Brian Linn – Brief Biography

Brian McAllister Linn is professor of history and director of the Military Studies Institute at Texas A&M University, where he has taught since 1989. He received his B.A. from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from The Ohio State University. A student of American military history, he best known for his work on the U.S. military’s involvement in Asia in the first half of the twentieth century. He is the author of *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (University of North Carolina Press, 1989), *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (University of North Carolina Press, 1997), and *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (University Press of Kansas, 2000). His books have won several prizes, and the two most recent were both selections of the History Book Club. He is now working on a study of the U.S. armed forces during the 1950s, tentatively entitled *Elvis’s Army*. 
The continuing revelations of deep divisions within the Bush Administration have brought home to Americans a simple truth: however great a president’s popularity, he often faces resistance from his military chiefs in implementing his national security policy. Although the current internal disagreement over Iraq have garnered the most publicity, it is worth noting that even before the declaration of the War on Terrorism, there was considerable turmoil within the Administration over military issues. If press reports are accurate, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld came into office convinced that the nation’s military leaders had learned all the wrong lessons from the past; that Vietnam has left them with a concept of war that was defensive, risk-adverse, and ill-suited to regaining the United States rightful place as the arbiter of world affairs.1

Rumsfeld’s most obvious target has been the U.S. Army. The Secretary of Defense’s doubt that the United States armed forces need to be capable of fighting two major wars threatens the entire basis of the Army’s force structure. His willingness to cancel major weapons systems, such as the Crusader, threatens the Army’s modernization program. Most seriously, Rumsfeld’s opinion that over-the-horizon weapons systems and information superiority can eliminate the messy business of close-in ground combat challenges the Army’s purpose and raises questions about its continued relevance. According to one analyst, the root of the problem is the “Army’s inability to supply the theoretical underpinnings for future land warfare founded on a modern general theory of war that is persuasive to the nation’s civilian leaders.”2

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Although one defense analyst has termed the Army “shell shocked” by Rumsfeld’s reforms, the service has sought to defend itself in a number of ways. It has publicly declared its intention of transforming itself towards an “Objective Force, a ground force that will bear little physical or operational resemblance to today’s Army.” This new land force will be more mobile, both tactically and strategically, it will incorporate the latest technology, and it will be capable of fighting everything from terrorists to a modern conventional army. It has also sought to undercut the Secretary of Defense in a number of ways. Last May, the Department of the Army leaked a memo criticizing Rumsfeld’s decision to cancel the Crusader, an act that apparently so irritated Rumsfeld that there was speculation the Secretary of the Army would be forced to resign.

Former Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan took the very unusual step of publicly criticizing Rumsfeld, while a retired Army four-star general claimed his fellow generals were convinced “the Army is now threatened by a lot of technological purists and dilettantes who have new ideas of how to fight wars that don’t square with reality.”

In view of this divisiveness, it may be worth considering a similar period, some fifty years ago, when an even more popular president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, encountered a similarly strong reaction from his military subordinates in his efforts to implement his own defense policy. As defined by Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, the Administration would “take a new look at the entire defense picture. This will involve an intensive and detailed study of all aspects of defense—forces, missions, weapons, readiness levels, strategic plans, and so forth...
This “New Look” was highly controversial, and elements of it were unpopular with each individual service. According to one biographer, President Eisenhower "was nearly driven to distraction" by the service chiefs' bickering and in-fighting, by their recurrent challenges to his budgets, by their refusal to accept any decision as final, and by their willingness to go behind his back and appeal to Congress and to the press. As with Rumsfeld, there was a personal element in this antagonism as well, one general termed Wilson "the most stupid Secretary of Defense this country ever had, and the most determined to remain that way."

As is the case today, of all the services the Army was the most threatened by Eisenhower’s policies, and its objections were the most vociferous, and the most heavily publicized. Perhaps

5 Kitfield, “Army shell-shocked.”


8 Clyde D. Eddleman Oral History, 5 sections, U.S. Army Military History Institute [MHI], Carlisle, Pa., 3:46. This may be a paraphrase of an anonymous chief of staff’s comment that Wilson was “the most uninformed man, and the most determined to remain so, that has ever been Secretary,” see James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 155. For another unfavorable view of Wilson, see Barksdale Hamlett Oral History, MHI, 7: 35, 65-70.

most important, the Army campaign against Eisenhower's New Look to a large extent succeeded. By the time Eisenhower left the presidency, his national security policy lay under widespread attack. His successor, John F. Kennedy, rejected the New Look and embraced the Army’s counter-concept of Flexible Response.¹⁰

Clearly, a study of the Eisenhower-Army disagreements goes beyond historical curiosity and raises questions that are still very much in today’s headlines. How does a President’s view of future war shape his administration’s defense policies? How do the armed forces’ traditional views of war, and their place in it, promote opposition to administration policy? What arguments, techniques, and methods do military leaders use to counter administration directives and publicize their own views? In studying the Eisenhower-Army debate we may not only explore these questions, but also perhaps shed some light on their continuing relevance.

Both then and since, scholars who focus on the Cold War have tended to interpret the Eisenhower-Army conflict over the New Look very much in light of the immediate threats and challenges of the 1950s. They point to the death of Stalin, the Korean War, and the escalating atomic arms race, as creating an international environment that demanded a new defense policy.


Others view 1950s domestic issues as even more important; one prominent historian of defense policy states bluntly that in the Eisenhower Administration "strategy was the child of the budget." There are those who seek the origins of Eisenhower's defensive policies further back in time, but they tend to look no further than Eisenhower's experiences as supreme commander in World War II. This paper will take a different tack. Although not denying the importance of contemporary issues or of World War II, or even of Eisenhower's childhood, it argues that a significant part of the Army-Ike struggle has its roots in the intellectual debate that occurred during the three decades that Eisenhower served in uniform prior to World War II. To explore this idea, it will be necessary to provide a relatively short overview of the strategic environment that existed when Eisenhower entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1911, and a more detailed examination of the intellectual debate over the Army's role in the next war that occurred between 1918 and 1938. It will then be possible to examine the strategic debate of the 1950s and trace how these interwar beliefs shaped both Eisenhower's views and those of his Army opponents.

When Eisenhower entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1911, the United States, in the words of one general officer, faced a hostile "world in arms." New developments in naval

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gunnery and, in the minds of at least a few visionaries, the airplane, threatened the nation's traditional reliance on coastal defense fortifications. Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 had turned the newly won Pacific territories from a springboard into the Far East to what Teddy Roosevelt termed America's Achilles' heel. If Japan attacked, American war planners expected to lose the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii, and to have to make a stiff defense simply to preserve the Western states. The trans-Atlantic threat, previously centered on Great Britain and France, had now increased with Germany's decision to build a fleet. Army scenarios for conflict were almost universally gloomy. General Francis V. Greene imagined a war wherein a German expedition of 240,000 troops captured New York City within two weeks, and forced John D. Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan, and other millionaires to sign a $5,000,000,000 peace bond. In 1913, Captain Paul D. Malone wrote a futuristic article in which an enemy blockade of New York City touched off widespread rioting by anarchist mobs.

Eisenhower joined an army that conceived the "Proper Military Policy for the United States," the title of a 1915 General Staff study, as one that ensured the security of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine. A 1916 War Department plan for a 500,000-man "Continental Army"—its very name a testimony to its defensive mission. This defensive outlook permeated an officer corps that had no wish to go "Over There" and fight on the battlefields of France.

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Indeed, Joseph T. Dickman, who commanded a corps in the AEF, recalled of his fellow officers that "participation in the war, except, possibly, through naval operations, did not enter our minds." Lieutenant Colonel Henry Jervey predicted in a book published in 1917 that "the United States, if drawn into a conflict with a first-class power or combination of powers, is not likely to send expeditions across the seas to invade the territory of a distant power. It will in all probability wage a defensive war," to "deny an invader our shores."

The experience of World War I and the mobilization, transport, and deployment of almost two million soldiers to the Western Front by November 1918 created a great many questions for Army officers. Not least was how the Army would prepare to fight and win the nation's wars after the War to End All Wars? Perhaps not surprisingly, the Army's first response was to seek a return to its prewar missions. The commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, and soon to be Army chief of staff, John J. Pershing argued in 1920 that the nation's postwar military should be a relatively small Regular Army focused on continental and border defense. That same year the War Department stated that the Regular Army's first priority was "the adequate defense of..."
of all permanent fortified or garrisoned possessions of the United States."\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, the most immediate transfer of the lessons of World War I was in coastal defense doctrine, prompting the \textit{Journal of the U.S. Artillery} to claim: "The Coast Artillery holds the front line--the seacoast. No Man's Land is the ocean washing our shores."\textsuperscript{22} The emphasis on defense was sometimes carried to ridiculous extremes. In 1925 there was a serious proposal to surround all major American cities with a belt of anti-aircraft artillery, airfields, and early warning stations. A precursor of the current anti-ballistic missile or "homeland defense" plan, this proposal collapsed on the argument that its "cost would be out of all proportion to its probable efficiency."\textsuperscript{23} To defend New York City alone would have required twenty-five regiments and $15,000,000 for anti-aircraft guns; as a

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\textsuperscript{21} AG to All Chiefs of Bureaus and Services of War Department, Sub: Approved policies governing the functions of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, 24 January 1920, AGO 3810, Record Group [RG] 407, National Archives II, College Park, Md. [henceforth all RG citations are to National Archives documents]. John J. Pershing to Secretary of War, 16 June 1920, endorsement on U.S. Army, A.E.F, \textit{Report of the Superior Board on Organization and Tactics}, 27 April 1919 (U.S. Army War College Library). The 1924 Army Regulations that were in force until 1929 listed the Regular Army's first priority as garrisoning the overseas possessions and the second as manning the continental coast defenses.
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point of comparison, the entire U.S. Army ground forces averaged only $21,000,000 a year on weapons procurement between 1925 and 1940.24

Although the consensus was that the primary role of the Army was defensive, there was far less agreement on whom that defense should be directed against. World War I had not only temporarily removed the German threat, but also had greatly enhanced continental security by leaving the United States with "a Navy second to none." The Mexican border remained turbulent, but the Army's War Plans Division (WPD) refused to dignify the contingency planning for Green (Mexico) as a war plan, since it called for "occupying a country incapable of serious military resistance."25 Army planners continued to regard the most dangerous opponent as the United Kingdom, and the most serious contingency an Anglo-Japanese coalition (Red-Orange), but, as WPD concluded in 1924, war with England was "unthinkable" and "a Red-Orange war is even less probable."26 A more likely danger involved a Japanese attack on the Philippines and Hawaii, and Pacific defense remained the primary strategic problem of the interwar era. But the problem lacked clear definition. In 1919 the members of the Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee complained it was impossible to develop a coherent war plan against Japan when they lacked political guidance on such basic issues as whether it was national policy to fight a long, unlimited offensive war to secure the complete surrender of Japan or a short, cheap defensive war in which

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23 AG to Chief of Coast Artillery, Sub: Anti-aircraft defense, 2 May 1925, AGO 381 (1-6-25), Box 17, E 37B, RG 407.


25 Briant H. Wells to C/S, Sub: Revision of Special Plan Green, 3 March 1922, Green 573 Folder, Box 266, E 282, RG 165.
the United States accepted the loss of the Philippines and its Far Eastern interests.27 The inability of either political or military leaders to resolve this question would be a major contributor to the American disaster in the Pacific in 1941. Lacking clear guidelines from its political leadership, and unable to agree with the Navy on a joint national strategy, it fell to Army officers to try to develop a concept of land warfare that would have application for the future.

When trying to envision war in the period when there was no clear foreign threat—roughly between 1920 and 1938—American officers tended to fall into three camps. The first of these were those who adhered to the Army’s traditional emphasis on the protection of the nation’s borders. As Mark Stoler has explained, the “Continentalists” maintained that both the nation’s interest and the miniscule size of its armed forces demanded a strictly defensive strategy.28 They tended to exaggerate potential threats and minimize their own nation’s considerable strengths, with the result that they became almost pacifistic in their conclusion that war was a poor instrument of national policy. Many of the strongest Continentalists were in the Coast Artillery, but there were also a sizeable number of officers from other branches. Although he would later be lionized as the prophet of offensive strategic bombardment, in the early 1920s William “Billy” Mitchell’s focus was firmly fixed on continental defense. His popular journal articles did not emphasize aggressive war, but rather conjured up an apocalyptic vision of air attack on American

26 LeRoy Eltinge to C/S, Sub: Request for Instructions from the Joint Board, 29 July 1924, AGO 381 (7-29-24), Box 20, E 37B, RG 407.

27 Joint Board Planning Committee to Joint Board, Sub: National Policy and War Plans, 28 October 1919, Box 1, E 284, RG 165.

cities in which poison gas and explosions would destroy both the nation's industry and its will to fight. Only an independent air force could avert such a catastrophe and, in addition, it could easily destroy a seaborne invasion.29

A second group might be termed "the Warriors." Their focus was on the "army in the field", on tactics and battle, training and performance, and on the character of the commander. In the years immediately following World War I, they dismissed the mass industrial trench warfare of the Western Front as an aberration. Rather, they believed, in the words of A.E.F. commander James G. Harbord that "man remains the fundamental instrument of battle."30 The Warriors' emphasis on the "human element" contributed to their belief that individual leadership remained a crucial component in war. Students at the Army War College in the 1920s were taught that command was "the military agency which organizes, indoctrinates, plans and executes," and the commander was "the dominating influence over that organ." The commander required much more than professional ability or managerial skill, in fact these abilities were secondary to a


"morally strong character." A great commander, such as Robert E. Lee, could impose his character or will on an entire army and "arouse, mold, control, and direct the minds of his men to attain a desired military end." The Warrior vision focused on top-down leadership, on character, and on tactical excellence, not on strategic leadership, or managerial excellence, or the ability to harmonize political and military goals. So too, their view of the past was somewhat anachronistic: they perceived it as a source of demonstrated principles, but also as a compendium of the triumph of the soldierly spirit, battlefield judgement, and the commander's moral presence.

Many Warriors saw in new technology, especially the tank, a way to restore mobility to the battlefield, to avoid reliance on mass armies of citizen-soldiers, and create a new military elite. In Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur's last two annual reports, he claimed that the next war would not be a repetition of World War I, but rather be fought by small, highly mobile, highly mechanized forces. Mechanization thus provided a means to restore the importance of martial


32 Pete T. Hefner, "Leadership: An Analysis of the Leadership of Robert E. Lee," 32, IRP #47. Robert S. Miller, "What is the more important factor, leadership or tactical skill?" IRP 71, both in 1935 CGSS, CARL.

skills, provide freer play for generalship, and make war once again the business of professional soldiers. But the Warriors' interest in technology clashed with their romantic belief in the martial spirit, with sometimes farcical results. In urging his fellow cavalry officers to embrace the tank, one Leavenworth student urged them to "Imagine a Cavalry regiment or even brigade attacking in open order in successive waves preceded by a battalion of light fast tanks! What a combination! The moving fortresses of fire followed by the horseman with cold steel! What troops would stand against it?" Moreover, the Warriors attention to technological developments was impeded by their insistence that new weapons neither altered the fundamental and historically tested principles of war nor the time-honored truth that man was the most important element. In the words of one of the greatest of the Warriors, George S. Patton, "Wars are fought with men, not weapons. It is the spirit of the men who fights, and of the man who leads which gains the victory."

The last group of Army military thinkers during the interwar period, whom I term the "Progressives," perceived war as an outgrowth of economic competition, and equated economic prosperity with national security. The Progressives repeatedly in the 1920s emphasized the "nation at war", of which the army was only a part, and the need for the administrative and technical expertise to manage the mass armies and the increasingly sophisticated weapons systems


34 Captain [no first name] Kloepfer, "Cavalry in Mounted Attack Against Infantry," IRP #106, CGSS, 1930, CARL.

35 George S. Patton, "The Effect of Weapons on War," JI 37 (November 1930), 488.
that modern war required. To the Progressives, the Warriors’ focus on the personality and character of the commander was anachronistic: as a Command and General Staff School officer commented in 1930, “we have passed from the age of great captains to an age of nations in arms. Great captains may still arise but war has become more and more of a community proposition.”

In contrast to the Warriors’, the Progressives concluded that WWI had demonstrated “the imposing mission of modern war demands the mobilization of the physical, economic, spiritual, and moral powers of the entire nation.” Given the small size of the Regular Army establishment, the first priority would be to raise and train a “military machine”—but not at the cost of crippling the nation’s economy. Rather, the nation at war must insure a “balanced distribution of brain and brawn, both in the field armies and the supporting industrial organization.”

Moreover, it was absolutely essential that the government arouse popular will, for as George Van Horn Moseley pointed out, “the United States could scarcely be plunged into a major conflict except upon the

36 John Gooch believes a belief that war was an outgrowth of economic competition was the semi-official doctrine for both the Army and the Navy war colleges in the interwar period, see “Hidden in the Rock: American Military Perceptions of Great Britain, 1919-1940,” in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neil, eds., War, Strategy, and International Politics (Oxford, UK.: Clarendon Press, 1992), 162-634. Fox Conner, “Relations Between the War Department and the Forces in the Field,” 4 November 1920, War Plans Course, MHI.


insistence of the majority of its citizens." Whereas the Warriors tended to look to the past for inspiration, the Progressives tended to see it as a database that must be scientifically examined so that success might be duplicated and failures avoided.

Prior to World War II, Eisenhower was rather conspicuous in his absence from the post-WWI military intellectual discourse. The one piece that his biographers have seen as indicative of both his originality and his moral courage—a 1920 article on mechanization—is actually quite conservative, even by the standards of the day. Nevertheless, he was solidly in the Progressive wing in his conviction that future war would be a mass conflict between industrialized powers requiring the full mobilization and efficient harnessing of America's manpower, moral, and economic resources. As early as his 1920 article he stated as a certainly that "large armies... will always be the rule in wars between two first-class powers," and he claimed that in the early 1920s he accepted the inevitability of another world war.

Eisenhower's early views of the interrelationship of the Army and national defense may be seen in a 1928 paper written while a student at the Army War College. In it, Eisenhower attempted to resolve the interwar Regular Army's dilemma: with a strength of barely 120,000 (less than half its authorization under the 1920 Defense Act), it was too small to fulfil all (or indeed any) of its missions: to furnish a training cadre for the reserves (National Guard and federal); garrison the coastal fortifications; protect the overseas possessions; and provide an immediately deployable force for emergencies. Eisenhower's solution was less interesting than


41 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "A Tank Discussion," LI 17 (November 1920): 453-58. Eisenhower claimed the article was so radical he was threatened with a court martial by the Chief of Infantry, but the only source for this story is Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1967), 173. See also, Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987); Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldiers' Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 152.

42 Eisenhower, "Tank Discussion," 454.
were his arguments. Unlike many of his fellow officers, who predicated their policies on unlimited funds and popular support, Eisenhower accepted that the most obvious solution, to increase the Regular Army to its authorized limits, was both politically and financially impossible. Indeed, he warned that "needless military expenditures, if carried to the extreme, operate to defeat one of the purposes for which they are made; namely, the insurance of general prosperity." 

Instead, he proposed that the Regular Army shorten the time it took to train soldiers and to discharge them after one year, they would then be obligated to serve in the Reserves for the next four. This would not only save money—Eisenhower estimated that 37 Reservists could be supported each year for the same price as one soldier on active duty—it would provide some 108,000 Reservists each year, giving the United States an immediately deployable wartime force of several hundred thousand trained soldiers.

Like all Progressives, Eisenhower took a broad view of international conflict. In speeches written for the Assistant Secretary of War, Eisenhower argued that "modern war" was "essentially dual in nature—combatant and industrial" and that "to meet the demands of armed conflict every material resource, and every individual in the state must be called upon to bear a proportionate share of the burden." Eisenhower's experiences in the Philippines in the 1930s trying to build an army for a financially weak government greatly strengthened his conviction that national defense expenditures must be "provided without wrecking the very thing [they] are

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44 Ibid., 62-78.
appropriated to secure, the stability and security of the nation." 47 As he would when he was president, Eisenhower was very aware of the importance of ensuring and maintaining popular support in a democracy. He believed that "war would be declared by this country only in response to a definite expression of the popular will, and it is obvious that without the support of public opinion no program for the conduct of war can succeed." 48 Eisenhower's Progressive views were no doubt further reinforced by his long service with Douglas MacArthur—whose messianic view of the individual commander, misplaced faith in technology, romanticism, and constant (and usually inaccurate) references to the past—personified the worst aspects of the "Warriors."

Eisenhower's military thought thus fit well within one of the three major schools of thought in the pre-World War II Army. In common with other Progressives, Eisenhower envisioned war as a phenomenon that required the total mobilization of the national resources. In this conceptual framework, military goals needed to be harmonized with political and economic ones; it would not do for a nation to achieve military success at the cost of bankruptcy. In following the Progressive vision of future war, Eisenhower rejected both the Continentalists' desire to create a "fortress America" and thus avoid conflict altogether, and the Warriors' belief that technological superiority, morale, and operational skill were sufficient to achieve victory.

Many of President Eisenhower's postwar national security policies, his insistence on seeing it in its totality—as a combination of military factors and psychological, political, and economic ones—accorded with his prewar Progressive views. He was also Progressive in his view that the past was largely a litany of errors, and in his conclusion "our armed forces must be modern,

46 Quoted from a speech written by Eisenhower, Frederick H. Payne, "To the Graduating Class [USMA]," 10 June 1931, in Holt, Eisenhower, 174.

designed to deter or wage the type of war to be expected in the mid-twentieth century. No longer could we afford the folly, so often indulged in the past, of beginning each war with the weapons of the past." 49 Unfortunately for his former colleagues, President Eisenhower appears to have determined that one of the "weapons of the past" was the Army itself. 50

As President, Eisenhower sought to create a strategy based on the "long haul" in which the "moral, political, and economic--not military--dimensions of the crusade against the Soviet Union were preeminent." 51 This resulted in the New Look, the basic tenets of which were outlined in 1953.52 In part for economic reasons—nuclear weapons were much cheaper than manpower-heavy land forces—and in part for strategic reasons, Eisenhower greatly increased the U.S. Air Force's strategic bombing elements. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, declared that the United States would follow a policy of "Massive Retaliation" based on the use, or

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50 Robert Cutler, Notes on Conference in the President's Office, 8 December 1954, Manpower and Personnel (2) [January 1955 to August 1957] File, Box 5, White House Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, DOD Subseries) Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kan.


52 It is instructive that one "documentary history" of the Eisenhower presidency could not find any speeches or writings by Eisenhower that provided a coherent definition of the New Look. Instead, it cited a speech made to the American Legion on 25 August 1952 which is largely a denunciation of the USSR, and two virtually incomprehensible replies to journalists, see Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Random House, 1971), 32-41.
threatened use, of nuclear weapons to counter Soviet aggression.\(^5^3\) In the interests of preserving the economy and avoiding another Korea, Eisenhower cut the Army budget by nearly a third in Fiscal Year 1955, making it the smallest of the three services. From 1954 to 1960, Active Army strength declined from 1,400,000 to 870,000. Secretary of Defense Wilson declared that it made no sense to have a large standing army where there was insufficient air transport to move more than a fraction to the battlefield, avoiding the obvious question of why the Administration did not compel the Air Force to provide this transport. The Administration claimed that substantial increases in Reserve forces would make up for cuts in the Regulars, and at a far cheaper cost.\(^5^4\)

One of the intellectual foundations of the New Look was the President's concept of war. In his autobiography, Eisenhower stated that even before taking office in 1952 he had become convinced that "since modern global war would be catastrophic beyond belief, America's military forces must be designed primarily to deter conflict . . .\).\(^5^5\) In 1956 he told Field Marshall Montgomery that nuclear war would be a "holocaust" with "literally millions of dead," but


\(^5^5\) Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 446. Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 48. The view that Massive Retaliation was a bluff is not accepted by all, see James D. Weaver, "Eisenhower as Commander in Chief," in Krieg, *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 133.
without significant advantage to either side. Therefore, Eisenhower's support for massive retaliation had something of an element of bluff to it. He gambled that if the Russians believed the U.S. might literally "go ballistic," they would cease provocations that might lead to General War, in the process surrendering the initiative in the Cold War. However, although pursuing a vigorous anti-Communist foreign policy, he practiced fiscal conservatism at home, cutting the nation's armed forces to the point that the United States had very little military recourse short of massive retaliation—and thus increasing the risk that any Russian provocation would escalate into the nuclear annihilation Eisenhower feared. Small wonder that some scholars call Eisenhower's strategy "irrational." Nevertheless, because there was such an element of bluff in the New Look, it was essential that Eisenhower's service chiefs publicly support the Administration's policies; otherwise, the Russians would recognize the hollowness of the American threats. Instead, the Army persisted in treating massive retaliation as a "real" policy and in publicly disputing it with rational counter-arguments. For Eisenhower, a consummate bridge player, it must have appeared as if the Army was the most inept of partners, always trumping his aces and refusing to follow his leads.

Just as Eisenhower's views on postwar national security policy may be the logical continuation of his prewar Army views, so much of the 1950s critique of the New Look falls within the framework of prewar Army thought. And, just as the New Look was predicated on Eisenhower's vision of future conflict, so the Army's concept of war during the 1950s also entailed a number of assumptions. The first, and perhaps the strongest, was that a strategic nuclear exchange, or "General War," would not achieve the nation's political objectives and might

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"conceivably result in disaster to all participants and to other nations." The Army's position was outlined by a number of officers, but perhaps none did it as well as Army Chief of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer. In a speech before the Air Force's Air War College, Lemnitzer argued in good Clausewitzian fashion that "the object of a nation at war is to impose its will by force upon its enemy" and thus as the definer of that "will," the political objective, must be paramount in war. But "barring a situation in which survival is the only object of a war and absolute destruction of the enemy the only means of attaining that object, the unlimited use of all available capabilities would tend to defeat the purpose of war; conceivably, there would be no one left on whom the victor could impose his will; there would be nothing left to control except a radioactive wilderness, uninhabitable by human beings." The Army had achieved a similar strategic conclusion as the President—a general nuclear war could not achieve American political objectives—but failing to recognize Eisenhower's element of bluff, it argued that "massive retaliation" be rejected for "Limited War" in which "land power" defeated the enemy's military, occupied his territory, and imposed a political solution.

The Army also rejected Eisenhower's argument that "massive retaliation" was the affordable solution. Drawing on the Army's experience in the reconstruction of Japan and Germany, Colonel William D. McKinley explained in 1954, "It would be inconsistent with our war aims and unsound to . . . wreak any more havoc on the USSR than our very victory demands. Wholesale destruction and obliteration of the Soviet urban industrial complex—except as may be patently necessary for victory's sake—is undesirable. This position is not taken on moral grounds

57 Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1825-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 162; Betts, Soldiers, 98.

58 ST 100-5-1, Field Service Regulations, Operations, June 1960, Combined and General Staff College Files, Box 39, RG 498. "The Army and National Security," (1000/8), CGSC 1957-58, CARL.
or on a basis of probable retaliation. The practical fact is that we have learned, to our cost, how expensive it is to refill and vitalize economic and military vacuums, and to reestablish conditions which further the prosperity and safety of this country.”  

By implication, only ground forces, fighting a limited war and using carefully controlled firepower, could ensure victory at a cost the United States could afford.

In place of Massive Retaliation, the U.S. Army articulated a view of future conflict that drew on the intellectual premises of the Warrior school. They claimed that atomic weapons had changed neither the principles of war nor the fundamentals of tactics, but rather allowed for ground forces to implement "classic" concepts of fire and movement. Indeed, faced with what they were convinced was an overwhelming Soviet advantage in both manpower and materiel, atomic weapons provided the means to "neutralize an aggressor's reliance upon reckless expenditure of lives to pound out victory in land warfare." Army officers went to great lengths to explain that atomic tactics were not revolutionary, they were simply variations of traditional methods, albeit with far more intensive firepower.

The Warrior legacy can also be seen in Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway's outline of a possible European war in 1954. The USSR would announce at the outset that it would not


engage in strategic nuclear bombardment unless the U.S. did so, and such retaliation, if any, would be directed against the cities of Europe. This would compel both the United States and the Soviet Union to restrict nuclear weapons to the tactical battlefield. The U.S. Army and its NATO allies would engage in a mobile defense East of the Rhine using a variety of measures, from guerrilla war to tactical atomic strikes against Red Army forces. There would be an air campaign, but the Air Force would be restricted to interdicting the battlefield and securing air superiority. Indeed, Ridgway argued that the Air Force’s atomic bombers were essentially redundant, for the “Army family of atomic weapons operating within Army command channels is well suited for employment in this situation” and was capable of “highly accurate delivery of atomic projectiles at the propitious moment without unduly endangering front line troops.” After a successful defense of the Rhine line, and “following the elimination or control of the Russian sea threat by naval forces, a crippling of the Soviet war-making potential by allied air, and the halting of the Russian army offensive by Western land power, the West will be in a position to deal with the European Russians. Closing with the cornered enemy and completing his subjugation is Army business.”

Army officers also reverted to Warrior arguments that the "human element" was the true determinant in war. According to Ridgway, "Despite the remarkable developments in military technology, despite the weapons and machines which have vastly expanded our striking power, it is still a basic truth that the only absolute weapon is man. Upon his determination, his courage, his stamina, and his skill rests the issue of victory or defeat in war." Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor was equally emphatic: "The Army is convinced that in the next war the basic weapon will be--as it has been in all other wars--man. In the Navy and Air Force, the function of men is to


serve machines; in the Army the function of machines is to put men into action."\textsuperscript{65} The Army emphasis on the individual soldier is perhaps best illustrated in its choice of the airborne paratrooper as its symbol of combat excellence.\textsuperscript{66}

The Warrior legacy can also be seen in the continued emphasis on the character of the commander. General Leslie Grove had predicted as early as 1948 that in future atomic warfare "the qualities required for leadership . . . will be far greater than in the past."\textsuperscript{67} Colonel Charles C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, two of the leading Army authorities on post-WWII tactics, took issue with those who maintained that technology and logistics had made tactical commanders little more than managers of resources. In 1953, the year of the New Look, they insisted that atomic warfare would make even more demands on the moral character and tactical skill of the general.\textsuperscript{68}

The Army not only attacked the New Look, it sought to develop and publicize an alternative strategy. In the mid-1950s, Chief of Staff Taylor outlined a "National Military Program of Flexible Response" which would provide military forces which could deal with a variety of contingencies, not just all-out atomic war. In a return to interwar concepts of mobile elites waging rapid warfare, Army planners developed a concept of war during this period that was based on light, highly mobile forces that would move rapidly in dispersed formations, briefly concentrate to fight using tactical atomic weapons, and then disperse again before the enemy.

\textsuperscript{64}Quoted in \textit{The Role of the Infantry} (Fort Benning, Ga.: The Infantry School, 1955), 22. Ridgway, \textit{Soldier}, 290.
\textsuperscript{65}Charlton Ogburn, "The United States Army," \textit{Holiday} 28 (September 1960): 102.
\textsuperscript{66}For an example of the cultural mystique surrounding the airborne, see Surgeon H. Neel, Jr., "The Airborne Soldier," \textit{Combat Forces Journal} 2 (December 1951): 24-28.
could launch a nuclear counterstrike. In Taylor's words, these forces would be "versatile, highly mobile, and . . . possess an integrated atomic capability" that could deter or punish "local aggression" without escalation into general war.69 With such an army, Taylor predicted that the United States "could restore warfare to its historic justification as a means to create a better world upon the successful conclusion of hostilities."70 With the benefit of hindsight, much of the Army's critique of the New Look appears to be both shortsighted and self-serving, based as much on debatable assumptions and outright bluff as Eisenhower's reliance on massive retaliation.

Certainly many of the practical efforts the Army undertook to turn its concept of war into reality were less than successful. Determined to end its reliance on the U.S. Air Force's atomic weaponry, in 1953 the Army rushed into production a massive 280-mm artillery piece that fired an 800-pound atomic warhead. Unfortunately, "Atomic Annie" was so dangerous to its own crews and so politically unpopular that it was soon withdrawn from active service.71 At the other end of the weapons spectrum, the Army's missile project, which promised weapons that could extend the tactical battlefield hundreds of miles, was so successful that the Air Force eventually appropriated it. The Army also explored the possibility of short-range tactical missile that could be used down to the company level. The logical extreme of this program was the infamous Davy Crockett, a

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69 Remarks at Secretary's Conference, 16 July 1955, Item 6, Fldr A, Box 5, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, National War College, Fort McNair, D.C.

light, portable rocket that could lob a tactical nuclear warhead slightly over a mile—vaporizing enemy tanks and its own crew—in a mini-mushroom cloud.\(^{72}\)

The Army was equally frustrated in its efforts to create combat vehicles to allow its forces to fight on the nuclear battlefield. Such vehicles need to be able to withstand atomic blasts and radiation, to be easily transportable by air, and to travel hundreds of miles through areas devoid of refueling facilities. Finally, they needed both strong armor and powerful weapons to defeat the more numerous Soviet tanks and artillery. Ultimately, the design solution required the building of a vehicle of some as yet undiscovered substance, powered by an as yet undiscovered fuel source, and firing an as yet un-invented weapon.\(^{73}\)

An even more famous example of the Army effort to prove that ground combat still had a place in the era of the B-52 and the intercontinental missile was the pentomic division. As described by one of the first battle group commanders, the pentomic division was intended to be a "light, lean, and mean" force that could also deliver devastating firepower, including its own tactical nuclear weapons.\(^{74}\) But by 1961 the pentomic division had been completely repudiated. There were a variety of problems; some of them more reflective of the Army's convoluted bureaucratic needs than of a fundamental weakness in the pentomic organization. The key technologies that would have allowed the divisions to maneuver on the nuclear battlefield—not least the infantry combat vehicle mentioned above—were never developed. But perhaps the most serious problem was that the pentomic organization was unsuited to anything but war in Central


\(^{73}\) Combat Developments Office, US Army Infantry School, "Infantry Fighting Vehicle for the PENTANA Combat Group (U)," 29 May 1958, MHI.

\(^{74}\) Forsythe Oral History, 333.
Europe. In the post mortem, virtually everyone denied responsibility for the experiment and, in what may be deliberate irony, the Army's official history branch blamed Eisenhower’s New Look.75

The Eisenhower-Army conflict of the 1950s has long been interpreted as essentially a struggle over contemporary issues such as budgets, manpower, and mission. But at its heart were two very different visions of future war that had their roots in pre-WWII US military thought. From very early on in his military career, Eisenhower viewed war as an extension of national policy that must be seen in its totality. In the prewar period, this placed him very much within the mainstream of "Progressive" military thought. As president, he implemented policies that were in harmony with these Progressive views. Once he had concluded that the Soviet-American estrangement would be a long one, and that the United States must not let military spending unbalance such vital institutions as the free market, a limited federal government, and democratic values, then he became convinced that what was necessary was a military organization able to deter war. He believed this was best, and most cheaply done by relying on the strategic retaliatory capacity of the U.S. Air Force, not on large, expensive, ground forces.

In contrast, in the 1950s, the Army leadership tended to view war on the micro "Warrior" level. At its bluntest, they viewed the Eisenhower Administration as both immoral and criminally stupid for embracing a strategic concept that accepted the inevitability of mutual thermonuclear annihilation. Unwilling to agree that they had no role in the next major conflict, military thinkers sought to develop a rationale for both large conventional ground forces and a scenario in which such forces could be used without igniting a general nuclear conflict. In the process, the Army

was able to mount a substantial challenge to the New Look, but less than successful in its efforts to develop a credible alternative.

In conclusion, the Eisenhower-Army debate lends itself to a few broader conclusions about the nature of civil-military relations in the United States which may be useful to understand other conflicts, both past and present. First, in seeking to understand current issues, it is often instructive to trace their intellectual antecedents. In the Eisenhower-Army case, it is possible to discern in the policies and rhetoric of the 1950s echoes of an inter-Army debate that occurred two decades earlier. Similarly, in the current Rumsfeld-Armed Forces debates, the influence of the Vietnam War appears to loom large. Second, that military institutions are not monolithic blocs and the so-called military mind is not necessarily the unimaginative and dull void of popular legend. However unified the front they present to outsiders, the military services are often deeply divided internally. In the 1920s and 1930s the divisions between Continentalists, Warriors, and Progressives were manifest, and had implications for everything from weapons technology to national security policy. I would argue that neither these military schools of thought nor the policy disagreements they promote, have disappeared today. Third, and a related point, that in the face of an outside challenge—be it the New Look or the Rumsfeld reforms—the armed forces’ internal divisions tend to be papered over and a unitary front established. Since Eisenhower had already captured the Progressive position—and in the process repudiated the Hoover-Taft version of “fortress America” that appealed to the Continentalists— it is perhaps not surprising that the Army opposition adapted arguments from the Warrior school. Last, it is worth noting that the armed forces, and especially the Army, were far better at presenting counter-arguments to the New Look than they were at developing a rationale and affordable counter-strategy. Neither the pentomic division nor atomic tactics proved to be the wave of the future. As most people know, the optimism engendered by Flexible Response was, in part, responsible for the Vietnam debacle. This is not to say that the Army resistance to the New Look was not useful in pointing out its logical and conceptual flaws, but rather that the task of finding a way for the United States to wage wars that could achieve strategic objectives at an acceptable military,
political, and economic cost was perhaps beyond the abilities of any individual or service in the Cold War. Whether such wars can be fought in the post-Cold War era is something that the current Administration might do well to give far more thought to.