Industrial dynamics and the neolclassical growth model.
Allocating Government Education Expenditures across K-12 and College Education.
Labor Market Trends with
Balanced Growth.
Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures.
The Transition from Dirty to Clean Industries: Optimal Fiscal Policy in
a Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth.
Growth Effects of Shifting from a Graduated- Rate Tax System to a Flat Tax.
Fiscal Policy and Productivity Growth in the OECD.
Uniform Two-Part Tariffs and Below Marginal Cost Prices: Disneyland Revisited.
Optimal Fiscal Policy, Public Capital, and the Productivity Slowdown.
On Public Capital Analysis with State Data.
The Link Between Tax Rates and Foreign Direct Investment.
Welfare, Stabilization or Growth: A Comparison of Different Fiscal Objectives.
Equivalence of the Standard and Modified Switching Regression Models.
A Normative Analysis of Public Capital.
Optimal Tax Rules in a Dynamic Stochastic Economy with Capital.
A Diagnostic Test Without Numerical Integration.
Backward Solving Quarterly Models with Seasonal or Annual Shocks.
Health Plan Choice and the Utilization of Health Care Services.
The Demand for Employment-Based Health Insurance Plans.
Employment Based Health Insurance.
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.
Abstract: As of the late 1990s, public spending on education in the U.S. comprised approximately 7.1% of GDP; about 60% of that support was directed at K-12 education and the remainder at college education. We investigate the welfare and output implications of this spending in a theoretical model in which agents of differential innate ability choose whether to pursue higher education. Higher-ability agents support greater expenditures at both the K-12 and college levels. When public education expenditures are low, all agents prefer that spending be directed solely to K-12 education; when expenditures are high, all prefer that some spending be allocated to college education.
