Skip to the content

Kansas State University

economicshome
economics

Tabs

Breadcrumbs

Publications


Public education expenditures, taxation, and growth: Linking data to theory.

Allocating government education expenditures across K-12 and college education.

How different is the cyclical behavior of home production across countries?

Labor market trends with balanced growth.

A simple economic theory of skill accumulation and schooling decisions.

Public schooling, college subsidies and growth.

Public education expenditures and growth.

School finance litigation, tax and expenditure limitations, and education spending: an empirical analysis.

The interrelatedness of tax and expenditure limitations and education finance reform.

The welfare implications of factor taxation with rising wage inequality.

Can real world interest rates explain business cycles in small open economies?

A welfare analysis of policy responses to the skilled wage premium.

 

Lorem ipsum

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

A simple economic theory of skill accumulation and schooling decisions.

With Gabriele Camera, January 2006, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 9, pp. 93-115.

Abstract: We propose a model of schooling that can account for the observed heterogeneity in workers' productivity and educational attainment. Identical unskilled agents can get a degree at a cost, but becoming skilled entails an additional unobservable effort cost. Individual labor can then be used as an input in pairwise production matches. Two factors affect students' desire to build human capital: degrees imperfectly signal productivity, and contract imperfections generate holdup problems. Multiple stationary equilibria exist, some of which are market failures characterized by a largely educated workforce of low average skill. Policy implications are explored.