this country about 150,000 copies have been sold. An abbreviated edition in English was published in London under the title "Ashes in the wind" (Souvenir Press, 1968) and in New York under the title "The destruction of Dutch Jewry" (Dutton, 1969).
Out of print.

First of all a study in administrative collaboration. In addition attention is paid to the work of the resistance movement in thwarting the call-up for forced labour and to the living conditions of Dutch workers in Germany during war-time.


A detailed description of the resistance of the Protestant (primary) schools against attempts at nazification. In addition much information is given on conditions at schools in war-time in general.


A survey of the living situation of caravan dwellers and especially the gipsies in the Netherlands and in Germany before the Second World War and of the administrative control which was enforced to them, followed by a detailed description of the persecution of the gipsies in the Netherlands (and other German-occupied countries) during the war.
c. Miscellaneous

Commemorative album, published in May 1960, consisting of the best pictures and wartime poems from the collections of the institute. It sold 80,000 copies.

This book, published under the supervision of the board of the Foundation "The Indies at war" (chairman prof.dr. I.J. Brugmans), contains a detailed chronological survey of the Indies at war (with special attention to the war in the Pacific in general) and full texts or extracts from 470 documents relating to Japanese rule in the occupied Indies and the fate of the Dutch part of the population in Japanese internment. It is extensively illustrated.

Contains 17 studies written by members of the institute's staff (prof.dr. A.E. Cohen, drs. E. Fraenkel-Verkade, prof.dr. L. de Jong, A.J. van der Leeuw and dr. J.C.H. de Pater) on various subjects of the history of the Netherlands during the German occupation. Most of these had been originally written as preliminary reports (see pages 29-30 of this Progress Report, nrs. 26, 37, 41, 47, 71, 72, 80, 80a, 90, 116, 119 (in two parts), 127, 145, 146). Added were the results of two very detailed researches by mrs. E. Frankel-Verkade, "Nederlandse SS-Frontarbeiders" (Dutch "SS-Frontarbeiter") and L. de Jong, "Heeft Felix Kersten het Nederlandse volk gered?" (Did - Himmler's Finnish masseur - Felix Kersten save the Netherlands people - from mass deportation to Poland in 1941?).
This extensive report is the result of a long investigation into the activities of a Dutch Jew who after the war had been condemned to six years of imprisonment on a charge of (i.a.) betrayal and espionage amongst prisoners in a German prison, and who had started an action for rehabilitation. The main conclusion of the authors is that the misbehavings of Mr. Weinreb were far more serious than the courts had been able to determine shortly after the war. The report contains many detailed descriptions of the life of Dutch Jews under German persecution.

d. "The Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Second World War"

In 1955 Dr. L. de Jong was commissioned by the minister of Education and Sciences to write a publication which would give an overall picture of the Netherlands in the Second World War, based on the records held by the institute or kept elsewhere and on the researches carried out not only by the institute's staff but also, for instance, by the historical sections of the staffs of the army, navy and air-force and by the Netherlands Parliamentary Commission of Investigation, the reports of which were published in the period 1948-1956. The complete work will consist of twelve volumes, totalling between 13,000 and 15,000 pages. Up till now volumes 1-9 have been published, volumes 10-12 are scheduled to be published in the
period 1980-1985. All volumes are extensively illustrated.

The "scientific" editions of all volumes, published by Martinus Nijhoff, contain full references to the source-material quoted as well as an extensive index compiled by drs. C.J.F. Stulderher and mr. L.F. de Jong. "Popular" editions (without references to the source-material and without an index) have been published by the Staatsuitgeverij (State Publishing House) in The Hague. So far about one million copies of the various volumes of the "popular" edition have been sold.

Vol. 1 - Voorspel (Prelude), 772 pages, five maps.


In indicating the background of the Dutch people's reactions in the years 1939-1945 the author goes back to the early nineteenth century, the formative period of the Dutch nation in modern times. In the fourth decade of the twentieth century the description becomes more detailed, in particular with reference to the Dutch Nazi-movement and to defence-policy. The book ends with the outbreak of World War II.

Vol. 2 - Neutraal (Neutral), 540 pages, eighteen maps,


The book starts with a separate chapter on Queen Wilhelmina. The detailed description of events in the period of neutrality breaks off abruptly in the night of May 9 to 10 at the moment of the German attack. The relative strength of the German and Dutch armed forces opposing each other is minutely analysed. There are new details on the so-called Venlo-incident and the author shows in general that, contrary to what was believed so far, there have been some secret contacts between the Dutch army staff and General Gamelin as well as between the Dutch naval staff and the British Admiralty, which were based on the likelihood of a German invasion.
A detailed description of the fighting in the Netherlands during the German invasion, of the reactions of the government and of the civilian population.


Vol. 5 - Maart '41 - Juli '42 (March '41 - July '42), two parts, 1171 pages, eleven maps. The Hague, 1974.


Together these four volumes contain a comprehensive description of developments and events in the German-occupied Netherlands from May, 1940 till June, 1944. Volume 4 ends with the description of the "anti-pogrom"-strike of 25-26 February, 1941 which clearly showed that German policy to make the Dutch people a partner in Germany's "New Order" or even in a Germanic "Reich" had been rejected. In July, 1942 a new chapter in occupation-history started by the first deportations of Jews to the extermination-camps in Eastern Europe; this event forms the watershed between the volumes 5 and 6, volume 6 ending with a description of the nationwide strikes of April-May, 1943. Volume 7 ends on the eve of D-Day; this volume contains a long chapter on the economic and social history of the 1940-1944 period. Themes which are extensively dealt with in all four volumes comprise: the policy of the German occupier and of the various Dutch pro-German groupings, first of all the Dutch Nazi-movement; the policy of the Dutch administration; the development of public opinion; the attempts of Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to nazify Dutch public life; the persecution of the Jews and the attitude of the non-Jews towards their Jewish fellow-citizens; the growth of a spirit of resistance and the development of the...
resistance-organizations; the secret links with Britain. The volumes contain also brief descriptions of the strategy of the major powers so that events in the Netherlands can always be seen as part of the momentous struggle that was being waged.


This volume is exclusively devoted to the fate of those groups of Dutchmen who, so to speak, were lifted from Dutch society: prisoners of war, hostages, political and other prisoners who suffered either in German prisons or in concentration-camps in the Netherlands and in Germany, and Jewish deportees. The first chapter of this volume describes the general German system of oppression and persecution and the last one answers the question to what extend the various groups of prisoners and deportees have received aid either from the Netherlands or from allied territory. Memoirs of prisoners and deportees are extensively quoted in this volume.


A detailed description of the policy of the Dutch government in London in the period May, 1940 - summer, 1944. Particular attention is paid to the relations between Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch ministers which were often strained. There are separate chapters on the effects of Japanese aggression in the Far East, on the aid given to Dutchmen who escaped from the German-occupied Netherlands, on Dutch foreign policy, on the Dutch armed forces and the merchant navy, on the Dutch secret services and their co-operation with the British Secret Service and the Special Operations Executive, on the England-spiel, on the preparations for the liberation of the Netherlands Indies (attention is also paid to the wartime history of the Dutch West Indies) and on the decrees that were to be applied in the Netherlands after their liberation.
Vol. 10 - Het laatste jaar (The last year), four parts (scheduled to be published in 1980 and 1981).

Will describe the events in the occupied parts of the Netherlands, in the liberated southern part of the country and the policy of the London government - three factors which in the period concerned (Summer 1944 - May 1945) closely influenced each other.

Vol. 11 - Nederlands-Indië (The Netherlands Indies), two parts (scheduled to be published in 1983).

After an introduction in the history of the Netherlands Indies, this volume will contain a detailed description of what happened in three distinctive periods: (1) between May 1940 and Pearl Harbor, (2) the months of Japanese aggression, (3) the period of Japanese occupation.

Vol. 12 - Epiloog (Epilogue), (scheduled to be published in 1985).

This volume has a function similar to volume Nr. 1 in which pre-war Dutch history has been dealt with so far as this was necessary to understand what happened during the war. In volume 12 post-war Dutch history will be described as far as it has been closely linked with what happened during the war.

9. PRELIMINARY REPORTS

Reports on a wide variety of subjects have been written by members of the staff of the institute, sometimes by outsiders. Most are in Dutch, several in German (indicated: G), a few in English (indicated: E), and in French (indicated: F). The nrs. 26, 37, 41, 47, 71, 72, 80, 80a, 90, 116, 119 and 146 have been published (in a slightly modified form) in their original language in Studies over Nederland in Oorlogstijd (see page 24). Of those reports which still may be of interest xerox copies can be obtained at a rate of Dfl. 0.30 per page. They are
not to be quoted or published in any form without the
approval of the institute. Copies of the following
numbers can be ordered:

1. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Brief survey of the Hauptämter
of the SS (3 pages; 1951)

7. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The activities of Dr. Kajetan
Mühlmann in the Netherlands and
his relations to Seyss-Inquart
(1 page; 1952)

10. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Authority and power in national-
socialist Germany in the political
field (10 pages; 1952)

11. A.J. van der Leeuw - Authority and power in national-
socialist Germany in the economic
field (7 pages; 1952)

12. J.R. de Groot - Authority and power in national-
socialist Germany in the military
field (6 pages; 1952)

13. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The relationship between ir. Mussert
and miss M.C. Mijnlieff (3 pages;
1952)

15. Dr. L. de Jong - The origin of "Unconditional surren-
der" (4 pages; 1952)

16. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The structure of the German Reichs-
kommissariat in the Netherlands
(23 pages; 1952)

17. A.J. van der Leeuw - The structure of the German
economic administration in the Nether-
lands (5 pages; 1952)

18. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The organization of the Auswärtige
Amt, 1940-1945 (4 pages; 1952)

19. Dr. A.E. Cohen - New data on the so-called honorary
ranks in the SS (3 pages; 1952)

20. J.R. de Groot - The German Wehrmacht in the Nether-
lands (14 pages; 1952)

22. J.R. de Groot - German penal jurisdiction in the
Netherlands (14 pages; 1952)

23. J.R. van der Leeuw - The Nuremberg trials (19 pages;
1952)
24. A.J. van der Leeuw - The significance of the taxation of blocked German marks and the true meaning of the conception "Durchlöcherte Devisengrenze" (4 pages; 1952)

26. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Origin and significance of the Arbeitsbereich der NSDAP in den Niederlanden (18 pages; 1952)

29. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The institution of the German Reichskommissariat in the Netherlands viewed in the light of the Norwegian precedent (The Rosenberg diary) (9 pages; 1952)

30. B.A. Sijes - Political strategy and tactics of the Communist Party in the Nederlands, 1 Sept 1939 - 22 June 1941 (16 pages; 1952)

31. H. Daalder - The Netherlands and world policy 1940-1945 (40 pages; 1952)

37. Mrs. E. Fraenkel-Verkade - Mussert, the Dutch Nazi party and the oath to Hitler (15 pages; 1953)

39. Mrs. E. Fraenkel-Verkade - Service of Dutchmen in the enemy's armed forces (67 pages; 1953)

40. Mrs. E. Fraenkel-Verkade - Oaths to be sworn in joining the German NSDAP and the Dutch National Socialist Movement (6 pages; 1953)

41. A.J. van der Leeuw - Trade in German bonds and shares during the occupation period (17 pages; 1953)

44. B.A. Sijes - Some remarks concerning the "Eenheidsvakcentrale" (a communist-inspired trade union movement) during the second world war (3 pages; 1953)

47. A.J. van der Leeuw - The Nazification of the organizations of the Nederlands Press in the summer and autumn of 1940 (26 pages; 1954)

48. B.A. Sijes - The so-called "Radencommunisten" (German: Nâtekommunisten) and the revolutionary-socialist group "De Bedrijfsraad" ("The shop council") (5 pages; 1954)
49. Mrs. A. Hiemstra-Timmenga - The concentration camp of Amersfoort (4 pages; 1954)

50. Mrs. A. Hiemstra-Timmenga - The legal position of German and stateless Jews in the Netherlands, 1939-1945 (4 pages; 1954)

53. J.R. de Groot - Hitler's decree of 19 May 1943 concerning the awarding of German citizenship (7 pages; 1954)

55. Prof. dr. I.A. Diepenhorst - The Jehovah Witnesses and the resistance movement (6 pages; 1954)

56. A.J. van der Leeuw - Survey of events leading to government control of raw materials, 1924-1939 (31 pages; 1954)

58. A.J. van der Leeuw - Survey of reports on the activities of the Dutch raw material control offices during the war, 1939-1945 (15 pages; 1954)

61. A.J. van der Leeuw - The Dutch raw material control offices and private industrial corporations, 1939-1945 (49 pages; 1954)

62. A.J. van der Leeuw - The economic control offices under German and Dutch supervision (28 pages; 1954)

70. E.G. Groeneveld and Dr. J.M. Pluvier - List of articles published in the Dutch SS-weekly "Storm-SS", dealing with the churches and religious life (6 pages; 1955)

71. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Dr. Eberhard Schöngarth, the last Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei in the occupied Netherlands (19 pages; 1955)

72. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The responsibility for the reprisals after the attempt on Rauter's life March 8, 1945 (14 pages; 1955)
73. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Some data on Hitler's lack of interest in the occupied Netherlands (12 pages; 1956)

74. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Preparing source publications on the history of the Second World War (9 pages; 1955) (E) (1)

77. Miss E. Ottow - Names and administrative periods of the "Beauftragten des Reichskommis- sars in den besetzten niederländischen Gebieten" (2 pages; 1955)

78. Dr. A.E. Cohen - The position of the secretarissen-Generaal during the occupation (27 pages; 1955)

80. Dr. J.C.H. de Pater - The aim of German civil administration in the occupied Netherlands (8 pages; 1956)

80a. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Some remarks on Preliminary Report No. 80 (9 pages; 1956)

81. Miss L.E. Winkel - The fate of Jewish deportees. What was said on this subject in the press, in the underground papers and on the wireless up till September 1943 (69 pages; 1956)

84. A.J. van der Leeuw - Brief survey of the Aryanization of Jewish business in the occupied Netherlands (4 pages; 1956)

87. Dr. L. de Jong - Some problems of Europe's anti-Nazi resistance, 1939-1945 (28 pages; 1956) (E) (2)

(1) Dutch text of an address given on September 11, 1955, at the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences (Rome).

(2) Text of an address given during the Tutzing conference, May 1956, organized by the Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte.
88. A.G. Vromans - A list of chronological surveys of World War II (7 pages; 1956)

90. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Guilty victim: the third Befehls­haber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in the Netherlands (E. Naumann) (20 pages; 1957)

91. Dr. A.E. Cohen - How the German Reichskommissariat for the Netherlands was set up (7 pages; 1958)

92. R. de Bruin - Indonesian Dutchmen during the Japanese occupation and afterwards (11 pages; 1958)

93. Dr. L. de Jong - Anti-Nazi resistance in the Netherlands (9 pages; 1958) (E) (1)

94. Dr. L. de Jong - Het Groot Burger Comité, 1941-1943 (Committee of prominent Dutchmen preparing the re-establishment of law and order after the occupation) (3 pages; 1958)

95. Dr. L. de Jong - The reports of the Parliamentary Commission of Investigation into the policy of the Netherlands war-time governments, and their value as a historical source (21 pages; 1959)

96. Dr. A.E. Cohen - Netherlands research on the Second World War (9 pages; 1959) (E) (2)

97. Mrs. A. Hiemstra-Timmenga - The deportation of Dutch Jews to Mauthausen and Ravensbrück in 1941 and 1942 (6 pages; 1959)


(1) Text of an address given during the conference on the history of European resistance, Liège, September 1958.

(2) Text of a paper read at the Oxford-Netherlands Historical Conference, January 1959.
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(3) Report prepared for the Israel Ministry of Justice.
(5) Text of an address given in the first plenary session of the Fourth World Congress of Jewish Sciences, Jerusalem, July 1965.
111. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. Furniture (9 pages; 1965) (G)

112. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. Diamonds given in exchange for postponement of deportation (22 pages; 1965) (G)


115. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. The furniture of two country houses confiscated by the Commander of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber) (18 pages; 1961) (G)


118. A.J. van der Leeuw - Spoliation in Western Europe of public and private libraries (60 pages; 1961) (G)


120. A.J. van der Leeuw - The eleventh Decree in connection with the Reichsbürgergesetz (13 pages; 1962) (G) (1)

121. A.J. van der Leeuw - Spoliation in general. Works of art confiscated by the Dienststelle Dr. Mühlmann (9 pages; 1962) (G)

(1) Published in "Rechtsprechung zum Wiedergutmachungsrecht" 62, 1.
122. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. The robbery of diamonds from the Amsterdamse Bank, Arnhem (16 pages; 1962) (G)


124. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jewry. The "Hanemann-present" (diamonds) (7 pages; 1963) (G)

125. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. Confiscation of diamonds under false pretences (case of two families) (9 pages; 1963) (G)

126. A.J. van der Leeuw - A case of spoliation. The Lugt art-collection (14 pages; 1965) (G)

127. A.J. van der Leeuw - The spoliation of Dutch Jews. Abuse of the Enemy Property order to seize a prominent leather factory (13 pages; 1965) (G)

128. A.J. van der Leeuw - Statistical data on the numbers of Dutchmen who may be considered victims of Nazi persecution (27 pages; 1961)

129. A.J. van der Leeuw - The punishment of Dutch workers who refused work in Germany or who returned from Germany without permission (18 pages; 1964)

130. N.K.C.A. in 't Veld - Fascism and national-socialism in the Netherlands between the world wars (18 pages; 1965) (G) (1)

131. Dr. L. de Jong - Queen Wilhelmina in London, 1940-1945 (35 pages; 1966) (2)

132. A.J. van der Leeuw - The seizure of seven lots of diamonds on March 1, 1945 (10 pages; 1965)

133. C.J.F. Stuldreher - Some particulars on the periodical of emigrants Der Deutsche Weg (7 pages; 1965)

(1) Text of an address given in the Institut für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz, 1965.

(2) Text of an address given to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, Amsterdam, 1966.
134. E.G. Groeneveld - Political and social aspects of resistance in the Netherlands (11 pages; 1966) (F) (1)

135. Dr. L. de Jong - Resistance in the Netherlands (39 pages; 1966) (E)

136. A.J. van der Leeuw - The deportation of the Roman Catholic Jews from the Netherlands in August, 1942 (15 pages, 1966) (G)

137. A.J. van der Leeuw - The German Ordnungspolizei in the occupied Dutch territories (11 pages; 1966) (G)

138. A.J. van der Leeuw - The seizure of household silver in the Netherlands by the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the "M- Aktion" (5 pages; 1967) (G)

139. A.J. van der Leeuw - The liquidation of the Jewish philatelic shops in the Netherlands (9 pages; 1967) (G)

140. R. de Bruin - Sense and non-sense in the Three-A-Movement (28 pages; 1967) (E) (2)

141. Dr. L. de Jong - The Netherlands and Auschwitz (24 pages; 1967) (E)

142. Dr. J.C.H. de Pater - The Hauptabteilung für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda during the first years of the occupation (51 pages; 1967)

143. Dr. J.C.H. de Pater - The NIVO (Netherlands Institute for National socialist Education) in the occupied Netherlands (28 pages; 1968)

144. A.J. van der Leeuw - The reconstruction of the archives of Referat IV B 4 (15 pages; 1969)


(1) Text of a paper read at a conference on resistance in Europe, organized by the Istituto di Storia Medioevale e Moderna, Milan, 1966.

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(3) Text of an address given to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, Amsterdam, 1976.
157. Drs. E.G. Groeneveld - The Dutch universities between 1940 and 1945. Teachers and students under German occupation (35 pages; 1979) (E) (1)

158. G.P. van der Stroom - Dutch agents, dispatched by the allied secret services in London. Chronological Survey (80 pages; 1979)

(1) Paper presented to the international conference on "Universities and other scientific centres within the range of the influence of the Axis States 1938-1945", Cracow, 1979.
THIRD REICH, GERMAN ARMY, AND NATIONAL
SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKER'S PARTY PUBLICATIONS

The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed the four titles cited below as part of the Library's Preservation Program and can provide 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm copies for the prices quoted after each citation. For shipment to other than North American addresses, add an additional $.60 per reel to cover surface postage. Inclusive dates filmed and parts lacking are noted in each citation. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C-248, 10 First Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20540. Checks should be made payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service.

   [wanting jahrg. 1, heft. 1-2]
   1 reel, $14.00

Junge Welt (Young people's world) was an official weekly publication of the Hitler Youth. The Hitler Youth was established in 1926 as the youth organization of the National Socialist German Worker's Party and was expanded by law in 1936 to educate German youth outside of school and family. It was one of the most important units of the party. In 1939 it was decreed to be the only organization for German youth and was placed under the leadership of the National Youth Leader. Junge Welt was directed toward German young people and its articles and reports were written to instill Nazi Party doctrines and ideals in German youth.

(38396) Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit. jahrg. 1-4, heft. 3; 1941-44. Berlin.
   [wanting jahrg. 1]
   1 reel, $9.00

The Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit (Labor review) was a quarterly publication issued by the Research Institute of the German Labor Front with the cooperation of the Central Office for International Social Development.
Reichs-Elternwarte (Parent-teacher Journal) was a semi-monthly journal of the National Socialist Teacher's League. The National Socialist Teacher's League was founded in 1927 and in 1933 became the all-inclusive organization of German educators. This journal provided instructions and guidance on the teaching of party doctrines to German youths.


This bi-weekly publication of the Army High Command was written in a popular style and directed at a broad spectrum of readers. The publication was heavily illustrated with excellent photographs and art work. Articles covered general news from the front, detailed descriptions and diagrams of battles, e.g., Stalingrad, and historical articles on the history of warfare and German military figures.
HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRAINING

The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed the four-volume manuscript, History of Military Government Training. This collection is now available on three reels of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm for $64.50. For shipment to other than North American addresses, add an additional $1.60 per reel to cover surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C-264, 10 First Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20540. Checks should be made payable to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service.

The Military Government Training Program, administered by the Office of the Provost Marshal General, was a World War II program which sought to prepare United States Army officers for civil administrative duties in countries to be occupied by U. S. Forces. Although U. S. Armies had administered some military governments prior to this time, this was the first attempt by the Army to prepare its officers for such roles. The program prepared officers for both the European and Far Eastern Theaters. Civil Affairs Training Schools were established at several universities, including Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Western Reserve, Pittsburgh, Boston, and Michigan.

In addition to a history and evaluation of the program, the manuscript file includes course materials used, lists of lecturers and lectures, occasionally full texts of lectures given, and rosters of officer participants.
A History of the Military Intelligence Division
7 December 1941 - 2 September 1945

The Library of Congress has recently microfilmed a one-volume, typescript history entitled, A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945. This file is available on one reel of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm for $14. For shipment to other than North American addresses, add an additional 60¢ to cover surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C-278, 10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service.

This history is a detailed survey and analysis of the internal organization, the several reorganizations, and functions of the War Department General Staff's G-2 Division and its component branches, sections, and agencies as they developed and changed throughout World War II. The study is based upon a series of histories prepared shortly after V-J Day by the units, branches, and sections of the military intelligence service. This work is a summary of all of these histories, supplemented with additional research. Part I covers organizational developments, beginning with the Peace Time Division. Part II describes the information gathering agencies with an emphasis on foreign operations. Part III outlines the activities of the intelligence producing agencies which include the geographic, political and economic, sociological, scientific, and military branches. Part IV describes the policy making agencies of the Military Intelligence Division. Part V covers the administrative agencies. Organizational charts are included in this study.
The Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed two typescript, manuscript histories of the United States Bombing Survey: one covering the European area, the other describes the Pacific effort. Both histories are two volume works and each is contained on one reel of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm. Both studies can be secured for $40 or can be purchased individually at the prices cited below. Prices quoted include postage and handling. For shipment to other than North American addresses, an additional 60¢ per reel should be added to cover surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, Department C-280, 10 First Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service.

51342

2 v. photos. charts
Typescript 1 reel, $15.00

"This study describes the administrative form and work of the US Strategic Bombing Survey in the Pacific Area, with greatest emphasis being laid on Japan. This survey is the continuance of that conducted in the ETO instituted to appraise results of the strategic bombing in Japan and other selected Pacific islands in order that the answers might be applied in the formulation of long-range Naval and Air Force bombing doctrine as well as in atomic research. This study describes at length the physical and administrative form of the survey..."
'This study covers the actions of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey from its earliest conception by the Air Force, to its actual inauguration and completion under impartial civilian auspices. The survey was set up in order to appraise the results of strategic bombing in Europe in order that the answers might be applied in the war against Japan and in formulation of long-range Air Force bombing doctrine. This study describes at length the preliminary preparation for this survey as well as its physical and administrative form... The whole is of value to one interested in the administration of the survey.' The study contains many photographs of individuals involved in the survey.
The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed two, little-known, technical histories entitled, The Jeep and The Alaskan Highway. Each title is contained on one reel of 35 mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm and can be purchased for $15.00 apiece, postage included. Orders and inquiries concerning these titles should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C, 10 First Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service.

The Jeep (51324) is a one-volume, typescript history of the development and the procurement of this vehicle by the Quartermaster Corps during the period 1940-1942. The work was prepared by Herbert R. Rifkin under the auspices of the Quartermaster Corps in 1943. Photographs are included in the history.

One reel, $15.00

The Alaskan Highway (51360) is a two-volume study covering the planning, construction and use of the Alaskan Highway. This history was completed in 1945 by the United States Army Service Forces and consists of a one volume narrative history and one volume of exhibits which contains all the pertinent documents, from the highest planning to operational levels and forms a valuable supplement to the text. The Alaskan Highway was initially projected as a peacetime measure in 1930, and construction as a military necessity by the Corps of Engineers was not authorized until February 1942. The purpose of the highway, from the War Department's point of view, was primarily to connect a string of air bases on the route to Alaska and secondly to provide a supplemental supply line to that territory. The author of this study devotes special attention to explaining the military necessity of the highway and the choice of route by the War Department in preference to other suggested routes. This is a good, general account of this project, comprehensive in scope yet supplying many pertinent details.

One reel, $15.00
History of the French Underground.

The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed a 13-volume manuscript history entitled, The French Forces of the Interior: Their Organization and Participation in the Liberation of France, 1944. This collection of over 2,000 pages is available on two reels of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm for $40.00, postage paid. Orders requiring shipment to other than North American addresses should add an additional $.60 per reel for surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C, 10 First Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service.

The title as cited above is somewhat misleading because the history covers the organization and activities of the French Resistance from 1940 on. Written in 1945 by the French Resistance Unit of the U.S. Army Historical Section, the document is organized as follows:

Part One. Organization.
Chapter One - Development and evolution of the French Resistance.
Chapter Two - French Resistance and Allied Services.
(Special Operations Executive, Office of Strategic Services, and Special Forces Headquarters, London)
Chapter Three - Organization of transmissions.
Chapter Four - Constitution of the Staff of the French Forces of the Interior.
Chapter Five - Statistics of materiel and armament supplied to French Resistance from 1941 to the end of the campaign.

Chapter One - Summary of military operations carried out by the F.F.I.
Chapter Two - F.F.I. activities of special interest.
Chapter Three - Part Played by French Resistance in sabotaging Germany's war effort.
Chapter Four - Life in the Underground.
Chapter Five - Conclusion.
In addition to the narrative text, the history is supplemented with appendices, charts, maps and photographs. Some text is in French.

This account gives great credit to the role of the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action Militaire and the later General Staff of Forces Francaises de l'Interieur in coordinating the Resistance groups and their activities. The importance of this coordinating role was not given proper emphasis, according to the authors, by earlier writers because of their desire "to claim for the Resistance Movements a sovereign authority and an autonomy of action, which they attempt to prove by conferring an independent character on their military exploits."

This is a substantial study of great detail on a complex and frequently controversial chapter of World War II.
The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service and Serial Division are pleased to announce the microfilm edition of the Japanese Relocation Camp and Assembly Center Newspapers. Publications from all 10 relocation camps and the two assembly centers are present in the file. The Library of Congress collection—no doubt, the best in the United States—has been microfilmed for reasons of preservation. This collection, consisting of 50 individual titles, is now available on 22 reels of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm for $216.00. For shipment to other than North American addresses, an additional $0.60 per reel should be added to cover surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C, 10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service.

JAPAN WARS ON U.S. AND BRITAIN; MAKES SUDDEN ATTACK ON HAWAII
Sudden and unexpected attacks on Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and other United States possessions in the Pacific early yesterday by the Japanese Air Force plunged the United States and Japan into active war.
New York Times
December 8, 1941

This headline was but one of thousands appearing in United State's newspapers on the morning following the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese Forces. This single event and the war that followed were covered well by the national press, thus this chapter in our history is well documented. To a lesser extent, we know what actions this nation took in regard to the Japanese-American minority living on the West Coast of the United States. We know that in the months following the attack on Hawaii, the U.S. Government was besieged with demands that action be taken against the Japanese in the form of removal from "sensitive areas" and incarceration in camps, preferably located in the interior of the U.S. These demands and subsequent actions were motivated by the fear that the Japanese would become a fifth column of the Japanese High Command and spy against the United States. By April of 1942, over 100,000 Japanese, aliens and citizens, were housed in what came to be known as relocation centers run by the War Relocation Authority. This rude up-rooting not only violated the civil rights of Japanese-Americans, but also caused great financial sacrifice as much property was sold at distress prices. Every person was allowed to take with them what they could carry; the government
agreeing to store property at the owner's risk.

Although histories exist about this chapter in American History (Edward H. Spicer's Impounded People, 1969), the Japanese Camp Newspapers record the concerns and the day to day life of the interned Japanese-Americans. These files are the record of an unpleasant and embarrassing chapter in World War II. Although articles in these files frequently appear in Japanese, most of the papers are in English or in dual text. Many of the 50 titles constituting this collection are complete or substantially complete. The files have been carefully collated and omissions are noted. Substantial files included which are worthy of special note are: Rohwer Outpost, Poston Chronicle, Gila News Courier, Tulean Dispatch, Granada Pioneer, Minidoka Irrigator, Topaz Times and Heart Mountain Sentinel.

This collection is of research value to historians, sociologists, and, perhaps, even psychologists interested in studying the reactions of people under stress.
UNITED STATES DOCUMENTARY POSTERS FROM WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II

The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service and the Prints and Photographs Division are pleased to announce the availability on microfilm of approximately 300 American posters from World War I and 1,200 posters from World War II. These posters are contained on four reels of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm. The one reel of World War I posters is available for $9.50 and the three reels of World War II posters for $42.00. Orders requiring shipment to other than North American addresses should add an additional $0.60 per reel for surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C, 10 First Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20540.

Various government agencies, particularly the Armed Services, Office of War Information, and the Public Health Service, businesses, and volunteer organizations produced these posters to incite the public to action, to support drives, to give funds, to enlist, to volunteer, to conserve food and material, to increase production in industry and agriculture, to encourage good health and safety practices, to attend motion pictures, and so forth. These posters are from the Library's documentary poster collection and are arranged by promotional goal. The major promotional goal groupings are: agricultural production; industrialization and production; special interest groups including labor, women, youth, and international organizations; welfare activities; political propaganda, policy, and ideology; foreign relations, and war; and war films.

Although not a complete collection of World War I and World War II posters, it is a comprehensive one which reflects advertising styles, indicates intellectual moods and social attitudes, and graphically reveals the role of men, women, children, minorities, and other countries within the war effort. As such, this collection is a significant source for research in each period.

The posters vary in size, however, most appear on a single frame of microfilm. Also, a few may be considered broadsides rather than pictorial presentations. Requests for photographs or slides of individual posters or price quotations on specific items should be directed to the Photoduplication Service.
The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service has recently microfilmed a collection of manuscript documents called the AMMISCA File which details activities of the 1941-1942 American mission to China headed by Brigadier General John Magruder. This collection is contained on one reel of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm and can be purchased for $20.00, postage included. For shipment to other than North American addresses, an additional $.60 should be added for surface postage. Orders and inquiries should be directed to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, Department C, 10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20540. Checks should be payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service.

Alarmed by the deteriorating situation in China, the U.S. Government sent a special mission to China in the fall of 1941. General Magruder and his support staff were dispatched to Chungking and charged with advising and assisting the Chinese Central Government in the methods of acquiring and utilizing materials and equipment which the U.S. now could make available under the Lend-Lease Act. The documents in this collection are the history of this mission and span the period July 11, 1941-June 1942. There is a considerable amount of material predating U.S. entry into the Asian War. The collection is organized into the following categories:

1. Top-Level Planning Papers & Outline of the AMMISCA
2. Weekly Reports, 1941-1942
3. Conferences with the Generalissimo, 1941-1942
4. Miscellaneous Mission Papers Prior to 8 December 1941
5. Outline of AMMISCA Projects, 7 November 1941
6. Special Orders, AMMISCA 1941-1942
7. War Diary 8 December 1941-June 1942

Of particular interest are the conference summaries which General Magruder and other U.S. officers held with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. These meetings frequently included Madame Chiang and, after U.S. entry into the war, British military representatives. Topics covered in these conferences included speculation concerning future Japanese military actions, the proper defense of Burma and Singapore, and Russia's position on Japan. This file provides interesting details concerning U.S., Chinese and British positions just prior to and after Pearl Harbor.
"Secrets of the German Oil Industry, some of them gathered from the ruins of wrecked plants before the Nazi surrender, are now available to the public," Deputy Petroleum Administrator Ralph K. Davies announced today.

The Library of Congress has agreed to make the records, collected by a mission of petroleum technologists organized under the supervision of the Petroleum Administration for War, a part of its permanent archives since the PAW is a war agency now in the process of liquidation....

Petroleum Administration for War Press Release
October 23, 1945

The collecting, abstracting, and indexing efforts of the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) attracted some interest in the 1940's, but constantly growing U.S. oil reserves and the opening of the Middle East oil fields made expensive synthetic fuel research a subject of academic rather than practical concern. Noting renewed interest in synthetic liquid fuel research, the Photoduplication Service again announces the availability of the complete set of Technical Oil Mission (TOM) Reports.

The Technical Oil Mission was organized in 1945 and operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Fuel and Power for Great Britain and the Petroleum Administration for War and the Bureau of Mines for the United States. The purpose of the Mission was to investigate the extensive secret research and industrial operations in the synthetic fuel industry which were being carried on in Germany during World War II. As the Allied armies advanced into Germany in 1945, teams of Mission investigators -- American and British experts in their fields -- visited all important synthetic oil targets available in the areas seized by the Allies.

The primary fields covered in the oil and synthetic fuels investigation were concerned with petroleum refining and the gas-synthesis and coal-hydrogenation processes for producing oil from coal. The teams of investigators examined plant sites, collected and evaluated source documents and interrogated plant personnel. The results of this work are contained on 307 reels of microfilm. The information on the reels includes original technical data and documents uncovered at the sites visited, reports of the investigators, and abstracts of articles on related subjects.
When the Petroleum Administration for War was liquidated, the TOM reels were turned over to the Library of Congress. The Library agreed to maintain permanent custody of the original negative reels and to supply distribution copies upon request and payment.

The TOM reels contain a great deal of information of a diversified nature on synthetic fuels distributed throughout the 307 reel run. The reels were subsequently reviewed and the contents of each listed. These listings were compiled and filmed and constitute a register to the collection. To further assist researchers in finding pertinent information contained in this wealth of material, the United States Bureau of Mines published in 1945-51 a five volume classified index to the TOM reels. By using this index, one can locate by specific reel and frame number, reports on any particular subject (reels 260-72 contain abstracts of articles which were not included in the Bureau of Mines subject index). This classified index has also been filmed. Individuals and institutions wishing to review the contents of the TOM reports may wish to purchase either the register index or the classified index prior to purchasing the whole collection or selected parts. These indexes are each contained on one reel of film and can be purchased for $15.00 each. The bibliographic data on the classified index is as follows:

[84610]
Preliminary classified index of Technical Oil Mission reels
4 v. 27cm. (Its Administrative publication)
Cover title.
---Supplementary preliminary classified index to Technical Oil Mission reels 281-306, compiled by W. M. Sternberg.
i, 87 l. 27cm. (Administrative publication)
Cover title.
TH572.A45 1949

The Photoduplication Service can provide the entire collection of TOM reports, including the Bureau of Mines index and register index on 309 reels of 35mm positive, silver halide microfilm for $5,565.00, postage included. Orders requiring shipment to other than North American addresses should add an additional $1.00 per reel for surface postage. Individual reels are available for $20.00 each. All of the above prices are guaranteed through January 1982.

The TOM reels are numbered 1-31, 32 (1), 32 (2), 33-105, 106 (1), 106 (2), 107-179 [there is no 180] 181-306.

The Library of Congress Photoduplication Service is pleased to announce the availability of the complete Intelligence Series prepared following World War II by the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command.

The purpose of the series was to record the important work done by the intelligence agencies in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The series was written in order to fill the gap which had previously existed in military literature on the practical aspects of intelligence in war. The introductory volume is an abbreviated history of the overall operations of the G-2 Section in the Southwest Pacific Area. The nine numbered volumes in the series each present in detail the essential features of a particular agency or group within the Section. Accompanying these descriptions are documentary appendices containing original documents, reports, orders, plans, etc. in order to show wartime operational procedures. Volumes I-VIII cover the wartime military operations while Volume IX outlines the non-military intelligence operations during the first three years of the Occupation of Japan.

The Photoduplication Service can provide the entire Intelligence Series on 11 reels of 35mm positive, silver halide, safety base microfilm for $185.00, domestic postage included. Individual volumes may be purchased at the prices listed below. For shipment to other than North American addresses, add an additional $1.00 per reel for surface postage. Address orders and inquiries to the Library of Congress, Photoduplication Service, Department C, Washington, D.C. 20540. Checks should be made payable to the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service. To avoid confusion in filling orders for similar titles, include the microfilm shelf number — the bracketed five-digit number following the citation — with each title ordered.

Introduction
A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA & Affiliated Units, prepared by the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo, Japan. July 8, 1948.
1 v. charts, maps, photos.

[51357] 1 reel $14.00
Vol. I
The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, ....
Tokyo, Japan. March 20, 1948.
2 v. charts, maps, photos.
[84622] 1 reel $19.00

Vol. II
Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation, .... Tokyo, Japan. June 10, 1948.
2 v. charts, maps.
[84623] 1 reel $22.00

Vol. III
Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, SWPA/FEC/SCAP, .... Tokyo, Japan. April 1, 1951.
5 v. charts, maps, photos.
[53158] 2 reels $34.00

Vol. IV
Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA, .... Tokyo, Japan. August 19, 1948.
3 v. charts, illus., maps.
[51356] 1 reel $19.00

Vol. V
Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA, .... Tokyo, Japan. July 12, 1948.
2 v. charts, maps, photos.
[51353] 1 reel $19.00

Vol. VI
3 v. charts, maps, photos.
[51381] 1 reel $18.00

Vol. VII
Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit in the SWPA, .... Tokyo, Japan. March 20, 1948.
1 v. chart, maps, photos.
[51352] 1 reel $14.00

Vol. VIII
Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, .... Tokyo, Japan. July 29, 1948.
2 v. chart, maps, photos.
[51355] 1 reel $16.00

Vol. IX
Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, GHQ, FEC & SCAP, .... Tokyo, Japan. December 31, 1949.
4 v. charts, maps, photos.
[51350] 1 reel $21.00
SRH-037 Reports Received by U.S. War Dept. on Use of Ultra in the European Theater, WWII
THE USE OF "U" IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
NORTHWEST AFRICAN THEATRES OF WAR

MIDDLE EAST - WESTERN DESERT (1941)

1. "U" was first made available to Middle East Command of the Royal Air Force in February 1941, by direct (Special) Signals link from EF. Although I was at no time on the Staff of M.E., I acquired an adequate insight into the methods under which it was used operationally in the Mediterranean by contact with the G.I.O. (G/C Paynter), and with the Head of the Heliopolis Bureau (Lt. Col. Jacob) as well as by visits to the Command, in 1942. Close contact was particularly necessary, because a direct "U" service had not, prior to that, been available to Commands; I initiated this as Head of the "U" Air Intelligence Section at EF. Until some experience had accumulated, it was decided to limit the service to Command Headquarters.

2. At that time, far and away the greater part of the material dealt with was G.A.P. material. Security restrictions on the use to which the Intelligence obtained was put operationally were rigid, so that, unless there was corroboration from other sources, no specific operational ACTION was taken on any specific piece of "U" intelligence, exploitation being confined to the study of G.A.P. capabilities and intentions, on a longer term basis.

3. The picture it was possible to obtain on this basis, however, was most complete, and since - at that stage of the War - "The intentions of the German Air Force were the intentions of the German Armed Forces as a whole" this picture gave a reliable clue to the overall plans of the German High Command in any particular Theatre.

4. With the dispatch of a British Air Force to Greece, and in view of the menace of German intervention there, a limited service to A.O.C., Greece was started, limited in the sense that only subjects of special importance were covered, as comprehensive appreciations. A service to R.A.F., Headquarters, Western Desert, and - a little later - to 201 Group, R.A.F., at Alexandria (mainly engaged on anti-shipping operations), was also initiated from EF. about that time.

5. Fusion of "U" and "T" Intelligence, the possibilities of which had been the subject of keen study at EF. by the R.A.F. "T" and "U" Air Intelligence Sections, had by then begun to take shape. Again for Security reasons, such
fusion was restricted to BP and Cairo (Middle East Bureau, Heliopolis, and NOT HQ R.A.F., M.E.). The co-ordinated collation of "U" and "T" was by then producing fairly substantial pictures of C.A.F. activity, of the greatest use for background and Intelligence assessment purposes. Opportunities of tactical application arose under secure conditions, and were taken, with good results, on an increasing scale. (The interception of German Bomber and Reconnaissance aircraft was successfully arranged for as a result of intelligence obtained from "T" plus "U", or from "U" plus an acceptable corroborative alibi from "T").

AXIS SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE

6. Similarly, direct operational application became possible in 1941, of intelligence on enemy shipping (Trans-Mediterranean convoys) from "U" (C.A.F. and Italian Naval) sources. BP, "U" Air Intelligence collated all the information reaching the Station and furnished comprehensive shipping intelligence to BP R.A.F., M.E., to XXI Group R.A.F. and to the Royal Navy (C.O.I.S.) at Alexandria, and also to V.A. and A.O.G. Malta. This, in co-ordination as far as Naval addresses were concerned, with Intelligence going from Admiralty over Naval channels. Operational application took the form of orientation of air reconnaissance against ships or convoys, and the information supplied permitted the establishment of an order of priority for the attack of convoys of greater or lesser importance, as revealed by "U". In the over-riding interests of "U" Security, offensive action was NOT taken against any such shipping targets UNLESS there was clearly a second source (such as Air - or Naval Reconnaissance -, "T" or other sources) which had corroborated.

7. Air reconnaissance for a ship or convoy known to be on passage from "U" sources was not laid on in specific terms of a search for such movement; recce sorties were dispatched to cover the sea areas involved; fairly precise courses having been reported by "U" for the whole passage, recce sorties were organised with cross-over points allowing for particularly full cover of crucial areas. This, to avoid the blatant a change in the pattern of reconnaissance searches, which might have compromised sources.

8. Discrimination was exercised by the "U" Air Intelligence Section at BP, in the amount and detail of information signalled to various addresses. R.A.F., M.E. and C.O.I.S. Alexandria, received fuller information than 201.
Group or Malta, although the service to the latter developed, as experience was gained, to a fuller basis.

GREECE AND CRETE

9. The invasion of Greece by the Germans, G.A.F. preparations for which had become clear from "U" months before, produced a greater volume of "U" Intelligence of specific interest to the British Army, and a direct service was then initiated from H.P. to G.O.C. Greece, in co-ordination with the service to A.O.C. Greece.

10. During the Greek campaign and indeed, before this started, the "U" Air Intelligence Section at H.P. had discerned a German intention to stage a large scale airborne operation involving a sea crossing, based in the Balkans. By a process of deduction at first, subsequently backed by more concrete indications from "U" sources, it was possible to fix Crete as the objective of this operation, and several papers on the subject were produced, with a circulation limited to the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Departments in Whitehall and C.S.S. It was clear that the operation was timed to take place as soon after the over-running of Greece as possible, and when later "U" gave the precise date and full plan of operation, details were communicated to Cairo. As much use as possible, consistent with security, was made of this intelligence in preparing the defence of the Island, but the danger of giving complete information to G.O.C. Crete, in his exposed position, presented a grave problem. On the Prime Minister's decision, the H.P. "U" Air Intelligence Section produced a paper purporting to be a compendium of German documents obtained through Secret Service channels from General Headquarters at Athens, the summary being couched in terms consistent with such an "alibi". This was then signalled to G.O.C. Crete over a special link, using "One-Time-Pad" Cypher procedure. The full and detailed knowledge available to the defence of the Island certainly contributed in a large measure towards making the operation a very much more costly one to the enemy than he had bargained for, costly both in terms of casualties and in terms of time.

10. The cost in time was particularly damaging to the enemy because he was unable to get off the mark sufficiently quickly in organising G.A.F. intervention in Syria and Iraq, where Rashid Ali had then begun to give trouble. Fairly detailed knowledge of German intentions in connection with the Rashid Ali rising, and of German transactions with General Dentsz in Syria, had also
become available from "U" and allied sources, as I might mention in passing.

THE C.A.P. BUILD-UP IN ITALY

11. Intelligence continued to become available from "U" on an increasing scale as the German Air Force developed its build-up in the Mediterranean. The reinforcement of that Theatre by Fliegerkorps I from Norway was first foreshadowed by a few scraps of information which came into OP. The incident is of particular interest because it proved the over-riding importance of a clearing-house for ALL C.A.P. Intelligence, dealing with the digestion and collation of such intelligence on a central basis. Speaking from memory, the first indication that something untoward was happening in connection with Fliegerkorps I was a "U" message from which it was apparent that in a reshuffle of W/7, point-to-point Call-Signs in the Luftlotte 5 (Norway) complex, Fliegerkorps I was to figure less largely than before. The next scrap, about a week or ten days later, was the presence of elements of Fliegerkorps I's Staff at Munich, indicated by contacts with Luftgau VIII. It was appreciated at the time that the two items of intelligence together portrayed the move of Fliegerkorps I from Norway to Luftgau VIII area, OR TO AN AREA SERVED BY Luftgau VIII. This might be France (where Luftlotte 3 was fully deployed at the time); it could not be the Balkans because VIENNA was the clearing-house for that Theatre. Munich, on the other hand, had been identified as the rear base for C.A.P. elements in the Western Desert; it would also be ideally situated for any units going to Italy. Then, again a week or ten days later, Call-Signs from one or two apparently Fliegerkorps I aircraft were reported by "U" in the Mediterranean, the picture was complete and the Corps' destination clear. It was considered that the C.A.P. would hardly contemplate basing a substantial Bomber force, such as was contained in Fliegerkorps I, in the Western Desert, and conclusions were:

(a) the base area would be Italy (including Sicily);
(b) the intention to step up the anti-shipping effort in the Mediterranean in general and in the Sicilian Straits in particular, as well as the development of Long-Range Bomber support to the Africa Corps.

Designs of Air action against Malta were also implicit in the appreciated re-deployment.
13. The substantial reinforcement of the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean did not, therefore, come as a surprise, when increased activity finally confirmed it, and the subsequent transfer to Greece of Fliegerkorps X was also reported by "U" well ahead of the actual date on which it took place, as well as the move of Luftflotte 2, with Kesselring as C-in-C German Forces in the Mediterranean, later still.

MIDDLE EAST - WESTERN DESERT (1942)

14. Meanwhile "U" had continued to produce intelligence on Fliegerkorps X in Africa, of value to both the R.A.F. and the Army, and progress was also made on obtaining "U" on the Africa Corps direct. Apart from the service to Cairo, the Desert Army and Desert Air Force received detailed reports from "U" in the "U" series, which was then rising above 100 signals a day.

15. I visited Middle East on two occasions in 1942, in May and in July, and was able to appreciate the very great value attached to the "U" service at both Army and R.A.F. Headquarters, Middle East, in Cairo, as well as by C.O.I.O. Alexandria. In Cairo, D.M.I. and C.I.C., each with a restricted number of Staff Officers, absorbed the general picture of the enemy situation as conveyed by the "U" service, and had, at all times, access to both C.O.C.-C.O.S. and A.O.C.-C.S.A.S.O., in connection with "U" Intelligence. On the air side the principal value of this Intelligence lay in providing a proper background for C.I.O. in appreciating the enemy's intentions and capabilities, and in allowing of adequate briefing of A.O.C.-C. when considering decisions of policy and strategy. This was equally true of Headquarters, Western Desert Air Force where, however, "U" Intelligence was, security permitting, put to tactical use, as well. At this latter Headquarters, only the A.O.C., S.A.S.O., and J.I.O. were in the "U" picture. The S.I.O. interpreted the information contained in "U" signals, against the background of intelligence available to him locally through "Y" and other Operational Intelligence sources, discussing this interpretation with S.A.S.O. and A.O.C., who also read the original "U" signals. In addition to spot reports, "U", in consultation with Air Ministry, periodically signalled summaries of background intelligence derived from "U" sources, against the picture of combined Situation Reports signalled home from the Desert and Cairo (and made available to "U”). Such summaries covered either a period of general activity by the G.A.F. in the Theatre, or specific features of activity and intentions, and were designed to provide a
recapitulation of the full picture, as available at EF, because the destruction
by fire of all "U" reports promptly after reading was always rigorously enforced
at Advanced Headquarters in the Desert.

16. An incident during my first visit to Middle East is worthy of recalling,
as showing one of the less usual possibilities of exploitation of "U" Intelligence.
A.O.C. Western Desert Air Force, whom I visited at his Headquarters at Gebut,
mentally registered a point in connection with G.A.F. intentions against Malta,
mentioned in the course of a general Air Intelligence expose. I had told the
A.O.C. that the indications were that the G.A.F. would not continue its D.A.
bombing of Malta from Sicilian bases, which was proving very costly for them,
that they would probably confine their Air action against Malta to night blits
activity only, and that fighters, then employed on escorting day-bombers to
Malta, would no longer be required there. I added that there were No. 109 P
Fighters, embodying various substantial improvements over Fliegerführer Africa's
No. 109 F's. On my return to Cairo next day, A.O.C.-in-C Middle East enquired how
strong was my information on the possibilities of the calling-off of the day-
bombing of Malta, and asked that no day raids had, in effect, taken place there
for two or three days past. He told me that the reason behind his question
was a demand from A.O.C. Western Desert, just received by (special link) signal,
for a diversion of Spitfires from Malta to the Western Desert, in order to meet
the probable move of No. 109 P's from Sicily to Africa, and in view of the
superiority of this type over Hurricanes and Tomahawks in the Desert Air Force.
Spitfires were duly allocated to the Western Desert Air Force soon after this
incident, which took place on the eve of the Rommel offensive ending at Alamein;
by this time I had returned to EF.

17. Research work had been terminated in the meantime at EF, on a means of
securing "U" Intelligence from a particular source in the Desert on a spot basis,
in a simplified manner. I had studied the possibilities of organising local
exploitation in Middle East of any such intelligence which might become available,
during my visit there and, three weeks after my return to EF, was again sent out
to Cairo to provide this service. I obtained the fullest facilities from both
G.O.C. and A.O.C.-in-C in Cairo and, on the basis of original material procured
through Alexandria and Heliopolis, a small "but 6" type party was provided at
the Middle East Bureau at Heliopolis. Their material was dispatched to me
at Headquarters Middle East, Cairo (by special arrangements, and ensuring all
security safeguards) where I took full action of the "But 3" type, including, of course, the Air Intelligence side. I occupied an office in a suite specially set aside for the S.L.U. at Headquarters, and, in conjunction with General Staff and Air Staff Intelligence, ran a service to the Alamein Headquarters, providing information of the highest tactical value on an hour-to-hour basis over the S.L.U. link. This, in addition to the normal EP service. General Auchinleck, G.O.C.-in-C Middle East at the time, expressed the opinion that, had we not had the "U" service, Rommel would certainly have got through to Cairo. Having got this special service underway, two R.A.F. Intelligence Officers from EP were sent out to Cairo to take it over from us after six weeks.

**OPERATION TORCH**

18. On my return to U.K. (September, 1942) I took over the post of Chief Air Intelligence Officer at the Headquarters (the formation of which was then being completed) of General Eisenhower's Allied Force. Working under the general direction of the A.O.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q., at Norfolk House in London, the day-to-day and long-term appreciation (based mainly on "U") of G.A.F. intentions in the Mediterranean Theatre - including planners' requirements - and a sharp look-out for any indications of knowledge the enemy might have gained of our own intentions in that Theatre, were my particular functions. At the same time I made all preparations for the future efficient and secure exploitation of "U" Air Intelligence in the Theatre. Apart from organising the Intelligence Branch of Eastern Air Command, Royal Air Force (Air Marshal Welsh), and making all arrangements with Air Ministry for the provision of an adequate "U" service in North Africa, these preparations entailed:

- **a)** Arrangements for the closest co-operation between Army and Naval Intelligence and my own Branch at Allied Force Headquarters,
  under A.O.C. of S., G-2.

- **b)** Arrangements for adequate handling of "U" Intelligence at Headquarters XIIth Air Force, USAAF (General Doolittle) etc., on the planned deployment, were to become established at Oran, whilst A.F.H.Q. settled at Algiers.
(a) Similar arrangements to the case of Eastern Air Command, Royal Air Force. (On a smaller scale, because their Headquarters were to be at Algiers, near AFRQ).

(d) Preliminary provision of similar arrangements in the case of 242 Group R.A.F., the Close-Support Force which was to operate under E.A.C., in Eastern Algeria and Tunisia.

(e) Arrangements to ensure a constant flow of all intelligence to and from AFRQ, by S.L.U., in the case of "U" Intelligence, and by other channels in the case of general and combat Intelligence.

19. At AFRQ, I had three officers on my staff, handling "U" material. One of them had had considerable experience of it at Air Ministry(A.I.J.(b)), one other had been a Station Intelligence Officer in Fighter Command, R.A.F., and required indoctrination. The third was a "Y-U" fusion officer, from R.P.

Two other officers, who were on my staff at the time, and who were to be Senior Intelligence Officers at Headquarters Eastern Air Command and Headquarters 242 Group, were also detailed for the handling of "U".

20. As regards the other Services, and apart, of course, from the A.C. of S., C-2 himself (Brigadier Hoekler-Ferryman), some four officers of the Army Operational Intelligence Section, and the Naval S.O.I. and S.O.Y. were "U" indoctrinated. At Headquarters XIIth Air Force the A.C. of S., A-2 and one other officer were indoctrinated.

21. So much for Intelligence circles. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, his Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, the A.C. of S., C-3, the Chief Signals Officer and the Signals Intelligence Officer, received indoctrination at AFRQ. On the Naval side, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, his Chief of Staff and the S.O.O. On the Air side, the A.O.C., R.A.F., his S.A.S.O. and C/O Ops., as well as the Commanding General XIIIth Air Force, his Chief of Staff and the A.C. of S., A-3. On the R.A.F. side, the O.C. "Y" Units destined for North Africa, was also in the picture.

22. S.L.U. facilities comprised four units, the principal one of which was to serve AFRQ. two others, the forces landing at Oran and Casablanca, and the last, the forces destined to push east towards Tunisia.

23. During the pre-D-Day period at Norfolk House full "U" cover was available on the C.A.F. in the Mediterranean, and told us precisely how little
information on our TORCH plan was available to the enemy. That we had some important intentions in the Mediterranean was patent to him from his Secret Service Reports, including information on our Air build-up at Gibraltar, and also of increased Naval preparations at that port. It was patent to us, however, thanks to "U", that the enemy mis-appreciated the purpose of our preparations and was hesitating between forecasting an operation to reinforce Malta on a very large scale, alternatively a landing in Tripolitania, and alternatively again, the relief of Tobruk. The deployment of his Air Forces, including the basing of short range forces (Ju.87's and fighters) in Sicily and Sardinia, confirmed that he had no inkling of our intention to land well west of the Sicilian Straits. In sum, the enemy's planned reactions to all the intelligence he was receiving, were limited to a strengthening of his potential effort against shipping proceeding through "Bomb Alley". Although part of our assault convoy was spotted by reconnaissance aircraft in the Atlantic, over a thousand ships passed through the Straits of Gibraltar shortly before D-Day and proceeded to their destinations in Algeria without interference by the enemy Air Forces.

2a. At the end of October 1942 the advanced element of AFEQ opened at Gibraltar. The Intelligence side of the staff comprised the A.C.of S., G-2, with half a dozen Staff Officers (two of whom were "U" indoctrinated), Naval S.O.1 and S.O.1, and myself with three officers, all "U" indoctrinated.

My staff was joined at Gibraltar by an officer from the XIIIth Air Forces who, at my request, had been attached to me to act as my deputy. He also received "U" indoctrination and was, more particularly, to look after XIIIth Air Force interests in my central Air Intelligence organisation at AFEQ. Intelligence requirements of the Allied-Commander-in-Chief and of the Air and Naval Commanders on the spot during the final preparatory stages and the assault stage, were met at Gibraltar, information from "U" combined with that coming in from Secret Service and Operational sources giving a particularly clear picture of the mixed state of affairs in French North Africa. The Headquarters S.L.U., handled a large volume of traffic from EF, and also assured communications of a special Intelligence nature, via the S.L.U. (which had landed at Algiers with the assault convoy) serving the forward element of AFEQ under General Mark Clark, and which included a "U" indoctrinated Army Intelligence Staff Officer.
The R.A.F. "T" service at Gibraltar was providing extremely useful information on the G.A.P. picture, but could not satisfy all requirements because of its remoteness and poor interception conditions. I therefore borrowed equipment and personnel from the Gibraltar "T" station and dispatched them by air to Algiers under the command of my "T-U" fusion officer who, first at Algiers and subsequently at Bône, provided supplementary intelligence to Allied Air Force units based on Algerian airfields, which was of particular value on the tactical, defensive side, pending the establishment of the Allied Radar chain in Algeria. The value of this supplementary "T" element, particularly in providing early warning of impending G.A.P. attacks in the early days of the North African campaign, can be largely attributed to the complete and detailed knowledge of the G.A.P. and of its deployment in the Mediterranean of my "T-U" fusion officer, used as mental background in the interpretation of "T" traffic. The importance of full collation of "T" Signals Intelligence in the accurate perspective furnished by "U", induced me to strengthen by "T-U" fusion party to a staff of three at an early date, the staff spending half their days in my "U" office at AFHQ, and half their days at the "T" station (in the suburbs of Algiers), where a full "T" picture from local intercepts, supplemented by Chaddle broadcasts, was available. As soon as the whole of the advanced element of AFHQ had moved to Algiers, and when it became apparent that the allied ground forces would not succeed in over-runnig Tunisia until the following Spring, I turned to the intensified local exploitation of intelligence (almost exclusively from "U") on Axis reinforcement and supply traffic to North African ports and along Tunisian roads and railways towards Libya, which traffic would obviously require considerable attention by the Allied Air Forces. To serve the Allied Forces established in Eastern Algeria and Western Tunisia, S.I.O., elements were established for 242 Group and Army Headquarters. At the former, A.O.C., S.A.S.C., and S.I.O., were "U" indoctrinated and received a limited direct service from WP, supplemented by daily appreciations, signalled from Algiers over the special link, based on "U" and all other intelligence. Headquarters Eastern Air Command R.A.F., (at Maison Carrée, near Algiers) received "U" Intelligence through my branch at AFHQ, and gave me Combat Intelligence. Headquarters XIIth Air Force, USASC, were moved up to Algiers as well and a similar two-way traffic of intelligence was established with them.
26. On the one hand, therefore, G-2 Air at AFRQ was handling G.A.F. Intelligence from all sources, to meet requirements of the Air Forces employed tactically, as well as to complete the Intelligence picture required by the Ground Forces and the Navy. This entailed following very closely, and in detail, the G.A.F.'s effort and intentions over the forward areas and against our shipping in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. The basis was the comprehensive fusion of Intelligence from all sources, clarified by the powerful light cast upon the whole situation by "U". On the other hand there was the detailed study of the build-up of Axis reinforcements and supplies to Tunisia and Libya, with a view to providing the necessary guidance for the development of our offensive effort against such traffic, both by our Air Forces and our Navies. By making full use of all Signals facilities (S.L.U., "Y" point-to-point services, direct telephone lines and general Signals channels, as well as courier officers) a complete picture of all friendly and enemy Air activity became available daily at AFRQ, and was presented at the Chief of Staff's morning meeting by the A.O. of S., G-2. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air held a daily meeting at which details of strategic Air action against enemy supply traffic were decided, and directives issued for the operations of the XIIth Air Force and E.A.C. (Wellingtons), as well as for co-ordinated fighter action by 242 Group. This meeting was attended by S.A.S.O. or G/O Ops. from E.A.C., by the Chief of Staff or the A.O. of S., A-3, XIIth Air Force, as well as by Naval and Army representatives, all on the "U" list. After the arrival in North Africa of General Spatz, the meeting was also attended by him and his A.O. of S., A-2. I presented the full Intelligence picture on which the adaptation of general policy to the current situation, and the selection of specific targets for bomber or fighter-bomber attention were based. Extremely detailed "U" Intelligence on enemy shipping guided attacks against convoys or vessels on passage between Italian and North African ports, and was exploited on the basis of corroboration by suitably oriented Air Reconnaissance, or by direct attack in the course of Naval or Air sweeps carefully planned from the points of view of effectiveness and security. In the case of attacks upon shipping in harbours, Air attack could be directed with less danger to security, because harbour areas in which important target ships could lie were restricted and general attacks on such harbour areas would therefore pay adequate dividends.
or because the results of Photo Recon, confirming "U" reports, provided a sufficiently satisfactory "open" source of Intelligence to warrant designation of specific ships as targets. We often knew the contents of the cargo of individual ships, and we also knew from what particular shortages the enemy was suffering; this gave us the basis for the allocation of priorities of attack.

27. To ensure that a full and accurate Intelligence picture was kept before Commanders and Senior Staff Officers, I produced a daily "U" Digest, including important matters from open sources by way of completing the picture. In view of the direct interest of ALL aspects of the campaign to Air Commanders and, conversely, of the equally direct interest of Naval and Army Commanders in the Air Intelligence picture, this daily Digest was not limited to Air subjects, but covered all three fields, from the Air point of view. The circulation of this "Top Secret" document was restricted to the A.O.C.of S., G-2 (who submitted it to the Allied Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff) General Spaatz and his A.O.C.of S., A-2, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, A.O.C., E.A.O. and C.G., XIIth Air Force (and their indoctrinated staffs), the Naval Commander-in-Chief, his Chief of Staff and S.O.I. All copies were promptly returned to me for destruction by fire, a file copy being retained in my branch under secure conditions.

28. "U" cover was so detailed and complete, that we had advance notice of every intention and move of the German forces in Africa and Italy, and of as many moves and intentions of Italian forces as fell into joint Italo-German programs. By following a few basic rules and by exercising ordinary common-sense it was possible to make the greatest use of all this Intelligence, strategically and tactically, without endangering security. But the intimate knowledge afforded by "U", of every facet of the enemy situation, was probably more valuable still, in that it permitted an accurate appreciation of enemy capabilities on a long-term basis and, therefore, the framing of the proper policies to deal with them. One of the factors which was of decisive importance in this whole picture was the confidence induced in all Commanders and Senior Staff Officers, a most important point in an integrated Headquarters such as AVEQ, with staffs drawn from the three Services of each of two nations. In this connection, the work of my deputy (Col. Palmer Dixon) in keeping the full picture before Headquarters, XIIth Air Force, was outstanding, and provided a solid foundation for that Headquarters when it moved east to Constantine, and also
for Headquarters, Northwest African Air Forces (with a staff partly drawn from the XIII) when it also set up there and handled "U" Intelligence direct, with less dependence on AFHQ.

29. After this development the daily Target Meetings at AFHQ, where Headquarters, Mediterranean Air Command had also then set up, (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder) were discontinued, (they took place at Headquarters NAFF,) and the full Air picture was from then on given to the Chief of Staff's meeting by me, subsequently by Air Commodore Woolley (or Col. Dixon) when I joined the staff of Headquarters, NAFF, as Deputy A.C. of S, A-2 in April 1943, some six weeks after its formation.

30. At the latter Headquarters, which exercised executive control over the North West African Strategic, Tactical and Coastal Air Forces, there was a substantial, integrated Intelligence Staff, comprising Combat Intelligence, Target Intelligence, "T" and Counter-Intelligence Sections. A "U" Section had also been formed, and I devoted particular attention to this, in order to provide, again, the fullest fusion of Intelligence from all sources. A daily Digest was again produced, as well as an interpretative "U" service, over S.U.L links, to formations under Command. Close touch was also kept with the Air Intelligence branch at M.A.C. (AFHQ), with particular reference to "U". A daily as well as a weekly Intelligence Summary were produced at NAFF Headquarters, by the Combat Intelligence Section (the Head of which was duly indoctrinated.) These two documents were written on the basis of open Intelligence only, but were checked by the "U" Section for erroneous implications. The daily report dealt almost exclusively with factual matter and corrections were seldom necessary. The Weekly Summary, including, as it did, a statement of the Order of Battle of the German and Italian Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre (and other deducive matter), based on "T", Combat Intelligence and Photo Recon results, not infrequently contained mis-appreciations in connection with points of detail, although there were rarely any erroneous interpretations as far as the over-all picture was concerned. By applying "U" background knowledge to the scrutiny of the matter submitted weekly to the "U" Section (known as the C.I.P. Section) it was possible to avoid the publication of inaccurate information in this document, which was classified SECRET only. By and large, Combat Intelligence
produced a very good Intelligence Summary, without access to "U" sources.

The section which required particular watching from the "U" security point of view, was that based on "T", where the line of demarcation with "U" was sometimes exceedingly thin due, of course, to the "U" background available in the minds of some "T" officers, acquired chiefly in their contacts with "Y-U" Fusion officers. Furthermore, at the time the Germans were still comparatively indifferent in their E/T traffic, making it possible for a good "T" officer to get a fairly clear picture of what was going on.

OPERATION HUSKY

31. In May 1943, a Command Post - with essential staffs only - was set up jointly by M.A.C. (Air Chief Marshal Tedder) and N.A.F. (General Spaatz) at La Marsa, near Tunis, to take over control of all Air Operations directed against Sicily and the Italian mainland in connection with the imminent invasion of Sicily. I was appointed Chief Intelligence Officer, with a very streamlined staff to deal with indispensable Intelligence only. Because the structure of the Intelligence Branch at La Marsa was, in my opinion, the ideal type-organisation required at a Headquarters of this sort, I shall describe its composition and functions in detail.

32. (a) G.A.F. Intelligence Section ("U" Section). Here there was one officer specializing on all G.A.F. Intelligence, particularly that gleaned from "U" sources, with an assistant in the shape of a "Y-U" Fusion Officer who, again, spent half his time at the "T" Station nearby and half his time in my "U" office. Both were Royal Air Force officers. Intelligence on Axis reinforcement and supply traffic was dealt with by two other officers (one R.A.F. and one U.S. Army Air Corps). Clerical assistance was provided by a Junior R.A.F. officer (shorthand-typist), and the whole staff was in self-contained offices, contiguous to mine and to the S.L.U. serving the Headquarters.

(b) Combat Intelligence Section. This Section, located in separate offices half a flight of stairs below the G.A.F. Section, was staffed by three U.S. Army Air Corps officers, assisted by a clerical staff of three enlisted men, and dealt with all Air Intelligence from "T", Photo (and other) Reconnaissance, and other non-"U" sources.

(c) Target Intelligence Section. Located in an office-trailer hard-by the other Intelligence offices, this Section consisted of one U.S. Army Air Corps officer and one R.A.F. officer, assisted by three enlisted men.
33. The Intelligence Branch thus had a total strength of eleven officers and seven other ranks, all provided by Headquarters, R.A.F., with the exception of some of the clerical staff. A direct "U" service from HQ, working on a full (and very large) volume basis, supplied spot Intelligence on all subjects affecting the Mediterranean Theatre, Sea, Land and Air.

NA.C assisted particularly in connection with the study of supply traffic through the Italian L. of C., by a "U" service over the Algiers-La Marsa S.L.U. link, and recapitulative summaries and appreciations were exchanged over the same special link with Algiers and Air Ministry (through B.P.).

Where desirable, such signals were repeated to formations under Command, as well as to Cairo, whence Headquarters, R.A.F. Middle East also frequently took occasion to signal appreciations and queries. It was not found necessary to maintain a night duty officer in the "U" Section, although the volume of information flowing in, and the work entailed with the clarification of the general picture from the day's "U" activity, made for late working hours at night. The S.L.U. operated on a twenty-four hour basis and called on me, or one of the officers concerned, in the event of any particularly important signals arriving during the early hours.

34. The Combat Intelligence Section received its information arising out of the activity of Commands under NA.F. through Main Headquarters, Constantine, except for "T" and Photo Recon results, which it received direct from the "T" Station and from the Photo Interpretation Unit at La Marsa airfield.

The last mentioned source of Intelligence was a most important one and, as Photo Reconnaissance of airfield and other targets was controlled by Command Post, under co-ordination by myself, it was possible to guide activity in the closest relation to Intelligence and Operational requirements, on an hour-to-hour basis. A daily, brief Operational Intelligence Report was produced by the Combat Intelligence Section at La Marsa; the full daily summary continued to be produced at Constantine, and there was the closest touch between the two Combat Intelligence Sections. The Combat Intelligence Section worked round the clock, the late-night Duty Officer being responsible for the production of the daily Operational Intelligence Report. Constantine continued to produce the weekly Intelligence Summary after clearing at La Marsa.
35. The Target Intelligence Section was kept supplied with Target material by its parent section at HAP, Headquarters, and by the Photo Interpretation Unit at La Marsa. A full range of Target dossiers was kept to meet tactical, and particularly strategic bombing requirements, arising out of the application of general policy or of intelligence from "U" or other sources, on specific targets. For reproduction work and plotting, the facilities of the Ph.I.U. were available.

36. The full Intelligence picture was presented daily by me at the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief's daily meeting attended by Commanders, Chiefs of Staff and Operations Staff Officers of all formations under Command. During the first part of this meeting representatives from Army Group Headquarters and from the Navy gave their accounts of the situation, followed by detailed reports by the Air Commanders on their activity during the previous twenty-four hours. Before the second part of the meeting officers who were not "U" indoctrinated took their leave, and I then presented the full Intelligence picture, compiled from all sources, including "U". After this, targets were selected for attack two days later, based on my suggestions. Not infrequently it was necessary, due to the quickly changing situation, to recommend modification of the next day's programme of bombing operations as agreed twenty-four hours earlier. This was particularly necessary in the case of our Air offensive against enemy airfields, in respect of which "U" kept us very fully informed of bombing results and the consequent frequent re-incipial of G.A.F. units. In the preparatory period before the Allied landing in Sicily, the rate of destruction to landing areas on airfields used by the G.A.F. was so rapid that the very closest watch of all relevant information and co-ordination of "U", "T" and Photo Recce sources was necessary if wasteful attacks on airfields temporarily evacuated by the enemy because of damage suffered were to be avoided. This was greatly assisted by regular Photo cover of Sicilian airfields at least once - often twice - every day.

The effect of our overwhelming Air superiority applied under those conditions of extremely close co-operation between Operations and Intelligence, was that the Jutstraffe withdrew from the Battle of Sicily altogether at an early date, in the hope of living to fight the Battle of Italy.

37. In view of the small circle of officers receiving "U" Intelligence at the La Marsa Headquarters, and of the ready accessibility at all times of Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General Spaatz, the production of a daily
"U" Digest was not necessary, particularly as the frequent exchange with Air Ministry et al. of views and appreciations (copies of which were circulated) provided adequate recapitulative summaries for the benefit of all concerned.

38. Upon my posting to Air Ministry at the beginning of August 1943, the Intelligence Branch at La Marsa continued to function on the lines described, under the direction of my successor, during the remaining stages of the Battle of Sicily and the opening phases of the Italian campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

39. "U" was first exploited in Overseas Commands in the Mediterranean Theatre. If its Operational application in Middle East tended to suffer from over-humility in the beginning, this was certainly a good fault at a time when, because there was insufficient experience prudence could hardly be exaggerated.

40. As experience accumulated and the Intelligence background became increasingly solid, there was more scope for discrimination as to the direct application of "U" to operations, with less risk to security. The selection and the creation of "alibis" became easier, because of a wider Intelligence knowledge on the one hand and of greater Operational resources on the other.

41. In spite of this, however, no liberties were taken and the standard of "U" security, directly and indirectly, was a high one. Apart from difficulties in some cases, in keeping officers on the "U" List from flying operationally, there was no problem about direct security, if regulations were strictly observed. The exercise of caution in the indirect aspect (i.e. in the Operational use of source) was more difficult because there was always a danger that - in order to exploit a good opportunity - extremely thin corroborative information would be viewed through rose-coloured glasses and be construed into the cast-iron alibi required. My own maxims was that the alibi must contain more information of the kind which MIGHT induce a NORMAL operation, than the original item from "U", and that I must not assume that, in the event of a security investigation, the enemy would automatically dismiss the possibility of a "U" leakage, merely because there had been another source. "You can't fool all of the people all of the time".

42. As to the value of "U" in the Mediterranean, we have a yard-stick
available which we can use to compare an Air Intelligence organisation WITH or WITHOUT 'U'. We had full 'U' Intelligence on the German Air Force, but NOT on the Italian. Our picture of the latter was incomplete and our knowledge far from sound; so - fortunately - was the I.A.F. Had we not known more about the G.A.F. than we knew about the I.A.F., our Intelligence position would have been a weak one; what our Operational position would have been, is not for us to appreciate in this paper.

October, 1945. (Signed) E.H.- Humphreys, Group Captain.
REPORT ON ASSIGNMENT WITH THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

15 AUGUST - 18 SEPTEMBER 1944

(MAJOR WARRACK WALLACE, USA)
N.B. For related material, see SRH-023, pp 22-26, "Reports by U. S. Army Ultra Representatives with Army Field Commands in the European Theatre of Operations."
REPORT ON ASSIGNMENT WITH THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

15 AUGUST - 16 SEPTEMBER 1944

1. Mission. The writer was assigned to duty with Third United States Army on 15 August to assist Major Helfers in the duties of Ultra recipient. He travelled by plane from Heston Field, London, to a temporary landing strip South of Cherbourg, and from there by plane to the Headquarters of 12th Army Group Southeast of Coutances, arriving 15 August. After spending the evening and the following morning with recipients Majors Murnane and Orr, studying the maps, files and procedure, and attending a briefing, he travelled by jeep to HQ Third United States Army, then about ten miles North of Le Mans, arriving 16 August in the evening and reporting forthwith to Major Helfers, recipient, and Colonel Koch, G-2 of Third Army.

2. Third Army Headquarters

a. Headquarters was then under canvas, all tents being camouflaged and cover sought by hugging the hedge-rows. Major Helfers' tent lay across a field from Colonel Koch's tent and three hundred yards from the SLU installation. One CP tent served as quarters and office for Major Helfers and the writer. The SLU unit, consisting of Captain Hutchinson (British), Lts. Hull and Brown (United States), and British enlisted men, was nicely fixed in caravans, wall tents and CP tents.

b. At this time, Major Helfers was confronted with many difficulties. There was no telephone, no electric light, and no transportation except what could be begged from a not-to-willing SLU unit or from overburdened G-2 transportation. The one CP tent was inadequate for living quarters and office space for two officers. The necessity for frequent trips to the SLU unit, to Colonel Koch, and to the engineering section, each requiring a locking up of Ultra maps and information, was a time-killer, and the traffic was then at its peak, amounting to about ninety messages per diem. SLU was not entirely aware of its proper function and needed a little enlightenment, which it thereafter received and accepted with good grace. Moreover, the night was as busy as the day.

3. Division of Duties. Upon the writer's arrival, duties were divided equally, Major Helfers being responsible for the mapping, digesting and briefing for one 24-hour period and the writer for the next period. This procedure was adhered to throughout. The officer not responsible for the briefing used the day to acquire equipment and new maps, to iron out the many physical and routine difficulties, to acquire information from other G-2 personnel and from the G-3 section, and to assist in the briefing and work as circumstances demanded.

At this time Ultra had a bare toe-hold on the thoughts of the Commanding General and G-2 of Third Army and was struggling for a permanent grip. It had proven its operational value at least once in a large way when
a division, on the strength of information supplied by our service alone, had been kept in place to meet a Panzer attack designed to cut the Third's life-line at Avranches, but it was not fully established as yet. The position of Ultra in an Army intelligence section depends largely upon what the CG, Chief of Staff, and G-2 think of its value and every effort was made by the recipients to sap the last ounce of intelligence from the messages and to present each day at the briefing a carefully digested, logically-ordered statement, tied in to a careful and readable situation and information map.

4. Briefing at Headquarters, Third Army.

a. Each morning at 0900 o'clock, a briefing was had in the War Tent at which General Patton and about forty officers, representing the key personnel of Headquarters Staff, were present. The briefing was based upon a carefully maintained situation map covering one end of the tent and consisted of ten-minute presentations by one or more of the G-3 staff, covering our own past, present and future operations, and similar presentations by two of the G-2 personnel, covering enemy identifications and information. When the situation demanded, Colonel Koch presented a summary of enemy intentions and capabilities. Other officers were called upon for impromptu remarks when additional information was desired. A general news report, garnered from public radio broadcasts, ended the meeting.

b. At the conclusion of the general conference, General Gaffey would direct that all officers retire except those who should remain for the "special briefing." All officers in the picture remained, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Patton</td>
<td>CG, Third Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General Gaffey</td>
<td>C of S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Gay</td>
<td>D C of S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Harkens</td>
<td>Aide to CG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Maddox</td>
<td>G-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Koch</td>
<td>G-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel Allen</td>
<td>Assistant to G-2</td>
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</tbody>
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c. On occasions General Weyland, in command of the 19th TAC, was present but his Headquarters was at some distance behind Army Headquarters during the entire drive across France and he usually was briefed by Captain Grove at his own Headquarters. Captain Grove received his messages from SLU at Third Army Headquarters, 12th Army Group Headquarters or at a pad station, as the various situations seemed to require.

d. Either Major Helfers or the writer then proceeded, spreading the Ultra map over the regular war map, and presenting the information orally, from notes and with all possible references to the map which had been carefully prepared up to the minute. The map was an awkward chore in that it was in large scale (1 to 25000) for trundling around through rain and
brambles and at one time it had to cover most of France, with Belgium and Holland thrown in, as the entire situation was pertinent to Third Army operations and of interest to General Patton. When the traffic was heavy, the preparation of the statement and map frequently required a nearly all-night vigil for the briefer of the following day but it was worth every possible effort as it made the intelligence shout out loud as no mere reading of messages or desultory pencil sketch could have done.

e. At the conclusion of the special briefing, General Patton frequently discussed poignant situations with his officers, requested enemy strength estimates and other information, and gave orders for troop dispositions.

4. Position of Ultra in Third Army Intelligence. It is not an overstatement to say that, from the recipient's standpoint, the position of Ultra in Third Army intelligence could hardly be improved. It was not received enthusiastically at the outset, its value then being regarded as insufficient to warrant any use of regular G-2 facilities, but it was given regular hearings and allowed to prove itself. Skepticism gradually wore away, the first item of moment being information of the impending drive by five Panzer divisions to cut the Third Army life-line at Avranches. There was no other information than Ultra on this vital operation and the 35th Division was kept in place to meet this drive on the sole basis of Ultra messages. It was a very good thing that it was. The Division stood its ground against a terrible assault and this defeated or discouraged the whole effort. General Gaffey at a later date mentioned the Avranches incident to the writer as one of the cases in which the service had been invaluable.

Colonel Koch gave the service every opportunity to prove itself but did not express himself as completely convinced of its merit and accuracy until the end of the Le Mans sojourn. Thereafter, he saw to it that every facility was extended to recipients. Priorities were given to the recipients for telephone and electric light installations at each new Headquarters; arrangements were made for their transportation; and, most important, recipients were never diverted from their own work and were permitted to present it directly to General Patton in their own way and with the active assistance and encouragement of Colonel Koch. All 4Z and 5Z messages, and any others which the recipients regarded as urgent, were taken to Colonel Koch at once. Usually, he directed the recipient, alone or with him, to take such messages to Colonel Kaddock, Colonel Harkens, General Gaffey or General Patton. The recipients thus were given the satisfaction of knowing that every item of information was considered by G-2 and passed on to the proper officer. The work was regarded as highly important and the recipients as responsible officers capable of presentation, thus giving every incentive for a maximum effort and an intense interest in the performance.

6. Tactical Use of Ultra by Third Army.

a. The service often is said to be primarily of strategic value and only useful tactically in a static situation. Perhaps its prime value is strategic, but General Patton's use of Ultra in his historic drive across
France is a fitting thesis for a tactical epic. It is a pity that the thousands who contribute in one mechanical way or another to the finished product cannot share in the drama attending its final use in the field. One message, as at Avranches, may turn the spear-points of a German Army and save an entire campaign from disaster. Each day brings some item of value and interest and in many cases the item is the motive force behind whole divisions. The service is so incredibly valuable that it requires time for an intelligent person to believe that it is really reliable. The first impression by other than the gullible is that it is too good to be true.

b. The writer moved with Third Army Headquarters from the hedge-rows of Le Mans to successive positions in the forests near Brou, near Chalons-sur-Marne and Southeast of Verdun. During this period the armor, infantry divisions, and combat teams of the Third Army were spread over the Brest peninsula, driving South towards Nantes and Tours, flanking Argentan at the South of the Falaise pocket, battering out bridge-heads on the Seine both North and South of Paris, throwing out spearheads East and North of Paris towards Chateau Thierry and East and South towards Neufchateau. With its elements thus all over France, the main body was plunging East to the Moselle and Metz. The idea that Ultra is useful tactically only in a static situation became ridiculous as an Army has never moved as fast and as far as the Third Army in its drive across France and Ultra was invaluable every mile of the way. Some of its particular uses in this period were:

(1) When Headquarters was near Chalons, a 5Z message arrived at 0100 o'clock, containing an Army order for an attack at 0300 o'clock by the 15 Pz Gr and the 17 SSPz. The message was taken at once to Colonel Koch who went with the recipient to General Gaffey. Means were devised to warn the Division concerned without jeopardizing security. The German attack was planned upon an exposed flank and at a time when the Army was spread out as "thin as the skin on an egg," in General Patton's language. No other form of intelligence could possibly give such advance warnings.

(2) The regular G-2 sections, by dint of painstaking and intelligent piecing together of scraps gleaned from PW's, captured documents and other sources, identified one morning at the regular meeting five enemy divisions in the line opposing the Third Army. This was good G-2 work. Yet, after the special briefing session following the regular meeting, Colonel Koch called to General Patton's attention that these five divisions had been identified by recipients and placed on the Ultra map as follows: two divisions a week before, two divisions three days before and one the preceding day. It was a common occurrence at the regular meeting for a G-2 man to identify a German division which had been spotted days before by Ultra and announced at the special briefing. On two occasions the regular G-2 staff placed German divisions in the line which were actually in Italy, according to the last Ultra report. At the special briefings following these occasions, it was stated that there had been no Ultra message showing a movement from Italy. In each case, the divisions remained in Italy and the G-2 section, a week or so thereafter, corrected the mistakes which were due to PW's who had strayed to France from their former units in Italy.
(3) When enemy strength estimates were desired, Colonel Koch requested the information by map and figures from the recipients. These were prepared, delivered to him and then discussed. Colonel Koch then made his own overall estimates. Considering the fact that Ultra often had exact figures to the man and the gun, as in the cases of 15 Pz Gr and 3 Pz Gr, or the number of trains required to unload the unit concerned, as in the cases of the 27, 29 and 30 SS Pz Bde, there was very little that regular G-2 information could add to these estimates.

(4) The operational value of the service was so impressive that General Patton never passed a special briefing. If he was unable to attend the regular meeting, he always saw to it that some time during the day the recipients came over to his caravan to make their showing. In fact, the only Third Army party who did not give Ultra its just due was Willie, the General's pink-eyed pit bull, who was too busy with operations against French dogs to collect information and showed his contempt for intelligence by raising his leg on one of the recipient's best maps.


a. The cover for recipients at Third Army was plausible and effective. Instead of furtive efforts to conceal the briefings there was a frank announcement at the regular meeting that the "special briefing" would follow. The recipients thus were known by everyone to conduct a daily briefing for General Patton and a few high officers and were known, also, to have frequent dealings with SLU. It made sense, therefore, to explain their silence as to their own activities by their tie-in with British Intelligence which, presumably, imposed unusual, and perhaps arbitrary, requirements. This explanation seemed to satisfy though the unaccountable impression nevertheless prevailed with some officers that recipients were a special means of communication between general officers. At first the personnel of the G-2 section were not over-friendly, but they gradually became accustomed to the situation, resentment abated, and it became possible to meet on a cordial basis.

b. A small safe was kept in recipients' tent and the maps, messages of the day and Ultra papers were locked therein except when in use. All messages were receipted for to SLU and turned back under counter-receipt within 24 hours. Colonel Koch made it a principle to have no Ultra papers in his hands at any time, choosing to fix an unvarying responsibility for safe custody upon the recipients. An incendiary bomb was kept in the safe for emergency use.

c. Extreme care was employed by Colonel Koch in transmitting information to Corps or Division Headquarters, both as to the ostensible source and means of transmission and as to the items which could be communicated without security risk. This is a delicate link in the chain and one which the recipient can forge only by suggestion as it is a G-2 matter and not one over which the recipient has control. However, Colonel Koch invariably discussed with recipients what he proposed to do before taking
action and invited suggestions as he was thoroughly conscious of security necessities.

8. Completion of Mission. During the first three weeks of duty with the Third Army, both Major Helfers and the writer were extremely busy. Headquarters moved frequently, message traffic was at its peak, and there were many difficulties to iron out. The load gradually lessened, however, until it could be handled satisfactorily by one officer. This fact was reported to Lieutenant Colonel McKee when he visited Third Army Headquarters and the writer was ordered back to London. This period of duty terminated in cordial expressions by General Patton, General Gaffey and Colonel Koch, and the writer left the Third Army on 17 September with the conviction that it had been an honor to serve with it in the choicest assignment of the War.

9. Comments.

a. General Patton and Colonel Koch expressed themselves as entirely satisfied with the service, but their interest in items of general significance, which were sent to, and collected from, Army Group, was so ardent that it suggested a broadening of the scope of Army messages. Messages of general policy and strategy for all Europe often came to Army Group but not to Army and, though excerpts filtered down, the whole message usually was of real interest, though it might not directly concern Third Army operations. Sending such messages direct to Army would serve two purposes in that it would supply general and useful information quickly and it would vividly emphasize the value of the service. The last point is important as it is always an essential part of recipient's work to display the full value of this intelligence miracle so that it will be relied upon and used to the maximum degree. If doubts exist as to its veracity or importance, it is easy for it to slip into a minor role. This comment was duly reported to the proper officers upon the writer's return to England.

b. The role of Ultra in a G-2 organization is determined by G-2. It is not a part of the G-2 section, as originally organized, and the G-2 must be convinced thoroughly of its high value before the necessary adjustments will be made. Its high standing in Third Army intelligence is due in no small measure to Major Helfers' persistence and unflagging zeal in the face of many initial discouragements and to Lieutenant Colonel McKee's visits to Third Army and his conversations with Colonel Koch. The example set by 12th Army Group Headquarters also had its influence.

c. The difficulties of the recipient in keeping his top secret papers secure and in preparing and maintaining his maps would be alleviated largely if he had a caravan instead of a tent. A tent requires a complete packing-up on each move, cannot be locked, is far from rain or wind-proof, and is less secure for conversations. SIU always has caravans, and the recipient at Army level should enjoy the same aid in his work.
"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS
JULY 1945

DECLASSIFIED per Soc. 3, E. O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Date: Sep. 13, 19
"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS
JULY 1945

SELECTED ITEMS PREPARED BY MIS, WAR DEPARTMENT
FOR THE ATTENTION OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Further Peace Move Developments: As previously noted, on 14 July Ambassador Sato advised Tokyo that Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky had sent word that "because of the departure of Stalin and Molotov" for Berlin, a reply about Konoye's trip would "be delayed". On 15 July Tokyo transmitted the following to Sato: "Please inform us at once as to when Stalin and Molotov left". Later on the 15th Sato replied: "It appears that Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Berlin on the evening of the 14th. Therefore, so far as I can surmise, in spite of the fact that they probably had at least a half day remaining before their departure they avoided making any reply other than the tentative statement that they were delaying their answer. Judging from this the Russians must have wished to avoid making a hasty reply, on a matter which could have such serious consequences, without making a complete study of the situation. As a result, it appears doubtful that we will be able to obtain a prompt reply.

"The following are four probable reasons for the hesitation of the Russians in this matter: (1) They are uncertain as to whether the Emperor's message on the termination of the war
signifies that the actual mission of the Special Envoy will involve the submission of a concrete plan for ending the war. (2) They fear that Japan may not propose unconditional surrender or terms approximating unconditional surrender, or make a specific proposal, but that she may actually intend to request Russian assistance in order to obtain a so-called 'negotiated peace'. In such an event it would be very difficult for them to approve our request. (3) They do not wish to benefit Japan at the expense of their relations with the United States and Great Britain at a moment when cooperation among the three countries is needed more than ever. (4) Since Far Eastern problems will inevitably come up for discussion both inside and outside the meetings of the Big Three, they believe that it is necessary to make sure of the agreement of the British and Americans on the question of the Special Envoy before they give a definite reply one way or the other. Perhaps Stalin believes, therefore, that it will be impossible to determine the Soviet attitude until he has informed the British and American authorities of the recent Japanese communication and has learned their views.

In connection with the 'negotiated peace' mentioned in subparagraph (2) above, we must remember that the Americans and
the British - and particularly the former - have always opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty by means of negotiation in regard to both the European and Pacific Wars. Moreover, since Russia herself insisted upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and, spurring the British and Americans on to the opening of the Second Front, finally defeated Germany with their cooperation, it can be seen that it will be extremely difficult to obtain the support of the Soviet Union for any proposal concerning the negotiation of a peace treaty.

"In the long run, leaving aside Japan's sincere desire for the termination of the war, I believe that she has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto. I would like to point out, however, that even on the basis of your recent messages I have obtained no clear idea of the situation which existed prior to those messages. Nor am I clear about the view of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war. Moreover it has been my understanding that, in case it were finally decided to bring the war to an end, it would be necessary to obtain a new formal resolution which would be sufficient to overrule the decision
reached at the Council held in the Imperial Presence last June 8th, but this has not been done. Now, if the Special Envoy does not bear concrete terms as mentioned in subparagraph (1) above, I fear lest he be dispatched with the approval of the Russians only to achieve unsatisfactory results in the end.

"Please consider the facts presented in this wire as well as in my earlier wires and, if the decision is finally made to dispatch the Envoy, I sincerely pray that a resolution be passed in the Cabinet Council to have the Envoy carry a concrete plan for the termination of the war."

*Councils 'in the Imperial Presence' have been held only rarely in the last 40 years and are apparently for the purpose of determining the most important long range policies for the Japanese Nation.
22 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

1. Sato analyzes Japan's situation and continues to urge immediate surrender: On 20 July Ambassador Sato sent the following message to Foreign Minister Togo:

"No. 1427. Strictly Secret. Reference your No. 913.*

"After careful reflection I am transmitting my views without reserve.

"1. It is reported that since 14 July the American task force, which has become active in northern waters, has approached and shelled the Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito areas and that carrier planes have been preventing communication [by rail ferry] between Hokkaido

* Togo's 913 was the message of 17 July in which he told Sato that, if the Anglo-Americans "insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese are unanimous in their resolve to wage a thorough going war," and instructed Sato to "please bear particularly in mind that we are not asking the Russian mediation for anything like unconditional surrender."
and the mainland /Honshu/ and have also sunk a number of ships. In contrast - according to enemy reports - counter-measures taken by both our Air Force and Navy have approached the non-existent. I think that this unfortunately demonstrates clearly the decline of our fighting power, and, if the same tendency continues, the activity of the enemy fleet will become /even more/ bold as time goes on. The enemy has publicly thrown down the gauntlet to the Japanese Navy and indeed has even gone so far as to broadcast boldly the names of the powerful ships in the raiding task force and of their commanders.

*2. Moreover, enemy air raids from bases in the Marianas, Okinawa, and Iwo are already reaching every part of the Japanese mainland almost daily. The great cities have been reduced to ruins. In addition to attacks on munitions plants, storehouses, etc., they have begun bombing even medium and small cities which are being wiped out one after another.

"In addition, it has become clear that our air defenses have declined in effectiveness since the start of the B-29 raids, and it must be concluded that the enemy has gained mastery of the air.

"3. It is clear that, once control of the air has fallen into enemy hands, our war situation will deteriorate at an accelerated pace. That control, once lost, is almost impossible to regain in the
absence of outside aid. Therefore, there will be no means of rescue and only increasing trouble for Japan except as she may hope for the production of munitions in Manchukuo. But I do not see how Manchukuo's industries can avoid heavy bombing, especially since the enemy is planning even now to send heavy planes from Okinawa against this area in the near future.

"4. I naturally do not know whether there will be an enemy landing on the Japanese mainland, but I would not want to go so far as to say that this will not occur. Judging from the thoroughness of the enemy’s landing operations on Leyte, I believe that - even though geographical conditions are different - we must indeed be ready for an invasion.

"Just as we can assume that the enemy will one day attempt a landing, it is also clear what Russia will do after our fighting strength has been destroyed.

"The enemy, in order to accomplish the destruction of Japan's fighting power, is not only bombing our productive facilities, bombarding our shores, etc., but will also attempt to deprive our people of the very means of subsistence. The enemy must already be fully aware of the food difficulties in our country and of the importance of this autumn's harvest to the maintenance of our war strength. Consequently, we cannot overlook the possibility that
Attempts will be made to destroy our crops when the time comes for their harvest. For example, the enemy may well ascertain when the rice fields throughout Japan are dry in preparation for harvest and devise a scheme for reducing these fields to ashes in one fell swoop."

Note: Rice fields in Japan are normally drained three or four weeks before harvesting. The stalks are cut when still green and are then left in the fields to dry for about a week before being threshed. The harvest period ranges from mid-September in the northern districts to late November in the south, but the bulk of the crop is harvested in October.

By late July, in most Honshu paddies, the young rice plants have been transplanted and are standing in about three inches of water. Until the paddies are drained, the crop is therefore highly vulnerable to chemical attack. "He will naturally regard this as one of our weak points of which he can take advantage.

"If we lose this autumn's harvest, we will be confronted with absolute famine and will be unable to continue the war. Furthermore, the Empire stripped of its air power will be able to do
nothing in the face of the situation and will be at the enemy's mercy.

5. In my message of 8 June, I pointed out that it would be unthinkable for us to continue the war once our fighting strength had been destroyed.* In the absence of Supreme Orders, our Imperial Army and the people as a whole will not, of course, lay down their arms until the last mile has literally been reached. Nevertheless, all our officers, soldiers, and civilians - who have already lost their fighting strength because of the absolutely superior incendiary bombing of the enemy - cannot save the Imperial House by dying a

* This is the message in which Sato stated that, if Russia were to embark on a course of "positive intervention" in the Pacific War, "we would have no choice but to reach a decision quickly and, resolving to eat dirt and put up with all sacrifices, fly into her arms in order to save our national structure".
glorious death on the field of battle. When we consider how the Emperor's mind must be disturbed because seventy million people are withering away, we must recognize that the point of view of the individual, the honor of the Army and our pride as a people must be subordinated to the wishes of the Imperial House. I have therefore come to the conclusion that there is nothing else for us to do but strengthen our determination to make peace as quickly as possible and suffer curtailment.

6. As for the making of peace proposals, I myself had felt that the best way to do this would be to send a special envoy to Moscow as you have already stated. Unfortunately, however, this idea has met with the disapproval of the Russian authorities and we are therefore faced with the necessity of finding some other expedient.

Once we decide to make peace, we must resign ourselves to severe peace terms and have an armistice treaty concluded as quickly as possible by the military representatives of both sides; any sacrifices beyond that will also have to be accepted.

The one condition we must insist upon in concluding a peace treaty is the safeguarding of our national structure, i.e., maintenance of the Imperial House. As I said in my message of 18 July, we
must impress very strongly upon the enemy that this is an absolute requirement on our part. A possible course of procedure is to exclude this issue from the peace terms on the ground that it is a domestic problem. In that case, however, we would have to convene something like a Constitutional Assembly in order to make a show of consulting the voice of the people — and in such an Assembly we could hardly expect complete absence of persons, such as the extreme Leftists, who would openly oppose the maintenance of the national structure. Moreover, the convocation of such an Assembly would in itself conflict with our own Constitution. But, as we are about to run into a catastrophic situation, we will have to furnish some proper solution of the problems of coping with adverse opinion.

"On the other hand, it is difficult to predict whether the enemy would agree to the foregoing procedure. If, however, it were decided — because of the suffering of the people — to give up the Imperial Family, our national structure would have undergone a grave change in the eyes of the World.

"7. The peace proposal which I advocate means the acceptance of the enemy's conditions, provided our national structure is maintained. So long as we keep our national structure, we will have preserved a minimum of honor as well as existence for the state, and

* Reported in 20 July 1945 "Magic" Political Extracts.
this I think would be consistent with the ideas expressed in your messages of 17 July that there could be no peace "unless the Anglo-Americans were to have regard for Japan's honor and existence". 

8. Japan may be said to be standing literally at the crossroads of destiny and - although the people who have continued the fight can close their eyes in good conscience, having given of their patriotism in full measure - our country is on the verge of ruin. While it is a good thing to be loyal to the obligations of honor up to the very end of the Greater East Asia War, it is meaningless to prove one's devotion by wrecking the State. I must therefore insist that we are required to bear every sacrifice for the existence of the State.

"Since the Manchurian Incident Japan has followed a policy of expediency. When it came to the East Asia War, we finally plunged into a great World War which was beyond our strength. As a result, we have now reached the point where we have no word missing, no assured production and are confronted with the danger that even Honshu will be trampled under foot. I think that we should acknowledge the inescapable and fundamental obligations of chivalry and resolve as quickly as possible to lay down our arms to save the State and its people."
"We may surmise what the peace conditions will be by looking at the example of Germany; our people will have to pant for a long time under the heavy yoke of the enemy. Nevertheless, the fate of the State is dependent upon this, and after some decades we shall be able to flourish as before. The Government will surely choose this road, and I pray ceaselessly that the solicitude of His Imperial Majesty may be put at rest even one day sooner.

"Immediately after the war ends, we must carry out thoroughgoing reforms everywhere within the country. By placing our government on a more Democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people. We must also recognize that another cause for the evils we have drawn upon ourselves today lies in the fact that even before the Manchurian Incident there were those who showed contempt for diplomacy and indifference toward international relations.

"Moreover, since postwar Japan will be buffeted by the waves of the usual international relationships and will experience difficulty in extricating herself from adverse situations, I believe that in the future we must so realign our political structure as to give greater attention to foreign affairs."
Ever since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, our foreign policy has been a complete failure. The whole trouble was that, once we had aligned ourselves with Naziism, the World was divided into two camps - pro-Axis and anti-Axis. It is therefore essential that this mistake be recognized in the future and that there be a fundamental reorientation in our foreign policy.

9. After the Imperial Rescript containing a declaration of war was promulgated, it was naturally the duty of the whole country to devote itself to the prosecution of our war objectives, and I too have simply put forth my humble efforts as required. However, since we have been reduced to the situation which now confronts us, I think it necessary that we weigh the sacrifices which the continuation of the war must involve.

We should, however, give a fair hearing to the argument that "if the enemy actually carries out a landing, we will concentrate all our strength on a counterattack and will thus bring about his disillusionment". I understand from your 17 July message* that the Government and the Military are convinced that we will still be able to give the enemy a considerable shock with our war strength. I too would find it possible to hope for this if we had not completely lost control of the air and of the sea. Unfortunately we have now

*Reported in 18 July 1945 *Magic* Diplomatic Extracts.
fallen into such a state that we cannot repulse the raids carried on day after day by the enemy fleet and air force, and our production installations are being destroyed one by one. Now that we are being scorched with fire, I think it becomes necessary to act with all the more speed.

Even though our Army should take control over the people and their possessions, that would in no way correct the disparity of military strength between the two sides and, as far as the volunteer units are concerned, it is clear that they will be unable to fight in the face of modern weapons. Thus if we were to fight for every foot of ground after the enemy's invasion of the Japanese mainland and reaffirm our fighting spirit, we would inevitably be forced to yield the sword at the end and by that time the whole Imperial Domain would have been overrun by the enemy army. The fact that sovereignty of the State will pass to the hands of the occupying nation has been indicated by the example of Germany.

I have no longer any hope of attaining our original objectives. Our ability to take advantage of the momentum of the past to continue our resistance even to a slight degree has suddenly come to an end, and we are already in a position where we are not the equal
of the enemy. To preserve the life of hundreds of thousands of people who are about to go to their death needlessly, to save seventy million of my comrades from the misery that is facing them, and to preserve the existence of our nation, I have no other desire than to drink the bitter cup of this decision to prevent annihilation of our State.

"I am presenting these statements, fully aware that they are not in accord with the treasured communication from His Majesty. I confess that my offense is tremendously great, but I have taken such a stand because I believe that this is the only way to save our country. If I am criticized as an advocate of defeatism, I will just have to put up with it, and I will gladly face any other accusations.

"The above are my views which I have given without reserve. To say anything more would be mere repetition. I beg you to understand that it was only my patriotic convictions that caused me to speak in this way of my own free will. My unceasing prayer is that you will not conclude that what I have said has resulted from an excessive [two or three words missing]."

2. Further messages from Togo: Two messages sent by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato on 21 July deal with Prince Konoye's intended mission and the official Japanese attitude toward a
proposal of unconditional surrender. The first of those dispatches reads:

"No. 931. Very Urgent. Re your wires No. 1417 and No. 1418.*

*Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government. In this regard he will set forth positive intentions, and he will also negotiate details concerning the establishment of a cooperative relationship between Japan and the Soviet which will be the basis of Imperial diplomacy both during and after the war.

*Please make the above representations to the Soviets and

* Sato's No. 1417 was the message of 19 July in which he forwarded Lozovsky's note stating that, because of the absence of "specific proposals", it was impossible for the Soviet Government to give a definite reply to the Emperor's message proposing Prince Konoye's trip.

No. 1418 was the message of 19 July in which, commenting on Lozovsky's letter, Sato said that "We have no alternative but to present the Russians with a concrete plan".
work to secure their concurrence in the sending of the Special Envoy.

"Please understand especially my wire No. 932 [which is quoted below]."

Togo's message No. 932, also sent on 21 July, reads as follows:

"With regard to unconditional surrender (I have already been informed of your No. 1416); we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will entail much more bloodshed, if the enemy demands unconditional surrender the whole country as one man will pit itself against him in accordance with the Imperial Will.

"It is in order to avoid arriving at such a state of affairs that, at this time and through the good offices of Russia, we are seeking to reach a peace which is not so-called unconditional

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*Received directly from Arlington Hall.

**No. 1416 was the message of 18 July in which Sato in effect urged unconditional surrender, provided that the "national structure", i.e. the Imperial House, should be preserved.
surrender. It is necessary that we exert ourselves so that this idea be finally driven home to the Americans and the English.

"Thus, under these circumstances, not only is it impossible to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, but it would also be both disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms. Consequently, we hope to deal with the British and Americans after first having Prince Koncye transmit to the Russians our concerted intentions as expressed by the Imperial Will, and then holding conversations with the Russians in the light of their demands in regard to East Asia.

"In view of the fact that this is a grave matter which will decide the fate of the nation, please request the Russians to give a full explanation of their reply, as presented in your wire No. 1417* so as to make sure that we grasp its real meaning.

"The Government's responsibility in this case rests in advising that a Special Envoy be sent, and it is limited to this fact.* The Envoy, however, will be sent as a special emissary

*No. 1417 contained Lozovsky's letter of 18 July refusing to receive the Special Envoy because the scope of his mission was not clear."
representing the Imperial Will as it is directed toward mundane affairs in particular. Hence if necessary please make both points clear to them. Please also bear in mind the necessity of sufficiently impressing upon them that Prince Konoye enjoys the confidence of the Imperial Court and holds an outstanding position in the political circles of our country.

"Since it is not absolutely necessary, please avoid stating in writing what is said in my caption wire No. 931 [quoted above].

"We are aware of your views as stated in your wire No. 1427 [Item No. 1 of this issue of Extracts] but a decision of the Cabinet Council has been rendered concerning my caption wire. Please, therefore, continue your efforts."
Japan - Eight new divisions: Eight new divisions (the 141st, 142nd, 145th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 157th, and 316th) have been identified in Japan, bringing the total of active divisions now carried there by MIS to 36 (including one armored division). The following Table gives a breakdown of divisions in Japan by Area Army Sector and the changes effected by the new identifications:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Army Sector</th>
<th>Total identified Active Divisions</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Estimated strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifth (Hokkaido)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh (North Honshu)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/2</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth (N. Central Honshu)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>/3</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth (Central Honshu)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/1</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth (S. Central Honshu)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/1</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One division (the 205th) is either in Shikoku or West Honshu.

*The total figure includes 10,000 for units carried unlocated in Japan.

Note: a. One of the 8 divisions (the 316th) has been identified from a direct reference in a 5 July message. The other 7 divisions have been identified from operational code names and numbers appearing in messages sent over the past four months; their numerical designations are not definitely known, but MIS has tentatively assigned numbers to them on the basis of a regular...
numbering pattern which the Japanese apparently have followed.

b. At about the beginning of March, when a program of rapid expansion apparently began, the Japanese are believed to have had in Japan proper a total of 11 active divisions and 14 depot divisions. Of the 25 additional active divisions which have since appeared in Japan, 4 are veteran divisions brought from Manchuria and 21 are divisions organized in Japan itself. The 21 divisions organized in Japan appear to fall into two categories:

(1) Fourteen divisions in the series 141 - 147 and the series 151 - 157 -- one formed in each of the 14 Divisional Districts in Japan. All fourteen probably were formed by the end of May and available messages indicate that they are regular triangular divisions.

(2) Seven divisions with numbers in the 200's and 300's. Little information on the make-up of these divisions is available, although at least one (the 205th) appears to be triangular. As yet there is no evidence that they are anything other than regular divisions. It is to be expected that divisions in the 200's and 300's will continue to be
identified.

c. It thus appears that of the 36 active divisions identified in Japan, 15 are veteran divisions and 21 have been formed since about the beginning of March. The 14 divisions (141 - 147 and 151 - 157) formed from depot divisions, however, may well have had a considerable amount of training, since the depot divisions from which they were formed had not in any instance produced an active division since July 1944. Little is known of the state of training of the remaining 7 divisions, since their method of formation is not known, but it is probable that they have had comparatively little training, at least as divisions.
Togo urges Sato to see Molotov during Conference adjournment. Following is text of Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 5-part message No. 944 sent "extremely urgent" from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato on 25 July.* [Parts 4 and 5 are not readable at present].

*Reference my wire No. 932.**

**Togo's No. 932 was the message of 21 July in which he said that despite Sato's various messages unconditional surrender was completely out of the question and that Japan hopes to avoid such a situation by talking with the Russians before approaching the Anglo-Americans.

* Received direct from Arlington Hall.
and Atlee are scheduled to return to England, it is said that the Conference will be adjourned for a short while. Consequently I would like you to take advantage of this opportunity and proceed, if necessary, to a place of the Russians' choosing in order to obtain an interview with Molotov and explain to him the intentions of the Japanese Government. Even in the event that it is impossible for Molotov to arrange a meeting, your request for an interview will at least go a long way to impress upon him our determination in this matter:"

"2. At the time of the interview please endeavor to get the Russians to form a positive attitude on this matter. Stress the fact, as indicated in my successive wires, that Japan has gone first to the Russians with its request for mediation. Make clear that the dispatch of the Special Envoy would permit Stalin to acquire the reputation of an advocate of world peace, and, further, that we are prepared to meet fully the Russian demands in the Far East (see the end of Part 2 of my wire No. 932). Finally, inform them that, in the event that the Soviet Government remains indifferent to our request, we will have no choice but to consider other courses of action."
"3. Furthermore, as you are aware, in Britain and the United States, especially in the latter, various discussions are taking place at present regarding the meaning of the demand on Japan for unconditional surrender. In studying the speech of the 'American spokesman', it appears that he said that in principle they are formally insisting to the end upon unconditional surrender but that if Japan accepts it quickly they are prepared to mitigate the conditions. For example on the 19th, Navy Captain Zacharias (he is on the staff of the Office of War Information but he broadcast to Japan as a 'spokesman' of the United States Government) said that Japan has two alternatives: The first is to submit to a dictated peace after being destroyed; the other is to make unconditional surrender and receive the attendant benefits stipulated in the Atlantic Charter. We believe that these are not merely to be viewed as simple-minded strategic propaganda but are calculated to lead us on."
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