AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

NEWSLETTER

DUES

Dues of $5.00 for the calendar year 1974 are now payable. A special appeal for remission is set forth on a separate sheet.

PROGRAM AT AHA MEETING

The American Committee is sponsoring a joint session at the St. Francis, Elizabeth Room B, Saturday, December 29, at 9:30:

Thirty years after: The Cairo Conference and China.

Chairman, Charles Delzell (Vanderbilt); papers by Howard Boorman (Vanderbilt), William Franklin (State Dep.), and William Roger Louis (Texas); comment by Akira Iriye (Chicago).

BUSINESS MEETING

Agendas:

Treasurer’s report

Election of Directors. Right to be elected with terms expiring in 1976. For this election it has been assumed that directors with terms expiring in 1973 are eligible for re-election. It has been proposed that this ruling as applicable in future elections should be discussed.

Program for AHA (Chicago), 1974. According to AHA policy, new organizations may have three joint sessions, but thereafter only every other year. Some groups (like the Conference on Peace Research) are opposing this policy. Do we wish to join them? In any case, we should propose a session for 1974. (Two programs, one on Japanese Americans, and one on Admirals in the Pacific, were not accepted last year.) Should we continue the theme of a 30th Anniversary?

Report on International Committee meeting at Budapest (September, 1973) attended by Donald Whitnah (Northern Iowa).


Bibliography (Janet Ziegler, UCLA).

Book reports and relations with Revue d’Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale (Robert Dalick, UCLA).

"Comments on War in the Air."

I believe my most useful role in the panel session of the conference would be to discuss primarily the state of the history of the Army Air Forces in World War II. Very little scholarly work beyond that in the official account edited by W. Frank Craven and James L. Cate has been published on the history of the Army Air Forces. The strengths and weaknesses of their seven-volume official account suggest a great deal about what has been accomplished and what our next assignment might be. The mighty obstacle of security classification undoubtedly has stymied work in all aspects of World War II. While that obstacle is finally beginning to disappear, other obstacles continue to hinder substantial, first-rate work on the history of the air side of the war.

One obstacle is that there are so few historians active in the field. Only two of the survivors among the major contributors, Alfred Goldberg and Robert F. Putrell, are still active in the history of Military aviation. Another contributor, Harry L. Coles, has continued to work in general military history. A ready explanation of this shortage of active workers may be found, Robin Higham has suggested, in the requirement for a specific technical expertise to work in the field. There are signs of change in this regard, most notable in the Air Force. As an institution only twenty-six years old, the Air Force had not been history-minded until recently. Since 1955, a requirement for young officers to teach history at the Air Force Academy has led to the creation of a pool of career officers trained as historians. The most important step occurred five years ago when the Air Force assigned a prestigious place to the discipline by appointing a general officer as chief of the historical program and by giving the program a distinctive place on the Air Staff.

The official account of the Army's air arm during World War II has many strong points. It is a sober, scholarly work, based on a mountain of sources including some 100 monographs. It is the product of a vast cooperative enterprise, which no individual historian could ever hope to undertake and its footnotes are the indispensable roadmap for future researchers. There are problems in this work. The choice was made to publish as soon as possible after the war; as a result, Craven and Cate learned a lot about the problems of writing contemporary history. Information from enemy sources, for example, did not develop as fast as the editors would have wished. The final work suffers from the unevenness so often characteristic of large scale collaborations.

If any one is looking for an assignment in the history of military aviation, he or she should consider researching and writing much-needed studies of the pre-World War II air arm (Army Air Corps, the General Headquarters Air Force, or the Air Corps Tactical School). We lack satisfactory biographies of early air leaders such as Benjamin Foulois and Mason Patrick even though considerable material is available (Happily, a full-scale biography of Gen. Hap Arnold is in
progress as is a study of Frank Andrews). A more ambitious but much-needed project would be a study of the evolution of strategic bombing (the Speer and Haywood S. Hansell memoirs being especially helpful). In assessing the effectiveness of strategic bombing, the researcher should read work by Major David Mac-Isaac and Anthony Verrier. In the field of oral history, men such as Generals Eaker, Twining, Lemay, Norstad, Kuter, and Hansell would make excellent subjects for interviews. The role of the civilian in shaping Air Force development is deserving of more attention. The World War II role of Robert A. Lovett deserves a detailed study. Work should be done on civilian scientists and engineers and the Army Air Forces. There is work to be done on the relationship between the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the air arm.

One sign of the professionalization of Air Force history is the new archival facility at Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery, Alabama), whose collection is especially strong in the records of the Air Corps Tactical School and World War II records, especially those supporting the official history. Another sign is the relatively new headquarters for the Air Force's historical activities in the Forrestall Building in Washington, D.C. The office is publishing within the next year a collection of selected letters between Arnold and his field commanders. To stimulate interest in Air Force history, the Office of Air Force History began to offer this year fellowships for graduate students, similar to those already offered by the Army and Navy's historical programs.

In support of the Air Force History Program, several of my colleagues are engaged in studies of the World War II period which reflect some very current interests: Two of them are studying the history of blacks in the air arm between 1941 and the birthdate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Another officer is about to begin a study of a POW camp, Stalag Luft III, using materials which have never been exploited.

The naval air story has a more substantial starting point for future work than that of the Air Force because of Turnbull and Lord's history of naval aviation through 1940 and Clark Reynolds's work on carrier operations in the Pacific. As to foreign air forces, I would only note the need for solid histories of the Luftwaffe and the Japanese Air Forces which would surely enhance any further work undertaken on the U.S. Army or Navy air arms.

Aerospace Historian, the magazine of the Air Force Historical Foundation, and Air University Review offer excellent vehicles for those who want to publish at least the interim results of their work in the history of military aviation.
Samuel Eliot Morison's overall account and synthesis of the U.S. Navy in World War II, combined with basic histories of Axis and Allied navies, have established a standard that has not been challenged in any general sense. A number of senior naval commanders have written their memoirs, or have been the subject of initial biographies. General insights into the Navy's participation in grand strategy are indicated in Morison and other works (some of them recently declassified monographs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Histories of overall naval administration, of several technical bureaus, and other institutional aspects of the Navy are available. Finally, a number of areas involving the Navy's external relationships have been explored, at least on a preliminary basis.

There is a need for more specialized studies covering the surprising number of gaps in the naval literature of World War II. Despite the initial biographical and autobiographical works relating to such leaders as Ernest J. King, William D. Leahy, and James Forrestal, William F. Halsey, Raymond A. Spruance, Richmond Kelly Turner, Charles A. Lockwood, and Milton E. Miles, historians are compelled to note the absence of major biographical studies based upon a full appreciation of the historical themes of World War II. Work is now underway on Chester Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance. No major biographer is assessing the exceedingly significant roles of Leahy, King, Forrestal, Thomas C. Kinkaid, Harold R. Stark, Thomas C. Hart, Frederick J. Horne, Alan Kirk, and Julius A. Furer. Any biographer would be aided by reasonable good collections of personal papers left by all of these men and the series of oral memoirs of senior officers prepared by Dr. John Mason under the auspices of Columbia University and more recently the U.S. Naval Institute.

Few published studies exist covering naval operations outside the major combatant zones. There is an absence of substantial works on the evolution of specific categories of naval tactics. An understanding of World War II tactics requires extensive research in the inter-war period. Here, one should find rich veins of data on the development of the doctrine and the material systems that explained the successes or deficiencies of the Navy's carrier, logistic, submarine, and anti-submarine forces in World War II.

A better understanding of many other internal aspects of the service is essential. Some areas would include: assessments of the training and attitudes of senior officers; the social and institutional history of the enlistees, including such groups as women and blacks; and the functioning of major commands; including Nimitz's Pacific Headquarters and Ingersoll's Atlantic Fleet, are notable for their absence from the published literature. The national research and development process has been covered by James Phinney Baxter and Harold G. Bowen, but the Navy's notable efforts remain to be described in detail or placed in overall perspective. The Navy's own historical program during World War II also deserves study.
Research opportunities exist in areas involving the Navy's external relationships. Urban and economic historians should find significance in the impact of the Navy on such areas as Norfolk, San Diego, and Narragansett Bay. An assessment is needed of the Navy's participation in the war crimes trials of the lesser Japanese leaders. Congressional relationships in wartime have potential relevance to Constitutional developments and inter-government relations. Some graduate students are already undertaking work on the Navy's industrial impact during World War II. Finally, it would be important to analyze the Navy's wartime relationships with other services at the Washington level, in the European and Pacific Theatres, or in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command.

What can one say regarding problems in the field? Fortunately, one difficulty involving source material has been lessened by the establishment of a system for the declassification of most World War II records. The amount of archival, manuscript, and special library materials relating to World War II naval history is enormous (see Dean C. Allard and Betty Bern, eds., U.S. Naval History Sources in the Washington Area and Suggested Research Subjects). Depositories with World War II collections need to increase their efforts to publicize, describe, and prepare finding aids for their holdings.

A more obvious problem is the task of attracting competent individuals to undertake studies relates to naval history. It seems clear that the uncertain reputation of the military in the United States, as well as the academic tendency to view military history as an overly narrow and relatively inconsequential field, discourage many potential writers.

Public views of the military may be slow to change; yet, the task of encouraging more research and writing in the naval history of World War II should be far from impossible. In contrast to certain other areas of U.S. history, a number of fresh topics and underworked bodies of source material are available. As for better recognition of the field's potential significance, I also am optimistic. That optimism is based upon the assumption that naval history will be defined in a broad sense, including all of the political, social, economic, and intellectual themes that are of concern to the modern scholar.
In 1967, the preface of a book dealing in part with World War II declared that "The intelligence history of World War II has never been written." In 1971, a young German historian noted in his concentrated little book on Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933-1945 that "A basic study of Hitler's information system and the then-current state of his actual knowledge is -- now as before -- overdue." In 1973, both statements can still be repeated.

For intelligence gaps as the biggest hole in the historiography of World War II. Other areas have been worked and reworked. Historians have produced so much material that they can even argue over it. In the ground, air, and sea wars, we know the crucial decisions, the great lines of the operations, the men and units who fought. But of the information about the enemy that leaders incorporated in making their plans, we know almost nothing.

Three reasons have, I think, created this gap. All of them are now fading rapidly. (a) The sources have not been available. The new archival regulations in the United States and Great Britain change this considerably. (b) The high decisions of strategy that won or lost the war have naturally attracted historians more than the secondary factors that merely contributed to these decisions, such as intelligence. But as the big questions become overstudied, the others gain in attractiveness -- in part intrinsically, in part for the fresh light that they may throw on the big questions. (c) Scholars have equated intelligence with espionage. This has had two effects. One is that they have recoiled from studying the subject, feeling that spies are unworthy of their attention. An elderly don here at Oxford, recipient of a Festschrift, expressed that very view to me last November. In part this feeling stems from the cheap and unheroic nature of spying, in part from scholarly revulsion for most of the literature of espionage, which overcolors its stories, claims too great an influence for its results, does not connect with the main stream of history, and -- horror of horrors! -- never cites sources. But among younger scholars this view is changing. Journal articles, dissertations, even books on spies and informers appear with increasing frequency. Last fall, Dakota State College finally placed the stamp of academic respectability on the subject by holding a conference on it. The second effect of the equation of espionage with intelligence has been to block research. Scholars, thinking spies the only source of information, have not seen the vast other areas involved in intelligence.

In this talk I shall show these undiscovered territories. I hope thereby to excite historians to explore them -- and to analyze spying as well, in a scholarly way. These studies of the sources and evaluation of information constitute the first step in writing the intelligence history of World War II. (Perhaps I should say that I am now doing this for the German side. But chapters 20 pages long cannot claim to be definitive, and so plenty of room is left for further research. Moreover, the Allied side remains virtually untouched.)

The elements of intelligence are these, in mixed order of importance to the generals, intrinsic interest, and logical succession:

(1) Codebreaking. During World War II this became both sides' major source of intelligence. Some material about German successes has come out. The Allied success in reading the top German cipher machine, the Enigma, apparently led to far more wide-ranging results, as victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. But only bits and pieces of this story has yet come out. An aggressive researcher can exhume it all under the new declassification regulations, as long as he avoids technical details. This will, I feel confident, shed considerable light on many now still somewhat obscure decisions and operations. I think this is the major untold story of World War II.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance. Some time ago I wrote to an American expert in this
field, Amrom Katz, asking for some hints to literature in the field. Back came a little pamphlet, with a reference to a well-known book or two, and an admission that people in the field had taken almost no interest in its history. This study must begin -- if you will pardon a pun -- from the ground up.

(3) Prisoners of war. On the German side at least, p.o.w. interrogations produced basic tactical intelligence. Prisoners identified units and betrayed plans. Talking about their prewar jobs, they helped complete air target dossiers. The sources should present no difficulties, as much of the material is in lower-unit records. The historian might consider resolving the psychological question of why prisoners talk; some of Hitler's generals said German kindness did it, others indicated fear. A corollary to this would investigate captured documents and matériel.

(4) The press. This was Hitler's favorite source of information. More lowly intelligence gatherers also emphasized how much they got from the American newspapers, almost sneering at their lack of discipline. Was this because they got so little from other sources, or did they really get relatively more from the press than the Allies? If they did, why? The Axis and the Allies apparently differed in their attitudes towards publication, in part through differing traditions. But did the Allies also deliberate permit more freedom because they thought that the spread of knowledge would generally aid their war effort? And if they did, did the additional knowledge help them more than the enemy? No one has yet looked into these questions. Of course, in investigating the press, the historian must not forget the radio and the specialized agencies on both sides that picked up foreign broadcasts and intercepted press transmissions.

(5) The attaches. Some memoirs and studies do exist on attaches. But none uses contemporary documents to examine the attaché contribution. Two periods must be looked at: before the war, when attaches were delivering information on their future enemies, and during the war, when, excluded from the enemy capitals, they sought information on the neutral lands.

(6) The diplomats. Almost all studies of foreign affairs in World War II emphasize negotiations. But gathering information was just as much a part of the job of an ambassador or a minister. Yet outside of a single article by George C. Kent, I know of no studies that look into how the various foreign offices performed this, one of their most traditional functions, and what role the information they collected played in policy-making.

(7) Ground reconnaissance, including patrols, armored reconnaissance, and artillery observation (sound- and flash-ranging). Tactical commanders got most of their information from this simple source, and they relied on it more heavily. They obviously felt that they could trust more than anyone else their own men, who came back and said they saw enemy troops in St. Dié with their own eyes. And such information bore directly on their immediate dispositions and actions.

(8) Spies. Work on the Allied side must begin with the most accessible sources, those dealing with front-line agents and agents of the Resistance. The declassifiers will probably make the reports of the more secret agents-in-place -- if indeed the Allies had any -- available before any details about the agents themselves. This at least permits an analysis of the importance of their information relative to other sources. Published work -- Masterman's and Farago's -- has told us that the Germans were almost totally ineffective in the West. The lack of citations in them requires that historians repeat some of the work to nail it down properly.

(9) Maps and weather. These do not deal with the enemy per se, but form an important part of military information.

(10) Basic theories. No one has ever compared the manuals and the staff organization of the various armies to extract their different doctrines on intelligence. For example, German regulations subordinated the intelligence officer (the Ic) to the operations officer (the Ia). American and French staffs, on the other hand, gave the intelligence officer (the G-2) a number before that of the operations officer (the G-3). What did this mean in terms of intelligence and operational results?
(11) The evaluation of intelligence. Most armies separated the acquisition of intelligence from its evaluation. In the Wehrmacht, for example, one agency ran spies, another flew photographic reconnaissance, another broke military ciphers, another read the newspapers, and so on. They then all transmitted their results directly or indirectly to the intelligence officer at their headquarters or to the army general staff's Foreign Armies East and Foreign Armies West sections near Berlin. These judged the various inputs as to probable accuracy and assembled them into a statement of enemy capabilities and possible actions. Similar agencies existed in other services and other armies. They perform the key process in intelligence. Yet no one has ever looked into it in detail to ascertain its principles and to determine its accuracy by comparing it with the now-known facts about the other side.

These areas comprise the operations of intelligence — its internal history, as it were. Historians must generate information on them in their usual ways as a first step in writing the intelligence history of World War II. For knowing how codebreaking or aerial photography worked and how they fit together forms the necessary base for the second and more important step in writing that history. This step links intelligence to operations. It shows how the information affected the battlefield results.

Despite its importance, hardly anyone has studies this relation. The spinners of spy stories tell of their great coups — but they almost never tell what has happened to this information when it reached headquarters. A good example is the Norden bomb sight. Apparently Nazi spies did steal this closely-guarded American secret around 1937. But the Luftwaffe ignored it, and first analyzed it when it seized some from downed American bombers in 1942.

The connection between intelligence and operations is admittedly difficult to determine. Intelligence is but one factor among many that guide a commander's actions. He weighs them in his mind and issues his orders, and only rarely does he later elucidate his reasoning — and even more rarely does he specify the importance of intelligence. So historians must try to ascertain the weight of the intelligence parameter through interviews 30 years after the fact, or by hypothesizing from hints in the documents. Neither is very satisfactory. Yet the historian must attempt the determination. For it alone lifts the study of intelligence into the history of war. Not to do so would leave it as an interesting but isolated artifact, unconnected with the total human experience.

This decision as to the influence of intelligence on operations is the most important that a historian of the subject must make. But he can also take a third step which is of considerable interest. He can compare the intelligence of the two sides to see which proved the more effective.

No part of this program presents any difficulty in principle. It can all be fulfilled on the basis of the usual sources. For the world of scholarship at large, such a program has the importance of filling the most important gap in our knowledge of the biggest war in history. For the individual historian, it offers two advantages. It is in the forefront of a new, growing, and relevant field of study. And, since intelligence attracts the interest of a wide public, it may perhaps win him a larger-than-usual measure of fame and — dare we say it? — fortune.
Louis Morton, Dartmouth College.

"Comments on Needs of World War II History."

In spite of the fact that geographical approaches have been used in connection with the history of World War II, this sort of approach is one of the things wrong with writing history of the war. The Pacific theatre, for example, was a sideshow; it was important to Americans, but thinking of the Pacific as a separate theatre is uniquely an American view, and it poses special problems.

Another problem relates to the passage of time. The "first generation" of World War II historians is now being succeeded by younger historians, who ask different kinds of questions and develop different interpretations. This by no means vitiates the accomplishments of the historians who, writing immediately after the war, did an enormous pioneering job.

The Cold War and Vietnam have had considerable influence on historians. The earlier histories written during the Cold War but, with the cooling of the Cold War one is inclined to examine Soviet actions and motivations in a different light. Similarly with southeast Asia: after the war historians tended to view the United States as a democracy trying to save China from a belligerent Japan attempting to establish its co-prosperity sphere. In the 1960's the United States could be viewed as a power seeking to establish its own sphere of influence in Asia. With this reversal of roles, with the ironic situation in which the United States sought the same types of objectives in 1964-70 the Japan sought in 1938, it is no wonder that the younger generation of historians view the Pacific war differently from the older writers.

A considerable problem exists in defining World War II. It was really a number of different wars. For example, the Pacific war was a struggle which really started in 1931 and was concluded, so far as the sea phase goes, in May, 1943. It was only a sideshow of the world struggle, and yet in another sense, it is still going on.

Korea and Vietnam are continuing episodes in the long-range struggle over control of the Asian mainland.

We continue to view China through Stilwell's eyes. No good biography of Chiang Kai-shek has yet been written. In the United States the usual assumption made is that Chiang's purpose was to defeat Japan. To Chiang, American entry into the war simply meant that Japan would ultimately be taken care of.

At one time one could have believed the Pacific was the most important, but the passage of years inclines one to modify this view. What needs to be done is to assess the Pacific conflict as part of the global struggle - yet this is not easy to do. Many historians call for more specialized studies, but what is really needed are more general histories, histories which provide perspective, which respond to critical and general questions.

Among these are: What are the relations between World War I and World War II? What was the role of Russia in both wars, especially regarding her relations with the Allies? Have adequate studies of the planning for peace been made? Have we analyzed completely the ways in which Roosevelt attempted to avoid the mistakes made by Wilson? We know a good deal about Marshall's concept of the unity of command; but have we studied this problem as related to the first World War or have we sought links between the two?

We have not adequately studied the home front. The British included excellent studies of Great Britain at war in their official histories, but we have not done this. We need to know more about the relationship of the military and civilians, and the effects on civil policy. Did the military influence domestic elections? Watanabe goes back to Roosevelt - to the president as commander in chief. The role of the military does not begin in the five last years. It goes back to World War II, where the origins of the "military-industrial" complex can be found. So far, no one has adequately analyzed this phenomenon.

There has been too much writing of World War II in sections: by service, by theatre, by command, by nationality - but we have no overall coverage. There are national histories, but few general interpretations. All aspects of the war ought to be put together into one history, analyzed and related by one directing intelligence.
Earl F. Ziemke, University of Georgia.
"Comments on the Eastern Campaigns."

I suspect that, of all the areas in which World War II was fought, the Eastern Front is the one about which we prefer to hear the least. In the American mind—and more surprisingly, the British—it has now become pretty firmly established that the war in Europe began in November, 1942, did not really get rolling until June, 1944, and that the Russians sneaked in at the end in 1945 chiefly to snatch Berlin out from under General Eisenhower's nose.

Louis Snyder in his 1960 volume The War gave 29 of 470 pages to the war in the East. Liddell Hart in the History of the Second World War (1970) gave 117 pages to war between the Soviet Union and Germany out of a total 682 pages, and he gave 111 pages to the campaign in North Africa. Calvocoressi and Wint, in Total War (1972) allot 47 of 51 pages to the war in the East and 63 pages to the Japanese campaigns from Pearl Harbor to Midway. It is understandable that American and British writers should see the war in the East as peripheral. If they did not, their publishers and readers almost certainly would. One must concede also that it is exceedingly difficult to describe the action on two widely separated fronts in a single narrative. The war in the East is not faring a great deal better as a major historical event in the hands of those whom it chiefly involved, i.e., the Germans and Russians.

No American writer has as yet undertaken a full-scale history of the war in the East. The Army's Office of the Chief of Military History has projected such a history in three volumes, but so far only one volume has appeared. Some earlier OCMH publications, The German Campaign in Russia, Planning and Operations, 1940-1942; The German Northern Theater of Operations; and The Soviet Partisan Movement could possibly be said to constitute a kind of makeshift history. Trumbull Higgins' book Hitler and Russia gives a brief, mostly high level, account of the war up to Stalingrad. It attempts to treat the German-Soviet conflict in the context of the whole war. American writers have preferred to deal with episodes, the Siege of Leningrad in Salisbury's 900 Days, Germany's final defeat in Ryan's Last Battle or Toland's Last 100 Days, and occupation policy in Dalliu's German Rule in the East.

At the moment, three books by British writers probably rank in the minds of most as the standard comprehensive histories. Of course, Seaton's The Russo-German War is the only one that claims to be a full treatment of the whole war. Alan Clark's Barbarossa is an attempt to rehabilitate Hitler's military reputation, and it dribbles out after 1942 when the going on that noble enterprise gets somewhat rough. Werth's Russia at War is certainly the most readable of the three, but it is essentially a memoir scantily reinforced with references to the Soviet official history published in the 1960s.

Until the early 1960s, German historians had the legitimate complaint that their own records were not available to them. Since the records were returned there has
been a small wave of document publication, the OKW War Diary, the Halder Diary, and some others, but no great wave of systematic history. A good account of the war on the Eastern Front in German is the late General Tippelskirch's Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, which was published in 1951 and expanded and revised in 1956. Some German historians, most notably Percy Ernst Schramm, have done much to advance knowledge of the war in the East, as have the memoirs of some German generals, particularly Manstein and Guderian.

The Military History Research Office of the West German Bundesarchiv has been in existence since the 1950s and has had access to the documents since at least 1963. Before last year it published four studies having to do with the Eastern Front: two concerned with defensive actions in the Baltic area in 1944-45, one with the capture of Odessa in 1941, and one with the "Fortresses" Kovel and Tarnopol in 1944. Last year it published Die Wende vor Moskau, the first effort at a larger subject, namely, Hitler's strategy in 1941 and early 1942. As in other Military History Research office publications, the documentation in this volume is nothing short of monumental. However, I am disturbed by the thesis that the military events on the Eastern Front are unimportant because by October, 1941, Germany had definitively lost the war in terms of manpower and production. One sees no sign of a comprehensive German official history similar to those which have already been published by the other nations that were involved in World War II.

Soviet publication on the war has been and will probably continue to be voluminous. The six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War has been out for almost ten years and a larger History of the Second World War is now promised by 1977. The question that remains to be answered is whether the second series will add to the first in terms of our knowledge of the war in the East or merely write Kruschchev out, write Stalin and Zhukov back in, and possibly reveal some hitherto unsuspected major contributions to the War's outcome on Mr. Brezhnev's part. The real Soviet contribution to the history of the war reached its high point between 1957 and 1959 with the publication of two relatively small books: P. A. Zhilin's The Most Important Operations of the Great Patriotic War and S. P. Platonov's History of the Second World War. Those two, particularly the second, released a flood of mostly useful and pertinent information. Progressively, the Soviet writers have been writing more and saying less. The clearest examples are Zhukov and Shtemenko, whose articles printed in the Military History Journal in the first half of the 1960s convey at least as much solid information as their book-length memoirs published five or six years later.

The outstanding feature of Soviet writing on the war in the past half dozen or so years has been the memoirs. Although they were not top ranking figures in the war, the authors achieved enough stature in the interim to be able to claim a piece of the action. Taken together, the memoirs perhaps can be described as a mine of information, but the ore assays low. Bailey's anthology, Stalin and His Generals, demonstrates that more than adequately. Whatever expectations we may have had for this form of history probably died about three years ago with the publication of Zhukov's autobiography. In spite of the massive literature in print, the lack of sound information from the Soviet side remains the single greatest impediment to the study of World War II in the East.

Because of problems with language and sources and because of other concerns, Western historians do not want to have any more to do with the war in the East than is necessary to give an appearance of balance. Nevertheless, the definitive history of World War II, when and if it is written, will have to take far more into account of this massive part of the conflict than has been done so far.
Plans for Future Meetings

**Great Britain:** The Imperial War Museum is organizing a meeting, to take place from 23rd to 27th September, 1974, on "The Cinema and the Second World War" with the support of the International Committee. The provisional programme includes the following points: a) retrospective of original documentary films; b) problems of collation, preservation and cataloguing; c) analysis of different types of existing film material; d) survey of post-war uses of this cinematographic material.

**France:** The Paris meeting, organized from 28th to 31st October, 1974, by the French Committee for the history of the Second World War, will dwell on the general theme of "The liberation of France". There will be 16 papers reporting on the general characteristics of the struggle for liberation, the place of France in the war between the Allies and Germany, the situation in France in 1944, national insurrection and post-war problems. The programme will be definitely established before the end of the year and will be published on the next issue of the Bulletin. Martin Blumenson, representing the American Committee, will present a paper.

**German Democratic Republic:** As the organization of a meeting that would ensure the presence of both German Committees presents too many difficulties, the Board takes note that the meeting planned on "The war aims of Hitler's Germany in the Second World War and their failure" will be organized by the GDR Committee with the agreement of Mr. Broszat, representing the GFR, and will be held at Weimar from March 31st to April 4th, 1975.

**Italy:** Mr. Rochat informs that the realization of the meeting planned for the autumn of 1975 on "The Pavel government: from war to post-war" is not yet certain because the Board of the Italian Institute has not yet taken a final decision.

**United States:** An Anglo-American conference, proposed to the Rockefeller Foundation to take place in the Foundation's conference center at Bellagio (on Lake Como), was not approved by the Foundation.

**France:** The Centre d'Etudes germaniques, affiliated with the Institut d'Etudes Politiques at the University of Strasbourg, is planning a colloquium on "Franco-German Relations from 1933 to 1939." This might take place in October, 1974 (prior to the Paris meeting) or in the spring of 1975. Those interested should communicate with Professor F. G. Dreyfus, director of the Institute.
Recent Books

I. GENERAL


II. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION PRIOR TO THE WAR


III. THE WAR

A. Mediterranean Africa, Italy, Southern France.


B. Air & Sea.

Von der Porten, E.P. The German navy in World War II. Apollo Ends, 1972.
C. Technical Developments.


D. Services, Intelligence, Resistance etc.


IV. NATIONS AT WAR

A. China.


B. Czechoslovakia.


C. France.


H. Japan.


I. Netherlands.


J. Norway.


K. Poland.


L. Soviet Union.


M. United States.


N. Yugoslavia.