This issue includes the minutes of the Committee meeting on June 16, 1973, summaries of the comments made during the afternoon session on June 15, and some other information. Summaries of the other sessions will be published in the next issue.

MINUTES OF THE BUSINESS MEETING, June 16, 1973

The meeting was called to order by Charles F. Delzell, Chairman. He explained that the major item on the agenda was the discussion of plans for the 1975 meeting of the International Committee on the History of the Second World War at San Francisco in conjunction with the International Congress of the Historical Sciences. Chairman Delzell asked Arthur Funk, Secretary of the American Committee to explain the background of planning and to discuss the current situation.

Professor Funk summarized the situation and observed that Henri Michel is anxious that facilities be available for an auditorium for two days with a capacity of between 200 to 300 persons. Funk expressed the opinion that this ought not to be a difficult hurdle. Michel also wants to have facilities for simultaneous translation. Mr. Funk observed that this could be more difficult and certainly will be costly. Michel expects the American Committee to work out the planning for these matters. This we are trying to do, but it requires considerable coordination with other entities, and especially the American Historical Association. Funk went on to say that a great deal depends on our receiving a sizable grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. He reported that according to the calculations of Boyd Shafer, about $400,000 will be needed. Thus far only $50,000 is assured. If there is to be simultaneous translation this will require about $100,000.

Funk went on to report that on September 28, 1973, in Budapest there will be a meeting of the Hungarian Committee on the History of the Second World War. Much of the preliminary planning for the San Francisco conference will take place there, as regards program planning on the part of the European delegations. The overall theme for the conference at San Francisco is "Strategy and Politics of the Second World War." At the Budapest meeting decisions will be made about blocking out how many papers should be presented.
At this point Professor Funk introduced Paul Ward, Executive Secretary of the American Historical Association, and asked him to explain further the status of planning for the San Francisco International Congress of the Historical Sciences in August of 1975. Mr. Ward responded that the National Endowment for the Humanities will be expected to provide most of the money for this. But the N.E.H.'s money depends upon the mood of Congress. When the time comes he will signal us whether it would be desirable for members of our American Committee to write to our respective congressmen urging support for the appropriations bill for the N.E.H. He went on to explain that the money to celebrate the bicentennial of American independence is also tied into this matter. Both the A.H.A. and the O.A.H. are working in support of this legislation. There is considerable static in Congress right now on the subject, unfortunately. If the appropriation comes through on schedule, the appointment of administrative staff for the San Francisco meeting should be made by January 1, 1974. The plans are that Professor Richard H. Schlater, a historian at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, would be named Executive Officer in charge of coordination of all the planning. Schlater will appoint other members of his own staff. Ward will be keeping in touch with Schlater, and our own committee should not make approaches to Congress without first coordinating such strategy with Schlater.

Ward went on to say that of the $50,000 that is currently available, actually $10,000 has been earmarked to finance the travel to San Francisco of foreigners from overseas. Thus only about $10,000 is actually available for other types of planning.

Ward said that plans call for the Congress to have six days of working sessions. The headquarters will be at the Fairmont Hotel on Knobb Hill. He envisaged no problem about the American Committee's being able to get a suitable room or slot on the program. He did emphasize, however, that it would be very wise if we could schedule our part of the program to begin on the Saturday before the main program gets under way. We could arrange the room on the same basis as the sessions for the regular six-day period. The opening and closing plenary sessions will take place at the Shriners' Auditorium in San Francisco.

Mr. Ward explained that the overall planning of the program calls for four parallel series: (1) methodological papers; (2) papers dealing with chronological periods ranging from ancient history to the present; (3) subject themes; and (4) reports of various commissions. The major papers will be published ahead of time and then will be summarized orally each morning. The afternoon sessions will be devoted to "interventions" of brief duration, which are to a considerable degree planned in advance.

Ward said that he intends to plan for simultaneous translation of the major sessions if the money is available from Congress and the foundations. The five languages that would be used would be English, French, German, Spanish, and Russian.

Professor Funk thanked Mr. Ward for his valuable comments. Discussion then moved to the activities of the American Committee. Funk asked whether our bibliographical data in the Newsletter is proving to be of use to the members. William Franklin recommended that if we could include a very brief analysis or comment about the scope of items listed in the bibliography this would be most helpful. He thought that one or two sentences, such as is included in the Foreign Affairs bibliography, would be the best sort of thing. Miss Janet Ziegler remarked that once we start including such analysis, it is difficult to remain current in our coverage of materials.
There was also discussion about ways of keeping our list of Ph.D. dissertations on World War II up-to-date.

Discussion also centered on the possibility of making more use of the Library of Congress printouts for bibliographical information for our Newsletter.

Professor O'Connor remarked that he thought we should do everything possible to create greater interest in our organization, and to make it clear to the public that we are interested not in just military history but in a much broader realm of studies dealing with World War II and its background and repercussions. We are interested, for example, in the social and economic and political and psychological history of that period, and in comparative studies between World War II and World War I. He thought it would be helpful if we would also get a mailing list from the American Historical Association and have cards prepared in which the recipients could set forth their specific fields of interest.

Chairman Delzell asked Paul Ward to say something about the nature of the program planning for the International Congress of the Historical Sciences at San Francisco in 1975. Ward replied that the United States has been specifically assigned the topic of "Revolutions." A committee headed by Robert Palmer and Joe Baylen is working on this subject. There are plans to have major papers presented by an Englishman (Hobsbawn); a Frenchman; and (I believe) an American.

SUMMARIES OF COMMENTS MADE AT THE AFTERNOON SESSION, CONFERENCE ON WORLD WAR II, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, JUNE 15, 1973

Janet Ziegler, UCLA Research Library, "Comments on Bibliography."

The scope of the bibliographic problem for the future is current control of about 1,000 to 1,500 items--books and articles--per year internationally, and about 400 items per year in English. Additionally, there are a number of retrospective bibliographic problems, as well as a great need for selective, annotated bibliographic works to help students, scholars, and librarians to find a path through this rather complex historical and bibliographical labyrinth.

For current international coverage of both books and articles, the Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale has long provided the most complete listings available. To be assured of completeness the searcher must now also turn for articles to such general tools as Historical Abstracts, the Air University Library's Index to Military Periodicals, and for books to a wide variety of reviewing and general bibliographic sources.

Current American books on the war have been listed for several years now in the Newsletter of the American Committee. As a forthcoming improvement, through the cooperation of the UCLA Library and the University of Florida, the Newsletter will be provided with weekly computer printouts of books on the war from the Library of Congress's MARC (machine readable cataloging) tapes, which list all current English-language books catalogued by the Library of Congress. As increasing numbers of American publishers are joining the Cataloging-In-Publication project, these lists will reflect the current titles. We hope to cumulate these lists and to publish them more often than the Newsletter, perhaps quarterly.
The Subcommittee on Bibliography is planning to prepare an international retrospective bibliography of periodical articles on the war. We are at present developing a list of periodicals which will need indexing, as well as a list of available indexing services which may provide shortcuts to the task. Once these lists are developed, they will be sent to members of the Subcommittee and others who may be interested, for additions and comments. Some interest was also expressed in seeking my bibliography of books in English updated past 1965. As you know, Arthur Funk has recently published a cumulation of the Newsletter bibliographies which covers the period from 1968 through 1972. We are in the process of compiling a list to fill the 1966-67 gap. These steps will go a long way toward helping my plans to publish a revised edition of the bibliography about 1976-77, so as to include publications through 1975.

There are about six members of the Subcommittee on Bibliography who seem inclined to participate in work for a bibliography of domestic America in the war. Planning for the project will begin later this year. Anyone interested in taking part should let me know. Another much needed bibliography is an annotated bibliography of Soviet books on the war, and it is currently being prepared by Michael Parrish of Indiana University. His bibliography will include books published from 1945 through 1972 or 1973, and will include titles published in the USSR but not released to the West. It will not include Soviet articles, which he sees as the object of a possible future companion volume.

Of lower priority, but also a much needed bibliography is the compilation of books and articles published in English during the war years. A number of countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, have published rather substantial bibliographies of war-time publications. A bibliography of American, or more usefully, English-language publications of the war years, would greatly aid research in the domestic and propaganda history of the war.

The Subcommittee's survey has revealed a number of special areas which need the attention of scholars and bibliographers. The war in the Pacific has had very little bibliographic attention in the past. The literature on the war crimes trials has had slightly more coverage, but is badly in need of a complete and up-to-date compilation. Another useful tool would be a list to guides to American archives and special collections.

One major project for which the planning must begin soon is the compilation of an international, multilingual, selective and annotated bibliography of the war. There are some building stones toward this objective. The Saggio bibliographico sulla seconda guerra mondiale, published by the Italian Army Historical Office, lists about 6,300 titles with annotations. The latest volume covers the years 1969-70. Although Italian titles are predictably the most heavily represented, the bibliography includes many publications from other countries. Another such publication is The Two World Wars: a Selective Bibliography, published by the International Commission for the Teaching of History in 1964. It lists the most important works on the various aspects of the war and also provides guidance to the major collections of documents, periodicals, and a selection of films, photographs, maps and records. With careful organization, planning, and cooperation, the ultimate product of such a project should be a guide to the study of the Second World War, suited to the needs of all categories of users—students, scholars, general readers, and librarians.
Trevor N. Dupuy, President, National Evaluation and Research Organization, "Comments on Quantification in World War II History."

There are seven steps which enable us to compare the relative combat capability of two opposing forces in combat, by determining the influence of all significant operational, environmental, and situational variables on the raw force strengths of the opposing sides.

1. **Compilation and Organization of Data.** The data is compiled from the records for each engagement. At the level of divisional combat, an engagement is a period of intensive action which generally lasts for two or three days with well-defined beginning and end, in relation to the opposing missions. The data consists of 22 specific items, in two general categories: (1) Qualitative and Descriptive Information; and (2) Statistical Inputs.

2. **Calculate Force Strength.** There are three sub-steps: (a) Calculate the total value of the firepower of all weapons on both sides. This is done by means of a form of firepower score which we call Operational Lethality Index (OLI). We make up our summation of the OLI values of the total weapons inventories of the opposing sides in four categories: Infantry weapons, Artillery, Armor, and Close air support sorties. (b) To the summation values of the OLIs in these four categories we apply certain environmental variables: these are the variables that influence weapons effectiveness. (c) We then combine the environmentally-modified values of the four weapons categories to get a consolidated value, in OLI units, which we call Force Strength.

3. **Determine Operational Variables.** Operational variables are those affecting the employment of weapons, and of each force as a whole. Operational variables are in two categories: tangible and intangible. We have developed tables of values related to the circumstances of historical combat, as known from the record, or—for mobility and vulnerability—we have prepared formulae representing the processes whereby these factors apparently operate. The Intangibles are Leadership, Training Experience, Morale, and Logistics. We can, with analyzed data from a sufficiently large number of engagements, calculate the combined effect of these four intangibles in the form of an overall effectiveness factor.

4. **Calculate Combat Power.** We do this for each of the opposing forces by applying all applicable, or available, operational variable factors to the previously-calculated Force Strength. The result, for each side, is a value, in OLI units, which we call Potential Combat Power, or Combat Power.

5. **Calculate Combat Power Power Ratio.** This ratio, $P_f/P_e$ (sub-script identifier $f$ for Friendly forces, $e$ for Enemy forces), tells us which side should theoretically have been successful in the engagement, on the basis of the data available in the records. If $P_f/P_e$ is greater than 1, theoretically the friendly side should have won; if less, theoretically the enemy should have won. The entire operation through Step 5 we call The Quantified Judgement Model Formula. The next steps are:

6. **Calculate Actual Outcome.** This is in order to compare our theoretical outcome with what actually happened. There is only one problem: How do we measure success in military combat? As to putting a numerical value on the outcome of a battle, this seems well-nigh impossible since responsible historians, even if they agree on the facts of a battle, will not have identical qualitative assessments of the outcome. Historians will generally be able to agree in qualitative assessments of three major performance criteria, which are also the basic components of engagements outcome: (a) Mission accomplishment (b) Spacial effectiveness (performance in gaining or
holding ground), and (c) Casualty effectiveness. By relating these performance
criteria to each other consistently for each side in all engagements, consistent
result quantifications are achieved. We do not use a ratio for the Result Comparison,
since it is impossible to have negative values for Spatial and Casualty Effectiveness.

7. Compare Theoretical and Actual Outcomes. This last step is simple and straight­forward: When \( \frac{P_f}{P_e} \) is greater than 1, \( R_f - R_e \) should be negative; when \( \frac{P_f}{P_e} \) is less
than 1, \( R_f - R_e \) should be positive. Usually the model results and the outcome results
are consistent. Sometimes they are not. When we find such inconsistency, this is
usually explicable in terms of doubtful records, or outstanding leadership on one
side, or exceptional effort or poor performance by one side or the other. Historians
need not be reminded that human interactions are never completely predictable. But
modem polling techniques, and actuarial statistics also tell us that they are suffi­ciently predictable that inconsistency should at least stimulate analysis.

In cases where theoretical and actual results do not coincide, several checks
need to be made: (1) Inconsistent results stimulate analysis, in order to find out
why the battle didn't turn out as it should have, (2) There is need to check all
figures carefully. (3) We must always bear in mind the unpredictable nature of human
beings and their institutions, in any single case, no matter how well they may fall
into actuarial patterns.

As for the reliability of quantitative techniques, I want to give you a statistical
summary of our results with the 78 engagements tested. In more than 92% of our
engagements, predicted outcome and actual outcome were consistent. To me these re­sults mean that we have been able, quite successfully, to quantify World War II results.

John E. Wickman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
"Comments on Oral History."

One must start by giving homage to Forrest Pogue, who did so much for oral history
before the widespread availability of the tape recorder.

In reviewing the activities of oral historians, one reaches certain conclusions.
For example:

(1) It almost appears that "only generals fight wars." Younger historians would
consider what is presently taped and available is highly elitist. The historians have
been most interested in strategy and tactics, or in the high politics of the war, and
have not been concerned overmuch with the ordinary soldier or citizen.

(2) Not enough historians who have interviewed participants have reported their
results. Undoubtedly a large number of researchers have materials used in their own
projects, but after they are finished they tend to retain their tapes or possibly dis­card them. It would be a great boon to future historians if these materials were re­ported and made available.

Also since the Second World War saw dramatic changes in the role of women in the
Armed Forces, we need to have more oral history interviewing of women in the military.
We need to have interviewing that is carefully planned and thought out on the psycholog­ical adjustments of women who went into the military service, if there were any. The
same thing is true of minority groups. The black, the Nisei, the American Indian all
have had their feats largely recorded by outstanding or singular individuals. We need
to know more about the average GI from these groups. Oral history is one technique
and possibly the only technique that makes it possible for us to store up this kind
of information. How much do we really know, for example, about inter-relationships
between the military and the political and bureaucratic branches of government or parts of government during the Second World War? The more of this kind of information we can store up, the better historians are going to be able to interpret the period of the 1940's.

Some of these thoughts came to me because of my recent experience in traveling abroad lecturing on behalf of the Oral History Association. I found that there was a great deal of interest and discussion among students in the United Kingdom and other parts of Western Europe on some of the questions that I have raised here. They were less interested in what a famous general had to tell us about a specific battle, via the oral history route. What they really wanted to know was what was it like for the people on the homefront during the Second World War? What was it like for the people who were caught in the battle zone as civilians during the Second World War? They frequently found that they could not get at this information directly. They reported that many of them had been doing their own oral history interviewing of their own families to try to answer some of these questions. Let me give you another illustration of where we have interaction between multi-national military groups during the Second World War. What do we really know of many of the frictions and developments towards cooperation that occurred? What we have for historical resources are primarily anecdotal material told usually by command officers. The anecdotes may be amusing and interesting, but they hardly do the job of giving us the scope of frictions or cooperativeness which one would find between the multi-national organisations.

Another way of expressing what has happened with oral history in the Second World War is to note that it has been largely confined to what we might call the battle zone type of investigation. We now need to broaden this sort of investigation as much as possible. We need to think of non-elite groups. We need to get into, for example, such topics as the attitude of American citizens towards the war, citizens of all types. We might want to move into the whole question of the Allied occupation policies and reactions on both sides that could be preserved through oral history; the people doing the occupying and those who are occupied.

In order to assist in cataloguing oral history projects, the Oral History Association started the first Oral History Directory, published in 1971. But immediately came the problem of how to keep it up to date. I am glad to announce that the R. R. Bowker Company has undertaken to do this. Your cooperation, in replying to their questionnaires, will be of great service to the profession.

William H. Cunliffe, National Archives. "Comments on Status of Access and Declassification of Archives."

On March 8, 1972, President Nixon issued Executive Order 11652, entitled "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and material."

The Archivist of the United States is empowered to act on the declassification and release of Presidential papers. This had enabled the F.D.R. Library to act more swiftly in opening the Roosevelt papers and it will obviously speed up the review of the Truman papers after they are released from probate.

Through a special review process, termed "mandatory review", historians can request the Archives or the originating agency to declassify and release any document over 10 years old. For items less than 10 years old, the request can be made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. There is some hope for us in this process of mandatory review. If the originating agency turns down a request, we can appeal to a departmental review committee, and if we are so unlucky as to suffer rejection a second time, there is an independent review body: the Interagency Classification Review Committee (the ICRC), currently headed by Dr. Rhoads, the Archivist of the United States.
For you as historians, the hitch in the use of mandatory review is that you are expected to identify the document or documents you need with some particularity. This is a difficult task if you can't see the document, or the indexes to the document, or if you don't know if it exists. In this respect, we as archivist have an obligation to bring this type of material to your attention and to assist you in gaining its release.

Another major event affecting your access to records is the creation of the Records Declassification Division in the Archives. This has been paralleled by the creation of declassification groups in a number of executive agencies to implement the new executive order. The first order of business for the Records Declassification Division is the review and release of the 30 year old records; and a valiant effort is being made to complete the World War II records by 1975, which should be just in time for our next meeting.

The Archives has no single declassification system, but rather, a series of guidelines issued by all those federal agencies that could classify records during the war. These guidelines reflect what can be released and what must be retained as a matter of national security. We are presented with a process that requires a page by page review of the mass of 172 million pages of classified documents produced in the war. Naturally, the Archives continues to press for broader and more liberal guidelines for the release of these files.

Now, what does this mean for you as researchers in the records of World War II?

1. Your access to records, whether in the Archives, a Presidential Library, a Federal Records Center, whether in the Naval Historical Division here in the Washington Navy Yard, or at the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base -- this access is more open than it has been, and the prospects are good for a generally open access within the next few years.

If we determine that your project is too broadly dispersed through the classified files, we will recommend that you take advantage of the agency programs which allow research in the classified files. It is a program that has enabled many of you to do research that was not otherwise possible.

What, so far, has been done? What new records have become available in the last two years?

1. In the area of civil records, the most active group of newly opened files are those of the State Department. You should make a special note of the fact that declassification review is now being taken on the non-State records in these files. The review is done by decimal categories, so you will need to know your material by decimal numbers in approaching these files.

2. The highlight of newly opened military files has been the release of the records of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. Of particular note here, is that the second review of the files has recently been completed, so that items withheld at the time of the initial release are now available.

In addition, I want to draw your attention to four extremely interesting manuscripts developed by the JCS historians: 1. "The Evolution of Global Strategy", a study of the prewar activity of the Joint Board and of our military cooperation with the British before Pearl Harbor; 2. "The War Against Germany", as with the first manuscript, this is an incomplete, but highly rewarding history; 3. "The War Against Japan" is a two volume history to which I believe Dr. Allard referred this morning; and 4. "The Organization and Structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", which will show that a great deal was 'on paper', supporting the formal organization of the JCS in World War II, even if it lacked a formal charter.
Naval Records: The opening of naval records recently has been highlighted by the release of a series of naval attaché files from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. And, in reference to some items of interest to Colonel Hurley, Naval Bureau of Aeronautics records through 1944 are now open. Very happily for us, here at the Archives, the Navy has turned over the World War II "Flag Files" to the Archives.

Regarding War Department records, and as an example, of the impact you as military historians can have, two special Army files have been declassified to assist in the current research projects: records of the Special Planning Division, which was responsible for the organization and structure of the postwar army; and a portion of the Manhattan Engineer District files - the Harrison-Bundy files - documenting the development of the atomic bomb.

In addition, the Washington National Records Center has reviewed the operational reports submitted to the Adjutant General's Office; and have declassified portions of the China Headquarters files of Generals Stillwell and Wedemeyer - files that have particular appeal in documenting our early relations with the Chinese communists; and an impressive set of combat interviews, which should have special appeal to John Wickman and those engaged in oral histories.

Finally, in process, the Archives is currently reviewing the files of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, as well as records of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Hopefully, the papers of President Truman, now in the custody of the courts, will be turned over to the Archives by the end of the year. At that time, processing and declassification review will begin.

As an example that there are still World War II records not even brought forward for use yet, I have just completed a review of some 3,000 feet of records of NACA: the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics covering the span 1915-1958. The documentation in this collection represents an impressive history of aeronautical development, not only in the United States; but worldwide. We are now seeking a presentation of these records to us by NASA. I cite this as a caution to you that there are many untapped and unknown sources for us as historians of the war, and there is a promising future for us in materials to be mined.

William M. Franklin, Director, Historical Office, Department of State. "Comments on the two World Wars."

As Forrest indicated, what I like about you is your determined interest in World War II. Nobody all day has asked me about documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis or on the Lebanon Landing or Vietnam--and it's just great. Our documents, as you all know, are wide open for World War II. You all have used the "Foreign Relations" volumes which amount to more than 40 for the World War II period. We have even put in our oar and helped to contribute happily to the output of those "Documents on German Foreign Policy" with the help of some whom I see here. So, I thought I'd just coast a bit in this happy glow, and talk out loud or think out loud for about 10 or 15 minutes with you--more like a professor and less like a bureaucratic watch dog of records.
Downstairs on the Pennsylvania Avenue side they have reminded us with Clio in statuary that the "Past if Prolouge", or as the Washington cabby put it when the building was first put up: "That means, 'man you ain't seen nothin' yet!'" Well, we know that the past is prologue; we wouldn't be historians if we weren't convinced of that. But I've been intrigued with the question that goes a little bit beyond that, and that is the matter of the "lessons" of history. I keep seeing references to these "lessons"; now that I think about it, this has annoyed me for years. People who write letters to editors are always talking about lessons of history; and the editorial writers themselves are very sure of themselves in pointing out that some clown about whom they're talking misread a "lesson" of history. How sure these editorial types seem to be! And then we are always reminded of that philosopher (but not historian) Santayana, who indicated in sharp terms that those ignorant of the past are condemned to repeat it, with an implication that if those clowns had really studied their history they would have learned lessons from it and wouldn't have fallen flat on their faces the way they did. Even Treitschke in a more cynical vein said the only thing you learn from history is that people don't learn from history. But that has an inverse implication also, that if they really did knuckle down and study it they would learn from it. People are just too indolent by good Prussian standards.

Now if you are going to get lessons out of history, ("relevance" as they now call it) you have to demonstrate applicability. Our friends in the natural sciences know exactly how to do it, and they have done a whale of a good job, because in the laboratory they can set up controlled experiments in which they have all the variables under their thumb. What a wonderful idea! The only trouble is that history provides nothing like that at all, except perhaps in the most recent history, namely, World Wars I and II. Here we have the closest thing to historical parallels that I can think of in a long while. This point was touched upon by Lou Morten this morning; which proves two things: first, it's a good idea, second, Lou Morten changes intellectual lanes at 70 miles per hour without putting his blinker on! Even worse: Morrie Matloff is going to be talking on the same subject after I finish. From all this exposure you really should leave here with some idea of the possibilities of comparative treatment of situations in World War I and World War II. To put it another way: How much did the World War I experience influence policies in World War II? What lessons (if any) were learned? Were they learned correctly? The similarities in these two situations are striking and known to all of us; oddly enough, they haven't been delved into as yet. Here we have this extraordinary circumstance of two wars which, as was also mentioned earlier this morning, may be con-
sidered as a continuation of the same one, the first and second anti-German wars, as I think Churchill once called them. Both were concentrated in Central Europe and turned into two-front wars, in Europe, that is. (The Japanese war was something else.) Being only 20 years apart--this is the unique thing--you have the leaders on all sides themselves carrying a living memory from World War I into World War II. Indeed many of them were far enough up in government policy circles in World War I to have been looking over the shoulders of the leaders and being very much in the know. Indeed it was not only the leaders but large portions of the populations in all countries who were of an age where they had recollections of the first World War and had fixed ideas about it and conclusions drawn from it, in part thanks to the teaching of history teachers during the inter-war period, who apparently had discovered all kinds of "lessons". Of course, some demonstrated that Germany had been treated too leniently and others demonstrated conclusively that Germany had been treated too roughly. (The lessons are always quite clear!)

Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, obviously had ideas from World War I that carried over into World War II, with striking results. In the case of Churchill there were the Gallipoli Campaign, the fixed ideology of British routes to India, the Mediterranean strategy; in short, the peripheral approach to the Continent, as the traditional method of maintaining strength and empire while avoiding blood baths on the fields of Flanders. These concepts were a powerful influence on his thinking all the way through.

In the case of Roosevelt, I guess it was Sherwood who first pointed out that F.D.R. worked with the ghost of Woodrow Wilson looking over his shoulder. Roosevelt was most impressed with the difficulties that Wilson had encountered as a result of the "secret treaties"--a dirty word in the American political vocabulary. Secret treaties had not only ruined Wilson's policies and wrecked his ideals, but also brought the President of the United States to deny before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had even known about them before he got to Paris--which led a writer in 1919 to say that the President of the United States was either a fool or a liar. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt had seen all this at first hand. It made a profound effect upon him, and one thing he was quite sure of was that in WWII, before we were involved, there weren't going to be any secret treaties. That lesson was perfectly clear and it was shared by Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, Averell Harriman, and all the other people who worked with and around FDR. The lesson was that you would postpone all post-war issues to the end of the war and there
would then be a grand peace conference. This meant that there couldn't be any "deals" along the way, which meant there would have to be a policy of unconditional surrender to make sure there were no sidewise deals by anybody. And there would be that grand peace conference to which everybody would come with clean hands, and FDR would be wheeled in at the head of the table, just like Woodrow Wilson only in a much stronger position because this time there wouldn't be any nasty secret treaties behind his back.

Stalin too had reminiscences of 1919, and very sharp ones. That was when Russia had not been invited to Paris, when she had been ostracized, when decisions had been made with respect to her boundaries and other boundaries in Eastern Europe, with Russia kicked out into the cold by the peacemakers gathered at Paris. So these two recollections, F.D.R.'s and Stalin's, and the lessons derived from them, ran in diametrically opposite directions. If Roosevelt saw it to his advantage to postpone, Stalin certainly saw it to his advantage to act fast: to make sure that the issues important and vital to the Soviet Union with regard to governments and boundaries in East Central Europe were not handed over to an eventual peace conference in Paris or London to be decided by a lot of other people not conversant with the needs of Russian security—at least not as conversant as Mr. Stalin was.

On the question of the organization of command structure: Interesting studies can be done, but haven't been, on the Supreme War Council of World War I and its influence on the organization of the command structure in World War II. George Marshall's insistence upon unity of command in World War II can be traced, I think, directly to the success finally achieved by the even partial unity of command under Marshall Foch on the Western Front in 1918.

These are some of the overt aspects of what I have in mind, but I think there are many more under the surface. I think that many of you with your specialized interests and expertise can plumb them further. That is my suggestion to seed the atmosphere. The committee for the study of World War II needs to broaden its scope, certainly to take in World War I, and I'm afraid that's going to include the inter-war period, too, because you can't really do a job on World War II without going back to at least 1914. Historians always have this kind of starting trouble: they can't begin in any one year because the year preceding was always crucial and determinative.

Now let me add a little word of caution about these historical lessons already implied from my ironic tone. When Roosevelt began to carry out this policy of postponement for instance, which he thought was derived from a perfectly clear lesson of World War I, he found
some odd things about lessons of history, and he learned it very much the hard way. In the first place, the lesson as he derived it, applied only to the European war. He found that he couldn't maintain the policy vis-à-vis China, because China needed bucking up, and the Chinese were desperately interested in knowing what they were going to get at the end of the war. The result was that as early as 1943 Roosevelt himself, in the Cairo Declaration violated his own policy of postponement to which he had been so stubbornly attached, as indicated by Professor Beitzell this morning. I would like to put it even more sharply. He had told Stalin several times that we weren't going to listen to any of his demands until the end of the fracas; and then it was Roosevelt himself who was the first to depart from his own principle. This was at Cairo, and three days later he was facing Stalin at Tehran—which made it extremely difficult to maintain a postponement policy vis-à-vis Stalin, particularly when they wanted to get his okay on the Cairo Declaration—a post-war commitment issued in the middle of the war. Indeed the oddity is, that Roosevelt who started out as being the President most clearly conscious of the lessons of the evil "secret treaties", turned out to be the American President who concluded the largest number of the most bitterly criticised secret agreements before the end of the war. This would suggest, just from this one example, that the ice is very thin indeed. The lessons that looked so obvious turned out not to fit very well, even in those instances in which you have as close an historical parallel as you are ever likely to get. In other words, lessons of history can be extremely useful, but they may become fixed ideas, and by concentrating too sharply upon fixed ideas drawn from the past one can stumble over the problems of the present. One can find examples, comparing World War I and II, in which various leaders, quite intelligent and very historically minded, sort of fell backwards into puddles that they hadn't seen, because they were concentrating so carefully on the way it looked in hindsight. Which leads to another quotation, an observation I think by Coleridge, that history is illuminating but it's rather like the light at the stern which illuminates so well the waters that we've passed through.

Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History. "Comments on Official Histories."

These comments focus on the role and contributions of the Army's historical program. The Army has had the largest central military historical office in Washington and the most extensive program. Aside from the U.S. Army in World War II series, the big series with which the Office of Military History is usually identified, the central office had produced such other publications as the American Forces in Action series, the Command Decisions volume, the first of three volumes on the German-Soviet conflict, and miscellaneous topical studies. Several other Army history offices, in addition to the Office of the Chief of Military History, have also published extensively on World War II—for example, the Surgeon General's historical office has published 37 volumes.
To date, 71 volumes have been published in the U.S. Army in World War II series. The series is now in the windup stage and we expect it to be completed, along with a master index, within the next few years. I would suggest that the series is significant in American historiography for at least four reasons: (1) It made official history respectable in the United States. (2) It has given a boost to contemporary history. (3) Official history pioneered in oral history and developed other techniques. (4) The Army official program produced historians as well as history.

The World War II volumes are official histories in the sense that they are prepared and published at government expense and deal with topics of value to the Army. But from the beginning, in line with scholarly practice, the Army's central history office has adhered to the principle of authorship responsibility and credit, and the volumes reflect the responsibility of the authors "to call the shots as they see them." (The series will fall somewhat short of the full coverage originally planned. Among the gaps will be comprehensive accounts of the activities of the Secretary of War and his assistants, of military intelligence, personnel and training, and statistical volumes.)

What directions appear most fruitful to meet the needs of a new generation--more than a quarter of a century after the war? Obviously the focus in the World War II series was on the mighty military machine--the Army's role in a gigantic global and coalition war. The writers were working closely to the events and had fuller access to enemy sources than to those of allies. I think it safe to assume that the definitive work of the official military historical community on World War II is about done. The Office of the Chief of Military History continues to adhere to the principle of not undertaking what can be done on the outside.

In the light of the lengthened perspective, the greater availability of sources, the broadening of the field of military history, new directions and techniques in historical research including greater interest in interdisciplinary studies, and the problems, needs, and interests of a new generation, certain areas suggest themselves as fruitful for future investigation and fuller exploitation. The opportunities for research are wide open, particularly in areas dealing with war and society themes. Among the promising general areas and fields for study I would list: (1) The impact of the war on society. We need to know more about the social context of the war--the transitional as well as the permanent effects on the home front and in the civil sectors. (2) Closely related to this theme we need studies of armies and military institutions as reflections of society. The men--enlisted, noncommissioned, and the officer corps--need to be studied. More attention is needed to the writing of World War II history from the "bottom-up." (3) A third field is biography. We are now almost past the memoir stage of the principal participants and the field of biography has begun to yield some notable multi-volume products recently--for example, the studies in progress on Generals Marshall, Patton, and MacArthur. Many more are needed--not only of the top military and civilian figures but also of key staff people and representative enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. (4) Problems of the beginning and end of the war need special attention. As the events recede into the larger stream of history, we need more definitive study of the links between the two world wars, the impact of the one on the conduct of the other, of the experience with the first on molding the leaders, concepts, and policies of the second. The end of the war with the merging of the World War II conflict into the Cold War poses a special problem. (5) Finally, we need good comparative studies--for example, of national mobilization and conscription systems, civil-military relations, occupation policies, as well as of strategy, tactics, logistics, training, and so forth.

This list could, of course, be multiplied. The items reflect the old adage that each generation rewrites history in terms of its own needs and problems. They reflect too that while in many ways the official military historian has led the way and gone further that traditional military history, more that military history needs to be written about World War II and much remains to be done.
A meeting was held in Fraly, Val Germanasca, Italy, from July 26 to 28, 1973, to constitute the International Committee for the Documentation of the European Resistance Movement in the Second World War: Research and Cataloging of Sources Existing in the United States. The meeting, organized by the Instituto Universitario di Studi Europei, Turin, included participants from Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the United States. The chairman of the assembly was Charles F. Delzell, Chairman of the American Committee for the History of the Second World War, and the secretary was Giovanni De Luna.

The aim of the Committee is to collect and catalog all material regarding the European Resistance, and more generally the Second World War, to be found in the United States; that is, to provide a "service function" making readily available to historians a vast and precious documentation, whose accessibility should provide solutions to some of the key historiographical problems to which scholars have consistently directed their attention. The meeting touched on some of these areas of study: the precise definition of United States policy vis-a-vis particular European countries, and the effects on this policy of the development of the European Resistance movements; the influence of American intervention in international power relations; the American approach to the problems of Resistance demobilization and the epuration of Fascism; the weight of the Resistance struggle at the political-diplomatic level—especially in American-Soviet relations; the military and political "use" of the European Resistance made by the United States; the dimensions of the problems of deportation and internment.

The importance of the acquisition of certain sources with respect to these problem-areas is clear—the reports of OSS officials, for example, or those of American pilots shot down and saved by partisans. Other relevant areas of exploration would include captured enemy material deposited in American archives, the interrogation reports of captured German and Fascist officers and war criminals, the memoirs or private papers of protagonists of the period, the archives of the Allied Commission, the Joint Intelligence Staff, the Psychological Warfare Branch, etc.

The research will thus be directed towards three categories of sources:

a) Official or semi-official documents;
b) Private papers;
c) Oral testimonies.

A particular section of the Committee will deal with the audio-visual sector, directing research towards filmed documentation, photographs and radiophonic material.

The Committee's American Secretariat, under Ferdjand Engel of Nashville, Tennessee, will begin work immediately on a topographic catalog which will be as extensive as possible. In the first stages this means a simple description of the most important archives where documents are known.
to exist, without being a detailed analytic guide. The published catalog should include entire categories of documents, but the point of reference will always remain external to the documentation itself (for example basic divisions will be made at this level between private papers, official documents, etc.). In particular the catalog will indicate precisely where documents are located, conditions of access, availability of research tools (indexes, summary guides, microfilm reproductions, etc.), the state of conservation, and bibliographical references in cases where documents have been published.

The American Secretariat, which will solicit as much aid as possible from American specialists in the field, intends to work on as broad a basis as the problem demands: all European countries will be included and the time span will in practice coincide with the time limits of the Second World War. This breadth is in any case inevitable, given the abundance of combined sources, that is of sources common to areas rather than to particular countries. Only at a later stage should it be possible to concentrate on single nations on the basis of the sources available.

It is intended that the American Secretariat will approach scholars, archives and libraries by means of a detailed questionnaire, which will take special account of the needs of European specialists.

The questionnaire will be edited by the European Secretariat, (Marcel Baudot, Paolo Gobetti, Gustave Malan, Jovan Marjanovic, Lamberto Mercuri), with the aid of a network of "correspondents" based on the European historical institutes specialized in this field. The European Secretariat regards as one of its most urgent tasks a census of materials already existing in Europe--and of their accessibility--in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and consequent waste of effort.

Depending on the Committee's financial resources, individual researchers will be sent to the United States, or will be found there, to concentrate on single archives or sources, working on a more profound analytic level. This phase of the research is not necessarily consequent to the compilation of the general catalog: its immediate action is linked simply to the availability of financial means. One research priority which emerged from the discussions at Prato regarded the archives of the Allied Commission, another was related to the entire field of audio-visual material.

The Committee will work in strict collaboration with other international organs in the field, particularly the Comité Internationale pour l'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, and will concern itself exclusively with the archival aspect of research, leaving to existing bodies that effort which most closely relates to the study and elaboration of the material found. The committee's headquarters will be in Turin, where service structures exist which allow operations to begin immediately. That material which is considered sufficiently interesting to be transported to Europe will thus be concentrated in Turin.

The next meeting of the European Secretariat is envisaged for the end of October; on that occasion a first report from the American Secretariat will be presented and a study made of the work carried out at the European level for the preparation of the questionnaire.

The next general meeting will take place in about one year's time.

RECENT BOOKS RELATING TO WORLD WAR II

I. GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE WAR


II. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION PRIOR TO THE WAR


Eubank, Keith, comp. The Road to World War II: A Documentary History. New York: Crowell, 1973


Central and East Europe


Fascism

III. COMMAND AND STRATEGY OF WAR


Political and Diplomatic Aspects


Operations


Mediterranean, Africa, Italy, Southern France


German - Russian Front; Eastern Europe


Asian and Pacific Theater


Air and Sea Operations


Technical Developments, Services, Manpower


Bunker, John. Liberty Ships, the ugly ducklings of World War II. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1972.


Technical Developments, Services, Manpower (cont'd)


Intelligence, Secret Service, Espionage, Propaganda, and Information Media


Intelligence, Secret Service, Espionage, Propaganda, and Information Media (cont'd)


United States. FBIS in retrospect; 30 years of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1941-1971.

War Crimes, Concentration Camps, Atrocities, POW’s


War Crimes, Concentration Camps, Atrocities, POW's (cont'd)


IV. OPERATIONS BY COUNTRY AND AREA

Baltic Countries


Belgium


Bulgaria


China


Chin: (cont'd)


Czechoslovakia


France


Germany


Germany (cont'd)


Great Britain & Commonwealth


Great Britain & Commonwealth (cont'd)


Greece


Italy


Japan


Netherlands

Poland


Soviet Union

Herring, George C. Aid to Russia, 1941-46; strategy, diplomacy, the origins of the cold war. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973.


Spain


United States


United States (cont'd)


Smith, Geoffrey S. To Save a Nation: American Counter-Subversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II. New York, Basic Books.


Yugoslavia
