AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

NEWSLETTER

Number 22  Fall 1979

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ATTACHMENTS (following page 42)
Information, Dues, and Membership Form
1979 Committee Election Ballot
MEMBERSHIP AND DUES

Membership is open to anyone interested in the history of the Second World War. Annual dues, payable in January for the calendar year, are $10.00 for regular members, as well as for institutions receiving the semiannual newsletter, and $2.00 for students. Those wishing to join or to renew their membership are invited to fill out the lower part of the Information and Membership Form (attached to this newsletter as an unnumbered page) and to return it, with the appropriate remittance, to the secretary.

NOTE ON THE MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY SUPPLEMENT

Newsletter 21, issued this past spring, included a directory of the membership of the ACHSWW. This newsletter includes a supplement reflecting changes and additions. Committee members are requested to indicate changes of address and areas of interest on the annual membership form, so that this information can be included on membership directory supplements, as well as in the next new edition of the directory.

COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

The three-year terms of eight of the directors end on 31 December 1979. Following the established practice of the committee, the directors, acting as a nominating committee, have selected a slate of incumbents and new candidates. These nominations are recorded on the ballot attached to this newsletter (as an unnumbered page following the membership renewal form). Members are requested to send their completed ballots to the secretary at their earliest convenience, either enclosing them when they renew their membership or sending them separately. Because of possible delays in postal service during early December (when this newsletter with the ballot is being mailed), ballots will not be tallied until January.

THE 1979 ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the ACHSWW is being held this year, as in the past, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. In 1979 the joint meeting is being held in New York City.

BUSINESS MEETING

The ACHSWW Business Meeting is scheduled to take place from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, 29 December 1979, in Suite 507 of the New York Hilton. The tentative agenda of the meeting includes reports on the joint session proposal for the 1980 annual meeting, being held in
Washington, D. C., and plans for the 1980 Conference of the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, being held in conjunction with the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest in August. There will also be consideration of plans for future joint sessions with the AHA; the lead time is so great that a program proposal for a joint session with the American Historical Association, if it is to be discussed at our annual meeting, has to be taken up two years before it would actually be presented.

Committee members wishing to have items put on the agenda of our meeting may directly contact the secretary, who will arrive at the New York Hilton on 26 December, or may introduce them from the floor as "other business" in the course of the meeting itself.

1979 JOINT SESSION

The ACHSWW joint session with the AHA, scheduled for the Beekman Parlor of the New York Hilton, 9:30-11:30 a.m., Friday, 28 December is Session No. 1 in the 1979 AHA Program:

**EFFECT OF WORLD WAR II ON THE HOME FRONT:**
**CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND GOVERNMENT**

**CHAIR:** Richard Polenberg, Cornell University

*American Propaganda in World War II and After*
Allan M. Winkler, University of Oregon

*Toward an Isolationist Braintrust: Establishment of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs*
Justus Doenecke, University of South Florida

*Political Upheaval in America and Britain, 1944-46: An Interpretation of Popular Attitudes and Behavior*
Richard Jenson, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, and Newberry Library

**COMMENT:** Susan M. Hartmann, University of Missouri, St. Louis

OTHER MEETINGS

RIO DE JANEIRO, 17-21 JULY 1978

*Professor Frank D. McCann, Univ. of N. H., sends this report on the International Colloquium on the military, diplomatic, and economic participation of Brazil in the Second World War.*

The conference was sponsored by the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (IHGB), the Instituto de Geografia e História Militar do Brasil, and the Brazilian committee on the history of World War II.
It was held in the headquarters of the IHGB, a modern office building in downtown Rio, and attracted scholars from Brazil, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States. These sessions were divided into plenary and special, the former being mostly devoted to presentations by military figures of the war era, and the latter to papers by scholars. Topics of the plenary sessions included: "The Diplomacy of Brazil in World War II," "Economic Mobilization of Brazil," "Allied Strategy in World War II," "Brazil-United States Military Collaboration," "Brazilian Navy in World War II," and "The Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy." The sessions had a special flavor since most of the speakers had been participants in the events discussed and often the numerous veterans in the audience would break into applause at the mention of a popular figure or someone who was present. The special sessions included an interesting paper by Professor Mariano Gabriele of the University of Rome on partisan cooperation with the Brazilian division (part of a larger study on partisan-allied cooperation). I gave a paper entitled: "Brazil, the United States, and World War II: A Commentary," which subsequently appeared in Diplomatic History, 3,1 (Winter 1979), pp. 59-76.

My university provided travel funds and the Brazilian committee arranged comfortable accommodations in a hotel near the Institute. In addition to the conference itself, the Brazilian Air Force arranged a special tour of its principal base and the army had us participate in a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument to the World War II dead. Finally, the Instituto de Geografia e História Militar do Brasil honored me with election as a corresponding member.

BONN AND STUTTGART, 15-18 NOVEMBER 1978

A special report from David Kahn regarding the ULTRA Conference, briefly noted in the Spring 1979 issue, appears elsewhere in this newsletter.

OTTAWA, 14-16 NOVEMBER 1979

The Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War sponsored an international conference on "The Second World War as a National Experience," held in Ottawa on 14, 15 and 16 November 1979. Plenary sessions featured papers on Canada, the United States, Britain, France, Norway and Yugoslavia delivered by distinguished historians who are citizens of the countries concerned. Anyone interested in information regarding this conference or the activities of the Canadian Committee should write to the Secretary, Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, K1A 0K2.

BUCHAREST, 10-17 AUGUST 1980

The following circular was received from the organizing committee of the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest, in conjunction with which the International Committee for the History of the Second World War is, as already noted, holding a conference.

The Bureau of the International Committee of Historical Sciences and the National Committee of Romanian Historians extend an invitation
to all historians to participate in the XV International Congress of Historical Sciences to be held in Romania from August 10-17, 1890.

To assist with the planning of the congress, the organizing committee wishes to have an approximate idea of the number of persons planning to attend, and information should be sent as soon as possible to the National Committee of Romanian Historians, Bulevardul Aviatorilor 1, Bucharest 1, Romania. Please supply full name and address, and name(s) of those accompanying you.

The registration fee is US$65.00; this fee includes four copies of the printed proceedings. The fee for spouses is $30.00; students currently enrolled at an institution, $20.

The languages of the Congress will be: English, French, German, Spanish, and Russian.

NORFOLK, 16-18 OCTOBER 1980

The MacArthur Memorial, the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, and Old Dominion University invite former participants in the Occupation of Japan, scholars, researchers, and graduate students to submit papers for presentation in a symposium entitled "The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform," to be held in Norfolk, Virginia, October 16, 17, and 18, 1980. The effects of these reforms both on the Occupation itself and on post-occupation Japan, pre-surrender and post-surrender planning for the reforms, and the roles of individuals, groups, and committees in the planning and implementation of reforms are all of interest for this symposium.

The participation of discussants, commentators, and chairpersons is likewise invited. The MacArthur Memorial will publish the proceedings of this symposium. The deadline for proposals and participation inquiries is June 1, 1980. Please direct all inquiries and proposals to:

Director
MacARTHUR MEMORIAL
MacArthur Square
Norfolk, Virginia 23510
(804) 441-2256

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Only documentary publications, archival guides, and reports on research facilities or conference proceedings are cited below. Bibliographical listings based on Library of Congress MARC (machine-readable cataloguing) data printouts, on which our past bibliographies have largely been based, will soon be provided through the UCLA Library. With these, we can resume, in our next newsletter, representative (though not comprehensive) coverage of current monographic publications on the World War II era, especially in the English-speaking world. We will also continue to welcome bibliographical compilations from sister committees in other countries. We will be delighted to include them in the newsletter whenever we receive them.
Detwiler, Donald S., and Burdick, Charles B., eds. *War in Asia and the Pacific, 1937-1949: Japanese and Chinese Studies and Documents.* 15 vols. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979-80. An 8400 pp. collection of some seventy reports prepared after World War II by Japanese officials (vols. 2-12) and Chinese Nationalists (vols. 13-15) at the U.S. Army's Center of Military History. The first volume is the Introduction & Guide not only to this publication, but also to the far larger collection from which these studies (in English) were selected for facsimile reproduction. A detailed catalogue, including the editor's introductory essay, is available from the publisher at 136 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y. 10016, from whom the set may be ordered, before 1 March 1980, for $550.00, a substantial saving over the full price. (This is a companion set to the 24-volume collection of German Military Studies listed in the previous newsletter, and for which a catalogue is also available. The German set is in print; the Asian will be by mid-1980.)

Kent, George O. "Research Opportunities in West and East German Archives for the Weimar Period and the Third Reich," *Central European History,* Vol. XII, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 38-67, a meticulously documented (125 footnotes) guide not only to archives, but also finding aids, references, and current research by a leading authority.


Schramm, Percy E., and Greiner, Helmuth. *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 1940-1945.* Supplement to Vol. IV: *Der Krieg in Italien und im Heimatkriegsgebiet vom 1. Januar-31. März 1944,* ed. by Donald S. Detwiler. Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1979. Pp. 85. A supplemental volume to the War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, with recently surfaced material on the war in Italy and on the German home front that had not been included in the original four-volume edition (the publication of which, like this supplement, was commissioned by the *Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung*).


[N.B. The last two publications are part of a continuing series of catalogues giving a brief abstract of each document, together with date and source, as well as microfilm frame and roll number. No. 75 covers records of SS units from their formation to 1945; no. 76, Army divisions numbered from 712 through 719 and 999, thirteen "name" divisions, the First Cossack Division, and the Second Marine Division. They are available free from Publications Sales Branch (NEPS), General Services Administration, Washington, D. C. 20408.]
SUPPLEMENT TO MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY

Additions and changes to the Membership Directory published in the Spring 1979 Newsletter (No. 21) are given below in alphabetical order.

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NEWSLETTER EDITOR’S NOTE

This issue of the newsletter was typed largely by Mrs. Lorie Zaleskas, who, unfortunately, has now left the employment of the SIU-C History Department; she will be missed. The newsletter was compiled with the help of Mr. Lawrence D. Higgins, a doctoral student, and, especially, Mr. Lee D. Edwards, my research assistant. Their support is sincerely appreciated.

Appreciated also is the cooperation of two ACHSWW Directors in arranging for us to reproduce their essays as part of this issue of the newsletter—not to mention the permission granted by the publishers of the journals in which the two pieces initially appeared. As a rule, this newsletter does not carry such extensive reviews or reports, but the particular significance of Dr. Kahn’s and Dr. Pogue’s contributions fully justified making this exception.

Finally, but by no means casually, I would like to reiterate my appreciation of the indispensable support provided by Southern Illinois University at Carbondale for the work of the ACHSWW and the publication of its newsletter.

THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY — A REVIEW OF AMERICAN CAESAR BY FORREST POGUE

The following review of William Manchester's best-selling biography of Douglas MacArthur is reproduced from the Spring 1979 issue of INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Vol. 3, No. 4, Copyright President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1979), with the kind permission of the author and of Derek Leebaert of the Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University. As biographer of George C. Marshall, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, former chairman and a permanent director of the ACHSWW, has developed unique authority on and insight into many questions raised (and others ignored) in Mr. Manchester's book—especially the fundamental problem complex with which he deals in this magisterial review article.
My first impulse upon agreeing to write this review was to call it “Flawed Warrior”. After carefully reading and checking the sources of *American Caesar*, I decided that “Flawed Biography” might be better. Ultimately, the present title seemed best to join a review of the book with some observations on MacArthurism, which are presented both in the biography and in the various volumes Manchester has cited.

It is disappointing that despite Manchester’s ability to write, he has fallen short of the scholarly standard that he apparently set for himself. Far more discouraging is the extravagant reception with which several scholars, who should know better, have greeted this book; some of them ignoring the far more careful and authoritative work of D. Clayton James (whose first two volumes, covering MacArthur’s life through World War II, are singled out by a grateful Manchester as “scholarly, perceptive, objective, and in its accounts of battles, extraordinarily detailed.”).

*Handling Small Matters*

If one counts footnotes, Mr. Manchester has done a scholarly study. But if one counts the works that he lists—and evidently failed to read carefully, or at all—one soon recognizes that his book merely follows in the wake of others. Furthermore, in Manchester’s list of abbreviations for the repositories containing his most frequently cited works, there are notable omissions, namely the National Archives, the Roosevelt Library, and the Truman Library. Although Manchester might argue that the MacArthur Library at Norfolk has a “priceless collection,” those who have used it know that the collection is far from complete. Secondary sources can be used safely where there are two volumes of James to follow. It is in the period after World War II, where there are no such volumes to rely on, that one finds additional gaps in Manchester’s writing.

Manchester might argue that it is not necessary to look at the frightening...
bulk of documents found in the National Archives, if the best secondary
sources are cited. But it is difficult to understand his scanty reference to the
numerous official volumes of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Joint Chiefs of Staff, which cover World War II, the occupation of Japan, and
the Korean War. Maurice Matloff's two volumes on strategy in World War
II and Louis Morton's *Strategy in the Pacific* are not even listed; and although
Manchester refers to Morton's *Fall of the Philippines* a few times, on several
occasions it is noted only as "cited in James."

Far more interesting than the volumes that are not used are some three or
four that are cited repeatedly. Next to James, the most frequently cited books
are those of Courtney Whitney, a member of MacArthur's staff in the Pacific
and his aide in retirement, and Frazier Hunt, a newsman who spent a
number of months at MacArthur's headquarters. Neither of these two books
has footnotes. Manchester warns us that "certain passages in Whitney must
be read skeptically and confirmed elsewhere." Then what are we to make of
more than a hundred citations from such a source, especially when it is often
the sole basis for a charge of antagonism by Washington? Manchester also
recommends Hunt's book for further reading, despite Hunt's sustained re­
cord of unsupported statements—many of which find their way into *American
Caesar*’s generalizations. Hunt himself has, on occasion, hesitated to make
the flat statements that Manchester adopts. Even MacArthur recognized that
Hunt's credibility was suspect. In an interview that I held with General
MacArthur on January 2, 1961, I mentioned that some of MacArthur’s biog­
raphers were not helping his reputation: my notes (he did not permit me to
tape the conversation) reflect MacArthur's response: "'Spike' Hunt [is] of
extreme right."

The extent to which the author worked in the files at Norfolk is not clear.
His footnotes list such items as "RG 4; RG 6," which refer to various large
sections of files in that library. James' book and the official histories, on the
contrary, indicate who wrote the messages and who received them. But the
reader of Manchester must be content with mention of one of twenty-four
categories of documents.

Graduate students are warned by their professors of the dangers of im­
provising on a theme from an account based on documents which the author
has not seen. Several illustrations of these dangers may be selected at random
from Manchester. James, in writing of MacArthur's days at Fort Leavenworth
(1908-12), listed a number of men who later became well-known; he mistak­
enly added the name of Robert L. Eichelberger (later commander of the
Eighth Army under MacArthur. James' slip did no damage because he drew no conclusions from it. Manchester, however, saw the collected letters of General Eichelberger to his wife, *Dear Miss 'Em*, edited by Jay Luvaas. Luvaas' brief foreword referred to Eichelberger's reflection on MacArthur in 1911. Manchester makes this observation of the Leavenworth experience: "Lieutenant Robert L. Eichelberger was impressed. Like lieutenants Walter Krueger and George C. Marshall, Eichelberger was a fellow officer of MacArthur's at Leavenworth." (Manchester, p. 71). But page four of the book from which Manchester cites his quotation makes it clear that Eichelberger, who had graduated from West Point in 1909, was actually stationed with the 10th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana—he did not attend Leavenworth until after Marshall and MacArthur had left. Eichelberger's letters had recalled instead his first sighting of MacArthur during a maneuver at San Antonio in 1911.

A more interesting example is the problem which arose sometimes because Manchester simply followed James' footnotes—apparently without noting that they refer to several paragraphs in James, which Manchester reduces to one paragraph. In one example of this, Manchester writes of MacArthur's assignment to a new job in Washington, a statement that MacArthur was waiting to pick up the standard recently laid down by his father, a three-line summary of the Vera Cruz incident, and MacArthur's assignment to a particular task in Mexico. In footnoting the paragraph, Manchester makes reference to Hunt, Quirk, Elting Morison, Weigley, Hagedorn, James, and Alfred Steinberg. All of these are pertinent to James' longer statements, but the bulk of them have little to do with the paragraph in Manchester for which they are cited. Elting Morison's life of Stimson and Hagedorn's life of Leonard Wood deal with the Ainsworth case, which was bothering both Stimson and Chief of Staff Wood about the time MacArthur came to Washington. Weigley's book refers more to Wood's work for preparedness than to Vera Cruz, while Quirk's twenty-five pages, which should have been cited as suggested reading to make up for the omission of background material discussed in James' book, appear to represent detailed research for Manchester's one paragraph.

One would like to hear more of the men who made MacArthur's headquarters function, contributions that are described in James but which rate few citations in Manchester. For example, his able Chief of Operations, Stephen J. Chamberlin, is scarcely mentioned at all.

Manchester too often becomes involved in the fear and dislike of Wash-
ington that run through books written by MacArthur and his close staff members. Although Manchester recognizes elements of paranoia in these reactions and clarifies the support that George Marshall in particular gave MacArthur, he ultimately makes even more unsupported statements about some of these fears than does Frazier Hunt. In *American Caesar* one finds the thread of controversy leading to a final earth-shattering confrontation between MacArthur and Marshall.

Manchester starts this ball unraveling with a statement on Marshall’s and MacArthur’s first years together at Leavenworth: “The only officer to stay at arm’s length from MacArthur was Marshall, even then the two future five-star generals rubbed each other the wrong way.” (Manchester, p. 71). Both James and I have noted in our books that the two men were rarely thrown together because Marshall was an instructor in the School of the Line and MacArthur an officer in the Post Engineers’ Complement. This general explanation was based on MacArthur’s statement to me, which seemed not to need any further elaboration. But Manchester apparently depends on yet another statement by Frazier Hunt, who cites no source: “He [Marshall] had no particular gift for friendship, and his relationship with MacArthur . . . was forced and without warmth.” (Manchester, p. 42).

Manchester next picks up the legend of “the Chaumont crowd.” Soon after MacArthur arrived in France, near the end of 1917, the General Headquarters officials at Chaumont (Pershing’s HQ) decided to use troops of the newly-arrived 42nd division for replacements in units already in France. MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the division, a member of the War Department while the division was being organized, helped send messages to influential individuals and got the proposal changed. Thereafter, runs the tale, the “Chaumont crowd” was out to get MacArthur. Manchester’s contribution to all this is the extraordinary statement: “It is worth noting that Chaumont’s brightest young colonel was George C. Marshall. In France the antagonism between the two men would grow, with grave consequences for the country both served so well in other ways.” (Manchester, p. 84). As a source, there is another portmanteau footnote with citations gathered from James’ much longer discussion—this one concerning the situation in France and on the American Army about the time the 42nd Division arrived. Manchester presents a scholarly listing with references to works of Pershing, Frederic Paxson, Basil Liddell Hart (some 70 pages cited), and U.S. official records. None of these original sources mention any controversy between the two officers. To this list, Manchester adds James (who also makes no reference to such a
problem) and Hunt, who says only, "At the end of the war the little G. H. Q. crowd that had never been quite reconciled toward the brilliant young MacArthur was joined by the then Colonel George C. Marshall."

At the time of which Manchester writes (1917), Marshall was a major at 1st Division. He remained there until the middle of the following July, when he was sent briefly to Chaumont to work on war plans; he was detached within a few weeks to work with First Army on plans for the fighting in the St. Mihiel salient and then assigned to help prepare for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In the final stages of the war, he was Chief of Operations at First Army. Assigned then as Chief of Staff of the VIII Corps to prepare plans for occupation duties in West Germany, Marshall did not go to Chaumont until May, 1919, after MacArthur had returned to the United States. Later that year Marshall returned to Washington with General Pershing and was his Senior Aide until 1924. MacArthur has said that he saw Marshall from time to time when he sought Pershing’s advice.

Manchester unearthed another old canard—that Pershing reprimanded MacArthur for a minor matter after MacArthur married a widow once dated by the Chief of Staff; Manchester writes: "the four-star general [Pershing] had his eye on a woman, and the dashing brigadier had heisted her." (p. 127, Manchester). He also cites the lady’s suggestion that this was why MacArthur was sent overseas. Under the rules for officers then prevailing, a system of rotation required foreign service (China, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama were the chief posts) at regular intervals—and MacArthur was number one on the list. Marshall went to China the next year under the same rule; but Manchester fails to remove the suspicion that Pershing acted on a personal basis.

Surely, the critics who have praised the book will say, "All this is pedantry. It does not affect the solid portions of the book." But it is this slippage in accuracy in the handling of small matters that makes one wonder about Manchester’s treatment of the broader issues. Especially disturbing is the elevation of books long discredited to sources for damaging allegations about MacArthur’s associates and superiors, or for excessive praise of the Pacific Commander.

Nevertheless, Manchester has much in his favor. His personal experience as a Marine, severely wounded in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945, gives him a feeling for the horrors of the jungle and protracted or needless fighting. This is forcefully expressed in Manchester’s graphic descriptions of “the
green war." He has a gift for distillation and an overall grasp of MacArthur's personal contradictions that are described in the striking introductory paragraphs that, I imagine, convinced some of his laudatory critics of deep scholarly perception.

In dealing with many disagreeable charges by MacArthur and his followers, he rejects some of their more extreme allegations about the plots in Washington, the incapacity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the errors of the Europe First Strategy. He describes well the many weaknesses in MacArthur's makeup: his vanity, his extreme ambition, his attempts to manipulate public opinion, his failure to give credit to subordinates, his efforts to pit members of his staff against each other, his virtual hatred of the Navy, his constant insinuation of an intention to appeal to the general public over the heads of political and military superiors, and his encouragement of boomlets of his candidacy for the presidency. But then Manchester concludes by adopting some of the clichés of an anti-MacArthur Washington plot.

Perhaps because Manchester continued to read the biased volumes from MacArthur's staff, he began to accept them as evidence. Basic research in MacArthur's headquarters files would exaggerate the General's role in the planning and making of strategy. These files would fail to show in detail the patience of the men in the White House and the Pentagon, and give a false perspective to the Navy's role in the Pacific and the part played by MacArthur's forces.

Reaching for an Effect

A better perspective for judging General MacArthur's strategic judgment would have been achieved by: a more careful look at the tasks of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the world strategic picture, the distances from the United States to fighting fronts in the Pacific and in Europe, the importance of saving from German domination the fighting forces and productivity of the Soviet Union and western Europe before their manpower and industrial capacity were absorbed into the Reich. Manchester would then be able to rate more sagely the tributes to the Pacific commander by Field Marshal Alanbrooke, Liddell Hart, and Field Marshal Montgomery. Alanbrooke was willing to praise MacArthur to spite Marshall and Eisenhower, Liddell Hart was willing to name someone in preference to Eisenhower or Montgomery and Montgomery was certainly prepared to praise MacArthur as the greatest American Commander if it downgraded Eisenhower, Bradley,
and Patton. But the reader is never told exactly what they were praising. If by calling MacArthur the great strategist of the war, Alanbrooke meant the setting of the priorities in the war, it is hard to see how Manchester reconciled Alanbrooke’s characterization of the Pacific Commander’s last-ditch opposition to the Europe First strategy that Alanbrooke fiercely demanded. Perhaps he had in mind MacArthur’s advocacy of the indirect approach, favored by Churchill and Alanbrooke in the Mediterranean.

Another problem with Manchester’s perspective is his tendency to see everything constructive in the Pacific as inspired exclusively by MacArthur. In the late spring of 1943, he says, “[MacArthur] probably knew more about the geography of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands than any other man before or since.” (Manchester, p. 33). He knew the coral reefs, the coves and inlets, the mountain passes. The list continues. It presumes MacArthur’s omniscience with no suggestion of the involvement of Intelligence, a diligent map service, reconnaissance teams, and coordinated planning staff.

I recall that the first group of combat historians brought to Washington in March, 1944 to be briefed for the European theater were given to study the documents concerning the Buna operation. We noted the paucity of information about the coves and inlets and mountain passes, and the great amount that remained to be done by reconnaissance to remedy that situation. We were impressed by the careful supervision of the forward commanders and of the later Army Commander, General Eichelberger, whose accounts contradict Manchester’s notion that MacArthur’s control reached down as far as battalions. In fact, Eichelberger liked to tell how the Pacific Commander tried to impress newsmen by implying that he and Eichelberger had been together at Buna.

Manchester is on surer ground in praising MacArthur’s role in the occupation of Japan. He cites familiar evidence of MacArthur’s skilled use of the Emperor’s support and notes the way that MacArthur used his own emperor-like postures to impress the Japanese. But Manchester does not give proper credit to the able men who helped write the Japanese constitution. He tells how a Japanese committee, asked to prepare a suitable draft, produced an unsatisfactory document and, then, how MacArthur asked Whitney to help in the process. When the second draft proved unsatisfactory, MacArthur acted. According to Manchester, “He decided that the only way he would get the version he wanted would be to write the key sections of it himself. . . as it happened, he had become interested in democratic constitutions
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and over the holidays he had read all of those then in force. Tearing off a sheet of yellow legal paper from a pad, he wrote his first memorandum on the subject, starting 'Four Points for a Constitution.' By the middle of February, we learn, he had what he wanted." (Manchester, p. 499). There is no footnote but apparently this version comes from a statement by MacArthur.

Certainly, the MacArthur Library contained a copy of the Report of the Government Section, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). This was incorporated in a larger report made on the occupation by General MacArthur. Less dramatic, and more appreciative of the work of the staff, is the statement that when General Whitney presented the Government section with three major points that MacArthur wanted incorporated, a steering committee and several special committees were assigned to write sections of the constitution. "Working steadily, the Public Administration Division completed its work on February 10 . . . Approved with only one significant change by General MacArthur the draft was mimeographed on February 12." (Report of Government Section, SCAP, p. 105). This version gives the General full credit for his important intervention but makes it clear that the main changes were in accord with Allied Arrangements at Potsdam and the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many hands were included in writing the constitution.

With all the emphasis on personal planning (which ends by obscuring the work of Army commanders and high command staffs), one is reminded again and again of the enemy in Washington. Manchester decries such paranoia but adds his bit to the myth. He writes of General Marshall's trip to Goodenough Island in December, 1943 to visit MacArthur. In the course of a long conversation (which MacArthur indicates ended with the promise of more assistance from Washington), Manchester says that when at one point MacArthur mentioned his staff, Marshall said, "You don't have a staff, General, you have a court." I was startled to find that my own book is the sole source cited for the paragraph in which this statement occurs. The first part of the paragraph, dealing with the visit, I accept. But I am not responsible for the Marshall quote (which I doubt if he made). And I know of no one who would accept authorship of the next sentence: "It was true, but it was equally true that the Chief of Staff had been off horseback riding when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and tactful officers never reminded him of it." (Manchester, p. 352). This is reaching for an effect. Marshall had finished a morning ride, had come to his office, had read the last part of Tokyo's intercepted instructions to her diplomats, and had warned Short and
MacArthur of the possible meaning of the timing. He was having lunch when word of the attack came in the early afternoon.

The persistent recurrence of statements that have been set right in numerous books that appeared before this volume suggests that for some of the sections Manchester has drawn on some of his own earlier writing and that he has not added corrections which are easily found. My Volume III, which covers November, 1942 to May, 1945, is not included in his bibliography, although it appeared five years before this book. It would have saved Manchester some errors as would have Schnabel's official volume on the Korean War and other books he should have been aware of.

It remains for the most dramatic sections—those dealing with the MacArthur relief and the crashing confrontation of the old adversaries from Leavenworth, to Chaumont, to Sedan, and to Goodenough Island—to illustrate some of this author's most unusual handling of sources. The story reaches its climax when Truman summons Marshall, Acheson, Harriman, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ask how they reacted to his view that MacArthur must be recalled from Korea. After summarizing the play-by-play account (which could have been more accurately written had he consulted Truman's personal papers at the presidential library in Independence), Manchester adds that when Truman found that all agreed with his earlier secret decision to relieve MacArthur, he gave the job of drafting the message to Marshall and Acheson. "That was a mistake," concludes Manchester. "Both men [Marshall and Acheson] were hostile toward the Supreme Commander [MacArthur] and he reciprocated." The author continues that Acheson, who would have been the more tactful drafter, was too occupied to have a hand in the writing. "The version which would reach MacArthur was Marshall's, gruff and abrupt." (Manchester, pp. 641-642).

The sources cited for this paragraph are: Acheson [Present at the Creation], Payne [The Marshall Story], and Fournier [Napoleon]. Fournier at least cannot be held responsible for the mistakes which seem to sprout from Manchester's description of the "Chaumont crowd." His description of the treatment of Napoleon after his 1813 defeat is used by Manchester to suggest that he was treated better by his opponents than MacArthur was treated by Truman and Marshall.

At least, Manchester writes, Napoleon's enemies gave him Elba. Acheson merely says that Truman asked the various participants to appear the next day, Tuesday, with the necessary drafts. And Payne's 1951 volume on Marshall was a quickie designed to cash in on the MacArthur removal and the
consequent congressional hearings, as well as on Marshall’s September 1 retirement from the office of Secretary of Defense. Although Payne did not study Marshall’s papers, he ventures the opinion that the language of “the curt dismissal” was remarkably in the style of Marshall (Payne, The Marshall Story, p. 319). Truman’s explanation (which is not noted by Manchester) is by far the most complete account in print, and is based on documents at the Truman Library, which can be examined. Truman says simply, in a volume published in 1956: “I then directed General Bradley to prepare the orders that would relieve MacArthur of his several commands and replace him with Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway . . . I instructed him to confer with Secretary of State Acheson, since the office of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, was also involved.” (Truman, Volume II, p. 448).

Finally, the definitive word on this matter can be found in General J. Lawton Collins’ War in Peacetime, page 284. The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of the recall writes: “After the decisive meeting with the President, Secretary Marshall met with General Bradley and me and asked me to draft the messages that would have to be sent to Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and James A. Van Fleet, who was to succeed Ridgway.” The draft orders were submitted to General Marshall, who presented them at the next meeting with the President and his advisers. Collins’ book, published in 1969, is not included in Manchester’s bibliography nor cited in connection with the incident.

The normal process was followed in the case of MacArthur’s relief. There was nothing sinister in Marshall’s testimony when he said that he believed the drafts were written partly in the Department of Defense and partly in the Department of State. There was nothing extraordinary about Truman’s action. The relief order was, of course, terse, in accordance with Army practice. The language would be the same if Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, or Douglas MacArthur issued it. But the announcement which accompanied it could have been written by Marshall or Acheson. There was nothing harsh. It announced with deep regret fundamental differences between MacArthur and the United States Government and the United Nations which made necessary his relief. And it stated, “General MacArthur’s place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional services which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take at this time.” (Truman, Volume II, p. 523). The whole drawn out
business of the confrontation might play well with Gregory Peck as the much-abused good guy sat upon by the villainous denizens of the striped pants State Department and the Chaumont-crowded Pentagon. It is a great script to make the flesh creep, but it is not history. And the scholarship tends to fade away into some excellent rhetoric as well as some fustian, which close students of MacArthur would recognize.

The Limits of Military Authority

Whatever the quality of his research and his handling of evidence, Manchester sought to make some important points about military leadership and civilian-military relations in the twentieth century. In the confusing elements of MacArthur’s character and actions, he finds a symbol which is alternately deplorable and appealing. The author’s true sympathies may be with the flawed commander, rather than with his superiors. MacArthur was willful but he was brave; his opponents were administrators, not warriors; he went too far but he should have been reined in earlier; his actions in Korea called for punishment but he should have been brought back for a talk (a possibility which Marshall momentarily entertained, only to be met with Acheson’s chilling reminder that it would afford MacArthur an opportunity to make strong public appeals while still in command). Although it was the American tendency to give the general in the field considerable freedom to fight his battle within the broad directives sent from Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service secretaries in doing so are depicted as timorous and indecisive. And the final recall is somehow reduced to a spiteful act of little men.

This is the type of reaction that makes it impossible to present MacArthur’s relief as a classical tragedy.

Samuel Huntington, in his brilliant study, The Soldier and the State, pictures vividly American attitudes toward the role of the military in a democracy, and the highly important matter of civilian control. With a few exceptions, he sees liberal conceptions of the military dominating American thinking from the end of the Revolution to the middle of the twentieth century. The people of the United States, according to Huntington, feared and distrusted a standing army, a professional officer class, large military budgets, and overseas commitments. There was a feeling that a fighting force could be improvised when needed, and that militia units and reserve elements were sufficient to keep order and to provide the basis for later military expansion.
In the face of these views and the swift reduction in the fighting forces after the Civil War, the small group of Regular officers, underpaid, widely scattered to isolated posts, and often regarded with hostility by the general population, turned inward to create a professional officer class devoted to the defense of the state and strongly subject to civilian control. The fact that Grant was a professional turned president, or that civilian soldiers-turned-politicians held public office, did not affect the conviction of the Regular officers that they must avoid both public statements on political matters and political activity.

These acts of political self-denial, imposed more by the Regular officers than by civilian regulations, helped to avoid conflicts with authorities in Washington. This was fortunate since the framers of the Constitution in their search for separation of powers had erected barriers to the firm imposition of civilian control on the military services. The President was the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy but the budgets had to be approved by Congress and appropriations could not be made for more than two years. The President nominated officers by and with the consent of the Senate. The President could not declare war but he could dispose his units in such a way as to require the approval of Congress. If the legislative and executive branches differed on military policy or were politically divided, it was possible for a popular military leader to appeal to a part of the legislative branch against the directives of the executive and excuse his failure to obey orders on his right—or even duty—to carry his fight to the true representatives of the people. Douglas MacArthur used that procedure in 1951 when he provided civilian authority over the military with its most severe test in recent American history.

Nineteenth century France had seen a highly popular general, Georges Boulanger, become active as a proponent of military reform. He was courted by radical political elements, and then by less liberal groups. He got support from various sectors by his fiery advocacy of revanche against Germany. Although not eligible for election to the Chamber of Deputies, he allowed his name to be entered for a vacant seat, which he won. Later, when he was dismissed for disobedience of army rules, he was elected from three constituencies, with a large proportion of votes coming from Paris. He then called for various reforms and asked that the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved and new elections be held. Alarmed, the government secured a warrant for his arrest and he fled the country. Soon fallen from public favor, he committed suicide in Brussels. Boulangism is spoken of as the threat of the man on
horseback who appeals to factions in the legislative body, and to the masses by saber-rattling and personal popularity.

No such challenge bothered the United States after the Civil War. Most officers judged unfavorably General George McClellan's ill-timed but wholly constitutional opposition to President Lincoln in the election of 1864. Washington used reassignment or reprimand to deal with those officers who challenged legitimate authority. Thus the nearest thing to a challenge to presidential authority, for a half century, came from Leonard Wood—a former army doctor and later cavalry officer who as a volunteer colonel headed the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, and then rose rapidly to the post of Army Chief of Staff in Taft's Administration. His early efforts at American preparedness drew no opposition from President Taft, but were later frowned upon by Woodrow Wilson who disliked the use of the Chief of Staff's office as a base for General Wood's preparedness propaganda. Although he was backed by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and other advocates of preparedness, Wood failed to gain presidential approval. He lost his foothold when his term as Chief of Staff expired but in his new post in the First Military District he continued his efforts, thereby earning the opposition of the President and of a number of professional officers, including Generals John J. Pershing and Peyton C. March.

World War I saw no contest of wills, inasmuch as Pershing was allowed wide control over operations and training of troops, and Washington for the most part backed Pershing's policy toward the Allies. The later clash of Billy Mitchell with Army chiefs on the question of airpower involved the army hierarchy more than the President or Secretary of War; and a military court martial condemned Mitchell's actions. Even Mitchell's good friends among airmen agreed that he had been fairly dealt with, although they admired his courage in seeking a sounding board for his views.

The 1930s, a period of social and economic unrest, and pervaded with fears of both left-wing and right-wing extremists, found some officers in opposition to governmental policies. George Van Horn Moseley, a friend of MacArthur's, was ultimately eased into retirement by President Roosevelt because of Moseley's strong right-wing and racist views. George Paiton wrote in private to Pershing and others of his violent dislike of politicians and pacifists in the country. Some ROTC officers and National Guard instructors stirred unfavorable reactions by their denunciations of subversive elements on campuses and in the country. But military men saved this talk mainly for their private clubs. The loud talking was done by men like William Pelley, Gerald L. K. Smith, and Father Coughlin, some of whom later joined
the appeal to MacArthur to save the country by running for the presidency, but the Regular Army remained professional and loyal under civilian control.

In their appeals to MacArthur, the dissidents sought more than his military prestige and able leadership for their own political purposes. They found evidence that he was willing to listen to promotions of his presidential candidacy. It was noted that members of Congress, who had been exposed to his lectures on the errors in Washington's strategy, came back from the Pacific with proposals that MacArthur be put in sole charge of the conduct of the war.

To judge from numerous instances cited by Manchester, the General's tendency to challenge anything that would interfere with his advancement or ambitions arose initially from his natural dislike of authority. Later, he would assume that his wishes or the needs of his theater were those best suited to the good of the army or the nation. His most recent biographer notes the paranoia that greeted Washington's allocations of manpower or supplies, or its proposed strategy for Japanese defeat.

Manchester suggests that MacArthur's distaste for civilian authority came from his great devotion to the memory of his father, the young Wisconsin officer who became a temporary colonel before he was twenty, winning the Medal of Honor for his gallant action at Missionary Ridge. There was the recollection that his father had been removed as military governor of the Philippines because of his clash with the president of the Philippine Commission, William Howard Taft. Although the elder MacArthur felt that he deserved the office of Chief of Staff of the Army because of his seniority; Taft, now Secretary of War, thought otherwise. Any prospect of appeal was ruled out when Taft became President. Bitterly disappointed, MacArthur retired in 1909. He died three years later while attending a reunion of his Civil War associates.

The younger MacArthur liked to speak of his father. He sometimes told the story that when in 1864 a government representative came to Arthur MacArthur's unit to collect the votes of eligible soldiers for the presidential candidates, the young officer's ballot was declined because he was underage. As Douglas MacArthur told it, his father placed a pistol on the table and said "The Colonel votes or nobody votes." Manchester perhaps goes too far in saying that the removal of Arthur MacArthur from the Philippines at the turn of the century planted the seed that would bear extraordinary fruit fifty years later. But at least the father left the tradition of dislike of civilian control.

This aversion to civilian authority was more than a personal peculiarity.
As a young officer, MacArthur may have seen a newly published book by Emory Upton, a veteran of the Civil War who had left a manuscript on his views of a professional army. The book, with many good suggestions for the strengthening of the Army, was published in 1904. His contempt for civilian control and the concept of the citizen soldier had some appeal, but his narrowness defeated his purpose. Russell Weigley, in *Towards an American Army*, p. 110, notes: “Because Upton never really attempted to understand the civilian view of military policy, he failed utterly to formulate a military policy in harmony with the American natural genius... He began with fixed views of military policy and then despaired because he could not shape the nation in accord with their demands.”

One must not make assumptions about the influence of Upton’s book on MacArthur’s thinking. He was not averse to political influence if it aided his advancement. Manchester tells how MacArthur’s father’s hand reached from the grave to aid his son’s assignment. In 1912, Leonard Wood suggested to Secretary of War Stimson that something should be done for Arthur MacArthur’s son. Douglas was brought to the War Department where he was at once given special assignments by the Chief of Staff. Wood’s departure did not affect the young officer’s relationship with the Wilson Administration. Assigned to public relations duties, he came to the attention of Secretary of War Newton Baker, who accepted his proposal of a Rainbow Division, made up of men from various states; Baker announced that MacArthur would be its first Chief of Staff, and then promoted him to colonel so that he could fill the position.

MacArthur also contradicted the older professional army view that a Regular officer must not engage in politics. He always denied his ambition to be president, but it was astonishing how he encouraged trial balloons by supporters. Senator Arthur Vandenberg concluded in 1943 that MacArthur might be the one man who could defeat Roosevelt for the presidency in 1944. Through intermediaries, he sounded out MacArthur. Vandenberg noted that the Republican nomination could be reached only through a real draft movement, and warned the general to leave political moves to the Senator. The Senator wrote that the Administration’s policies on strategy might “easily martyrize him into a completely irresistible figure.” (Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 82). But MacArthur was drawn into presenting his views by two letters from a conservative representative from Nebraska, A. L. Miller, who suggested that the General had to save the Republic. Instead of a bland reply, MacArthur implied that he shared at least some of Congressman
Miller's concerns. Thinking he was aiding MacArthur, Miller released the letters. Vandenberg complained that this rash action killed MacArthur's chances. When the Pacific commander later said that he would not permit his name to be used in partisan politics since it would be unseemly for a high commander in the field to be engaged in a presidential campaign, Vandenberg confided to his diary that this was not the real reason; it was the adverse effect of the Miller letters. It seems strange that MacArthur did not remember the danger of writing to politicians when he penned the famous letter to Joseph Martin that hastened his recall.

MacArthur was more careful in 1948, when he permitted his name to be presented at the Republican convention. Some polls showed grass roots strength, but the party managers had other men in mind. At the Republican convention, his nomination by Jonathan Wainwright was proffered in the small hours of the morning when few delegates remained. (As one of the few auditors left in the great hall, this reviewer recalls the loneliness.)

MacArthur's continued willingness to allow his name to be used in a political challenge apparently rested on a conviction that he alone could save the situation in the Far East. He seems to have taken seriously some of the assessments of his staff as to his magic powers. Apparently it is from reading too much of their works that Manchester writes (p. 143): "MacArthur never accepted the implied sacrifice [of the Philippines in case of a Japanese attack], and from 1928 onward the chief obstacle to Japanese conquest of the Philippines was his implacable will."

The climate in which MacArthurism flourished was created by the division of civilian authority which followed the Republican congressional victory in 1946, by the fierce election of 1948 which found Truman narrowly returned to office, and a strongly partisan Congress in which both parties sought advantage for the 1952 presidential contest. In this atmosphere a disgruntled general or admiral would find ample opportunity to criticize the Administration. Even more disturbing was the public disappointment and fear following the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese, the end of American atomic monopoly, fears of the growing strength of Communism, belief in widespread subversive activity in the United States, and strong opposition to further financial assistance to Europe. In such a situation, there was likely to be strong public support for resistance to Washington officials who were charged with being too soft on communism.

Manchester’s title, American Caesar, suggests at first glance the possibility that he was writing of a great proconsul, long absent from Rome, who
became concerned over deteriorating conditions at home and a lessening of support for his campaigns. Informed of growing dissatisfaction, he returned home to seize power or dominate the government. The subject deserves examination beyond the lurid Sunday supplement treatment. It is unlikely that MacArthur ever entertained any such idea of a Boulangist approach, although his closest advisers included several strong right-wing supporters. Certainly, he could not have expected to depend on his soldiers in such an effort. Walter Millis, in his perceptive *Arms and the State*, which appeared a few years after MacArthur’s recall, makes it clear that the soldiers, under a system of rotation, were not disgruntled at civilian control. Although the generals might be strongly frustrated, as he suggests, the army commanders associated with MacArthur had been trained in old army precepts and all had strong ties to Marshall, Bradley, and Collins; they felt no desire to mount strong opposition to civilian authority. Unlike the Caesars, who returned at the head of their loyal legions, MacArthur had to seek his supporters in the Congress and among the general public.

Perhaps MacArthur hoped for a great surge of support from Republican leaders in Congress who were willing to use his arguments to bless their opposition to the Administration. But he had been too long away from the United States to gauge adequately the temper of his political backers. Since 1935, he had been absent from home—first as Quezon’s field marshal, then as Far East commander in the Philippines, then as victorious commander in the Pacific and the virtual uncrowned emperor of Japan. All this made him an inspiring ally on the campaign trail. But that was all. Robert Taft and others who had waited for so long to lead the Republicans back to a long denied victory had no intention of stepping aside for MacArthur any more than they did for that other general who waited in Europe.

MacArthur’s speech to the Congress, after his return, met with an outpouring of approval that may have held, for a few hours, an element of danger for the President; but that threat soon evaporated. It seemed too evident that MacArthur’s eloquent testimony would assure Truman’s defeat in 1952. There would be no need for any disruption in the constitutional succession even if MacArthur had been inclined to make a serious campaign. The shift in attitude was subtle, but it became clear that MacArthur was to be feted, consulted, exhibited as an example of Truman’s ingratitude and ineptness. That was all, however. He could make the keynote speech, and there was the hope that he could offset Ike’s glamor, but there would be no stampede of Taft Republicans to his banner.
Furthermore, MacArthur’s vanity and tendency to believe that his former aide in Washington and Manila could not possibly be presidential timber, blinded him to the fact that Eisenhower’s calm approach, the European Commander’s avoidance of attacks on the President, and his stand above politics were winning more than the stormy rhetoric of the old warrior. As Manchester shows, at the great moment in the Republican convention, when MacArthur had a last chance to sweep the delegates by his eloquence, his appeal fell flat. After that, he could only make a separate peace. MacArthur could criticize Eisenhower to his friends and rejoice that the mountain named for his former subordinate was only a small one; he could accept the respectful plaudits of those who saw in him a symbol of what was right with America; and then he could say to interviewers, “You know Eisenhower worked for me for years,” or “Jack Kennedy was one of my boys,” as if to suggest that he was a power still to be reckoned with.

It was not the challenge to civilian control that was the most unfortunate lasting effect of the 1951 crisis. It was the reactions to MacArthur’s war cry, “There is no substitute for victory.” When he was summoned to lead the UN and U.S. forces in Korea, the general had been aware that the United States was committed only to a limited action to restore the status quo or to contain the North Korean thrust. The communist attack came when the United States was woefully unprepared for a showdown battle in the Far East, and when it was gathering its strength to shore up western Europe’s defense against possible Soviet attacks. This was no time for a great crusade against communism or a total commitment of forces in the Far East. Inasmuch as some UN forces were involved, there had to be some effort to work with nations whose active support America sought for NATO.

Later, MacArthur would argue that there had been no restrictions set on his actions in Korea. Particularly after his early restoration of the situation, some of the early inhibitions had been removed. But his hopes for a quick victory were dashed when the Chinese Communists intervened and threatened to turn his triumph into a rout. He began to ask for greater extensions of the war, for naval blockade, for bombings, for destruction of Communist China’s industrial capacity to make for the unleashing of the Chinese Nationalists.

Despite warnings from the White House and the Pentagon, MacArthur continued to press his campaign. His replies seemed increasingly to be raw appeals against civilian authority. His letter to Joseph Martin seemed to demand anti-Administration intervention on his behalf. Recalled, he went at
once on the attack with a ringing statement for unlimited warfare—one to be conducted almost without restraint on the authority of the commander in the field. This blatant appeal initially scored the most points. Senators Knowland and Cain, two of the strongest anti-Administration leaders, saw to it that he had ample opportunity to make his case in the Senate hearings which followed soon after MacArthur’s relief.

MacArthur’s reply to a request for his views on politics and war may have been based on a misinterpretation of Clausewitz. MacArthur declared in the Senate hearings:

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that a war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily . . . .” [Senate Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East, Part I, p. 45].

General Marshall disagreed. Although he had always favored great latitude among his commanders, they were expected to fight in accord with political directives and to conduct occupation duties in accord with carefully designed regulations. He declared:

The fundamental divergence is one of judgment as to the proposed course of action to be followed by the United States. This divergence arises from the inherent difference between the position of a field commander, whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States, and who . . . must weigh our interests and objectives in one part of the globe with those in other areas of the world so as to attain the best over-all balance. It is their responsibility to determine where the main threat to our security lies, where we must fight holding actions, and where and how we must gain time to grow stronger . . . . (Hearings, I, 325).

The latter was the sounder view but not the one that appealed to public opinion and to many in Congress. And it made no impact on MacArthur. His statement showed that in Korea, as in the Pacific, he had never really looked at matters globally and never considered that anything really mattered save his own area of operations. Many Americans saw no outcome, once engaged, but all-out victory. To them there was something ignominious in Marshall’s line of reasoning. A few weeks later, Joseph McCarthy was en-
couraged to charge that Marshall was taking a soft line on Communism and playing the Soviet game. The more extreme advocates of this all-out view in Asia were never convinced of the need to save U.S. strength for the problems in western Europe. For years, many opponents of American involvement in Europe favored strong measures in the Far East. MacArthur’s case before Congress supplied these critics with the arguments they desired.

At the moment, the situation was saved for the Administration by the reaction of a number of genuine conservatives who liked MacArthur’s patriotic fervor but condemned his challenge to the President. Among these men were conservative Democrats as well as Republicans. Manchester does a disservice to Senator Richard Russell by implying that the committee he headed was set up to protect the Administration. One of Russell’s more liberal colleagues said that his admiration of Russell grew because, despite strong championship of MacArthur in the Pacific, he kept the sessions on a balanced course. One can draw satisfaction from the fact that most senior officers agreed with the constitutional correctness of Truman’s action.

But in a sense MacArthur won a victory—one which did not coincide with his later appeal for the abolition of war. His impassioned attack on the concept of limited war and limitations on the power of the field commander to expand the conflict years later haunted political leaders and officers who considered holding down increasing commitments in Vietnam. Although MacArthur is widely quoted as warning President Johnson against involvement in Vietnam, his own formula for victory contained the element of greater expansion in Asia. His proposal to unleash the Chinese Nationalists would have guaranteed such a commitment.

Hereafter, it would be difficult for political leaders to ask for limited operations. Hereafter, it would be difficult for younger commanders to accept limits to their campaigns or avoid all-out use of planes and ships and tanks. For future candidates to ponder, there was the fact that Truman had ultimately decided that he could not stand again for election. For several commanders, there was the feeling that they had to ask for another 50,000 or 100,000 men. The hands of those who called for new crusades without stint were strengthened.

The great consolation in 1951 was that the officers who might have turned the balance against civilian control were men trained in the allegiance to that type of authority. The cautionary element about the experience is that one can only hope that the appeal to a divided Congress against a president or civilian officials will not find the type of division that existed in France when
French officers in Algeria posed a military challenge to the policy of de Gaulle. On that occasion only tremendous prestige of de Gaulle prevented a military coup against the government. The lesson is not so much to the military as to the civilian politicians who must learn the danger of stirring potential constitutional crises in the hope of gaining political advantage.

At last we come to Manchester’s claim that MacArthur was the most gifted man-at-arms the United States has produced. What does it mean? Some critics assume he is proclaiming that MacArthur was the greatest American general.

If he speaks of America’s greatest warrior, a term Manchester believes is peculiarly applicable to MacArthur, he must establish his case against the claims of at least a dozen others, including Summerall in World War I, Patton and Truscott in World War II, or Ridgway in Korea. If he is referring to a great leader of armies, inspiring his troops, appearing among them frequently, assuring them of his care, winning their respect by his lack of showiness, allowing his commanders great initiative, supporting them in their difficult hours, backing them in their battles and sharing the credit fully with them, then we must think of an Omar Bradley.

Does he mean the commander in a coalition, bringing together with minimum friction the services of his country with forces of various allied countries with their different interests and ambitions? Clearly, Eisenhower was MacArthur’s superior here.

Or do we speak of a general who had to see the war whole, who looked at the entire globe without a parochial view, who assessed the position of the United States and acted in international conferences to support his own Commander in Chief, and his various commanders, never forgetting any theater, who strove to see the other side and to subordinate his own desires for field command to victory. Here, Marshall has the advantage. First among equals, as a British official historian puts it, he won the respect of his civilian superiors while protecting the interests of the military and without damaging any part of the fragile fabric of the society in which he lived. Reserved about a public parading of his overwhelming patriotism, he proved it by quiet performance of duty and the laying aside without complaint or frustration of the supreme command he wanted above all else to have.

Selecting the greatest, the best, the most swashbuckling, the most loyal is a futile exercise. So far as MacArthur is concerned, it is notable that he deserves well of his country. He proved his courage on many fields in several conflicts. He contributed great skill and planning and fighting ability to the
execution of military designs. He succeeded brilliantly as proconsul in Japan, and he deserves great praise for his Inchon strategy.

But he and certain members of his staff contributed to virtual conflict with the Navy in the Pacific. In fact, Marshall had to remind him that they and the Navy were on the same side. They seemed never to have recognized that the Navy helped move the troops and the arms and supplies that MacArthur’s troops used, that it mounted their amphibious attacks, cut the supply lines of the enemy, sank his ships with submarines, pounded his forces with aircraft from carriers, furnished support by Marines, and aided in the final defeat of Japan by a strategy that was in some cases superior to that of the Southwest Pacific commander.

When one says greatest in leadership, he is dealing with a strong word. Greatness not only implies deeds but strength of character. And strength of character involves self-control. With all of MacArthur’s excellent qualities went his conviction that he alone knew best—a view made worse by the unalloyed praise of some of his subordinates. In a sense, he established a separate headquarters which could be negotiated with but not commanded. As the great proconsul in Japan, he seemed almost to have concluded a separate peace.

In Korea, he scorned military and political superiors. He acted as if Marshall, who had commanded 8½ million men in the Army and Army Air Forces, who appeared regularly before Congress to get the support needed for his forces around the world, who dealt with the President, Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and with independent minded commanders around the world, who managed to supply his own troops and helped to find guns and planes for British, French, Russian, Chinese and Polish contingents, had no concept of concern for the war in the Pacific. Bradley, who led four armies to MacArthur’s two, and Collins, whose abilities as a corps commander were unsurpassed in the war, were looked upon almost as schoolboys. Eisenhower, who superbly blended together the diverse efforts of one British, one Canadian, one French and five American armies plus Polish, Dutch, and Belgian units, drawing cooperation from men with varying concepts of victory, MacArthur dismissed as a general who let others do his fighting for him.

Despite his great abilities and contributions, he posed political and military opposition to a well-integrated national and allied effort in time of war. In Korea, he risked adoption of a policy of adventurism in his disdain for presidential and high-level military decisions in Washington. He helped stir
dangerous dissension in the United States by his challenges to directives from that capital. These weaknesses and elements of pettiness and vain self-indulgence, depicted in detail by Manchester, tarnish the gloss of greatness claimed for him by the author. That other great proconsul of the late 1940s, General Lucius Clay, once said that he never understood why MacArthur was held up to West Point cadets as a model. Clay was not denying the general’s great qualities or contributions, but questioning whether he should be regarded as the exemplar of the great military leader. Beyond deeds and dash, greatness requires inner strength born of self-discipline, a dedication to duty that transcends one’s personal desires, and a selflessness that puts in first place the success of the common cause. Judged by these requirements, MacArthur falls short of the standard raised by such military leaders as Washington, Lee, and George C. Marshall.

THE ULTRA CONFERENCE — A REPORT BY DAVID KAHN

This report on the Bonn-Stuttgart ULTRA Conference of November 1978 is reproduced from the January 1979 issue of CRYPTOLOGIA (Vol. 3, No. 1), with the kind permission of the author and of Prof. Brian J. Winkel of the Dept. of Mathematics of Albion College, Michigan, where the quarterly is published. Devoted to all aspects of cryptology, the journal carried (to cite but two recent items of possible interest to ACHSWW members), in its subsequent issue (April 1979, Vol. 3, No. 2), an article by T. Jack Good on “Early Work on Computers at Bletchley” (pp. 65-77—a reprint, incidentally, from a British technical publication) and a review by Bradford Hardie of Ronald Lewin’s recent book on ULTRA (pp. 122-26). An annual subscription to CRYPTOLOGIA costs $20.00; insofar as available, individual copies and back issues are $6.00 each. Manuscripts on cryptology and all its applications are most welcome. For information regarding individual copies, subscriptions, or submission of manuscripts to the journal, write to the Editorial Office, CRYPTOLOGIA, Albion College, Albion, Michigan 49224.

For details on the recently published German edition of the proceedings of the conference, as well as tentative information on the forthcoming English edition, please see the bibliography above (p. 6).
The first international conference of cryptologists took place in Germany in November 1978.

The backroom boys of World War II -- Allied communications intelligence experts and Axis communications security specialists -- met under scholarly sponsorship to try to determine the effect of codebreaking on the war. They concentrated particularly on the Allied codebreaking of the German Enigma and Geheimschreiber machines (these solutions were codenamed ULTRA). The enormous Allied success in cracking these high-level German ciphers and in thereby gaining insight into top German plans and capabilities was the greatest secret of the war after the atom bomb. It also became the longest-held secret of the war: the British did not expose it until 1974, when they allowed F. W. Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret* to be published. That revelation touched off almost frantic activity among historians of the war. Had it made their work nugatory? Would they have to rewrite the whole history of the war? What was the weight of this intelligence in the conflict as a whole?

It was to answer such questions as these that the conference was organized -- and brilliantly run -- by Dr. Jürgen Rohwer. Germany's leading naval historian, Rohwer is also director of the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Library for Contemporary History) in Stuttgart, an adjunct professor at the University of Stuttgart, and current head of the Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung (Working Circle for Military Research). The extraordinary warmth of the conference owed as much to his charm and easygoing manner as it did to the camaraderie that sprang up among the participants. The success of the conference -- participants agreed that it was one of the most rewarding they had ever attended -- owed all to him.

The conference consisted of two parts. On 15 and 16 November, a dozen speakers addressed 250 military and military-industrial leaders in the municipal auditorium of Bonn on the theme "Modern Technology and Its Consequences for the Conduct of War: The Example of Radio Intelligence." This constituted the 45th working session of the Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung; also participating were the Clausewitz-Gesellschaft (Clausewitz Society) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrtechnik (German Society for Military Technology). The speakers used German or English, and simultaneous translation was provided. The program is listed on the next pages. On 17 and 18 November, the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte and the history department of the University of Stuttgart conducted a colloquium in the Senate room of that university on "What Role Did Radio Intelligence Play in the Course of the Second World War?" Sitting around a U-shaped table, with a score of spectators at one end of the room, about 25 ex-spooks and historians grappled with the subject. The proceedings are scheduled to be published in German by a publisher in Germany and in English by the U. S. Naval Institute Press. The volume will include the texts of the Bonn talks and a summary or, perhaps, a transcript of the Stuttgart meeting. This report will therefore only highlight the major contributions, the most interesting of which emerged in Stuttgart. Though questions were permitted from the floor in Bonn, none yielded any significant new information.

Kahn offered reasons for Allied superiority and German inferiority in cryptanalysis. He listed five general and four technical: (1) the fragmentation of the German effort among several codebreaking agencies compared with the concentration of the Allies'; (2) German aggression, which led to a neglect of intelligence, compared with the Allies' defensiveness, which heightened their
THE PROGRAM IN BONN

Wednesday, 15 November 1978

9:30  Greetings
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rohwer, head of the Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung

10:00  "The Influence of Modern Technology on the Command of Military Forces"
Gen. Harald Wust, Generalinspector of the Bundeswehr

11:15  "Communications, Cryptology and Signal Intelligence in the Wars of the 20th Century"
Dr. David Kahn, author of The Codebreakers.

2:30  "The Development of the German Radio Cipher Machines"
Lt. Col. (ret.) Waldemar Werther, wartime worker in the cipher bureau of the Luftwaffe High Command and later head of radio cryptanalysis at Air Fleets 1 and 6

3:00  "The Achievement of the Polish Biuro Szyfrów (Cipher Bureau) in Breaking the German Enigma Cipher"
Lt. Col. (ret.) Tadeusz Lisicki, participant in the Polish cryptanalytic service

4:30  "The Organization and Operation of G.C. & C.S. (Government Code & Cypher School) at Bletchley Park"
Mr. Peter Calvocoressi, wartime watch chief for German air force and army cryptanalyzed intelligence at Bletchley

5:00  "Successes and Failures of the German Cipher Services in the Second World War"
Dr. Erich Hüttenhain, wartime head of analytical cryptanalysis in the Cipher Branch of the Armed Forces High Command

watchfulness; (3) greater bureaucratic rigidity and greater fear in Hitler's dictatorship, which made it more difficult for German cipher experts to admit that the Enigma was being solved and to take corrective steps; (4) the expulsion of the Jews, which cost the Germans talent; (5) better Allied luck, especially in having a link between cryptanalysts and electronics technicians; and (6) Allied knowledge of the commercial Enigma, which gave their codebreakers a technical and psychological head start, while the corresponding Allied cipher machines were never made public; (7) the employment essentially of only one German machine, which made solution easier and more valuable than the many Allied machines; (8) inept German keying methods, which eased Allied solution; (9) stereotyped reports, which did the same.

Lisicki gave for the first time a clear and -- given the nature of the audience -- fairly technical description of the Polish solution of the Enigma. He said that the Poles would have solved the Enigma even without a spy's having furnished the Enigma operating instructions and some keys but that it would have taken them about two years longer. He observed that the spy
THE PROGRAM IN BONN

Thursday, 16 November 1978

Radio Reconnaissance
in the Atlantic Battle

9:00  "The Radio Command of the German U-Boats and the Role of the German Naval Cryptanalytic Service"
Capt. (ret.) Hans Meckel, wartime officer for radio communications on the staff of the commander of U-boats

9:30  "The British Admiralty's Operation Intelligence Centre and the Battle of the Atlantic"
Lt. Cdr. Patrick Beesly (R.N.V.R. ret.), wartime deputy chief of O.I.C.'s Submarine Tracking Room and author of Very Special Intelligence

10:30 "The Effects of German and British Radio Reconnaissance and the Convoy Operations in the North Atlantic"
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rohwer, author of The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943

11:00 "Radio Intelligence and the Turning Point in the Battle of the Atlantic"
Vice Admiral (ret.) Brian B. Schofield, R.N., wartime director of the Admiralty's Trade Division (Convoys and Routing)

2:30  "Radio Intelligence and Deception During Operation OVERLORD"
Mr. Ronald Lewin, author of Ultra Goes to War

3:30  "Electronic Warfare: Its Possibilities, Its Limitations and Its Dangers During the Second World War"
Prof. Dr. R. V. Jones, wartime director of scientific intelligence for the Air Ministry

contributed nothing to the fundamental problem of reconstructing the wiring of the Enigma rotors. In the next talk, Calvocoressi, at pains to give a true picture of the operation of the British codebreaking agency at Bletchley Park, remarked, "It is not the case that an eccentric English codebreaker would get an idea in his bath for solving a cipher and then would run back to his office to win the war without putting his clothes on!" Rohwer's talk, illustrated with slides, was a masterly reconstruction of how both sides used cryptanalyzed information to help direct their forces at sea. He warned historians particularly of the danger of thinking that all messages were solved on the day they were sent. Usually there was a delay, sometimes of days, between the interception and the solution, which meant that often these solutions were practically useless to the commands.

The whole first day in Stuttgart, instead of just the morning, as scheduled, was devoted to formal presentations, and another was given on Saturday morning, rather to the disappointment of some participants, who had hoped for a more free-wheeling discussion. Some discussion did creep into the interstices
between the presentations, however. For the sake of coherence and space, it seems better to group here all the presentations and then to keep together discussions and comments dealing with a single topic, though they may have been taken up at separate times.

To open the conference, Dr. Eberhard Jäckel, the administrative director of the university's Historisches Institut, posed the two questions the colloquium should address: How important was cryptology in World War II? How much must we rewrite World War II history? As a starting point for the discussion, he iterated the reasons proposed by Kahn for Allied superiority. No one ever alluded to them again.

In a paper read for him by Beesly, Vice Admiral (ret.) Sir Norman Denning, who during the war headed the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, said that Ultra and aerial reconnaissance provided the greater part of his intelligence. The reading of the traffic of the HYDRA key net of the Naval Enigma enabled the Allies to fill in the whole picture of German naval operations, he said.

Dr. Harold Deutsch, professor emeritus at the University of Minnesota, now Johnson professor of military history at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and author of numerous books on World War II, sought to stimulate controversy in a very lively talk by stating "to the absolute limit" his view on the influence of Ultra. Perhaps Ultra's most important contribution was its educating the higher commanders and their staffs to what was happening on the other side of the hill, he said.

Churchill's support of Ultra was his second-greatest contribution to victory, for without this support, "Bletchley Park would have been almost inconceivable." Could the war have been won without Ultra? he asked. His answer: "In virtually all of the important encounters, Ultra played a vital and perhaps decisive role." And, he asked, if Ultra was so important, why didn't it end the war sooner? His answer was that "It did end sooner."

Sir Herbert Marchant, a former ambassador and Bletchley worker in the same hut of Bletchley Park as Calvocoressi, gave a nuts-and-bolts description of how the papers flowed through the hut. Col. Donald Bussey, U.S.A. (ret.), the Ultra officer for the United States 7th Army, which landed in the south of France, told how the Ultra intelligence came in and was used by that command. "Ultra's greatest contribution on a day-to-day basis," he said, "was the understanding and full knowledge of German order of battle that it provided."

He mentioned a remark made by the G-2, Colonel William Quinn just after he had received an especially valuable piece of Ultra intelligence. "You know," said Quinn, "this just isn't cricket."

Edward Thomas, now a historian in the Cabinet Office helping with the forthcoming official history of British intelligence, told of his experiences in receiving Ultra in his office in a former steward's bathroom aboard the HMS Duke of York. It came in by direct wire from Bletchley Park. Because naval intelligence is simpler than army and air, he said, he alone in his office could maintain all his records. "We always had good information on German submarines in the North and Polar Seas," he said.

On Saturday morning, Jones spoke on Ultra's importance to scientific intelligence. He said that Churchill wanted to see the original signals, and as soon as the prime minister learned that the source was Ultra in the case of Peenemünde, where the Germans were making their rocket trials, he accepted it quickly, in part because of Ultra's help in enabling the British to bend the German navigational beams, and in part because of his experiences with cryptology in World War I (when, as first lord of the Admiralty, he received from the Russians a German naval code book that greatly helped Britain in starting
its successful cryptanalytic agency, Room 40).

This concluded the set talks. The comments may be grouped under the following headings: (1) specific cases in which Ultra played a role, (2) Ultra's overall importance, (3) the effect of Ultra on the war, (4) the Russians, (5) rewriting history, and (6) miscellaneous.

(1) Specific cases in which Ultra played a role. Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, professor of history at the University of Bonn and a leading World War II historian, asked for such case histories, saying it was a fundamental point. Bussey told two stories. Ultra-furnished knowledge that no German forces were off to the army's right flank soon after the landing let the invaders concentrate more force on a push to the north. And Ultra revealed an impending German attack near Saverne around 31 December 1944, enabling the American command to better its dispositions. Beesly said that when Adm. Karl Dönitz, commander in chief of the German navy and commander of U-boats, pulled his U-boats out of the North Atlantic in May, 1943, he left three to emit radio messages to disguise the withdrawal. "But Ultra told us of this so we could move our forces to the new threatened area, west of the Azores," Beesly said. Later, Jackel asked how Bletchley Park learned that Hitler's planned 1940 invasion of Britain had been postponed. Thomas said that the first decrypts revealing preparations for the invasion dealt with the training of units for the landing. The first indication of the postponement was the abandonment of this training, as well as the release of barges and the maintenance of some element as cover for the preparations for the invasion of Russia. A case in which Ultra did not play a decisive role may be entered under this heading to correct published accounts. Winterbotham and others have written that Ultra ascertained the German tactic during the Battle of Britain of sending their bombers in waves and that this enabled Fighter Command to parcel out its pitifully few fighters most effectively. But Calvocoressi said that Ultra intelligence tended to be late and corrupt and had too few people to interpret it in those days of 1940. When the documents are examined, it would probably be found that Ultra did not play a decisive role in that critical battle for command of the air, he said.

(2) Ultra's overall importance. The German historians persisted on this point. They wanted a single summary assessment of Ultra's global wartime importance. Jacobsen, for example, asked what the value of Ultra was relative to other sources of information. Dr. Michael Salewski, author of a multi-volume work on the German navy, asked how Ultra was used in the mass. But the Americans and the Britons who had worked with Ultra denied that answers to such questions were possible. Calvocoressi declared that "The value of Ultra depended on the time and place [in which it was used]. It can't be quantified [over the whole war]." He criticized the "obsession" with individual cases, saying that "By talking about these particulars, one may get a false picture of the source as a whole. The main value was building up a picture from which conclusions could be drawn." Bussey remarked that Ultra was indeed "part of a mixture, but this is to underestimate the importance of Ultra in that mixture." He said that a useful analogy for Ultra's help was the Allied radar moving-target indicator, which pierced through jamming and segregated out the moving target. Both it and Ultra, he said, eliminated the background noise to focus on the meaningful signals. Lewin said that "Any suggestion of a structural flow in which you say Ultra came first among the sources of information, this came second, and so on, distorts the picture... Sometimes Ultra was the most important, but sometimes it arrived too late." Thomas provided the most lapidary reply to the German question. "No simple answer, no generalization is possible," he said. But he noted that "Ultra information was most sought when the enemy had the initiative, as in the case of counterattacks."
The effect of Ultra on the war. Dr. Andreas Hillgruber, professor at the University of Cologne and perhaps the leading historian of World War II, asked rhetorically, how would the war have gone without Ultra? He answered that the war was sped up through Ultra and that without it, the invasion of France would have taken place later and the Russians would have gone further west. (Hillgruber seemed to imply that they would have stayed in the areas they conquered. But the Russians — like the western Allies — pulled back from such areas to the territories delimited as final occupation zones; the Russians returned three fourths of Berlin to the Allies, for example.) Dr. Gerhard Weinberg, professor of history at the University of North Carolina and first head of the American project for microfilming the seized German records, retorted with some asperity that "It is ridiculous to argue that if the Atlantic battle had been won more slowly all else would have been unchanged. If things had not gone so well in the Atlantic, the Allies would have put more resources into the Atlantic to keep on their timetable." These resources would have come from supplies intended for the Pacific — "the lesser theater. So if there had been no Ultra in the Atlantic, the United States would perhaps be fighting in the Philippines [in early 1945] instead of on Iwo Jima and Okinawa." Thus the Atlantic Ultra actually helped the Pacific war, he said.

Lewin observed that "The two main decisions of the Casablanca conference do not come in any way from Ultra." These were to give the highest priority to the Battle of the Atlantic and to destroy Germany from the air. The same goes for the invasion of North Africa, he said. "I don't think Ultra fits in the real picture of grand strategy," he concluded. In addition, Gen. Leo Hardy, wartime chief of staff to the German army chief signal officer, said that Allied material superiority was the crucial factor, not Ultra. No one disputed this.

The Russians. Hillgruber commented that everyone forgets the importance of the Russian front, which absorbed two thirds of the German war effort. This importance remains the same with or without the western Allies' Ultra, he affirmed. Dr. Geoffrey Jukes, a former Bletchley worker now at the University of Canberra, who nodded his head vigorously when Hillgruber was making this point, noted that "We don't know whether the Russians could read Enigma and this is as big a gap as Ultra used to be for the West." (Some evidence — nearly all of it German — indicates that the Russians could solve Enigma messages, at least at times. Some discussions at a 1943 conference of German army signal officers centered on this likelihood. In his talk in Bonn, Werther said that the war diary of Army Group North says 11 Enigma keys have been exposed. A Russian book mentions the recovery of an Enigma from a U-boat in the Baltic in 1944. Tending to corroborate this are the admittedly vague observations that the Russians have long been good in cryptanalysis and have also been good in subjects that go along with excellence in cryptanalysis: music, chess, and mathematics. On the other hand, their then relatively impoverished technical background suggests that they were far less likely than the Poles or the British to independently evolve electromechanical devices for automatically solving Enigma messages. Could they have used, instead of such devices, hundreds of men from their vast human reservoirs? A Finnish cryptanalyst, Erkki Pale, who during World War II had solved Russian codes, thought that such an undertaking could not be organized to succeed. Thomas said that, in his delving among the classified archives, he saw no evidence of Russian Enigma solutions. The Russians themselves have said nothing on the topic.)

Jukes raised the possibility that a Russian sympathizer at Bletchley might have told the Soviet Union of the fact of Allied success in this field out of outrage that the western Allies were not sharing this vital intelligence, in the same way as scientists at Los Alamos passed over the secret of the atom bomb. Kahn asked whether the story was true that the British had used the famed LUCY
Communist spy ring in Switzerland, headed by Rudolf Rössler, whose sources have never been revealed, as a conduit to feed disguised Ultra information to their Soviet allies. Thomas said that some Ultra intelligence was given to the Russians in concealed form. Calvocoressi said that there was no need for "mysterious people in Switzerland" because "a good deal" was sent through a special mission in Moscow headed by Edward Crankshaw, the writer. Crankshaw was disappointed that more could not be given, he said, and was finally convinced by Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the British secret service, which distributed the Ultra material, that poor Soviet cipher security risked revealing this precious source to the Germans, Calvocoressi said. When Jukes asked whether the Allies should not have told the Russians that their ciphers were weak, Thomas replied: "There's a whole book on this subject. It will not be published." Thomas also said it was very likely that the British attacked and even solved Soviet codes and that this work was mostly done in the Middle East (where the spheres of influence collided, especially in Iran, which was occupied jointly by Russian and British troops in August, 1941).

(5) Rewriting history. Dr. Forrest Pogue, author of the standard biography of Gen. George C. Marshall, U. S. Army chief of staff, said that to suggest that overnight all World War II history must be rewritten is to misunderstand that history is always being rewritten. The Ultra revelations must be seen as part of this process, he said. He added that 15 to 20 years is the time lag for facts to catch up with fiction. That's how long it will take for the false story that Winston Churchill allowed Coventry to be destroyed and its people martyred to save the secret of Ultra "to stop being used to keep sophomores awake in the classroom." Jacobsen said that only battle history will have to be revised; the overriding political events and global strategy would not be affected. Lewin wondered whether Ultra might become a new form of the stab-in-the-back legend. [Promulgated in Germany after World War I, this held that the German armies did not lose honorably on the field of battle but were betrayed on the home front by Communists and Jews.] Finally, Hepp asked whether, in a one-volume history of World War II, there belongs a chapter on radio intelligence. No, he assured himself. But there might be a chapter on intelligence in general, and radio intelligence would belong in that, he said.

(6) Miscellaneous. (a) An epigram from Werther: "The security of a cipher lies less with the cleverness of the inventor than with the stupidity of the men who are using it." (b) Karl-Otto Hoffmann, author of a three-volume history of the Luftwaffe signal corps, said that according to the Luftwaffe chief signals officer during the war, Gen. Wolfgang Martini, usually 30% and sometimes up to 50%, of Luftwaffe intelligence came from radio reconnaissance. He said that one depends more on radio reconnaissance in retreats than in advances, when one has other sources, such as prisoners of war and the population. (c) Charles von Luttichau, a historian with the U. S. Army's Center for Military History, asked whether the Germans ever thought that a single machine might be dangerous. Werther said "yes," but did not elaborate. Hepp said that he had a section to test German cipher systems. That the Enigma was provably unbreakable was never affirmed, he said, only that it could be solved. Consequently the rules for its use were constantly improved, he said. Some in the audience felt that he was placing more emphasis on Enigma solvability in 1978 than was done in 1943, when the emphasis lay rather on the near certainty that the Enigma was not being solved. At a party at the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte that evening, the present chief of German naval radio intelligence said that to have two machines would have cost more money and more training and would have engendered more errors and failures to get through, thus reducing the trust of the commanders in the machine and in communications. Finally, Calvocoressi noted dryly that the British, too, used but a single machine. (d) Alec Douglas, a Canadian official historian, said that more
comparisons need to be made between the use of intelligence in World Wars I and II. (e) "I am surprised," Thomas said, "to see so many distinguished minds trying to fit the importance of Ultra into the whole history of the war before we have the evidence. The cart is hurrying before the horse. I think we have 25 years' work to do in establishing the facts."

The conference ended at 12:10 p.m. Saturday with a graceful tribute by Marchant to the conference organizer. After expressing the thanks of the participants, he said that all present were thankful that Beesly's Operational Intelligence Centre had not caught that German minesweeper in the Baltic on which there was working a young naval officer by the name of Rohwer.

The hard-working historians seemed oblivious during the conference to the human dramas that swirled around them but that did not touch their high purposes. How did the former enemies feel about one another? All said they held no animosities. Capt. (ret.) Heinz Bonatz, who during part of the war had headed the Kriegsmarine's cryptanalytic service, said he did not hate the British. "We fought against one another and now we're comrades -- and historians, thank God," he said. But the British seemed a bit more reserved. "They're fine fellows -- now," said Beesly. Lewis told of an odd feeling he had during the Bonn meeting. "I was talking about the deception in Normandy, and in front was a row of elderly Germans, one of whom at the end asked a question. Suddenly it shot through my head. 'I was there, and you were there, and here we are.' It was very strange."

A more poignant drama was more suppressed. How did the German cryptographers feel as the British and American intelligence officers cited case after case in which their solutions of a machine which the Germans had said was secure cost Germany battle after battle, U-boat after U-boat, and thousands of German lives and contributed much to the defeat of their nation? Mostly the German cryptographers sat silent, for they had, after all, no comeback to this. And they denied feeling guilt or embarrassment over the proceedings.

Meckel said he feels he did his best. He said he didn't mean he never made mistakes. But he had no certain indication that the Allies had solved the machine -- there were always alternative explanations for the apparent Allied foreknowledge of German moves -- and so he feels he did not err about the ciphers. Hepp and Bonatz likewise both denied suffering from the situation. "I had a view and I was wrong. Now I have to correct it," said Bonatz.

But others did feel badly. The chief of staff to the U-boat command, Adm. (ret.) Eberhard Godt, not present at the conference, "suffers badly on account of this," Meckel said. And the Finnish codebreaker Pale said, "I felt depressed." Why? "Because I was on the losing side," he explained (Finland fought as a co-belligerent with Germany against Russia). He added, "It must have been very depressing for the Germans with the English firing all those cannonballs from all sides."

Indeed. For what human could not feel at least a twinge of guilt over the fact that his failure, however hard he worked at the time, helped cost his country a war? Yet the answer remains locked in the fastness of the German codebreakers' hearts. And to secrets there, no one, not even the Allies' cryptanalysts, has ever been able to penetrate.